Fourth Amendment violation in New York

2015“Claims that law enforcement personnel used excessive force in the course of an arrest are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its standard of objective reasonableness” (Moore v City of New York, 68 AD3d 946, 947 [2009]; see Graham v Connor, 490 US 386, 394-395 [1989]; Ostrander v State of New York, 289 AD2d 463, 464 [2001]).

2015“Claims that law enforcement personnel used excessive force in the course of an arrest are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its standard of objective reasonableness” (Moore v City of New York, 68 AD3d 946, 947 [2009]; see Graham v Connor, 490 US 386, 394-395 [1989]; Ostrander v State of New York, 289 AD2d 463, 464 [2001]).

2016“Claims that law enforcement personnel used excessive force in the course of an arrest are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its standard of objective reasonableness” (Ostrander v State of New York, 289 AD2d 463, 464 [2001]; see Williams v City of New York, 129 AD3d 1066, 1066 [2015]).

2016“Claims that law enforcement personnel used excessive force in the course of an arrest are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its standard of objective reasonableness” (Ostrander v State of New York, 289 AD2d 463, 464 [2001]; see Williams v City of New York, 129 AD3d 1066, 1066 [2015]).

2024Under both state and federal law, "claims that law enforcement personnel used excessive force in the course of an arrest are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its standard of objective reasonableness" ( Holland v City of Poughkeepsie , 90 AD3d at 844 ; see also ( Lennox v Miller , 968 F3d 150 [2d Cir 2020]).

2024Under both state and federal law, "claims that law enforcement personnel used excessive force in the course of an arrest are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its standard of objective reasonableness" ( Holland v City of Poughkeepsie , 90 AD3d at 844 ; see also ( Lennox v Miller , 968 F3d 150 [2d Cir 2020]).

2022Moreover, because Fourth Amendment rights are personal ( Rakas v Illinois , 439 US 128, 133 [1978]), it is unclear that a defendant could challenge the use of DNA collected from a relative ( see generally Julie Agueros at 9). [FN9] Perhaps most importantly, this proceeding is not strictly speaking a Fourth Amendment challenge to the family DNA regulation.

2022Moreover, because Fourth Amendment rights are personal ( Rakas v Illinois , 439 US 128, 133 [1978]), it is unclear that a defendant could challenge the use of DNA collected from a relative ( see generally Julie Agueros at 9). [FN9] Perhaps most importantly, this proceeding is not strictly speaking a Fourth Amendment challenge to the family DNA regulation.

2017In order to establish a violation, the defendant must establish both “an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy, and . . . that the expectation [is] one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.” (United States v DE L’Isle at 431 [internal quotation marks omitted], quoting United States v Katz at 361.) In United States v DE L’Isle, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that scanning the magnetic strip on a card “was not a physical intrusion into a protected area prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.” (Id. at 431.) Because “ ‘sliding a card through a scanner to read virt

2002When viewed in the context of reasonableness, the cornerstone in any Fourth Amendment inquiry (see, Katz v United States, 389 US 347 ), the seizure of the defendant’s property, which was located within 10 feet of him, did not invade his expectation of privacy any more than the arrest itself (see, People v De Santis, 46 NY2d 82, 87 ).

2024"Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis" ( Whren v United States , 517 US 806, 813 [1996]; see People v Robinson , 97 NY2d 341, 349 [2001]).

2022While the People are correct in their contention that "[s]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis" ( Whren v United States , 517 US 806, 813 ; see People v Ortiz , 265 AD2d 579, 579 ), and the proper inquiry is whether "[t]he totality of the information" in the officer's possession "supported a reasonable conclusion" that the defendant had a weapon, contraband, or evidence of a crime in his vehicle ( People v Robertson , 109 AD3d 743 , [*4]743-744), this argument by the People does not cure the deficiencies in the hearing evidence.

2025The defendants appeal. "'Claims that law enforcement personnel used excessive force in the course of an arrest are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its standard of objective reasonableness'" ( Combs v City of New York , 130 AD3d 862, 864 , quoting Moore v City of New York , 68 AD3d 946, 947 ).

2021Where there is a lawful arrest, intentional contact with the arrested person does not constitute assault and battery, provided such force is reasonable ( see Boyd v City of New York , 149 AD3d 683, 685 ; Washington-Herrera v Town of Greenburgh , 101 AD3d 986, 989-990 ; Wyllie v District Attorney of County of Kings , 2 AD3d 714, 719 ). "'Claims that law enforcement personnel used excessive force in the course of an arrest are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its standard of objective reasonableness'" ( Lepore v Town of Greenburgh , 120 AD3d 1202, 1203 , quoting Moore v City of New York ,

2025The defendants appeal. "'Claims that law enforcement personnel used excessive force in the course of an arrest are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its standard of objective reasonableness'" ( Combs v City of New York , 130 AD3d 862, 864 , quoting Moore v City of New York , 68 AD3d 946, 947 ).

2016We further conclude that the court properly denied that part of defendants’ motion with respect to the battery cause of action because defendants failed to eliminate issues of fact whether the police officers in question used excessive force when taking decedent into custody (see Holland v City of Poughkeepsie, 90 AD3d 841, 846 [2011]). “ ‘Claims that law enforcement personnel used excessive force in the course of an arrest are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its standard of objective reasonableness’ . . . ‘Because of its intensely factual nature, the question of whether the use of for

2009The touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis has always been the reasonableness of the search or seizure in issue (see Illinois v Rodriguez, 497 US 177, 185-186 [1990]; Pennsylvania v Mimms, 434 US 106, 108-109 [1977]; People v Hall, 10 NY3d 303, 308 [2008], cert denied 555 US —, 129 S Ct 159 [2008]; People v Batista, 88 NY2d 650, 653 [1996]).

1982The touching of the pocket appears to us to be a minimal intrusion certainly justified by the “touchstone” of Fourth Amendment analysis, i.e., “ ‘the reasonableness in all .the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security.’ Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 19 (1968)” (Pennsylvania v Mimms, 434 US 106, 108, 109 ). “[T]he predicate for the police action * * * justified the extent of the official intrusion on the individual”, “the intensity of the police action” — here touching the pocket.

2019With respect to the cause of action for assault and battery, "[a] police officer or a peace officer, in the course of effecting or attempting to effect an arrest . . . of a person whom he or she reasonably believes to have committed an offense, may use physical force when and to the extent he or she reasonably believes such to be necessary to effect the arrest" (Penal Law § 35.30 [1]; see CPL 140.25 [1] [a]). " Claims that law enforcement personnel used excessive force in the course of an arrest are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its standard of objective reasonableness' " ( Bridenbak

2016“Claims that law enforcement personnel used excessive force in the course of an arrest are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its standard of objective reasonableness” (Ostrander v State of New York, 289 AD2d 463, 464 [2001]; see Williams v City of New York, 129 AD3d 1066, 1066 [2015]).

2014By directing the petitioner to move to preclude the Town respondents from conducting an interior inspection of her home, the Supreme Court improperly shifted the burden from the Town respondents to demonstrate their entitlement to entry into the petitioner’s home upon a showing of probable cause, to the petitioner to demonstrate her right to deny entry to the Town respondents (see Matter of Aylward v City of Buffalo, 101 AD3d 1743, 1744 [2012]). “[B]y erroneously requiring [the] petitioner[ ] to move to preclude, the court did not properly evaluate the reasonableness of the inspections sought

2012Moreover, by erroneously requiring petitioners to move to preclude, the court did not properly evaluate the reasonableness of the inspections sought by respondents, i.e., the court did not conduct the necessary Fourth Amendment analysis balancing respondents’ need for interior inspections against the invasion of petitioners’ privacy interests that such inspections would entail (see Matter of Yee v Town of Orangetown, 76 AD3d 104 , 111-113 [2010], citing Schlesinger v Town of Ramapo, 11 Misc 3d 697, 699-700 [2006]; see generally Camara v Municipal Court of City & County of San Francisco, 387 US

2020As to the “second level of our Fourth Amendment inquiry” required when law enforcement presents the courts with a request for a bodily intrusion, we held that there must be a “clear indication that the intrusion will supply substantial probative evidence” but that facts establishing probable cause would likely establish the necessary relevance ( 56 NY2d at 297 [internal quotation marks omitted], citing Schmerber, 384 US at 770 ).2 2 The “clear indication” that material and relevant evidence will be found is not a separate standard under the Fourth Amendment (see United States v Montoya de Hern

2019The hearing court excluded defense counsel based on its understanding that the discussion of notice in Abe A. applied only to the first "discrete level" of Fourth Amendment analysis identified in that case, involving "the seizure of the person necessary to bring him into contact with government agents," and not the second level, involving "the subsequent search and seizure for the evidence" ( id. at 295 [internal quotation marks omitted]).

2005See Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U. S. 721, 726-727 (1969).

1980As to the constitutional issues involved in United States v Dionisio ( 410 US 1, 8-9 ) the court said, “As the Court made clear in Schmerber, supra, the obtaining of physical evidence from a person involves a potential Fourth Amendment violation at two different levels — the ‘seizure’ of the ‘person’ necessary to bring him into contact with government agents, see Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U. S. 721 , and the subsequent search for and seizure of the evidence.

2021"Claims that law enforcement personnel used excessive force in the course of an arrest are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its standard of objective reasonableness" ( Bridenbaker v City of Buffalo , 137 AD3d 1729 , 1730 [4th Dept 2016] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Jones v Parmley , 465 F3d 46, 61 [2d Cir 2006]).

2019With respect to the cause of action for assault and battery, "[a] police officer or a peace officer, in the course of effecting or attempting to effect an arrest . . . of a person whom he or she reasonably believes to have committed an offense, may use physical force when and to the extent he or she reasonably believes such to be necessary to effect the arrest" (Penal Law § 35.30 [1]; see CPL 140.25 [1] [a]). " Claims that law enforcement personnel used excessive force in the course of an arrest are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its standard of objective reasonableness' " ( Bridenbak

2000The Court went on to state that it believed its prior decisions in United States v Villamonte-Marquez ( 462 US 579 [1983]), United States v Robinson ( 414 US 218 [1973]), and Scott v United States ( 436 US 128 [1978]) served to “foreclose any argument that the constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the actual motivations of the individual officers involved,” and further iterated that “[s]ubjective intentions[ 2 ] play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis” (Whren v United States, supra, at 813).

1998In contrast to that well-established prohibition against permitting the police to rely upon traffic violation stops as a means of investigating unrelated matters, the Whren Court ruled that a credible, objective traffic infraction foreclosed examination of the actual motivations of the individual officers who made the stop because “[s]ubjective [police] intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.” (Supra, at 813.) Significantly, the Whren Court described its holding as consistent with its own decades-old decisions, citing, inter alia, United States v Robinson

2020As to the “second level of our Fourth Amendment inquiry” required when law enforcement presents the courts with a request for a bodily intrusion, we held that there must be a “clear indication that the intrusion will supply substantial probative evidence” but that facts establishing probable cause would likely establish the necessary relevance ( 56 NY2d at 297 [internal quotation marks omitted], citing Schmerber, 384 US at 770 ).2 2 The “clear indication” that material and relevant evidence will be found is not a separate standard under the Fourth Amendment (see United States v Montoya de Hern

2011When making our Fourth Amendment inquiry, we must consider whether there is a “ ‘clear indication’ that the intrusion will supply substantial probative evidence” (Matter of Abe A., 56 NY2d at 297 , quoting Schmerber v California, 384 US 757, 770 [1966]; see Cupp v Murphy, 412 US 291, 295 [1973]).

2017This Court followed Bryant in People v Jones ( 73 AD3d 662 [1st Dept 2010], supra), in which we held that the summary denial of a suppression motion had been erroneous because “[defendant clearly raised a factual issue as to when and where he was arrested, or otherwise taken into custody, so as to raise a Fourth Amendment issue (see People v Mendoza, 82 NY2d 415, 426 [1993]).

2010Defendant clearly raised a factual issue as to when and where he was arrested, or otherwise taken into custody, so as to raise a Fourth Amendment issue (see People v Mendoza, 82 NY2d 415, 426 [1993]).

2024"Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis" ( Whren v United States , 517 US 806, 813 [1996]; see People v Robinson , 97 NY2d 341, 349 [2001]).

2006“The decision by a police officer to stop a vehicle is reasonable when supported by probable cause that a traffic violation has occurred . . . [and] [t]he officer’s subjective intentions at the time of the traffic stop play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis” (People v Ferraiolo, 309 AD2d 981 , 982 [2003], lv denied 1 NY3d 627 [2004] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see People v Robinson, 97 NY2d 341, 349-350 [2001]; People v Brooks, 23 AD3d 847, 849 [2005], lv denied 6 NY3d 810 [2006]).

2006We therefore reject the People’s claim that a finding of standing on the facts presented in this case results in the resurrection of the “automatic standing” doctrine, which was abrogated by the Supreme Court in United States v Salvucci ( 448 US 83, 85 [1980]) and by this Court as a matter of state law in People v Ponder ( 54 NY2d 160, 165 [1981]). 3 As we now clarify, standing *591 does not arise from a defense motion to suppress that merely states, as attested by police, that the arresting officer conducted a search of the accused’s person and allegedly found narcotics in an article of cloth

2006We therefore reject the People’s claim that a finding of standing on the facts presented in this case results in the resurrection of the “automatic standing” doctrine, which was abrogated by the Supreme Court in United States v Salvucci ( 448 US 83, 85 [1980]) and by this Court as a matter of state law in People v Ponder ( 54 NY2d 160, 165 [1981]). 3 As we now clarify, standing *591 does not arise from a defense motion to suppress that merely states, as attested by police, that the arresting officer conducted a search of the accused’s person and allegedly found narcotics in an article of cloth

2021Nothing seen or found on the premises may legally form the basis for an arrest or search warrant or for testimony at the homeowner’s trial, since the prosecution would be using the fruits of a Fourth Amendment violation” ( 394 US 165, 177 [1960]).

2021Nothing seen or found on the premises may legally form the basis for an arrest or search warrant or for testimony at the homeowner’s trial, since the prosecution would be using the fruits of a Fourth Amendment violation” ( 394 US 165, 177 [1960]).

2014By directing the petitioner to move to preclude the Town respondents from conducting an interior inspection of her home, the Supreme Court improperly shifted the burden from the Town respondents to demonstrate their entitlement to entry into the petitioner’s home upon a showing of probable cause, to the petitioner to demonstrate her right to deny entry to the Town respondents (see Matter of Aylward v City of Buffalo, 101 AD3d 1743, 1744 [2012]). “[B]y erroneously requiring [the] petitioner[ ] to move to preclude, the court did not properly evaluate the reasonableness of the inspections sought

2012Moreover, by erroneously requiring petitioners to move to preclude, the court did not properly evaluate the reasonableness of the inspections sought by respondents, i.e., the court did not conduct the necessary Fourth Amendment analysis balancing respondents’ need for interior inspections against the invasion of petitioners’ privacy interests that such inspections would entail (see Matter of Yee v Town of Orangetown, 76 AD3d 104 , 111-113 [2010], citing Schlesinger v Town of Ramapo, 11 Misc 3d 697, 699-700 [2006]; see generally Camara v Municipal Court of City & County of San Francisco, 387 US

1982The touching of the pocket appears to us to be a minimal intrusion certainly justified by the “touchstone” of Fourth Amendment analysis, i.e., “ ‘the reasonableness in all .the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security.’ Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 19 (1968)” (Pennsylvania v Mimms, 434 US 106, 108, 109 ). “[T]he predicate for the police action * * * justified the extent of the official intrusion on the individual”, “the intensity of the police action” — here touching the pocket.

1981If reaching into the shopping bag was an intrusion, it was so minimal as to be a reasonable intrusion, within the “touchstone” of Fourth Amendment analysis, i.e., “‘the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security.’ Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 19 (1968)” (Pennsylvania v Mimms, 434 US 106, 108, 109 ).