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40 Mississippi opinions name it 2 courts 1971–2026 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Mississippi courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Lawrence v. Stategreen2 sentences2014Rule 6.03 of the Uniform Rules of Circuit and County Court states that “[e]very person in custody shall be taken, without unnecessary delay and within 48 hours of arrest, before a judicial officer or other person authorized by statute for an initial appearance.” However, the “failure to follow the exact procedure of Rule 6.03 does not necessarily result in a Fourth Amendment violation.” Pugh v. State, 101 So.3d 682, 690 (¶ 31) (Miss.Ct.App.2012) (quoting Lawrence v. State, 869 So.2d 353, 356 (¶ 12) (Miss.2003)). 2014Rule 6.03 of the Uniform Rules of Circuit and County Court states that “[e]very person in custody shall be taken, without unnecessary delay and within 48 hours of arrest, before a judicial officer or other person authorized by statute for an initial appearance.” However, the “failure to follow the exact procedure of Rule 6.03 does not necessarily result in a Fourth Amendment violation.” Pugh v. State, 101 So.3d 682, 690 (¶ 31) (Miss.Ct.App.2012) (quoting Lawrence v. State, 869 So.2d 353, 356 (¶ 12) (Miss.2003)). | 4 | 6 |
Rakas v. Illinoisgreen2 sentences2002Id. at 143 , 99 S.Ct. 421 . [S]uppression of the product of a Fourth Amendment violation can be successfully urged only by those whose rights were violated by the search itself, not by those who are aggrieved solely by the introduction of damaging evidence. 2002Id. at 143 , 99 S.Ct. 421 . [S]uppression of the product of a Fourth Amendment violation can be successfully urged only by those whose rights were violated by the search itself, not by those who are aggrieved solely by the introduction of damaging evidence. | 2 | 4 |
Patterson v. Stategreen2 sentences1986Where a Fourth Amendment violation "taints" the confession, a finding of voluntariness for the purposes of the Fifth Amendment is merely a threshold requirement in determining whether a confession may be admitted in evidence. [citation omitted] ___ U.S. at ___, 105 S.Ct. at 1292 , 84 L.Ed.2d at 230 . [3] See also, Penick v. State, 440 So.2d 547, 554-558 (Miss. 1983) considering Brown v. Illinois in the context of a question regarding admissibility of tangible evidence in a search following an illegal detention, and Patterson v. State, 413 So.2d 1036, 1039-1040 (Miss. 1982) considering Brown in 1986Where a Fourth Amendment violation "taints" the confession, a finding of voluntariness for the purposes of the Fifth Amendment is merely a threshold requirement in determining whether a confession may be admitted in evidence. [citation omitted] ___ U.S. at ___, 105 S.Ct. at 1292 , 84 L.Ed.2d at 230 . [3] See also, Penick v. State, 440 So.2d 547, 554-558 (Miss. 1983) considering Brown v. Illinois in the context of a question regarding admissibility of tangible evidence in a search following an illegal detention, and Patterson v. State, 413 So.2d 1036, 1039-1040 (Miss. 1982) considering Brown in | 1 | 2 |
Degenhardt v. Bintliffgreen2 sentences2026“Impounding a vehicle qualifies as a seizure subject to a Fourth Amendment analysis.” Degenhardt v. Bintliff, 117 F.4th 747, 756 (5th Cir. 2024) (citing United States v. McKinnon, 681 F.3d 203, 207-08 (5th Cir. 2012)). 2026“Impounding a vehicle qualifies as a seizure subject to a Fourth Amendment analysis.” Degenhardt v. Bintliff, 117 F.4th 747, 756 (5th Cir. 2024) (citing United States v. McKinnon, 681 F.3d 203, 207-08 (5th Cir. 2012)). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. McKinnongreen2 sentences2026“Impounding a vehicle qualifies as a seizure subject to a Fourth Amendment analysis.” Degenhardt v. Bintliff, 117 F.4th 747, 756 (5th Cir. 2024) (citing United States v. McKinnon, 681 F.3d 203, 207-08 (5th Cir. 2012)). 2026“Impounding a vehicle qualifies as a seizure subject to a Fourth Amendment analysis.” Degenhardt v. Bintliff, 117 F.4th 747, 756 (5th Cir. 2024) (citing United States v. McKinnon, 681 F.3d 203, 207-08 (5th Cir. 2012)). | 1 | 1 |
Ray v. Stategreen2 sentences2026“When an individual is arrested and there is no one readily available to take possession of the arrestee’s vehicle, the arresting officer will often have the car impounded.” Ray v. State, 798 So. 2d 579, 583 (¶13) (Miss. 2026“When an individual is arrested and there is no one readily available to take possession of the arrestee’s vehicle, the arresting officer will often have the car impounded.” Ray v. State, 798 So. 2d 579, 583 (¶13) (Miss. | 1 | 1 |
Joe Johnson v. State of Mississippigreen2 sentences2021“It is unusual for this Court to consider a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel when the claim is made on direct appeal because there is usually insufficient evidence within the record to evaluate the claim.” Johnson v. State, 191 So. 3d 732, 735 (¶13) (Miss. 2021“It is unusual for this Court to consider a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel when the claim is made on direct appeal because there is usually insufficient evidence within the record to evaluate the claim.” Johnson v. State, 191 So. 3d 732, 735 (¶13) (Miss. | 1 | 1 |
Delker v. Stategreen2 sentences2018See Delker v. State , 50 So.3d 300 (Miss. 2010) (Randolph, J., for the Court) (regarding enforcing the exclusionary rule against a Fourth Amendment violation due to a violation of jurisdictional boundaries, finding that any deterrent effect "is significantly outweighed by the 'substantial social costs' and 'harm to the justice system' exacted by exclusion .... 2018See Delker v. State , 50 So.3d 300 (Miss. 2010) (Randolph, J., for the Court) (regarding enforcing the exclusionary rule against a Fourth Amendment violation due to a violation of jurisdictional boundaries, finding that any deterrent effect "is significantly outweighed by the 'substantial social costs' and 'harm to the justice system' exacted by exclusion .... | 1 | 1 |
Marshall v. Stategreen2 sentences2017Based on this alleged Fourth Amendment violation, he argues the evidence seized following his arrest should have been excluded as inadmissible “fruit of the poisonous tree.” See Marshall v. State, 584 So.2d 437, 438 (Miss. 1991) (citing Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 536 , 108 S.Ct. 2529, 2533 , 101 L.Ed.2d 472 (1988)) (explaining the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine — also known as the exclusionary rule — deems inadmissible any evidence obtained incident to an unlawful search or seizure). 2017Based on this alleged Fourth Amendment violation, he argues the evidence seized following his arrest should have been excluded as inadmissible “fruit of the poisonous tree.” See Marshall v. State, 584 So.2d 437, 438 (Miss. 1991) (citing Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 536 , 108 S.Ct. 2529, 2533 , 101 L.Ed.2d 472 (1988)) (explaining the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine — also known as the exclusionary rule — deems inadmissible any evidence obtained incident to an unlawful search or seizure). | 1 | 1 |
Baker v. Stategreen2 sentences2015The majority, relying on this Court’s precedent in Baker v. State, 802 So.2d 77, 79 (Miss.2001); Taylor v. State, 733 So.2d 251 (Miss.1999); and Smith v. State, 419 So.2d 563, 570 (Miss.1982), finds that there was no Fourth Amendment violation because “the second entry into Crawford’s residence constituted a continuation of the original search.” But the United States Supreme Court never has allowed police to extend -their entry into a dwelling based on the exigency exception to reenter a dwelling for the purpose of conducting a plain-view search, .as happened in this case. . 2015The majority, relying on this Court’s precedent in Baker v. State, 802 So. 2d 77, 79 (Miss. 2001); Taylor v. State, 733 So. 2d 251 (Miss. 1999); and Smith v. State, 419 So. 2d 563, 570 (Miss. 1982), finds that there was no Fourth Amendment violation because “the second entry into Crawford’s residence constituted a continuation of the original search.” But the United States Supreme Court never has allowed police to extend their entry into a dwelling based on the exigency exception to reenter a dwelling for the purpose of conducting a plain-view search, as happened in this case. | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Statered2 sentences2015The majority, relying on this Court’s precedent in Baker v. State, 802 So.2d 77, 79 (Miss.2001); Taylor v. State, 733 So.2d 251 (Miss.1999); and Smith v. State, 419 So.2d 563, 570 (Miss.1982), finds that there was no Fourth Amendment violation because “the second entry into Crawford’s residence constituted a continuation of the original search.” But the United States Supreme Court never has allowed police to extend -their entry into a dwelling based on the exigency exception to reenter a dwelling for the purpose of conducting a plain-view search, .as happened in this case. . 2015The majority, relying on this Court’s precedent in Baker v. State, 802 So. 2d 77, 79 (Miss. 2001); Taylor v. State, 733 So. 2d 251 (Miss. 1999); and Smith v. State, 419 So. 2d 563, 570 (Miss. 1982), finds that there was no Fourth Amendment violation because “the second entry into Crawford’s residence constituted a continuation of the original search.” But the United States Supreme Court never has allowed police to extend their entry into a dwelling based on the exigency exception to reenter a dwelling for the purpose of conducting a plain-view search, as happened in this case. | 1 | 1 |
Mosley v. Stategreen1 sentence2015“The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 3[,][S]ection 23 of the Mississippi Constitution protect individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures.” Mosley v. State, 89 So.3d 41, 45 (¶ 12) (Miss.Ct.App.2011) (citing U.S. Const. amend. | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. Stategreen2 sentences2015In Brown v. State, 358 So.2d 1004, 1005 (Miss.1978), this Court said: Consent to search voluntarily given without coercion may be given by a third party who possessed common authority, mutual use and joint control over property not in the exclusive control or possession of the defendant and where the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy. 2015In Brown v. State, 358 So.2d 1004, 1005 (Miss.1978), this Court said: Consent to search voluntarily given without coercion may be given by a third party who possessed common authority, mutual use and joint control over property not in the exclusive control or possession of the defendant and where the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. James Andrew Colbert and Michael Beryl Reesegreen2 sentences2015“Only those persons whose privacy is invaded by a search have standing to object to it under the exclusionary rule[.]” United States v. Colbert, 474 F.2d 174, 176 (5th Cir.1973). 2015“Only those persons whose privacy is invaded by a search have standing to object to it under the exclusionary rule[.]” United States v. Colbert, 474 F.2d 174, 176 (5th Cir.1973). | 1 | 1 |
| Pugh v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Johnson v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Jones v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Figueroa v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Glasper v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Richardson v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Manix v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| City of St. Paul v. Mylesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Robinson v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gerstein v. Pughgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Jones v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lockett v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Penick v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Mississippi. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Kansas v. Ventris
green
2 sentences2024Even in the event of a Fourth Amendment violation, the supreme law of the land requires a case-by-case “balancing test” to be performed, and suppression ordered “only in those unusual cases in which exclusion will further the purpose of the exclusionary rule.” Kansas v. Ventris, 129 S. Ct. 1841, 1845 , 173 L. Ed. 2d 801 (2009) (requiring “balancing test”); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 918 , 104 S. Ct. 3405 , 82 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1984). 2024Even in the event of a Fourth Amendment violation, the supreme law of the land requires a case-by-case “balancing test” to be performed, and suppression ordered “only in those unusual cases in which exclusion will further the purpose of the exclusionary rule.” Kansas v. Ventris, 129 S. Ct. 1841, 1845 , 173 L. Ed. 2d 801 (2009) (requiring “balancing test”); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 918 , 104 S. Ct. 3405 , 82 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1984). | 3 | 2007–2024 |
United States v. Leon
green
2 sentences2024Even in the event of a Fourth Amendment violation, the supreme law of the land requires a case-by-case “balancing test” to be performed, and suppression ordered “only in those unusual cases in which exclusion will further the purpose of the exclusionary rule.” Kansas v. Ventris, 129 S. Ct. 1841, 1845 , 173 L. Ed. 2d 801 (2009) (requiring “balancing test”); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 918 , 104 S. Ct. 3405 , 82 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1984). 2024Even in the event of a Fourth Amendment violation, the supreme law of the land requires a case-by-case “balancing test” to be performed, and suppression ordered “only in those unusual cases in which exclusion will further the purpose of the exclusionary rule.” Kansas v. Ventris, 129 S. Ct. 1841, 1845 , 173 L. Ed. 2d 801 (2009) (requiring “balancing test”); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 918 , 104 S. Ct. 3405 , 82 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1984). | 3 | 2007–2024 |
Alderman v. United States
green
2 sentences2023“The established principle is that suppression of the product of a Fourth Amendment violation can be successfully urged only by those whose rights were violated by the search itself, not by those who are aggrieved solely by the introduction of damaging evidence.” Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 171-72 , 89 S. Ct. 961 , 22 L. Ed. 2d 176 (1969). ¶25. 2023“The established principle is that suppression of the product of a Fourth Amendment violation can be successfully urged only by those whose rights were violated by the search itself, not by those who are aggrieved solely by the introduction of damaging evidence.” Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 171-72 , 89 S. Ct. 961 , 22 L. Ed. 2d 176 (1969). ¶25. | 2 | 2002–2023 |
Herring v. United States
green
2 sentences2010The issue is whether the exclusionary rule should be applied.” Herring, 129 S.Ct. at 699 . 2010The issue is whether the exclusionary rule should be applied.” Herring, 129 S.Ct. at 699 . | 2 | 2007–2010 |
Kimmelman v. Morrison
green
2 sentences1999The standard of review for such a question may be found in Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375 , 106 S.Ct. 2574 , 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986), where the U.S. Supreme Court stated: Where defense counsel's failure to litigate a Fourth Amendment claim competently is the principal allegation of ineffectiveness, the defendant must also prove that his Fourth Amendment claim is meritorious and that there is a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different absent the excludable evidence in order to demonstrate actual prejudice.... 1999The standard of review for such a question may be found in Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375 , 106 S.Ct. 2574 , 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986), where the U.S. Supreme Court stated: Where defense counsel's failure to litigate a Fourth Amendment claim competently is the principal allegation of ineffectiveness, the defendant must also prove that his Fourth Amendment claim is meritorious and that there is a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different absent the excludable evidence in order to demonstrate actual prejudice.... | 2 | 1992–1999 |
Terry v. Ohio
green
2 sentences1992Id. (citing cases). 1992Id. (citing cases). | 2 | 1983–1992 |
Jones v. United States
red
2 sentences2023As White explained, “[t]he automatic standing rule provided that one charged with a possessory crime automatically had standing to object to a search which tended to establish guilt of possession of the prohibited items.” White, 571 So. 2d at 959 (citing Jones, 362 U.S. 257 ). 2023As White explained, “[t]he automatic standing rule provided that one charged with a possessory crime automatically had standing to object to a search which tended to establish guilt of possession of the prohibited items.” White, 571 So. 2d at 959 (citing Jones, 362 U.S. 257 ). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
White v. State
green
2 sentences2023As White explained, “[t]he automatic standing rule provided that one charged with a possessory crime automatically had standing to object to a search which tended to establish guilt of possession of the prohibited items.” White, 571 So. 2d at 959 (citing Jones, 362 U.S. 257 ). 2023As White explained, “[t]he automatic standing rule provided that one charged with a possessory crime automatically had standing to object to a search which tended to establish guilt of possession of the prohibited items.” White, 571 So. 2d at 959 (citing Jones, 362 U.S. 257 ). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Cornelius Young v. State of Mississippi
green
1 sentence2021Because Scruggs raises a Fourth Amendment issue in connection with his ineffective- assistance-of-counsel claim, we also review the record to ensure that it does not 13 “affirmatively show[] that [Scruggs] was denied effective assistance of counsel of constitutional dimensions.” Young v. State, 294 So. 3d 1238 , 1244 (¶17) (Miss. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
United States v. Richard Jackson
green
1 sentence2021Id. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Eddie Hall v. State of Mississippi
green
2 sentences2018It takes neither a judge nor a lawyer to recognize the compelling social interest in protecting innocent citizens from drunk drivers and the offense to 'basic concepts of the criminal justice system' by 'letting guilty and possibly dangerous defendants go free.' "); Hall v. State , 201 So.3d 424 (Miss. 2016) (Randolph, P.J., for the Court). 2018It takes neither a judge nor a lawyer to recognize the compelling social interest in protecting innocent citizens from drunk drivers and the offense to 'basic concepts of the criminal justice system' by 'letting guilty and possibly dangerous defendants go free.' "); Hall v. State , 201 So.3d 424 (Miss. 2016) (Randolph, P.J., for the Court). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Murray v. United States
green
2 sentences2017Based on this alleged Fourth Amendment violation, he argues the evidence seized following his arrest should have been excluded as inadmissible “fruit of the poisonous tree.” See Marshall v. State, 584 So.2d 437, 438 (Miss. 1991) (citing Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 536 , 108 S.Ct. 2529, 2533 , 101 L.Ed.2d 472 (1988)) (explaining the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine — also known as the exclusionary rule — deems inadmissible any evidence obtained incident to an unlawful search or seizure). 2017Based on this alleged Fourth Amendment violation, he argues the evidence seized following his arrest should have been excluded as inadmissible “fruit of the poisonous tree.” See Marshall v. State, 584 So.2d 437, 438 (Miss. 1991) (citing Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 536 , 108 S.Ct. 2529, 2533 , 101 L.Ed.2d 472 (1988)) (explaining the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine — also known as the exclusionary rule — deems inadmissible any evidence obtained incident to an unlawful search or seizure). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Georgia v. Randolph
green
2 sentences2015“To the Fourth Amendment rule ordinarily prohibiting the warrantless entry of a person’s house as unreasonable per se, one ‘jealously and carefully drawn’ exception, recognizes the validity of searches with the voluntary consent of an individual possessing authority.” Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 109 , 126 S.Ct. 1515 , 164 L.Ed.2d 208 (2006) (internal citations omitted). • ¶ 127. 2015“To the Fourth Amendment rule ordinarily prohibiting the warrantless entry of a person’s house as unreasonable per se, one ‘jealously and carefully drawn’ exception, recognizes the validity of searches with the voluntary consent of an individual possessing authority.” Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 109 , 126 S.Ct. 1515 , 164 L.Ed.2d 208 (2006) (internal citations omitted). • ¶ 127. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2015He was subsequently inadmissibility of the confession based on a Fourth Amendment violation, we do not find this to be a waiver of this issue, as the circuit court had already ruled that the search warrants were supported by probable cause. 13 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 14 The Patterson court found the confession at issue to be admissible, as the statement was made prior to the illegal search. 2015He was subsequently inadmissibility of the confession based on a Fourth Amendment violation, we do not find this to be a waiver of this issue, as the circuit court had already ruled that the search warrants were supported by probable cause. 13 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 14 The Patterson court found the confession at issue to be admissible, as the statement was made prior to the illegal search. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Mincey v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2015In fact, in Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 , 98 S.Ct. 2408 , 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978), the Supreme. 2015In fact, in Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 , 98 S.Ct. 2408 , 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978), the Supreme. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Taylor v. State
green
2 sentences2015The majority, relying on this Court’s precedent in Baker v. State, 802 So.2d 77, 79 (Miss.2001); Taylor v. State, 733 So.2d 251 (Miss.1999); and Smith v. State, 419 So.2d 563, 570 (Miss.1982), finds that there was no Fourth Amendment violation because “the second entry into Crawford’s residence constituted a continuation of the original search.” But the United States Supreme Court never has allowed police to extend -their entry into a dwelling based on the exigency exception to reenter a dwelling for the purpose of conducting a plain-view search, .as happened in this case. . 2015The majority, relying on this Court’s precedent in Baker v. State, 802 So. 2d 77, 79 (Miss. 2001); Taylor v. State, 733 So. 2d 251 (Miss. 1999); and Smith v. State, 419 So. 2d 563, 570 (Miss. 1982), finds that there was no Fourth Amendment violation because “the second entry into Crawford’s residence constituted a continuation of the original search.” But the United States Supreme Court never has allowed police to extend their entry into a dwelling based on the exigency exception to reenter a dwelling for the purpose of conducting a plain-view search, as happened in this case. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Whren v. United States green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Taylor v. Alabama green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Brown v. Illinois green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Woodward v. State green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Abram v. State red | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| United States v. Gallo green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Oregon v. Elstad green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| State v. Tourtillott green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| State v. Tourtillot green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Tourtillott v. Oregon neutral | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| State v. Halverson green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Harris v. United States green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Arkansas v. Sanders red | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| United States v. Thurman Jeff West green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| United States v. John Thomas Allen green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| United States v. White green | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.