Fourth Amendment violation in Michigan

2026It is well-established that 3 Although the act uses the spelling “marihuana,” we use the more common spelling “marijuana” throughout this opinion. -5- “[s]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.” Whren v United States, 517 US 806, 813 ; 116 S Ct 1769 ; 135 L Ed 2d 89 (1996).

2026It is well-established that 3 Although the act uses the spelling “marihuana,” we use the more common spelling “marijuana” throughout this opinion. -5- “[s]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.” Whren v United States, 517 US 806, 813 ; 116 S Ct 1769 ; 135 L Ed 2d 89 (1996).

2002Affording deference to the magistrate’s decision simply requires that reviewing courts ensure that there is a substantial basis for the magistrate’s conclusion that there is a “fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Gates at 238. [Russo, supra at 603-604 .] As stated in Russo, supra at 605 , staleness is not a separate doctrine regarding probable cause to search analysis, but is an aspect of the Fourth Amendment inquiry regarding whether probable cause exists to support issuance of the search warrant.

2002Affording deference to the magistrate’s decision simply requires that reviewing courts ensure that there is a substantial basis for the magistrate’s conclusion that there is a “fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Gates at 238. [Russo, supra at 603-604 .] As stated in Russo, supra at 605 , staleness is not a separate doctrine regarding probable cause to search analysis, but is an aspect of the Fourth Amendment inquiry regarding whether probable cause exists to support issuance of the search warrant.

2025See People v Mead, 503 Mich 205, 213-215 ; 931 NW2d 557 (2019) (recognizing that a passenger of a vehicle ordinarily does not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the trunk of another person’s vehicle but holding that he or she may nonetheless “challenge an alleged Fourth Amendment violation if [he or] she can show under the totality of the circumstances that [he or] she had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched and that [his or] her expectation of privacy was one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable”).

2025See People v Mead, 503 Mich 205, 213-215 ; 931 NW2d 557 (2019) (recognizing that a passenger of a vehicle ordinarily does not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the trunk of another person’s vehicle but holding that he or she may nonetheless “challenge an alleged Fourth Amendment violation if [he or] she can show under the totality of the circumstances that [he or] she had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched and that [his or] her expectation of privacy was one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable”).

2025This motion also sought to correct an invalid sentence but that ruling is not challenged in this appeal. 14 We denied defendant’s application for leave to appeal, People v Horton, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered February 17, 2021 (Docket No. 3355783), but our Supreme Court ordered the appeal addressed as on leave granted. 15 Typically, in the absence of a conditional plea preserving a Fourth Amendment challenge, People v Reid, 420 Mich 326, 331 ; 362 NW2d 655 (1984), a defendant who pleads guilty waives such a challenge.

2025This motion also sought to correct an invalid sentence but that ruling is not challenged in this appeal. 14 We denied defendant’s application for leave to appeal, People v Horton, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered February 17, 2021 (Docket No. 3355783), but our Supreme Court ordered the appeal addressed as on leave granted. 15 Typically, in the absence of a conditional plea preserving a Fourth Amendment challenge, People v Reid, 420 Mich 326, 331 ; 362 NW2d 655 (1984), a defendant who pleads guilty waives such a challenge.

2026“A valid investigatory stop must be justified at its inception.” People v Champion, 452 Mich 92, 98 ; 549 NW2d 849, 853 (1996) (emphasis added).

2026“A valid investigatory stop must be justified at its inception.” People v Champion, 452 Mich 92, 98 ; 549 NW2d 849, 853 (1996) (emphasis added).

2022See California v Ciraolo, 476 US 207, 211 ; 106 S Ct 1809 ; 90 L Ed 2d 210 (1986) (“The touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis is whether a person has a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy[.]”) (Quotation marks and citation omitted.) -5- obvious, 3) and the plain error affected substantial rights.” People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763 ; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).

2022See California v Ciraolo, 476 US 207, 211 ; 106 S Ct 1809 ; 90 L Ed 2d 210 (1986) (“The touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis is whether a person has a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy[.]”) (Quotation marks and citation omitted.) -5- obvious, 3) and the plain error affected substantial rights.” People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763 ; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).

1991Therefore, the touchstone of a reviewing court’s Fourth Amendment analysis is always "the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security.” Michigan v Long, 463 US 1032, 1051 ; 103 S Ct 3469 ; 77 L Ed 2d 1201 (1983), quoting Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1, 19 ; 88 S Ct 1868 ; 20 L Ed 2d 889 (1968).

1991Therefore, the touchstone of a reviewing court’s Fourth Amendment analysis is always "the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security.” Michigan v Long, 463 US 1032, 1051 ; 103 S Ct 3469 ; 77 L Ed 2d 1201 (1983), quoting Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1, 19 ; 88 S Ct 1868 ; 20 L Ed 2d 889 (1968).

2026“Once the constitutionally sound basis for the traffic stop has been addressed, any further extension of the detention in order to conduct ‘[o]n- scene investigation into other crimes’ or for any other reason is a Fourth Amendment violation unless new facts come to light during the traffic stop that give rise to reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.” Kavanaugh, 320 Mich App at 301, quoting Rodriguez, 575 US at 356 (footnote omitted, alternation in original).

2026“Once the constitutionally sound basis for the traffic stop has been addressed, any further extension of the detention in order to conduct ‘[o]n- scene investigation into other crimes’ or for any other reason is a Fourth Amendment violation unless new facts come to light during the traffic stop that give rise to reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.” Kavanaugh, 320 Mich App at 301, quoting Rodriguez, 575 US at 356 (footnote omitted, alternation in original).

2022See People v Lemmon, 456 Mich 625 , -4- Although the ultimate question of whether a Fourth Amendment violation occurred is one of law which we review de novo, Hyde, 285 Mich App at 436 , we conclude that vacating the order granting defendant’s motion to suppress, and remanding to allow the trial court to articulate on the record its credibility findings, and to apply those findings under the appropriate and more deferential reasonable suspicion standard, is the appropriate course.

2022See People v Lemmon, 456 Mich 625 , -4- Although the ultimate question of whether a Fourth Amendment violation occurred is one of law which we review de novo, Hyde, 285 Mich App at 436 , we conclude that vacating the order granting defendant’s motion to suppress, and remanding to allow the trial court to articulate on the record its credibility findings, and to apply those findings under the appropriate and more deferential reasonable suspicion standard, is the appropriate course.

2019See Davis v. United States , 564 U.S. 229 , 231, 131 S.Ct. 2419 , 180 L.Ed.2d 285 (2011) (stating that the exclusionary rule bars the introduction of evidence that was "obtained by way of a Fourth Amendment violation"); People v. Hawkins , 468 Mich. 488 , 498-499, 668 N.W.2d 602 (2003) ("The exclusionary rule ... generally bars the introduction into evidence of materials seized and observations made during an unconstitutional search.").

2019See Davis v. United States , 564 U.S. 229 , 231, 131 S.Ct. 2419 , 180 L.Ed.2d 285 (2011) (stating that the exclusionary rule bars the introduction of evidence that was "obtained by way of a Fourth Amendment violation"); People v. Hawkins , 468 Mich. 488 , 498-499, 668 N.W.2d 602 (2003) ("The exclusionary rule ... generally bars the introduction into evidence of materials seized and observations made during an unconstitutional search.").

1991Rejecting a Fourth Amendment challenge to the informant’s subsequent testimony, the Court said, Neither this Court nor any member of it has ever expressed the view that the Fourth Amendment protects a wrongdoer’s misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it. [ 385 US 302 .] As Justice Boyle later observed in People v Catania, 427 Mich 447, 456 ; 398 NW2d 343 (1986), "The Hoffa opinion essentially held that citizens assume the risk that their associates may be undercover agents.” Finally, in Katz v United States, 389 US 347, 353 ; 88 S Ct 507

1991Rejecting a Fourth Amendment challenge to the informant’s subsequent testimony, the Court said, Neither this Court nor any member of it has ever expressed the view that the Fourth Amendment protects a wrongdoer’s misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it. [ 385 US 302 .] As Justice Boyle later observed in People v Catania, 427 Mich 447, 456 ; 398 NW2d 343 (1986), "The Hoffa opinion essentially held that citizens assume the risk that their associates may be undercover agents.” Finally, in Katz v United States, 389 US 347, 353 ; 88 S Ct 507

2002Rather, a Fourth Amendment violation is “ ‘fully accomplished’ ” by the illegal search or seizure, and no exclusion of evidence from a judicial or administrative proceeding can “ ‘cure the invasion of the defendant’s rights which he has already suffered.’ ” United States v Leon, supra at 906; 104 S Ct at 3412 (quoting Stone v Powell, supra at 540 ; 96 S Ct at 3074, White, J., dissenting).

2002Rather, a Fourth Amendment violation is “ ‘fully accomplished’ ” by the illegal search or seizure, and no exclusion of evidence from a judicial or administrative proceeding can “ ‘cure the invasion of the defendant’s rights which he has already suffered.’ ” United States v Leon, supra at 906; 104 S Ct at 3412 (quoting Stone v Powell, supra at 540 ; 96 S Ct at 3074, White, J., dissenting).

2019See Davis v. United States , 564 U.S. 229 , 231, 131 S.Ct. 2419 , 180 L.Ed.2d 285 (2011) (stating that the exclusionary rule bars the introduction of evidence that was "obtained by way of a Fourth Amendment violation"); People v. Hawkins , 468 Mich. 488 , 498-499, 668 N.W.2d 602 (2003) ("The exclusionary rule ... generally bars the introduction into evidence of materials seized and observations made during an unconstitutional search.").

2019See Davis v. United States , 564 U.S. 229 , 231, 131 S.Ct. 2419 , 180 L.Ed.2d 285 (2011) (stating that the exclusionary rule bars the introduction of evidence that was "obtained by way of a Fourth Amendment violation"); People v. Hawkins , 468 Mich. 488 , 498-499, 668 N.W.2d 602 (2003) ("The exclusionary rule ... generally bars the introduction into evidence of materials seized and observations made during an unconstitutional search.").

2023Generally, standing to challenge the constitutionality of a search exists when, considering the totality of the circumstances, “the defendant had an expectation of privacy in the object of the search and seizure” and “that expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.” People v Parker, 230 Mich App 337, 340 ; 584 NW2d 336 (1998).

2023Generally, standing to challenge the constitutionality of a search exists when, considering the totality of the circumstances, “the defendant had an expectation of privacy in the object of the search and seizure” and “that expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.” People v Parker, 230 Mich App 337, 340 ; 584 NW2d 336 (1998).

2023“Application of the exclusionary rule to a Fourth Amendment violation is a question of law that is reviewed de novo.” People v Jenkins, 472 Mich 26, 31 ; 691 NW2d 759 (2005).

2023“Application of the exclusionary rule to a Fourth Amendment violation is a question of law that is reviewed de novo.” People v Jenkins, 472 Mich 26, 31 ; 691 NW2d 759 (2005).

2026That decision would not be an easy one under the circumstances because “the aim of the [exclusionary] rule is one of police deterrence,” Hawkins, 468 Mich at 499 , and it is not clear what police misconduct would be deterred by suppressing evidence where a Fourth Amendment violation is found simply because the record is undeveloped.

2026That decision would not be an easy one under the circumstances because “the aim of the [exclusionary] rule is one of police deterrence,” Hawkins, 468 Mich at 499 , and it is not clear what police misconduct would be deterred by suppressing evidence where a Fourth Amendment violation is found simply because the record is undeveloped.

1999The knock-and-announce statute provides as follows: The officer to whom a warrant is directed, or any person assisting him, may break any outer or inner door or window of a house or building, or anything therein, in order to execute the warrant, if, after notice of his authority and purpose, he is refused admittance, or when necessary to liber *55 ate himself or any person assisting him in execution of the warrant. [MCL 780.656; MSA 28.1259(6).] Because the statute’s requirement that officers knock and announce themselves before entering a house or building to execute a search warrant “has its

1999The knock-and-announce statute provides as follows: The officer to whom a warrant is directed, or any person assisting him, may break any outer or inner door or window of a house or building, or anything therein, in order to execute the warrant, if, after notice of his authority and purpose, he is refused admittance, or when necessary to liber *55 ate himself or any person assisting him in execution of the warrant. [MCL 780.656; MSA 28.1259(6).] Because the statute’s requirement that officers knock and announce themselves before entering a house or building to execute a search warrant “has its

2026A. PRESERVATION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW Defendant did not raise a Fourth Amendment claim in the trial court, so this issue is not preserved for appeal, see People v Hughes, 506 Mich 512 , 522-523; 958 NW2d 98 (2020), and we apply the plain-error rule, Carines, 460 Mich at 763-764 .

2026A. PRESERVATION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW Defendant did not raise a Fourth Amendment claim in the trial court, so this issue is not preserved for appeal, see People v Hughes, 506 Mich 512 , 522-523; 958 NW2d 98 (2020), and we apply the plain-error rule, Carines, 460 Mich at 763-764 .

2015Subjective intent is never an appropriate inquiry in Fourth Amendment analysis, see, e.g., Ohio v Robinette, 519 US 33, 39 ; 117 S Ct 417 ; 136 L Ed 2d 347 (1996) (“Reasonableness . . . is measured in objective terms -6- by examining the totality of the circumstances”) and People v Jenkins, 472 Mich 26 , 32 n 6; 691 NW2d 759 (2005) (“[O]nly objective conduct and circumstances are relevant for Fourth Amendment purposes”) (emphasis in original), as the relevant inquiry is whether the officers had a reasonable suspicion, based on the totality of the circumstances, that the probationer was involve

2015Subjective intent is never an appropriate inquiry in Fourth Amendment analysis, see, e.g., Ohio v Robinette, 519 US 33, 39 ; 117 S Ct 417 ; 136 L Ed 2d 347 (1996) (“Reasonableness . . . is measured in objective terms -6- by examining the totality of the circumstances”) and People v Jenkins, 472 Mich 26 , 32 n 6; 691 NW2d 759 (2005) (“[O]nly objective conduct and circumstances are relevant for Fourth Amendment purposes”) (emphasis in original), as the relevant inquiry is whether the officers had a reasonable suspicion, based on the totality of the circumstances, that the probationer was involve

2023Here, it is the actions of the police following the dog sniff that are challenged as a Fourth Amendment violation. -6- prosecution in a worse position than it would have been in had there been no police misconduct. [People v Stevens, 460 Mich 626, 637 ; 597 NW2d 53 (1999) (citations omitted).] The inevitable discovery exception arises because society’s interest in deterring police conduct and the public’s interest in having juries receive all probative evidence of a crime must be properly balanced by placing the police in the same, not a worse, position than they would have been in if no polic

2023Here, it is the actions of the police following the dog sniff that are challenged as a Fourth Amendment violation. -6- prosecution in a worse position than it would have been in had there been no police misconduct. [People v Stevens, 460 Mich 626, 637 ; 597 NW2d 53 (1999) (citations omitted).] The inevitable discovery exception arises because society’s interest in deterring police conduct and the public’s interest in having juries receive all probative evidence of a crime must be properly balanced by placing the police in the same, not a worse, position than they would have been in if no polic

2021I concur in full with the majority opinion and its application of Navarette v California, 572 US 393 ; 134 S Ct 1683 ; 188 L Ed 2d 680 (2014), to resolve defendant’s Fourth Amendment claim.

2021I concur in full with the majority opinion and its application of Navarette v California, 572 US 393 ; 134 S Ct 1683 ; 188 L Ed 2d 680 (2014), to resolve defendant’s Fourth Amendment claim.

2025“Because Fourth Amendment standing is subsumed under substantive Fourth Amendment doctrine, it is not a jurisdictional question and hence need not be addressed before addressing other aspects of the merits of a Fourth Amendment claim.” Id. at 411 .

2025“Because Fourth Amendment standing is subsumed under substantive Fourth Amendment doctrine, it is not a jurisdictional question and hence need not be addressed before addressing other aspects of the merits of a Fourth Amendment claim.” Id. at 411 .

2023So- called Fourth Amendment standing is “ ‘more properly subsumed under substantive Fourth Amendment doctrine.’ ” Id., quoting Rakas v Illinois, 439 US 128, 139 ; 99 S Ct 421 ; 58 L Ed 2d 387 (1978).

2023So- called Fourth Amendment standing is “ ‘more properly subsumed under substantive Fourth Amendment doctrine.’ ” Id., quoting Rakas v Illinois, 439 US 128, 139 ; 99 S Ct 421 ; 58 L Ed 2d 387 (1978).