12 New Hampshire opinions name it 1 courts 1988–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Hampshire courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Rakas v. Illinoisgreen2 sentences2016See, e.g., Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1998); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 138-40 (1978). 1993Id. at 139 . | 1 | 2 |
United States v. Ramirezgreen1 sentence2020In addition, even if a warrant satisfies the particularity and probable cause requirements, “the manner of its execution must in other respects be reasonable.” Schulz, 164 N.H. at 221; see also United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 71 (1998) (“The general touchstone of reasonableness which governs Fourth Amendment analysis governs the method of execution of the warrant.” (citation omitted)). | 1 | 1 |
Minnesota v. Cartergreen1 sentence2016See, e.g., Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1998); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 138-40 (1978). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Jonesgreen2 sentences2015See Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1417 ; see also Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 952 (stating that the “reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test”); United States v. Duenas, 691 F.3d 1070, 1080-81 (9th Cir.2012) (explaining that in Jones , “the Court reaffirmed that the home and its curtilage are sacrosanct” and that courts are not required “to apply the reasonable expectation of privacy standard in addition to finding that the subject of the search was ‘persons, houses, papers, or effects’ ” (brackets omitted)). 2015See Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1417 ; see also Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 952 (stating that the “reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test”); United States v. Duenas, 691 F.3d 1070, 1080-81 (9th Cir.2012) (explaining that in Jones , “the Court reaffirmed that the home and its curtilage are sacrosanct” and that courts are not required “to apply the reasonable expectation of privacy standard in addition to finding that the subject of the search was ‘persons, houses, papers, or effects’ ” (brackets omitted)). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Raymond Duenas, Jr.green2 sentences2015See Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1417 ; see also Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 952 (stating that the “reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test”); United States v. Duenas, 691 F.3d 1070, 1080-81 (9th Cir.2012) (explaining that in Jones , “the Court reaffirmed that the home and its curtilage are sacrosanct” and that courts are not required “to apply the reasonable expectation of privacy standard in addition to finding that the subject of the search was ‘persons, houses, papers, or effects’ ” (brackets omitted)). 2015See Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1417 ; see also Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 952 (stating that the “reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test”); United States v. Duenas, 691 F.3d 1070, 1080-81 (9th Cir.2012) (explaining that in Jones , “the Court reaffirmed that the home and its curtilage are sacrosanct” and that courts are not required “to apply the reasonable expectation of privacy standard in addition to finding that the subject of the search was ‘persons, houses, papers, or effects’ ” (brackets omitted)). | 1 | 1 |
Florida v. Jardinesgreen2 sentences2015See Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1417 ; see also Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 952 (stating that the “reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test”); United States v. Duenas, 691 F.3d 1070, 1080-81 (9th Cir.2012) (explaining that in Jones , “the Court reaffirmed that the home and its curtilage are sacrosanct” and that courts are not required “to apply the reasonable expectation of privacy standard in addition to finding that the subject of the search was ‘persons, houses, papers, or effects’ ” (brackets omitted)). 2015See Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1417 ; see also Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 952 (stating that the “reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test”); United States v. Duenas, 691 F.3d 1070, 1080-81 (9th Cir.2012) (explaining that in Jones , “the Court reaffirmed that the home and its curtilage are sacrosanct” and that courts are not required “to apply the reasonable expectation of privacy standard in addition to finding that the subject of the search was ‘persons, houses, papers, or effects’ ” (brackets omitted)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Barkusgreen2 sentences2014We have recognized that the doctrine applies when “the primary illegality [is] a Fourth Amendment violation.” State v. Barkus, 152 N.H. 701, 706 (2005). 2014We have recognized that the doctrine applies when “the primary illegality [is] a Fourth Amendment violation.” State v. Barkus, 152 N.H. 701, 706 (2005). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. James Ivygreen2 sentences2014We note, however, that the threats alleged here went beyond “a mere reference to the fact that [officers] could obtain a [search] warrant.” United *474 States v. Ivy, 165 F.3d 397, 403 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that defendant’s consent was not voluntary under totality of circumstances when, among other things, officer made statements to the effect that he would arrest defendant’s girlfriend and take away their small child if he did not consent, which “went far beyond a mere reference to the fact that he could obtain a [search] warrant”); cf. 4 LaFave, supra § 8.2(e), at 93-94 (“Consents given i 2014We note, however, that the threats alleged here went beyond “a mere reference to the fact that [officers] could obtain a [search] warrant.” United *474 States v. Ivy, 165 F.3d 397, 403 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that defendant’s consent was not voluntary under totality of circumstances when, among other things, officer made statements to the effect that he would arrest defendant’s girlfriend and take away their small child if he did not consent, which “went far beyond a mere reference to the fact that he could obtain a [search] warrant”); cf. 4 LaFave, supra § 8.2(e), at 93-94 (“Consents given i | 1 | 1 |
Silverman v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2006However, operation of RSA 318-B:16 does not require a physical intrusion into the home and, therefore, does not automatically implicate the type of Part I, Article 19 search and seizure issue involved in Johnston or the type of Fourth Amendment issue involved in the case cited by the defendant, Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961) (involving insertion of “spike” microphone into building heating system in order to listen to conversations going on inside the building). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Cobbgreen2 sentences2005See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 484-88 ; see also Cobb, 143 N.H. at 649-50 (where the “primary illegality” was a purported violation of Part I, Article 19 of New Hampshire Constitution). 2005See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 484-88 ; see also Cobb, 143 N.H. at 649-50 (where the “primary illegality” was a purported violation of Part I, Article 19 of New Hampshire Constitution). | 1 | 1 |
Wong Sun v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2005See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 484-88 ; see also Cobb, 143 N.H. at 649-50 (where the “primary illegality” was a purported violation of Part I, Article 19 of New Hampshire Constitution). 2005See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 484-88 ; see also Cobb, 143 N.H. at 649-50 (where the “primary illegality” was a purported violation of Part I, Article 19 of New Hampshire Constitution). | 1 | 1 |
Michigan v. Tuckergreen1 sentence1991See Michigan v. Tucker, supra at 446-47. | 1 | 1 |
Illinois v. Gatesgreen1 sentence1988See Carroll, supra at 190 , 552 A.2d at 76 ; see also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238-39 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Carrollgreen1 sentence1988See Carroll, supra at 190 , 552 A.2d at 76 ; see also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238-39 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Hampshire. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Orde
green
2 sentences2014“If the evidence in question has been obtained only through exploitation of an antecedent illegality, it must be suppressed.” Orde, 161 N.H. at 268 . 2014“If the evidence in question has been obtained only through exploitation of an antecedent illegality, it must be suppressed.” Orde, 161 N.H. at 268 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Tracey
green
2 sentences1995Although this court never directly returned to the issue after 1956, see State v. Tracey, 100 N.H. 267 , 125 A.2d 774 , since at least 1983 our cases have implicitly recognized the existence of a State exclusionary rule. 1995Although this court never directly returned to the issue after 1956, see State v. Tracey, 100 N.H. 267 , 125 A.2d 774 , since at least 1983 our cases have implicitly recognized the existence of a State exclusionary rule. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
New Jersey v. T. L. O.
green
2 sentences1995The United States Supreme Court enunciated the fourth amendment standard in New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 . 1995The United States Supreme Court enunciated the fourth amendment standard in New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Andresen v. Maryland
green
1 sentence1988Finally, as indicated by our reference to federal case law, the Federal Constitution provides the defendant with no greater protection, see Andresen, 427 U.S. at 479-82 ; Cortellesso, 601 F.2d at 31-32 , and we need not consider the defendant’s fourth amendment claim further. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
United States v. Albert A. Cortellesso
green
1 sentence1988Finally, as indicated by our reference to federal case law, the Federal Constitution provides the defendant with no greater protection, see Andresen, 427 U.S. at 479-82 ; Cortellesso, 601 F.2d at 31-32 , and we need not consider the defendant’s fourth amendment claim further. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.