Fourth Amendment violation in Indiana

2018In making this evaluation, we apply the test established by our supreme court in Litchfield v. State , 824 N.E.2d 356 (Ind. 2005), which is "our 'faithful stand-by' to determine reasonableness under our Constitution and is appropriate for a range of contexts." Watkins , 85 N.E.3d at 600 .

2018In making this evaluation, we apply the test established by our supreme court in Litchfield v. State , 824 N.E.2d 356 (Ind. 2005), which is "our 'faithful stand-by' to determine reasonableness under our Constitution and is appropriate for a range of contexts." Watkins , 85 N.E.3d at 600 .

2010See Esquerdo v. State, 640 N.E.2d 1023, 1030 (Ind.1994) (finding Fourth Amendment error may be subject to constitutional harmless error analysis: "[wlhere this Court can state beyond a reasonable doubt that the improperly admitted evidence did not contribute to the verdict, then the error is harmless."). 3 .

1998Amendments to the statute have in effect codified changes in Fourth Amendment doctrine on the use of informants to establish probable cause. (footnote: 2) Accordingly, we have held that “[w]hen seeking either a search or an arrest warrant, the police must follow the warrant statute, which specifies the minimum information necessary to establish probable cause.” Esquerdo v. State , 640 N.E.2d 1023, 1029 (Ind. 1994) (citation and footnote omitted); accord Houser , 678 N.E.2d at 99 . (footnote: 3) For many of the same reasons discussed in Part IA supra , the requirements of the statute were not s

2009The Fifth Circuit in recognizing that an officer may request a driver's license, insurance papers, vehicle registration, run a computer check thereon, and issue a citation has "'reject[ed] any notion that a police officer's question [of a detainee during a traffic stop], even on a subject unrelated to the purpose of a stop, is itself a Fourth Amendment violation.'" United States v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500, 508 (5th Cir.2004) (en bane) (quoting United States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 437 (5th Cir.1998)) (emphasis in original).

2009The Fifth Circuit in recognizing that an officer may request a driver's license, insurance papers, vehicle registration, run a computer check thereon, and issue a citation has "'reject[ed] any notion that a police officer's question [of a detainee during a traffic stop], even on a subject unrelated to the purpose of a stop, is itself a Fourth Amendment violation.'" United States v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500, 508 (5th Cir.2004) (en bane) (quoting United States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 437 (5th Cir.1998)) (emphasis in original).

1997Cf. Peterson v. State, 674 N.E.2d 528, 533 (Ind.1996) {‘‘Separate, and apart from the federal Fourth Amendment analysis, Article I, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution provides an independent prohibition against unreasonable searches.”); Price v. State, 622 N.E.2d 954, 958 (Ind.1993) ("[Federal] First Amendment jurisprudence differs from the Indiana approach [under Indiana's free speech clause]”); Collins v. Day, 644 N.E.2d 72, 75 (Ind.1994) (Article 1, Section 23 of the Indiana Constitution "should be given independent interpretation and application.”); Moran v. State, 644 N.E.2d 536, 540

1997Cf. Peterson v. State, 674 N.E.2d 528, 533 (Ind. 1996) ("Separate and apart from the federal Fourth Amendment analysis, Article I, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution provides an independent prohibition against unreasonable searches."); Price v. State, 622 N.E.2d 954, 958 (Ind. 1993) ("[Federal] First Amendment jurisprudence differs from the Indiana approach [under Indiana's free speech clause]"); Collins v. Day, 644 N.E.2d 72, 75 (Ind.1994) (Article 1, Section 23 of the Indiana Constitution "should be given independent interpretation and application."); Moran v. State, 644 N.E.2d 536, 540

2001Although this section and the Fourth Amendment are worded identically, as the Court of Appeals noted, the state constitutional standard has evolved differently from the Fourth Amendment analysis: To argue that a search or seizure is unreasonable, Smith "must establish ownership, control, possession, or interest in either the premises searched or the property seized." Peterson v. State, 674 N.E.2d 528, 534 (Ind.1996).

2001Although this section and the Fourth Amendment are worded identically, as the Court of Appeals noted, the state constitutional standard has evolved differently from the Fourth Amendment analysis: To argue that a search or seizure is unreasonable, Smith "must establish ownership, control, possession, or interest in either the premises searched or the property seized." Peterson v. State, 674 N.E.2d 528, 534 (Ind.1996).

2019“Consensual encounters in which a citizen voluntarily interacts with an officer do not compel Fourth Amendment analysis.” Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 261 (Ind. 2013).

2017It is, of course, true that “[consensual encounters in which a citizen voluntarily interacts with an officer do not compel Fourth Amendment analysis.” Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 261 (Ind. 2013).

2015“The Fourth Amendment analysis turns on whether the subject has a ‘reasonable expectation of privacy,’ while the Section 11 analysis turns on whether the police conduct was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances.” Id. at 1001-02 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)). [20] In addition, standing to challenge a search under Section 11 differs in some respects from standing to assert a Fourth Amendment claim.

2015“The Fourth Amendment analysis turns on whether the subject has a ‘reasonable expectation of privacy,’ while the Section 11 analysis turns on whether the police conduct was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances.” Id. at 1001-02 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)). [20] In addition, standing to challenge a search under Section 11 differs in some respects from standing to assert a Fourth Amendment claim.

2013Fourth Amendment analysis keys on a criminal defendant’s expectation of privacy, but under Article 1, § 11 of the Indiana Constitution “ ‘we focus on the actions of the police officer,’ and employ a totality-of-the-circumstances test to evaluate the reasonableness of the officer’s actions.” Duran, 930 N.E.2d at 17 (quoting Trimble v. State, 842 N.E.2d 798, 803 (Ind. 2006)).

2009In analyzing the Fourth Amendment challenge to the officer's entry of the curtilage of Trim-ble's property, our Supreme Court held that "police entry onto private property and their observations do not violate the Fourth Amendment when the police have a legitimate investigatory purpose for being on the property and limit their entry to places visitors would be expected to go, such as walkways, driveways, and porches." Id. at 802 .

2025Lee v. State, 545 N.E.2d 1085, 1091 (Ind. 1989); Livingston, 542 N.E.2d at 194 ; Stout v. State, 479 N.E.2d 563, 566 (Ind. 1985).

2025Lee v. State, 545 N.E.2d 1085, 1091 (Ind. 1989); Livingston, 542 N.E.2d at 194 ; Stout v. State, 479 N.E.2d 563, 566 (Ind. 1985).

2025Lee v. State, 545 N.E.2d 1085, 1091 (Ind. 1989); Livingston, 542 N.E.2d at 194 ; Stout v. State, 479 N.E.2d 563, 566 (Ind. 1985).

2025Lee v. State, 545 N.E.2d 1085, 1091 (Ind. 1989); Livingston, 542 N.E.2d at 194 ; Stout v. State, 479 N.E.2d 563, 566 (Ind. 1985).

2014The Supreme Court held that, although a Fourth Amendment violation did occur, the evidence would not be excluded because the police conduct was not “sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it” or “sufficiently culpable that such 6 deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system.” Id. at 144 .

2014The Supreme Court held that, although a Fourth Amendment violation did occur, the evidence would not be excluded because the police conduct was not “sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it” or “sufficiently culpable that such 6 deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system.” Id. at 144 .

2018Membres , 889 N.E.2d at 273 (citing Spillers , 847 N.E.2d at 957 ) ("Indiana search and seizure jurisprudence, like federal Fourth Amendment doctrine, identifies deterrence as the primary objective of the exclusionary rule.").

2011It also noted that “Indiana search and seizure jurisprudence, like federal Fourth Amendment doctrine, identifies deterrence as the primary objective of the exclusionary rule.” Id. at 273 .

2008In determining whether there has been a Fourth Amendment violation in the context of a traffic stop, a number of courts look to the scope of the detention as well as its duration. 1 This view is expressed by Judge Cudahy in his concurring opinion in United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947 (7th Cir.2002).

2008In determining whether there has been a Fourth Amendment violation in the context of a traffic stop, a number of courts look to the scope of the detention as well as its duration. 1 This view is expressed by Judge Cudahy in his concurring opinion in United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947 (7th Cir.2002).

2023Whren v. U.S., 517 U.S. 806, 813 , 116 S.Ct. 1769, 1774 , 135 L.E.2d 89 (1996); see also Graham v. State, 971 N.E.2d 713, 715-17 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (finding no Fourth Amendment violation where an officer observed Graham participating in a suspected drug deal, relayed his suspicion to another officer, and the other officer stopped Graham’s car after witnessing Graham commit a traffic infraction), trans. denied.

2023Whren v. U.S., 517 U.S. 806, 813 , 116 S.Ct. 1769, 1774 , 135 L.E.2d 89 (1996); see also Graham v. State, 971 N.E.2d 713, 715-17 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (finding no Fourth Amendment violation where an officer observed Graham participating in a suspected drug deal, relayed his suspicion to another officer, and the other officer stopped Graham’s car after witnessing Graham commit a traffic infraction), trans. denied.

2017On transfer, the Supreme Court held that under Fourth Amendment analysis, “the only factor cutting toward crediting the tip in this case was that the caller claimed to have personally witnessed the criminal activity.” 687 N.E.2d at 183 .

2017On transfer, the Supreme Court held that under Fourth Amendment analysis, “the only factor cutting toward crediting the tip in this case was that the caller claimed to have personally witnessed the criminal activity.” 687 N.E.2d at 183 .

1990Even if Hunt had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the Sanders residence so as to raise a fourth amendment challenge to his arrest, see Burris v. State (1984), Ind., 465 N.E.2d 171, 182-83 ; Rakas v. Illinois (1978), 439 U.S. 128, 142 , 99 S.Ct. 421, 430 , 58 L.Ed.2d 387, 400 , we find that Sanders' consent to the officers' entry is sufficient to overcome Hunt's fourth amendment claim. 1 That is, the holding in Payton v. New York (1980), 445 U.S. 573, 584 , 100 S.Ct. 1371, 1378 , 63 L.Ed.2d 639, 649 , with respect to a warrantless entry into a suspect's home is not controlling here becaus

1990Even if Hunt had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the Sanders residence so as to raise a fourth amendment challenge to his arrest, see Burris v. State (1984), Ind., 465 N.E.2d 171, 182-83 ; Rakas v. Illinois (1978), 439 U.S. 128, 142 , 99 S.Ct. 421, 430 , 58 L.Ed.2d 387, 400 , we find that Sanders' consent to the officers' entry is sufficient to overcome Hunt's fourth amendment claim. 1 That is, the holding in Payton v. New York (1980), 445 U.S. 573, 584 , 100 S.Ct. 1371, 1378 , 63 L.Ed.2d 639, 649 , with respect to a warrantless entry into a suspect's home is not controlling here becaus

2013The Court noted the overlap between the Fourth and Fifth Amendment, and how the exclusionary rule can be used to effectuate interests under both, id. at 599-601 , 95 S.Ct. 2254 , but said that exclusion of a confession made without Miranda warnings might be required to guarantee the protections of the Fifth Amendment but would not necessarily deter a Fourth Amendment violation, id. at 601 , 95 S.Ct. 2254 .

2013The Court noted the overlap between the Fourth and Fifth Amendment, and how the exclusionary rule can be used to effectuate interests under both, id. at 599-601 , 95 S.Ct. 2254 , but said that exclusion of a confession made without Miranda warnings might be required to guarantee the protections of the Fifth Amendment but would not necessarily deter a Fourth Amendment violation, id. at 601 , 95 S.Ct. 2254 .

2025Thus, “[d]espite the similarity of the two provisions, Indiana courts interpret and apply [A]rticle 1, [S]ection 11 independently from Fourth Amendment analysis.” Johnson, 117 N.E.3d at 583 (citing Mitchell v. State, 745 N.E.2d 775 (Ind. 2001)).

2020Mitchell v. State, 745 N.E.2d 775, 786 (Ind. 2001).

1997The constitutionality of pretextual traffic stops has recently been addressed by the Supreme Court in Whren v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 1769 , 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) and by this court in State v. Hollins, 672 N.E.2d 427 (Ind.Ct.App.1996), trans. denied. `Not only have we never held, outside the context of inventory search or administrative inspection ..., that an officer's motive invalidates objectively justifiable behavior under the Fourth Amendment; but we have repeatedly held and asserted the contrary.' Accordingly, `[s]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-ca

1997The constitutionality of pretextual traffic stops has recently been addressed by the Supreme Court in Whren v. United States, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 1769 , 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) and by this court in State v. Hollins, 672 N.E.2d 427 (Ind.Ct.App.1996), trans. denied. ‘Not only have we never held, outside the context of inventory search or administrative inspection ..., that an officer’s motive invalidates objectively justifiable behavior under the Fourth Amendment; but we have repeatedly held and asserted the contrary.’ Accordingly, ‘[sjubjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause