Fourth Amendment violation in Nebraska

2020Ed. 2d 1080 . 13 State v. Brown, supra note 12 , 302 Neb. at 60 , 921 N.W.2d at 811 (citing Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 , 126 S. Ct. 2159 , 165 L.

2020Ed. 2d 1080 . 13 State v. Brown, supra note 12 , 302 Neb. at 60 , 921 N.W.2d at 811 (citing Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 , 126 S. Ct. 2159 , 165 L.

2018State v. Ready, 252 Neb. 816 , 565 N.W.2d 728 (1997).

2018State v. Ready, 252 Neb. 816 , 565 N.W.2d 728 (1997).

2018Ed. 2d 89 (1996). 15 Id., 517 U.S. at 809 . 16 Id., 517 U.S. at 810 . 17 Id., 517 U.S. at 819 . - 687 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 298 Nebraska R eports STATE v. HILL Cite as 298 Neb. 675 intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.”18 In State v. Dallmann,19 we addressed a defendant’s conten- tion that officers “had decided, without probable cause, to follow and stop” the defendant and used the defendant’s subse- quent traffic violation as “a pretext to obtain consent to search the vehicle.” We rejected that argument, holding that “a traffic viola

2018Ed. 2d 89 (1996). 15 Id., 517 U.S. at 809 . 16 Id., 517 U.S. at 810 . 17 Id., 517 U.S. at 819 . - 687 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 298 Nebraska R eports STATE v. HILL Cite as 298 Neb. 675 intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.”18 In State v. Dallmann,19 we addressed a defendant’s conten- tion that officers “had decided, without probable cause, to follow and stop” the defendant and used the defendant’s subse- quent traffic violation as “a pretext to obtain consent to search the vehicle.” We rejected that argument, holding that “a traffic viola

2016The Supreme Court rejected the defendants’ “expansive read- ing” of the Fourth Amendment and of the exclusionary rule stating: “The established principle is that suppression of the product of a Fourth Amendment violation can be successfully urged only by those whose rights were violated by the search itself, not by those who are aggrieved solely by the introduc- tion of damaging evidence.” Alderman, 394 U.S. at 171-72 .

2016The Supreme Court rejected the defendants’ “expansive read- ing” of the Fourth Amendment and of the exclusionary rule stating: “The established principle is that suppression of the product of a Fourth Amendment violation can be successfully urged only by those whose rights were violated by the search itself, not by those who are aggrieved solely by the introduc- tion of damaging evidence.” Alderman, 394 U.S. at 171-72 .

2025The exclusionary rule was created by the U.S. Supreme Court and is “a deterrent sanction that bars the prosecu- tion from introducing evidence obtained by way of a Fourth Amendment violation.” 36 “The rule’s sole purpose . . . is to deter future Fourth Amendment violations.” 37 “The fact that a Fourth Amendment violation occurred—i.e., that a search or arrest was unreasonable—does not necessarily mean that the exclusionary rule applies.” 38 “Police practices trigger the harsh sanction of exclusion only when they are deliberate enough to yield ‘meaningfu[l]’ deterrence, and culpable enough to b

2025The exclusionary rule was created by the U.S. Supreme Court and is “a deterrent sanction that bars the prosecu- tion from introducing evidence obtained by way of a Fourth Amendment violation.” 36 “The rule’s sole purpose . . . is to deter future Fourth Amendment violations.” 37 “The fact that a Fourth Amendment violation occurred—i.e., that a search or arrest was unreasonable—does not necessarily mean that the exclusionary rule applies.” 38 “Police practices trigger the harsh sanction of exclusion only when they are deliberate enough to yield ‘meaningfu[l]’ deterrence, and culpable enough to b

2021The Supreme Court described this argument when it stated that “application of the good‑faith exception to searches conducted pursuant to warrants will preclude review of the constitutionality of the search or sei- zure, deny needed guidance from the courts, or freeze Fourth Amendment law in its present state.” United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. at 924 .

2021The Supreme Court described this argument when it stated that “application of the good‑faith exception to searches conducted pursuant to warrants will preclude review of the constitutionality of the search or sei- zure, deny needed guidance from the courts, or freeze Fourth Amendment law in its present state.” United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. at 924 .

2019While it is not clear to us what evidence Brown could have offered to negate the applicability of Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 , 107 S.Ct. 1160 , 94 L.Ed.2d 364 (1987), under these circumstances, Brown cannot point us to any such evidence, nor can he claim that he lacked the opportunity to present it to the district court.

2019While it is not clear to us what evidence Brown could have offered to negate the applicability of Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 , 107 S.Ct. 1160 , 94 L.Ed.2d 364 (1987), under these circumstances, Brown cannot point us to any such evidence, nor can he claim that he lacked the opportunity to present it to the district court.

2018See, e.g., U.S. v. Stokes, 829 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2016) (no standing to maintain Fourth Amendment challenge to search of post office box to which defendant held key); U.S. v. Reyes, 908 F.2d 281 (8th Cir. 1990) (possession of key to rental locker does not cre- ate reasonable expectation of privacy in locker); United States v. Sanchez, 635 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1980) (possession of keys insufficient to give defendant constitutionally protected interest in privacy of car).

2018See, e.g., *95 U.S. v. Stokes , 829 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2016) (no standing to maintain Fourth Amendment challenge to search of post office box to which defendant held key); U.S. v. Reyes , 908 F.2d 281 (8th Cir. 1990) (possession of key to rental locker does not create reasonable expectation of privacy in locker); United States v. Sanchez , 635 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1980) (possession of keys insufficient to give defendant constitutionally protected interest in privacy of car).

2018See, e.g., U.S. v. Stokes, 829 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2016) (no standing to maintain Fourth Amendment challenge to search of post office box to which defendant held key); U.S. v. Reyes, 908 F.2d 281 (8th Cir. 1990) (possession of key to rental locker does not cre- ate reasonable expectation of privacy in locker); United States v. Sanchez, 635 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1980) (possession of keys insufficient to give defendant constitutionally protected interest in privacy of car).

2018See, e.g., *95 U.S. v. Stokes , 829 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2016) (no standing to maintain Fourth Amendment challenge to search of post office box to which defendant held key); U.S. v. Reyes , 908 F.2d 281 (8th Cir. 1990) (possession of key to rental locker does not create reasonable expectation of privacy in locker); United States v. Sanchez , 635 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1980) (possession of keys insufficient to give defendant constitutionally protected interest in privacy of car).

2016Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. at 137 (“suppression is not an automatic con- sequence of a Fourth Amendment violation”); State v. Tyler, 291 Neb. 920, 937 , 870 N.W.2d 119 , 132 (2015), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 1207 , 194 L.

2016Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. at 137 (“suppression is not an automatic con- sequence of a Fourth Amendment violation”); State v. Tyler, 291 Neb. 920, 937 , 870 N.W.2d 119 , 132 (2015), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 1207 , 194 L.

2016In Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326 , 121 S. Ct. 946 , 148 L.

2016In Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326 , 121 S. Ct. 946 , 148 L.

1999State v. Chitty, 253 Neb. 753 , 571 N.W.2d 794 (1998).

1999State v. Chitty, 253 Neb. 753 , 571 N.W.2d 794 (1998).

2025FALCON Cite as 319 Neb. 911 which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promo- tion of legitimate governmental interests.” 32 [9,10] Law enforcement officers are often required to per- form noncriminal “community caretaking functions,” which are totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute. 33 Such community caretaking functions are a legiti- mate governmental interest. 34 Community caretaking func- tions are not subject to a special Fourth Amendment

2024HOEHN Cite as 316 Neb. 634 to the invasions of privacy that might call for the exclusion of evidence [under the Fourth Amendment].” 46 The Supreme Court of Ohio, in State v. Jones, 47 simi- larly held that the fact that the officer conducting the stop of the defendant was outside his jurisdiction and his reasons for being there were “irrelevant to the Fourth Amendment analysis.” 48 Instead, the “sole focus of the inquiry should [be] on the stop itself.” 49 The Supreme Court of Michigan, in People v. Hamilton, 50 also held that the fact that an arrest was made outside of the officer’s jurisdict

2024HOEHN Cite as 316 Neb. 634 to the invasions of privacy that might call for the exclusion of evidence [under the Fourth Amendment].” 46 The Supreme Court of Ohio, in State v. Jones, 47 simi- larly held that the fact that the officer conducting the stop of the defendant was outside his jurisdiction and his reasons for being there were “irrelevant to the Fourth Amendment analysis.” 48 Instead, the “sole focus of the inquiry should [be] on the stop itself.” 49 The Supreme Court of Michigan, in People v. Hamilton, 50 also held that the fact that an arrest was made outside of the officer’s jurisdict

2024ANDERSON Cite as 317 Neb. 435 establish probable cause under Camara or reasonable cause under § 29-833. 50 [20] Not every violation of a state law restricting searches is sufficient to show a Fourth Amendment violation. 51 And hav- ing reexamined the record to determine whether the omitted information was material to the probable cause finding here, we conclude it was not.

2024ANDERSON Cite as 317 Neb. 435 establish probable cause under Camara or reasonable cause under § 29-833. 50 [20] Not every violation of a state law restricting searches is sufficient to show a Fourth Amendment violation. 51 And hav- ing reexamined the record to determine whether the omitted information was material to the probable cause finding here, we conclude it was not.

2024Rather, when assessing whether the facts “reasonably warrant that intrusion. . . . it is imperative that the facts be judged against an objective standard.” State v. Eberly, 271 Neb. 893, 900 , 716 - 10 - N.W.2d 671, 677 (2006).

2024Rather, when assessing whether the facts “reasonably warrant that intrusion. . . . it is imperative that the facts be judged against an objective standard.” State v. Eberly, 271 Neb. 893, 900 , 716 - 10 - N.W.2d 671, 677 (2006).

2022If the latter, Rodriguez v. U.S., 575 U.S. 348 , 135 S. Ct. 1609 , 191 L.

2022If the latter, Rodriguez v. U.S., 575 U.S. 348 , 135 S. Ct. 1609 , 191 L.

2021In - 145 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports STATE v. SHORT Cite as 310 Neb. 81 my view, it would have been advisable to address the merits of the Fourth Amendment claim before proceeding to the good faith issue.

2021In - 145 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports STATE v. SHORT Cite as 310 Neb. 81 my view, it would have been advisable to address the merits of the Fourth Amendment claim before proceeding to the good faith issue.

2021For example, in U.S. v. White, 874 F.3d 490 (6th Cir. 2017), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recognized that the trial court had ruled on both the merits of the Fourth Amendment issue and the good faith - 146 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports STATE v. SHORT Cite as 310 Neb. 81 exception.

2021For example, in U.S. v. White, 874 F.3d 490 (6th Cir. 2017), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recognized that the trial court had ruled on both the merits of the Fourth Amendment issue and the good faith - 146 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports STATE v. SHORT Cite as 310 Neb. 81 exception.

2020Ed. 2d 496 (2009) (explaining that application of exclusionary rule is not “a necessary consequence of a Fourth Amendment violation”); State v. Brown, 302 Neb. 53 , 921 N.W.2d 804 (2019), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 2680 , 204 L.

2020Ed. 2d 496 (2009) (explaining that application of exclusionary rule is not “a necessary consequence of a Fourth Amendment violation”); State v. Brown, 302 Neb. 53 , 921 N.W.2d 804 (2019), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 2680 , 204 L.

2020Ed. 2d 496 (2009) (explaining that application of exclusionary rule is not “a necessary consequence of a Fourth Amendment violation”); State v. Brown, 302 Neb. 53 , 921 N.W.2d 804 (2019), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 2680 , 204 L.

2020Ed. 2d 496 (2009) (explaining that application of exclusionary rule is not “a necessary consequence of a Fourth Amendment violation”); State v. Brown, 302 Neb. 53 , 921 N.W.2d 804 (2019), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 2680 , 204 L.