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57 Nebraska opinions name it 3 courts 1972–2025 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Nebraska courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Herring v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2020The exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is not itself a constitutional right. 14 Rather, it is a remedy designed to deter constitutional violations by law enforcement. 15 Thus, in situations where the exclusion as a remedy would not deter law enforcement, several exceptions to the exclusionary rule have been recognized. 16 One of those exceptions to the exclusionary rule applies to evidence 11 See Carpenter v. U.S., supra note 1. 12 See, Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141 , 129 S. Ct. 695 , 172 L. Ed. 2d 496 (2009) (explaining that application of exclus 2020The exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is not itself a constitutional right. 14 Rather, it is a remedy designed to deter constitutional violations by law enforcement. 15 Thus, in situations where the exclusion as a remedy would not deter law enforcement, several exceptions to the exclusionary rule have been recognized. 16 One of those exceptions to the exclusionary rule applies to evidence 11 See Carpenter v. U.S., supra note 1. 12 See, Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141 , 129 S. Ct. 695 , 172 L. Ed. 2d 496 (2009) (explaining that application of exclus | 3 | 5 |
State v. Bondgreen2 sentences2021See State v. Bond, 23 Neb. App. 916 , 877 N.W.2d 254 (2016). 2021See State v. Bond, 23 Neb. App. 916 , 877 N.W.2d 254 (2016). | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Stokesgreen2 sentences2018See, e.g., U.S. v. Stokes, 829 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2016) (no standing to maintain Fourth Amendment challenge to search of post office box to which defendant held key); U.S. v. Reyes, 908 F.2d 281 (8th Cir. 1990) (possession of key to rental locker does not cre- ate reasonable expectation of privacy in locker); United States v. Sanchez, 635 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1980) (possession of keys insufficient to give defendant constitutionally protected interest in privacy of car). 2018See, e.g., *95 U.S. v. Stokes , 829 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2016) (no standing to maintain Fourth Amendment challenge to search of post office box to which defendant held key); U.S. v. Reyes , 908 F.2d 281 (8th Cir. 1990) (possession of key to rental locker does not create reasonable expectation of privacy in locker); United States v. Sanchez , 635 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1980) (possession of keys insufficient to give defendant constitutionally protected interest in privacy of car). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Braygreen2 sentences2021See State v. Bray, 297 Neb. 916 , 902 N.W.2d 98 (2017). (ii) Attenuation of Thompson’s Consent From Illegal Extension of Traffic Stop [23] In determining whether the causal chain leading to consent is sufficiently attenuated from a Fourth Amendment violation to allow for the admission of evidence, we consider three relevant factors: (1) the time elapsed between the constitutional violation and the acquisition of the evidence (temporal proximity), (2) the presence of intervening circumstances, and (3) the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct. 2021See State v. Bray, 297 Neb. 916 , 902 N.W.2d 98 (2017). (ii) Attenuation of Thompson’s Consent From Illegal Extension of Traffic Stop [23] In determining whether the causal chain leading to consent is sufficiently attenuated from a Fourth Amendment violation to allow for the admission of evidence, we consider three relevant factors: (1) the time elapsed between the constitutional violation and the acquisition of the evidence (temporal proximity), (2) the presence of intervening circumstances, and (3) the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct. | 1 | 2 |
Terry v. Ohiogreen2 sentences1981In applying this doctrine, two principles must be kept in mind. (1) Since the doctrine is an exception to the ordinary Fourth Amendment requirement of a warrant for entry into a home, the burden of proof is on the state to show that the warrantless entry fell within the exception. [Citations omitted.] (2) An objective standard as to the reasonableness of the officer’s belief must be applied. . “‘* * * |-jjn justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably wa 1981In applying this doctrine, two principles must be kept in mind. (1) Since the doctrine is an exception to the ordinary Fourth Amendment requirement of a warrant for entry into a home, the burden of proof is on the state to show that the warrantless entry fell within the exception. [Citations omitted.] (2) An objective standard as to the reasonableness of the officer’s belief must be applied. . “‘* * * |-jjn justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably wa | 1 | 2 |
Blizzard v. Chrisman's Cash Register Co.green1 sentence2024Finally, we note that [the Wisconsin statute requiring refusal of consent] does not specifically require suppression of any evidence obtained in violation of its provisions. 49 Jackowski thus concluded the inspection warrant was valid because the affidavit showed sufficient probable cause under Camara, and it held that no Fourth Amendment violation resulted from the failure to comply with Wisconsin’s prior refusal statute. [19] We agree with this reasoning and conclude that although there may be sound public policy reasons for requiring inspectors to show that consent to inspect was refused be | 1 | 1 |
State v. Lowmangreen2 sentences2024See State v. Lowman, 308 Neb. 482 , 954 N.W.2d 905 (2021). 2024See State v. Lowman, 308 Neb. 482 , 954 N.W.2d 905 (2021). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Albert Whitegreen2 sentences2021For example, in U.S. v. White, 874 F.3d 490 (6th Cir. 2017), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recognized that the trial court had ruled on both the merits of the Fourth Amendment issue and the good faith - 146 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports STATE v. SHORT exception. 2021For example, in U.S. v. White, 874 F.3d 490 (6th Cir. 2017), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recognized that the trial court had ruled on both the merits of the Fourth Amendment issue and the good faith - 146 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports STATE v. SHORT exception. | 1 | 1 |
| Katz v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Tyler v. Nebrasksgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Flonnory v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. GORUPgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Dixongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Nebraska. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Davis v. United States
green
2 sentences2025The exclusionary rule was created by the U.S. Supreme Court and is “a deterrent sanction that bars the prosecution from introducing evidence obtained by way of a Fourth Amendment violation.” 36 “The rule’s sole purpose . . . is to deter future Fourth Amendment violations.” 37 “The fact that a Fourth Amendment violation occurred—i.e., that a search or arrest was unreasonable—does not necessarily mean that the exclusionary rule applies.” 38 “Police practices trigger the harsh sanction of exclusion only when they are deliberate enough to yield ‘meaningfu[l]’ deterrence, and culpable enough to be 2025The exclusionary rule was created by the U.S. Supreme Court and is “a deterrent sanction that bars the prosecution from introducing evidence obtained by way of a Fourth Amendment violation.” 36 “The rule’s sole purpose . . . is to deter future Fourth Amendment violations.” 37 “The fact that a Fourth Amendment violation occurred—i.e., that a search or arrest was unreasonable—does not necessarily mean that the exclusionary rule applies.” 38 “Police practices trigger the harsh sanction of exclusion only when they are deliberate enough to yield ‘meaningfu[l]’ deterrence, and culpable enough to be | 3 | 2016–2025 |
United States v. Leon
green
2 sentences2021In fact, in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 925 , 104 S. Ct. 3405 , 82 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1984), the origin case of the good faith rule, the Supreme Court recognized that “it frequently will be difficult to determine whether the officers acted reasonably without resolving the Fourth Amendment issue.” This is because the Fourth Amendment analysis addresses judicial errors, whereas the good faith analysis addresses subsequent police errors when viewed against settled law. 2021In fact, in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 925 , 104 S. Ct. 3405 , 82 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1984), the origin case of the good faith rule, the Supreme Court recognized that “it frequently will be difficult to determine whether the officers acted reasonably without resolving the Fourth Amendment issue.” This is because the Fourth Amendment analysis addresses judicial errors, whereas the good faith analysis addresses subsequent police errors when viewed against settled law. | 3 | 1999–2021 |
Hudson v. Michigan
green
2 sentences2020The exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is not itself a constitutional right. 14 Rather, it is a remedy designed to deter constitutional violations by law enforcement. 15 Thus, in situations where the exclusion as a remedy would not deter law enforcement, several exceptions to the exclusionary rule have been recognized. 16 One of those exceptions to the exclusionary rule applies to evidence 11 See Carpenter v. U.S., supra note 1. 12 See, Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141 , 129 S. Ct. 695 , 172 L. Ed. 2d 496 (2009) (explaining that application of exclus 2020The exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is not itself a constitutional right. 14 Rather, it is a remedy designed to deter constitutional violations by law enforcement. 15 Thus, in situations where the exclusion as a remedy would not deter law enforcement, several exceptions to the exclusionary rule have been recognized. 16 One of those exceptions to the exclusionary rule applies to evidence 11 See Carpenter v. U.S., supra note 1. 12 See, Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141 , 129 S. Ct. 695 , 172 L. Ed. 2d 496 (2009) (explaining that application of exclus | 3 | 2019–2020 |
State v. Ready
green
2 sentences2018State v. Ready, 252 Neb. 816 , 565 N.W.2d 728 (1997). 2018State v. Ready, 252 Neb. 816 , 565 N.W.2d 728 (1997). | 3 | 1998–2018 |
Whren v. United States
green
2 sentences2018Ed. 2d 89 (1996). 15 Id., 517 U.S. at 809 . 16 Id., 517 U.S. at 810 . 17 Id., 517 U.S. at 819 . - 687 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 298 Nebraska R eports STATE v. HILL Cite as 298 Neb. 675 intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.”18 In State v. Dallmann,19 we addressed a defendant’s conten- tion that officers “had decided, without probable cause, to follow and stop” the defendant and used the defendant’s subse- quent traffic violation as “a pretext to obtain consent to search the vehicle.” We rejected that argument, holding that “a traffic viola 2018Ed. 2d 89 (1996). 15 Id., 517 U.S. at 809 . 16 Id., 517 U.S. at 810 . 17 Id., 517 U.S. at 819 . - 687 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 298 Nebraska R eports STATE v. HILL Cite as 298 Neb. 675 intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.”18 In State v. Dallmann,19 we addressed a defendant’s conten- tion that officers “had decided, without probable cause, to follow and stop” the defendant and used the defendant’s subse- quent traffic violation as “a pretext to obtain consent to search the vehicle.” We rejected that argument, holding that “a traffic viola | 3 | 1997–2018 |
Alderman v. United States
green
2 sentences2016The Supreme Court rejected the defendants’ “expansive read- ing” of the Fourth Amendment and of the exclusionary rule stating: “The established principle is that suppression of the product of a Fourth Amendment violation can be successfully urged only by those whose rights were violated by the search itself, not by those who are aggrieved solely by the introduc- tion of damaging evidence.” Alderman, 394 U.S. at 171-72 . 2016The Supreme Court rejected the defendants’ “expansive read- ing” of the Fourth Amendment and of the exclusionary rule stating: “The established principle is that suppression of the product of a Fourth Amendment violation can be successfully urged only by those whose rights were violated by the search itself, not by those who are aggrieved solely by the introduc- tion of damaging evidence.” Alderman, 394 U.S. at 171-72 . | 3 | 1972–2016 |
State v. Hoerle
green
2 sentences2020The exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is not itself a constitutional right. 14 Rather, it is a remedy designed to deter constitutional violations by law enforcement. 15 Thus, in situations where the exclusion as a remedy would not deter law enforcement, several exceptions to the exclusionary rule have been recognized. 16 One of those exceptions to the exclusionary rule applies to evidence 11 See Carpenter v. U.S., supra note 1. 12 See, Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141 , 129 S. Ct. 695 , 172 L. Ed. 2d 496 (2009) (explaining that application of exclus 2020The exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is not itself a constitutional right. 14 Rather, it is a remedy designed to deter constitutional violations by law enforcement. 15 Thus, in situations where the exclusion as a remedy would not deter law enforcement, several exceptions to the exclusionary rule have been recognized. 16 One of those exceptions to the exclusionary rule applies to evidence 11 See Carpenter v. U.S., supra note 1. 12 See, Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141 , 129 S. Ct. 695 , 172 L. Ed. 2d 496 (2009) (explaining that application of exclus | 2 | 2017–2020 |
Illinois v. Krull
green
2 sentences2019While it is not clear to us what evidence Brown could have offered to negate the applicability of Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 , 107 S.Ct. 1160 , 94 L.Ed.2d 364 (1987), under these circumstances, Brown cannot point us to any such evidence, nor can he claim that he lacked the opportunity to present it to the district court. 2019While it is not clear to us what evidence Brown could have offered to negate the applicability of Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 , 107 S.Ct. 1160 , 94 L.Ed.2d 364 (1987), under these circumstances, Brown cannot point us to any such evidence, nor can he claim that he lacked the opportunity to present it to the district court. | 2 | 2019–2019 |
United States v. Luis Sanchez, Luz Alvarez, Luis Torres Maldonado, Carlos Delgado and Juana Dominguez
green
2 sentences2018See, e.g., U.S. v. Stokes, 829 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2016) (no standing to maintain Fourth Amendment challenge to search of post office box to which defendant held key); U.S. v. Reyes, 908 F.2d 281 (8th Cir. 1990) (possession of key to rental locker does not cre- ate reasonable expectation of privacy in locker); United States v. Sanchez, 635 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1980) (possession of keys insufficient to give defendant constitutionally protected interest in privacy of car). 2018See, e.g., *95 U.S. v. Stokes , 829 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2016) (no standing to maintain Fourth Amendment challenge to search of post office box to which defendant held key); U.S. v. Reyes , 908 F.2d 281 (8th Cir. 1990) (possession of key to rental locker does not create reasonable expectation of privacy in locker); United States v. Sanchez , 635 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1980) (possession of keys insufficient to give defendant constitutionally protected interest in privacy of car). | 2 | 2018–2018 |
United States v. Angel Reyes, A/K/A Jose Konig Mangele, Etc.
green
2 sentences2018See, e.g., U.S. v. Stokes, 829 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2016) (no standing to maintain Fourth Amendment challenge to search of post office box to which defendant held key); U.S. v. Reyes, 908 F.2d 281 (8th Cir. 1990) (possession of key to rental locker does not cre- ate reasonable expectation of privacy in locker); United States v. Sanchez, 635 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1980) (possession of keys insufficient to give defendant constitutionally protected interest in privacy of car). 2018See, e.g., *95 U.S. v. Stokes , 829 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2016) (no standing to maintain Fourth Amendment challenge to search of post office box to which defendant held key); U.S. v. Reyes , 908 F.2d 281 (8th Cir. 1990) (possession of key to rental locker does not create reasonable expectation of privacy in locker); United States v. Sanchez , 635 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1980) (possession of keys insufficient to give defendant constitutionally protected interest in privacy of car). | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Illinois v. McArthur
green
2 sentences2016In Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326 , 121 S. Ct. 946 , 148 L. 2016In Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326 , 121 S. Ct. 946 , 148 L. | 2 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Tyler
green
2 sentences2016Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. at 137 (“suppression is not an automatic con- sequence of a Fourth Amendment violation”); State v. Tyler, 291 Neb. 920, 937 , 870 N.W.2d 119 , 132 (2015), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 1207 , 194 L. 2016Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. at 137 (“suppression is not an automatic con- sequence of a Fourth Amendment violation”); State v. Tyler, 291 Neb. 920, 937 , 870 N.W.2d 119 , 132 (2015), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 1207 , 194 L. | 2 | 2015–2016 |
State v. Chitty
green
2 sentences1999State v. Chitty, 253 Neb. 753 , 571 N.W.2d 794 (1998). 1999State v. Chitty, 253 Neb. 753 , 571 N.W.2d 794 (1998). | 2 | 1998–1999 |
Weeks v. United States
red
2 sentences2025See, Mapp v. Ohio, supra note 18 ; Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 , 34 S. Ct. 341 , 58 L. Ed. 652 (1914), overruled on other grounds, Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 , 80 S. Ct. 1437 , 4 L. Ed. 2d 1669 (1960). 37 Davis v. United States, supra note 36, 564 U.S. at 236-37 . 38 Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 140 , 129 S. Ct. 695 , 172 L. Ed. 2d 496 (2009) (emphasis omitted). 39 Davis v. United States, supra note 36, 564 U.S. at 240 . 40 Id., 564 U.S. at 238 . - 924 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 319 Nebraska Reports STATE V. 2025See, Mapp v. Ohio, supra note 18 ; Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 , 34 S. Ct. 341 , 58 L. Ed. 652 (1914), overruled on other grounds, Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 , 80 S. Ct. 1437 , 4 L. Ed. 2d 1669 (1960). 37 Davis v. United States, supra note 36, 564 U.S. at 236-37 . 38 Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 140 , 129 S. Ct. 695 , 172 L. Ed. 2d 496 (2009) (emphasis omitted). 39 Davis v. United States, supra note 36, 564 U.S. at 240 . 40 Id., 564 U.S. at 238 . - 924 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 319 Nebraska Reports STATE V. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Elkins v. United States
green
2 sentences2025See, Mapp v. Ohio, supra note 18 ; Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 , 34 S. Ct. 341 , 58 L. Ed. 652 (1914), overruled on other grounds, Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 , 80 S. Ct. 1437 , 4 L. Ed. 2d 1669 (1960). 37 Davis v. United States, supra note 36, 564 U.S. at 236-37 . 38 Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 140 , 129 S. Ct. 695 , 172 L. Ed. 2d 496 (2009) (emphasis omitted). 39 Davis v. United States, supra note 36, 564 U.S. at 240 . 40 Id., 564 U.S. at 238 . - 924 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 319 Nebraska Reports STATE V. 2025See, Mapp v. Ohio, supra note 18 ; Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 , 34 S. Ct. 341 , 58 L. Ed. 652 (1914), overruled on other grounds, Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 , 80 S. Ct. 1437 , 4 L. Ed. 2d 1669 (1960). 37 Davis v. United States, supra note 36, 564 U.S. at 236-37 . 38 Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 140 , 129 S. Ct. 695 , 172 L. Ed. 2d 496 (2009) (emphasis omitted). 39 Davis v. United States, supra note 36, 564 U.S. at 240 . 40 Id., 564 U.S. at 238 . - 924 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 319 Nebraska Reports STATE V. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Eberly
green
2 sentences2024Rather, when assessing whether the facts “reasonably warrant that intrusion. . . . it is imperative that the facts be judged against an objective standard.” State v. Eberly, 271 Neb. 893, 900 , 716 - 10 - N.W.2d 671, 677 (2006). 2024Rather, when assessing whether the facts “reasonably warrant that intrusion. . . . it is imperative that the facts be judged against an objective standard.” State v. Eberly, 271 Neb. 893, 900 , 716 - 10 - N.W.2d 671, 677 (2006). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Rodriguez v. United States
green
2 sentences2022If the latter, Rodriguez v. U.S., 575 U.S. 348 , 135 S. Ct. 1609 , 191 L. 2022If the latter, Rodriguez v. U.S., 575 U.S. 348 , 135 S. Ct. 1609 , 191 L. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Brown v. Nebraska
neutral
2 sentences2020The exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is not itself a constitutional right. 14 Rather, it is a remedy designed to deter constitutional violations by law enforcement. 15 Thus, in situations where the exclusion as a remedy would not deter law enforcement, several exceptions to the exclusionary rule have been recognized. 16 One of those exceptions to the exclusionary rule applies to evidence 11 See Carpenter v. U.S., supra note 1. 12 See, Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141 , 129 S. Ct. 695 , 172 L. Ed. 2d 496 (2009) (explaining that application of exclus 2020The exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is not itself a constitutional right. 14 Rather, it is a remedy designed to deter constitutional violations by law enforcement. 15 Thus, in situations where the exclusion as a remedy would not deter law enforcement, several exceptions to the exclusionary rule have been recognized. 16 One of those exceptions to the exclusionary rule applies to evidence 11 See Carpenter v. U.S., supra note 1. 12 See, Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141 , 129 S. Ct. 695 , 172 L. Ed. 2d 496 (2009) (explaining that application of exclus | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Jenkins
green
2 sentences2020A proper result will not be reversed merely because it was reached for the wrong reason. 21 We need not address the validity of the subsequent warrants that Jennings asserts failed to cure the Fourth Amendment violation. 17 State v. Brown, supra note 12 . 18 Id. 19 State v. Jenkins, 294 Neb. 684 , 884 N.W.2d 429 (2016). 20 Carpenter v. U.S., supra note 1. 21 In re Estate of Odenreider, 286 Neb. 480 , 837 N.W.2d 756 (2013). - 823 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports STATE v. JENNINGS 2. 2020A proper result will not be reversed merely because it was reached for the wrong reason. 21 We need not address the validity of the subsequent warrants that Jennings asserts failed to cure the Fourth Amendment violation. 17 State v. Brown, supra note 12 . 18 Id. 19 State v. Jenkins, 294 Neb. 684 , 884 N.W.2d 429 (2016). 20 Carpenter v. U.S., supra note 1. 21 In re Estate of Odenreider, 286 Neb. 480 , 837 N.W.2d 756 (2013). - 823 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports STATE v. JENNINGS 2. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Brown
green
2 sentences2020The exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is not itself a constitutional right. 14 Rather, it is a remedy designed to deter constitutional violations by law enforcement. 15 Thus, in situations where the exclusion as a remedy would not deter law enforcement, several exceptions to the exclusionary rule have been recognized. 16 One of those exceptions to the exclusionary rule applies to evidence 11 See Carpenter v. U.S., supra note 1. 12 See, Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141 , 129 S. Ct. 695 , 172 L. Ed. 2d 496 (2009) (explaining that application of exclus 2020The exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is not itself a constitutional right. 14 Rather, it is a remedy designed to deter constitutional violations by law enforcement. 15 Thus, in situations where the exclusion as a remedy would not deter law enforcement, several exceptions to the exclusionary rule have been recognized. 16 One of those exceptions to the exclusionary rule applies to evidence 11 See Carpenter v. U.S., supra note 1. 12 See, Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141 , 129 S. Ct. 695 , 172 L. Ed. 2d 496 (2009) (explaining that application of exclus | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Stone v. Powell
green
2 sentences2020The exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is not itself a constitutional right. 14 Rather, it is a remedy designed to deter constitutional violations by law enforcement. 15 Thus, in situations where the exclusion as a remedy would not deter law enforcement, several exceptions to the exclusionary rule have been recognized. 16 One of those exceptions to the exclusionary rule applies to evidence 11 See Carpenter v. U.S., supra note 1. 12 See, Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141 , 129 S. Ct. 695 , 172 L. Ed. 2d 496 (2009) (explaining that application of exclus 2020The exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is not itself a constitutional right. 14 Rather, it is a remedy designed to deter constitutional violations by law enforcement. 15 Thus, in situations where the exclusion as a remedy would not deter law enforcement, several exceptions to the exclusionary rule have been recognized. 16 One of those exceptions to the exclusionary rule applies to evidence 11 See Carpenter v. U.S., supra note 1. 12 See, Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141 , 129 S. Ct. 695 , 172 L. Ed. 2d 496 (2009) (explaining that application of exclus | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Salyers
green
2 sentences2019We agree with the State. 10 See State v. Salyers, 239 Neb. 1002 , 480 N.W.2d 173 (1992). 11 Brief for appellant at 20. - 90 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 304 Nebraska R eports STATE v. HARTZELL [6] Hartzell’s argument depends solely on the Fourth Amendment analysis. 2019We agree with the State. 10 See State v. Salyers, 239 Neb. 1002 , 480 N.W.2d 173 (1992). 11 Brief for appellant at 20. - 90 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 304 Nebraska R eports STATE v. HARTZELL [6] Hartzell’s argument depends solely on the Fourth Amendment analysis. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| United States v. Jacobsen green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| State v. Piper green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| State v. Abu-Serieh green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| State v. Hill green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| State v. Cotton green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| State v. Howell neutral | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| United States v. Eric B. Reinholz Margaret E. Chevalier green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| United States v. Lester Dale Perry, Also Known as Duane Thomas Stamps green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| State v. Henderson green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Heien v. North Carolina green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| United States v. Richard Lawrence Wellins green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| State v. Lane green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| State v. Rogers green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| State v. Tucker green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole v. Scott green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| United States v. Greer green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| United States v. Olawale Olamrewaju Oguns, Adenrele green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| United States v. Hilario Mendoza-Salgado, United States of America v. Ramon Edwardo Garcia green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.