Fourth Amendment violation in Alabama

2014More recently, this standard was reiterated in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 , 99 S.Ct. 421 , 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978).” McVickers v. State, 551 So.2d 1130, 1132 (Ala.Crim.App.l989)(a Fourth Amendment challenge to a seizure taking place in a residential driveway).

2014More recently, this standard was reiterated in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 , 99 S.Ct. 421 , 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978).” McVickers v. State, 551 So.2d 1130, 1132 (Ala.Crim.App.l989)(a Fourth Amendment challenge to a seizure taking place in a residential driveway).

1982They cannot assure in every case that the Fourth Amendment violation has not been unduly exploited.” Brown, 95 S.Ct. at 2261 .

1982They cannot assure in every case that the Fourth Amendment violation has not been unduly exploited.” Brown, 95 S.Ct. at 2261 .

2018Mapp v. Ohio , 367 U.S. 643 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed. 2d 1081 (1961). "[T]he State's intrusion into a particular area ... cannot result in a Fourth Amendment violation unless the area is one in which there is a 'constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.' " New York v. Class , 475 U.S. 106 , 112, 106 S.Ct. 960 , 89 L.Ed. 2d 81 (1986) (quoting Katz v. United States , 389 U.S. 347 , 360, 88 S.Ct. 507 , 19 L.Ed. 2d 576 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) ).

2018Mapp v. Ohio , 367 U.S. 643 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed. 2d 1081 (1961). "[T]he State's intrusion into a particular area ... cannot result in a Fourth Amendment violation unless the area is one in which there is a 'constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.' " New York v. Class , 475 U.S. 106 , 112, 106 S.Ct. 960 , 89 L.Ed. 2d 81 (1986) (quoting Katz v. United States , 389 U.S. 347 , 360, 88 S.Ct. 507 , 19 L.Ed. 2d 576 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) ).

2003However, numerous Federal Courts have addressed the Fourth Amendment issue as it relates to similar CODIS statutes in neighboring states. “ ‘In Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 307 (4th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 977 . 113 S.Ct. 472 . 121 L.Ed.2d 378 (1992), the Court upheld a similar Virginia statute against a Fourth Amendment challenge, stating: “ ‘ “Thus, in the case of convicted felons who are in custody of the Commonwealth, we find that the minor intrusion caused by the taking of a blood sample is outweighed by Virginia’s interest, as stated in the statute, in determining inmates’ ‘i

2003However, numerous Federal Courts have addressed the Fourth Amendment issue as it relates to similar CODIS statutes in neighboring states. “ ‘In Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 307 (4th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 977 . 113 S.Ct. 472 . 121 L.Ed.2d 378 (1992), the Court upheld a similar Virginia statute against a Fourth Amendment challenge, stating: “ ‘ “Thus, in the case of convicted felons who are in custody of the Commonwealth, we find that the minor intrusion caused by the taking of a blood sample is outweighed by Virginia’s interest, as stated in the statute, in determining inmates’ ‘i

2003In Jones v. Murray, 763 F.Supp. 842 (W.D.Va.1991), and State of Washington v. Olivas, 122 Wash.2d 73 , 856 P.2d 1076 , (1993), DNA statutes were upheld on the basis of a “special needs” exception to the Fourth Amendment requirement. “ ‘In the case sub judice, an argument can be made that officials possessed, at the very least, individualized suspicion.

2003In Jones v. Murray, 763 F.Supp. 842 (W.D.Va.1991), and State of Washington v. Olivas, 122 Wash.2d 73 , 856 P.2d 1076 , (1993), DNA statutes were upheld on the basis of a “special needs” exception to the Fourth Amendment requirement. “ ‘In the case sub judice, an argument can be made that officials possessed, at the very least, individualized suspicion.

2003However, numerous Federal Courts have addressed the Fourth Amendment issue as it relates to similar CODIS statutes in neighboring states. “ ‘In Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 307 (4th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 977 . 113 S.Ct. 472 . 121 L.Ed.2d 378 (1992), the Court upheld a similar Virginia statute against a Fourth Amendment challenge, stating: “ ‘ “Thus, in the case of convicted felons who are in custody of the Commonwealth, we find that the minor intrusion caused by the taking of a blood sample is outweighed by Virginia’s interest, as stated in the statute, in determining inmates’ ‘i

2003However, numerous Federal Courts have addressed the Fourth Amendment issue as it relates to similar CODIS statutes in neighboring states. “ ‘In Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 307 (4th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 977 . 113 S.Ct. 472 . 121 L.Ed.2d 378 (1992), the Court upheld a similar Virginia statute against a Fourth Amendment challenge, stating: “ ‘ “Thus, in the case of convicted felons who are in custody of the Commonwealth, we find that the minor intrusion caused by the taking of a blood sample is outweighed by Virginia’s interest, as stated in the statute, in determining inmates’ ‘i

2003However, numerous Federal Courts have addressed the Fourth Amendment issue as it relates to similar CODIS statutes in neighboring states. “ ‘In Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 307 (4th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 977 . 113 S.Ct. 472 . 121 L.Ed.2d 378 (1992), the Court upheld a similar Virginia statute against a Fourth Amendment challenge, stating: “ ‘ “Thus, in the case of convicted felons who are in custody of the Commonwealth, we find that the minor intrusion caused by the taking of a blood sample is outweighed by Virginia’s interest, as stated in the statute, in determining inmates’ ‘i

2003However, numerous Federal Courts have addressed the Fourth Amendment issue as it relates to similar CODIS statutes in neighboring states. “ ‘In Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 307 (4th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 977 . 113 S.Ct. 472 . 121 L.Ed.2d 378 (1992), the Court upheld a similar Virginia statute against a Fourth Amendment challenge, stating: “ ‘ “Thus, in the case of convicted felons who are in custody of the Commonwealth, we find that the minor intrusion caused by the taking of a blood sample is outweighed by Virginia’s interest, as stated in the statute, in determining inmates’ ‘i

1997"A defendant must also establish a legitimate expectation of privacy in the particular area searched in order for a Fourth Amendment challenge to be allowed." United States v. Meyer , 656 F.2d 979 , 981 (5th Cir. 1981) (quoted in Williams v. State , 601 So.2d 1062 , 1071 (Ala.Cr.App.), aff'd , 662 So.2d 929 (table) (Ala. 1991), cert. denied , 506 U.S. 957 , 113 S.Ct. 417 , 121 L.Ed.2d 340 (1992)).

1997"A defendant must also establish a legitimate expectation of privacy in the particular area searched in order for a Fourth Amendment challenge to be allowed." United States v. Meyer , 656 F.2d 979 , 981 (5th Cir. 1981) (quoted in Williams v. State , 601 So.2d 1062 , 1071 (Ala.Cr.App.), aff'd , 662 So.2d 929 (table) (Ala. 1991), cert. denied , 506 U.S. 957 , 113 S.Ct. 417 , 121 L.Ed.2d 340 (1992)).

2018Importantly, "objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure ...." Harris v. United States , 390 U.S. 234 , 236, 88 S.Ct. 992 , 19 L.Ed. 2d 1067 (1968).

2018Importantly, "objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure ...." Harris v. United States , 390 U.S. 234 , 236, 88 S.Ct. 992 , 19 L.Ed. 2d 1067 (1968).

2018Mapp v. Ohio , 367 U.S. 643 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed. 2d 1081 (1961). "[T]he State's intrusion into a particular area ... cannot result in a Fourth Amendment violation unless the area is one in which there is a 'constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.' " New York v. Class , 475 U.S. 106 , 112, 106 S.Ct. 960 , 89 L.Ed. 2d 81 (1986) (quoting Katz v. United States , 389 U.S. 347 , 360, 88 S.Ct. 507 , 19 L.Ed. 2d 576 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) ).

2018Mapp v. Ohio , 367 U.S. 643 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed. 2d 1081 (1961). "[T]he State's intrusion into a particular area ... cannot result in a Fourth Amendment violation unless the area is one in which there is a 'constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.' " New York v. Class , 475 U.S. 106 , 112, 106 S.Ct. 960 , 89 L.Ed. 2d 81 (1986) (quoting Katz v. United States , 389 U.S. 347 , 360, 88 S.Ct. 507 , 19 L.Ed. 2d 576 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) ).

2018Taking [Harris's] view of the facts as given, the Court of Appeals concluded that Scott's actions could constitute 'deadly force' under Tennessee v. Garner , 471 U.S. 1 [ 105 S.Ct. 1694 , 85 L.Ed.2d 1 ] (1985), and that the use of such force in this context 'would violate [Harris's] constitutional right to be free from excessive force during a seizure.

2018Taking [Harris's] view of the facts as given, the Court of Appeals concluded that Scott's actions could constitute 'deadly force' under Tennessee v. Garner , 471 U.S. 1 [ 105 S.Ct. 1694 , 85 L.Ed.2d 1 ] (1985), and that the use of such force in this context 'would violate [Harris's] constitutional right to be free from excessive force during a seizure.

2018Mapp v. Ohio , 367 U.S. 643 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed. 2d 1081 (1961). "[T]he State's intrusion into a particular area ... cannot result in a Fourth Amendment violation unless the area is one in which there is a 'constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.' " New York v. Class , 475 U.S. 106 , 112, 106 S.Ct. 960 , 89 L.Ed. 2d 81 (1986) (quoting Katz v. United States , 389 U.S. 347 , 360, 88 S.Ct. 507 , 19 L.Ed. 2d 576 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) ).

2018Mapp v. Ohio , 367 U.S. 643 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed. 2d 1081 (1961). "[T]he State's intrusion into a particular area ... cannot result in a Fourth Amendment violation unless the area is one in which there is a 'constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.' " New York v. Class , 475 U.S. 106 , 112, 106 S.Ct. 960 , 89 L.Ed. 2d 81 (1986) (quoting Katz v. United States , 389 U.S. 347 , 360, 88 S.Ct. 507 , 19 L.Ed. 2d 576 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) ).

2007In Elstad , the Supreme Court was discussing the doctrine derived from Wong Sun v. United States , 371 U.S. 471 , 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963), which states that "`a confession obtained through custodial interrogation after an illegal arrest should be excluded unless intervening events break the causal connection between the illegal arrest and the confession so that the confession is "sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint."`" Oregon v. Elstad , 470 U.S. at 306 , 105 S.Ct. 1285 , quoting Taylor v. Alabama , 457 U.S. 687 , 690 , 102 S.Ct. 2664 , 73 L.Ed.2d 314 (1982)

2007In Elstad , the Supreme Court was discussing the doctrine derived from Wong Sun v. United States , 371 U.S. 471 , 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963), which states that "`a confession obtained through custodial interrogation after an illegal arrest should be excluded unless intervening events break the causal connection between the illegal arrest and the confession so that the confession is "sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint."`" Oregon v. Elstad , 470 U.S. at 306 , 105 S.Ct. 1285 , quoting Taylor v. Alabama , 457 U.S. 687 , 690 , 102 S.Ct. 2664 , 73 L.Ed.2d 314 (1982)

2003In Jones v. Murray, 763 F.Supp. 842 (W.D.Va.1991), and State of Washington v. Olivas, 122 Wash.2d 73 , 856 P.2d 1076 , (1993), DNA statutes were upheld on the basis of a “special needs” exception to the Fourth Amendment requirement. “ ‘In the case sub judice, an argument can be made that officials possessed, at the very least, individualized suspicion.

2003In Jones v. Murray, 763 F.Supp. 842 (W.D.Va.1991), and State of Washington v. Olivas, 122 Wash.2d 73 , 856 P.2d 1076 , (1993), DNA statutes were upheld on the basis of a "special needs" exception to the Fourth Amendment requirement. "`In the case sub judice, an argument can be made that officials possessed, at the very least, individualized suspicion.

2003Also, see Kruger v. Erickson, 875 F.Supp. 583 (D.Minn.1995), in which the Court was called upon to address a Fourth Amendment challenge to a Minnesota CODIS statute.

2003Also, see Kruger v. Erickson, 875 F.Supp. 583 (D.Minn.1995), in which the Court was called upon to address a Fourth Amendment challenge to a Minnesota CODIS statute.

2000We stated, in Smith : "`In order to raise a Fourth Amendment claim, a defendant must assert a property or possessory interest in the property searched or seized or must show such an interest as to give him a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched.' Rivers v. State , 666 So.2d 34 , 35 (Ala.Cr.App. 1994).

2000We stated, in Smith : "`In order to raise a Fourth Amendment claim, a defendant must assert a property or possessory interest in the property searched or seized or must show such an interest as to give him a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched.' Rivers v. State , 666 So.2d 34 , 35 (Ala.Cr.App. 1994).

1992Rawlings v. Kentucky , 448 U.S. 98 , 100 S.Ct. 2556 , 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980).

1992Rawlings v. Kentucky , 448 U.S. 98 , 100 S.Ct. 2556 , 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980).

1986“Applying the Fourth Amendment standard of ‘reasonableness,’ the state courts have overwhelmingly concluded that, even if an inventory is characterized as a ‘search,’ the intrusion is constitutionally permissible.” Ibid., 428 U.S. at 569-371 , 96 S.Ct. at 3097-98 , 49 L.Ed.2d at 1005-06 .

1986“Applying the Fourth Amendment standard of ‘reasonableness,’ the state courts have overwhelmingly concluded that, even if an inventory is characterized as a ‘search,’ the intrusion is constitutionally permissible.” Ibid., 428 U.S. at 569-371 , 96 S.Ct. at 3097-98 , 49 L.Ed.2d at 1005-06 .

1986Fifth Amendment voluntariness is "merely a `threshold requirement' for Fourth Amendment analysis." Dunaway , 442 U.S. at 217 , 99 S.Ct. at 2259 , 60 L.Ed.2d at 839 . "[S]tatements given during a period of illegal detention are inadmissible even though voluntarily given if they are the product of the illegal detention and not the result of an independent act of free will." Florida v. Royer , 460 U.S. 491 , 501 , 103 S.Ct. 1319 , 1326 , 75 L.Ed.2d 229 , 238 (1983). "[R]easonable suspicion of crime is insufficient to justify custodial interrogation even though the interrogation is investigative."

1986Fifth Amendment voluntariness is "merely a `threshold requirement' for Fourth Amendment analysis." Dunaway , 442 U.S. at 217 , 99 S.Ct. at 2259 , 60 L.Ed.2d at 839 . "[S]tatements given during a period of illegal detention are inadmissible even though voluntarily given if they are the product of the illegal detention and not the result of an independent act of free will." Florida v. Royer , 460 U.S. 491 , 501 , 103 S.Ct. 1319 , 1326 , 75 L.Ed.2d 229 , 238 (1983). "[R]easonable suspicion of crime is insufficient to justify custodial interrogation even though the interrogation is investigative."

1986Fifth Amendment voluntariness is "merely a `threshold requirement' for Fourth Amendment analysis." Dunaway , 442 U.S. at 217 , 99 S.Ct. at 2259 , 60 L.Ed.2d at 839 . "[S]tatements given during a period of illegal detention are inadmissible even though voluntarily given if they are the product of the illegal detention and not the result of an independent act of free will." Florida v. Royer , 460 U.S. 491 , 501 , 103 S.Ct. 1319 , 1326 , 75 L.Ed.2d 229 , 238 (1983). "[R]easonable suspicion of crime is insufficient to justify custodial interrogation even though the interrogation is investigative."

1986Fifth Amendment voluntariness is "merely a `threshold requirement' for Fourth Amendment analysis." Dunaway , 442 U.S. at 217 , 99 S.Ct. at 2259 , 60 L.Ed.2d at 839 . "[S]tatements given during a period of illegal detention are inadmissible even though voluntarily given if they are the product of the illegal detention and not the result of an independent act of free will." Florida v. Royer , 460 U.S. 491 , 501 , 103 S.Ct. 1319 , 1326 , 75 L.Ed.2d 229 , 238 (1983). "[R]easonable suspicion of crime is insufficient to justify custodial interrogation even though the interrogation is investigative."

2026In time, however, we came to acknowledge the exclusionary rule for what it undoubtedly is--a 'judicially created remedy' of this Court's own making. [United States v.] Calandra, [ 414 U.S. 338 ,] 348 [(1974)].

2026In time, however, we came to acknowledge the exclusionary rule for what it undoubtedly is--a 'judicially created remedy' of this Court's own making. [United States v.] Calandra, [ 414 U.S. 338 ,] 348 [(1974)].

2023Thus, because Strickland requires that counsel's representation meet only "an objective standard of reasonableness," Ex parte Lawley, 512 So. 2d at 1372 , the dispositive question in this case is whether it was objectively unreasonable for McCoy's counsel to fail to raise a Fourth Amendment claim that hinges on a legal question of first impression.

2023Thus, because Strickland requires that counsel's representation meet only "an objective standard of reasonableness," Ex parte Lawley, 512 So. 2d at 1372 , the dispositive question in this case is whether it was objectively unreasonable for McCoy's counsel to fail to raise a Fourth Amendment claim that hinges on a legal question of first impression.