88 Oregon opinions name it 2 courts 1970–2026 13 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Oliver v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2026See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 US 170, 177 , 104 S Ct 1735 , 80 L Ed 2d 214 (1984) (“Since Katz v. United States, [ 389 US 347 , 88 S Ct 507 , 19 L Ed 2d 576 (1967),] the touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis has been whether a person has a con- stitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)). 2026See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 US 170, 177 , 104 S Ct 1735 , 80 L Ed 2d 214 (1984) (“Since Katz v. United States, [ 389 US 347 , 88 S Ct 507 , 19 L Ed 2d 576 (1967),] the touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis has been whether a person has a con- stitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)). | 3 | 3 |
Katz v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2026See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 US 170, 177 , 104 S Ct 1735 , 80 L Ed 2d 214 (1984) (“Since Katz v. United States, [ 389 US 347 , 88 S Ct 507 , 19 L Ed 2d 576 (1967),] the touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis has been whether a person has a con- stitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)). 2026See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 US 170, 177 , 104 S Ct 1735 , 80 L Ed 2d 214 (1984) (“Since Katz v. United States, [ 389 US 347 , 88 S Ct 507 , 19 L Ed 2d 576 (1967),] the touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis has been whether a person has a con- stitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)). | 2 | 5 |
State v. Kinkadegreen2 sentences2021See State v. McKee, 272 Or App 372 , 376 n 2, 356 P3d 651 (2015) (declining to address undeveloped Fourth Amendment claim); State v. Kinkade, 247 Or App 595 , 599 n 1, 270 P3d 371 (2012) (same). 2021See State v. McKee, 272 Or App 372 , 376 n 2, 356 P3d 651 (2015) (declining to address undeveloped Fourth Amendment claim); State v. Kinkade, 247 Or App 595 , 599 n 1, 270 P3d 371 (2012) (same). | 2 | 4 |
Robbins v. Californiared2 sentences2016See, e.g., Robbins v. California, 453 US 420, 426 , 101 S Ct 2841 , 69 L Ed 2d 744 (1981) (placement of property into closed, opaque container manifests “an expectation that the contents would remain free from public examination”); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 US 753, 761 , 99 S Ct 2586 , 61 L Ed 2d 235 (1979) (automo- biles are distinct from closed containers, not only because of their mobility, but also because their use, configuration, and regulation differentiate them for purposes of privacy expec- tations).18 The same is true of the nature and circumstances of the government intrusion that we 2016See, e.g., Robbins v. California, 453 US 420, 426 , 101 S Ct 2841 , 69 L Ed 2d 744 (1981) (placement of property into closed, opaque container manifests “an expectation that the contents would remain free from public examination”); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 US 753, 761 , 99 S Ct 2586 , 61 L Ed 2d 235 (1979) (automo- biles are distinct from closed containers, not only because of their mobility, but also because their use, configuration, and regulation differentiate them for purposes of privacy expec- tations).18 The same is true of the nature and circumstances of the government intrusion that we | 2 | 3 |
State v. Vondehngreen2 sentences2015In Vondehn , we cited Hall once in describing the Court of Appeals’ reasoning, see 348 Or at 465 , but we did not cite Hall afterwards or apply its methodology in determining whether the physical evidence in that case derived from the Miranda violation, see id. at 476. 2015In Vondehn , we cited Hall once in describing the Court of Appeals’ reasoning, see 348 Or at 465 , but we did not cite Hall afterwards or apply its methodology in determining whether the physical evidence in that case derived from the Miranda violation, see id. at 476. | 2 | 3 |
State v. Kreisgreen2 sentences2025See, e.g., State v. Kreis, 365 Or 659, 665 , 451 P3d 954 (2019) (holding that, unlike the Fourth Amendment, rea- sonable suspicion under Article I, section 9, requires an offi- cer to have “a subjective belief that the person stopped has committed, or is about to commit, a crime”); Maciel-Figueroa, 361 Or at 180 (holding that, unlike the Fourth Amendment, Article I, section 9, requires a reasonable suspicion that a person has committed or is about to commit “a specific crime or type of crime”); State v. Dixson/Digby, 307 Or 195, 208 , 766 P2d 1015 (1988) (holding, contrary to the federal rule, 2025See, e.g., State v. Kreis, 365 Or 659, 665 , 451 P3d 954 (2019) (holding that, unlike the Fourth Amendment, rea- sonable suspicion under Article I, section 9, requires an offi- cer to have “a subjective belief that the person stopped has committed, or is about to commit, a crime”); Maciel-Figueroa, 361 Or at 180 (holding that, unlike the Fourth Amendment, Article I, section 9, requires a reasonable suspicion that a person has committed or is about to commit “a specific crime or type of crime”); State v. Dixson/Digby, 307 Or 195, 208 , 766 P2d 1015 (1988) (holding, contrary to the federal rule, | 2 | 2 |
State v. Maciel-Figueroagreen2 sentences2025See, e.g., State v. Kreis, 365 Or 659, 665 , 451 P3d 954 (2019) (holding that, unlike the Fourth Amendment, rea- sonable suspicion under Article I, section 9, requires an offi- cer to have “a subjective belief that the person stopped has committed, or is about to commit, a crime”); Maciel-Figueroa, 361 Or at 180 (holding that, unlike the Fourth Amendment, Article I, section 9, requires a reasonable suspicion that a person has committed or is about to commit “a specific crime or type of crime”); State v. Dixson/Digby, 307 Or 195, 208 , 766 P2d 1015 (1988) (holding, contrary to the federal rule, 2025See, e.g., State v. Kreis, 365 Or 659, 665 , 451 P3d 954 (2019) (holding that, unlike the Fourth Amendment, rea- sonable suspicion under Article I, section 9, requires an offi- cer to have “a subjective belief that the person stopped has committed, or is about to commit, a crime”); Maciel-Figueroa, 361 Or at 180 (holding that, unlike the Fourth Amendment, Article I, section 9, requires a reasonable suspicion that a person has committed or is about to commit “a specific crime or type of crime”); State v. Dixson/Digby, 307 Or 195, 208 , 766 P2d 1015 (1988) (holding, contrary to the federal rule, | 2 | 2 |
United States v. George E. Garciagreen2 sentences2017See, e.g., United States v. Drayton, 536 US 194, 203-05 , 122 S Ct 2105 , 153 L Ed 2d 242 (2002) (voluntariness inquiry focused on reasonableness of police conduct, not on subjective reactions of persons searched); United States v. Garcia, 56 F3d 418, 423 (2d Cir 1995) (stating voluntariness test in terms of whether the police officer “had a reasonable basis for believing that there had been consent to the search”); United States v. Zapata, 997 F2d 751, 759 (10th Cir 1993) (casting doubt on whether person’s subjective characteristics are relevant to voluntariness of person’s consent). 2017See, e.g., United States v. Drayton, 536 US 194, 203-05 , 122 S Ct 2105 , 153 L Ed 2d 242 (2002) (voluntariness inquiry focused on reasonableness of police conduct, not on subjective reactions of persons searched); United States v. Garcia, 56 F3d 418, 423 (2d Cir 1995) (stating voluntariness test in terms of whether the police officer “had a reasonable basis for believing that there had been consent to the search”); United States v. Zapata, 997 F2d 751, 759 (10th Cir 1993) (casting doubt on whether person’s subjective characteristics are relevant to voluntariness of person’s consent). | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Draytongreen2 sentences2017See, e.g., United States v. Drayton, 536 US 194, 203-05 , 122 S Ct 2105 , 153 L Ed 2d 242 (2002) (voluntariness inquiry focused on reasonableness of police conduct, not on subjective reactions of persons searched); United States v. Garcia, 56 F3d 418, 423 (2d Cir 1995) (stating voluntariness test in terms of whether the police officer “had a reasonable basis for believing that there had been consent to the search”); United States v. Zapata, 997 F2d 751, 759 (10th Cir 1993) (casting doubt on whether person’s subjective characteristics are relevant to voluntariness of person’s consent). 2017See, e.g., United States v. Drayton, 536 US 194, 203-05 , 122 S Ct 2105 , 153 L Ed 2d 242 (2002) (voluntariness inquiry focused on reasonableness of police conduct, not on subjective reactions of persons searched); United States v. Garcia, 56 F3d 418, 423 (2d Cir 1995) (stating voluntariness test in terms of whether the police officer “had a reasonable basis for believing that there had been consent to the search”); United States v. Zapata, 997 F2d 751, 759 (10th Cir 1993) (casting doubt on whether person’s subjective characteristics are relevant to voluntariness of person’s consent). | 2 | 2 |
Vernonia School District 47J v. Actongreen2 sentences2016See, e.g., Robbins v. California, 453 US 420, 426 , 101 S Ct 2841 , 69 L Ed 2d 744 (1981) (placement of property into closed, opaque container manifests “an expectation that the contents would remain free from public examination”); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 US 753, 761 , 99 S Ct 2586 , 61 L Ed 2d 235 (1979) (automobiles are distinct from closed containers, not only because of their mobility, but also because their use, configuration, and regulation differentiate them for purposes of privacy expectations). 18 The same is true of the nature and circumstances of the government intrusion that we ha 2016See, e.g., Robbins v. California, 453 US 420, 426 , 101 S Ct 2841 , 69 L Ed 2d 744 (1981) (placement of property into closed, opaque container manifests “an expectation that the contents would remain free from public examination”); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 US 753, 761 , 99 S Ct 2586 , 61 L Ed 2d 235 (1979) (automobiles are distinct from closed containers, not only because of their mobility, but also because their use, configuration, and regulation differentiate them for purposes of privacy expectations). 18 The same is true of the nature and circumstances of the government intrusion that we ha | 2 | 2 |
Sterling v. Cuppgreen2 sentences2016See Sterling v. Cupp, 290 Or 611, 614 , 625 P2d 123 (1981) (describing first-things-first approach). 2016See Sterling v. Cupp, 290 Or 611, 614 , 625 P2d 123 (1981) (describing first-things-first approach). | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Knottsgreen2 sentences2016Rather than turn on an individual’s “right” of privacy, the Fourth Amendment test has both a subjective and an objective component, and thus involves “two discrete questions.” United States v. Knotts, 460 US 276, 280-81 , 103 S Ct 1081 , 75 L Ed 2d 55 (1983) (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 US 735 , 99 S Ct 2577 , 61 L Ed 2d 220 (1979)), rule further clarified in U.S. v. Jones, 774 State v. Newcomb ___ US ___, 132 S Ct 945 , 951-52, 181 L Ed 2d 911 (2012). 2016Rather than turn on an individual’s “right” of privacy, the Fourth Amendment test has both a subjective and an objective component, and thus involves “two discrete questions.” United States v. Knotts, 460 US 276, 280-81 , 103 S Ct 1081 , 75 L Ed 2d 55 (1983) (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 US 735 , 99 S Ct 2577 , 61 L Ed 2d 220 (1979)), rule further clarified in U.S. v. Jones, 774 State v. Newcomb ___ US ___, 132 S Ct 945 , 951-52, 181 L Ed 2d 911 (2012). | 2 | 2 |
Missouri v. Seibertgreen2 sentences2015Dickerson, 530 US at 440-41 ; accord Seibert, 542 US at 612 n 4 (plurality opinion). 2015Dickerson, 530 US at 440-41 ; accord Seibert, 542 US at 612 n 4 (plurality opinion). | 2 | 2 |
| UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Richard J. SMITH, Defendant-Appellantgreen | 2 | 2 |
| State v. Floresgreen | 2 | 2 |
Brown v. Illinoisgreen2 sentences2015Cf. Brown v. Illinois, 422 US 590, 602-03 , 95 S Ct 2254 , 45 L Ed 2d 416 (1975) (explaining that the question whether a statement is the product of a Fifth Amendment violation differs from the question whether it is a product of a Fourth Amendment violation). 2015Cf. Brown v. Illinois, 422 US 590, 602-03 , 95 S Ct 2254 , 45 L Ed 2d 416 (1975) (explaining that the question whether a statement is the product of a Fifth Amendment violation differs from the question whether it is a product of a Fourth Amendment violation). | 1 | 9 |
State v. Dixsongreen2 sentences2009See generally State v. Dixson/Digby, 87 Or.App. 1, 6-7 , 740 P.2d 1224 (1987), rev'd on other grounds, 307 Or. 195 , 766 P.2d 1015 (1988) (addressing constitutional underpinnings of protection of curtilage in context of addressing "open fields" doctrine). [6] See also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601 , 100 S.Ct. 1371 , 63 *351 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980) (emphasizing, for purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis, "the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic"). 2009See generally State v. Dixson/Digby, 87 Or.App. 1, 6-7 , 740 P.2d 1224 (1987), rev'd on other grounds, 307 Or. 195 , 766 P.2d 1015 (1988) (addressing constitutional underpinnings of protection of curtilage in context of addressing "open fields" doctrine). [6] See also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601 , 100 S.Ct. 1371 , 63 *351 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980) (emphasizing, for purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis, "the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic"). | 1 | 3 |
State v. Carseygreen2 sentences2015The court noted precisely that in State v. Carsey, 295 Or 32, 44-45 , 664 P2d 1085 (1983), when it rejected the proposed exception as a matter of Fourth Amendment doctrine, based on then-existing Fourth Amendment case law. 2015The court noted precisely that in State v. Carsey, 295 Or 32, 44-45 , 664 P2d 1085 (1983), when it rejected the proposed exception as a matter of Fourth Amendment doctrine, based on then-existing Fourth Amendment case law. | 1 | 3 |
State v. Bonillagreen2 sentences2022See Bonilla, 358 Or at 486 (“[T]he Fourth Amendment doctrine of apparent authority is based on different principles than those underlying the consent exception under Article I, section 9.”). 2015See, e.g., United States v. Moran, 214 F3d 950, 951 (8th Cir 2000) (declining to “pursue the intricacies of property and agency law” when the decisive question under Rodriguez “is whether the search was ‘unreasonable’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment”); State v. Morse, 156 Wash 2d 1, 12 n 3, 123 P3d 832 (2005) (noting that “apparent authority,” as used under Fourth Amendment, “is quite different than ‘apparent authority’ as used in agency law,” where “apparent authority stems from the principal’s objective manifestation to a third party”). 8 When this court implied in Carsey that act | 1 | 2 |
Loss v. Michigan Attorney Grievance Commissiongreen2 sentences2015See, e.g., State v. Thompson, 328 Or 248 , 254 n 3, 971 P2d 879 , cert den, 527 US 1042 (1999) (explaining that court would not address constitutional claims in the absence of “thorough and focused constitutional analysis”); State v. Kinkade, 247 Or App 595, 599 , 270 P3d 371 (2012) (declining to address Fourth Amendment claim where the defendant made “passing reference in his opening brief to the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution” but did not develop a “separate argument under the federal constitution”). 2013See, e.g., State v. Kinkade, 247 Or App 595, 599 , 270 P3d 371 (2012) (declining to address Fourth Amendment claim where the defendant made “passing reference in his opening brief to the Fourth Amendment” but did not develop a “separate argument under the federal constitution”); State v. Thompson, 328 Or 248 , 254 n 3, 971 P2d 879 , cert den, 527 US 1042 (1999) (explaining that court would not address constitutional claims in the absence of “thorough and focused constitutional analysis”). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Thompsongreen2 sentences2015See, e.g., State v. Thompson, 328 Or 248 , 254 n 3, 971 P2d 879 , cert den, 527 US 1042 (1999) (explaining that court would not address constitutional claims in the absence of “thorough and focused constitutional analysis”); State v. Kinkade, 247 Or App 595, 599 , 270 P3d 371 (2012) (declining to address Fourth Amendment claim where the defendant made “passing reference in his opening brief to the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution” but did not develop a “separate argument under the federal constitution”). 2015See, e.g., State v. Thompson, 328 Or 248 , 254 n 3, 971 P2d 879 , cert den, 527 US 1042 (1999) (explaining that court would not address constitutional claims in the absence of “thorough and focused constitutional analysis”); State v. Kinkade, 247 Or App 595, 599 , 270 P3d 371 (2012) (declining to address Fourth Amendment claim where the defendant made “passing reference in his opening brief to the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution” but did not develop a “separate argument under the federal constitution”). | 1 | 2 |
| Payton v. New Yorkgreen | 1 | 2 |
| Florida v. Wellsgreen | 1 | 2 |
| United States v. Ramirezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. McKeegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Walter v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Grossgreen | 1 | 1 |
| North v. Cuppgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Steven D. Morangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Eads v. Bormangreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Jacksongreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Baileygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Richards v. Wisconsingreen | 1 | 1 |
| Brigham City v. Stuartgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Campbell
green
2 sentences2006In fact, the Fourth Amendment analysis of whether police conduct amounts to a violation of a person's privacy differs significantly from the analysis under Article I, section 9, id. at 170-71 , 759 P.2d 1040 , and whether or not the kind of police conduct that occurred in Purvis implicates Article I, section 9, is an open question. 2006In fact, the Fourth Amendment analysis of whether police conduct amounts to a violation of a person's privacy differs significantly from the analysis under Article I, section 9, id. at 170-71 , 759 P.2d 1040 , and whether or not the kind of police conduct that occurred in Purvis implicates Article I, section 9, is an open question. | 3 | 1988–2006 |
State v. Caraher
green
2 sentences1990In State v. Caraher, 293 Or. 741 , 653 P.2d 942 (1982), the Supreme Court rejected the rule of uniformity with Fourth Amendment analysis that had been adopted in State v. Florance, 270 Or. 169 , 527 P.2d 1202 (1974), and stated that Oregon courts are free to impose on searches and seizures under our own constitution higher standards than are required by the federal constitution. 1990In State v. Caraher, 293 Or. 741 , 653 P.2d 942 (1982), the Supreme Court rejected the rule of uniformity with Fourth Amendment analysis that had been adopted in State v. Florance, 270 Or. 169 , 527 P.2d 1202 (1974), and stated that Oregon courts are free to impose on searches and seizures under our own constitution higher standards than are required by the federal constitution. | 3 | 1986–1990 |
State v. Atkinson
green
2 sentences2025This distinction was later reinforced in Atkinson, where we noted that an inventory conducted pursuant to a lawfully promulgated inventory policy was not “inherently ‘unreasonable’ within the meaning of Article I, section 9.” Atkinson, 298 Or at 8 . 2025This distinction was later reinforced in Atkinson, where we noted that an inventory conducted pursuant to a lawfully promulgated inventory policy was not “inherently ‘unreasonable’ within the meaning of Article I, section 9.” Atkinson, 298 Or at 8 . | 2 | 2025–2025 |
United States v. Matlock
green
2 sentences2018That rule was first announced as a Fourth Amendment principle in Matlock , 415 U.S. at 170 -71 , 94 S.Ct. 988 *728 . 2018That rule was first announced as a Fourth Amendment principle in Matlock , 415 U.S. at 170 -71 , 94 S.Ct. 988 *728 . | 2 | 1994–2018 |
Illinois v. Rodriguez
green
2 sentences2017Id. 2015Id. at 182 . | 2 | 2015–2017 |
United States v. Jones
green
2 sentences2016Rather than turn on an individual’s “right” of privacy, the Fourth Amendment test has both a subjective and an objective component, and thus involves “two discrete questions.” United States v. Knotts, 460 US 276, 280-81 , 103 S Ct 1081 , 75 L Ed 2d 55 (1983) (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 US 735 , 99 S Ct 2577 , 61 L Ed 2d 220 (1979)), rule further clarified in U.S. v. Jones, 774 State v. Newcomb ___ US ___, 132 S Ct 945 , 951-52, 181 L Ed 2d 911 (2012). 2016Rather than turn on an individual’s “right” of privacy, the Fourth Amendment test has both a subjective and an objective component, and thus involves “two discrete questions.” United States v. Knotts, 460 US 276, 280-81 , 103 S Ct 1081 , 75 L Ed 2d 55 (1983) (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 US 735 , 99 S Ct 2577 , 61 L Ed 2d 220 (1979)), rule further clarified in U.S. v. Jones, 774 State v. Newcomb ___ US ___, 132 S Ct 945 , 951-52, 181 L Ed 2d 911 (2012). | 2 | 2016–2016 |
Smith v. Maryland
red
2 sentences2016Rather than turn on an individual’s “right” of privacy, the Fourth Amendment test has both a subjective and an objective component, and thus involves “two discrete questions.” United States v. Knotts, 460 US 276, 280-81 , 103 S Ct 1081 , 75 L Ed 2d 55 (1983) (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 US 735 , 99 S Ct 2577 , 61 L Ed 2d 220 (1979)), rule further clarified in U.S. v. Jones, 774 State v. Newcomb ___ US ___, 132 S Ct 945 , 951-52, 181 L Ed 2d 911 (2012). 2016Rather than turn on an individual’s “right” of privacy, the Fourth Amendment test has both a subjective and an objective component, and thus involves “two discrete questions.” United States v. Knotts, 460 US 276, 280-81 , 103 S Ct 1081 , 75 L Ed 2d 55 (1983) (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 US 735 , 99 S Ct 2577 , 61 L Ed 2d 220 (1979)), rule further clarified in U.S. v. Jones, 774 State v. Newcomb ___ US ___, 132 S Ct 945 , 951-52, 181 L Ed 2d 911 (2012). | 2 | 2016–2016 |
Arkansas v. Sanders
red
2 sentences2016See, e.g., Robbins v. California, 453 US 420, 426 , 101 S Ct 2841 , 69 L Ed 2d 744 (1981) (placement of property into closed, opaque container manifests “an expectation that the contents would remain free from public examination”); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 US 753, 761 , 99 S Ct 2586 , 61 L Ed 2d 235 (1979) (automo- biles are distinct from closed containers, not only because of their mobility, but also because their use, configuration, and regulation differentiate them for purposes of privacy expec- tations).18 The same is true of the nature and circumstances of the government intrusion that we 2016See, e.g., Robbins v. California, 453 US 420, 426 , 101 S Ct 2841 , 69 L Ed 2d 744 (1981) (placement of property into closed, opaque container manifests “an expectation that the contents would remain free from public examination”); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 US 753, 761 , 99 S Ct 2586 , 61 L Ed 2d 235 (1979) (automo- biles are distinct from closed containers, not only because of their mobility, but also because their use, configuration, and regulation differentiate them for purposes of privacy expec- tations).18 The same is true of the nature and circumstances of the government intrusion that we | 2 | 2016–2016 |
Dickerson v. United States
red
2 sentences2015Dickerson, 530 US at 440-41 ; accord Seibert, 542 US at 612 n 4 (plurality opinion). 2015Dickerson, 530 US at 440-41 ; accord Seibert, 542 US at 612 n 4 (plurality opinion). | 2 | 2015–2015 |
Mapp v. Ohio
green
2 sentences2015The United States Supreme Court had held a year and a half earlier in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 US 643 , 81 S Ct 1684 , 6 L Ed 2d 1081 (1961), that the Fourth Amendment applied to the states, and the challenged search was a garden variety Fourth Amendment violation. 2015The United States Supreme Court had held a year and a half earlier in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 US 643 , 81 S Ct 1684 , 6 L Ed 2d 1081 (1961), that the Fourth Amendment applied to the states, and the challenged search was a garden variety Fourth Amendment violation. | 2 | 1981–2015 |
| State v. Hall green | 2 | 2013–2015 |
State v. Unger
green
2 sentences2015Given the state’s concession that defendant was unlawfully seized without reasonable suspicion, the state had the burden under either constitutional provision to demonstrate that the evidence in question was “independent of, or only tenuously related to, the illegal police conduct.” State v. Unger, 356 Or 59, 84 , 333 P3d 1009 (2014); see State v. Bailey, 356 Or 486, 508 , 338 P3d 702 (2014) (in a Fourth Amendment analysis, the state has the “burden to establish attenuation”); State v. Jackson, 268 Or App 139, 151 , 342 P3d 119 (2014) (“Whenever the state has obtained evidence following the vi 2015Given the state’s concession that defendant was unlawfully seized without reasonable suspicion, the state had the burden under either constitutional provision to demonstrate that the evidence in question was “independent of, or only tenuously related to, the illegal police conduct.” State v. Unger, 356 Or 59, 84 , 333 P3d 1009 (2014); see State v. Bailey, 356 Or 486, 508 , 338 P3d 702 (2014) (in a Fourth Amendment analysis, the state has the “burden to establish attenuation”); State v. Jackson, 268 Or App 139, 151 , 342 P3d 119 (2014) (“Whenever the state has obtained evidence following the vi | 2 | 2014–2015 |
| State Ex Rel. Juvenile Department v. Rogers green | 2 | 2014–2014 |
| United States v. Crews green | 2 | 2014–2014 |
| Dunaway v. New York green | 2 | 2014–2014 |
| Coolidge v. New Hampshire green | 2 | 1980–2010 |
| Franks v. Delaware green | 2 | 1988–1992 |
| State v. Florance green | 2 | 1987–1990 |
| State v. Tanner green | 2 | 1988–1990 |
| Aguilar v. Texas red | 2 | 1970–1988 |
| Spinelli v. United States red | 2 | 1970–1988 |
| Mincey v. Arizona green | 2 | 1980–1985 |
| Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc. green | 2 | 1980–1980 |
| State v. Gaines green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Carpenter v. United States green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Mitchell v. Wisconsin green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Missouri v. McNeely green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Mitchell v. Wisconsin green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Bell v. Wolfish green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| State v. Miller green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| State v. Newcomb green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Heien v. North Carolina green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Maryland v. King green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| State v. Evans green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| State v. Wacker green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| State v. Anspach green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Haynes v. Cupp green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| State v. Morse green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| United States v. Borowy green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Murray v. United States green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.