130 Kansas opinions name it 2 courts 1973–2026 12 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kansas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Leongreen2 sentences2014See Leon, 468 U.S. at 906-07 (sanction for a Fourth Amendment violation should weigh the costs and benefits of preventing the prosecution’s use of illegally seized evidence). 2014See Leon, 468 U.S. at 906-07 (sanction for a Fourth Amendment violation should weigh the costs and benefits of preventing the prosecution’s use of illegally seized evidence). | 4 | 8 |
State v. Thompsongreen2 sentences2013See State v. Thompson, 284 Kan. 763, 772, 779-80 , 166 P.3d 1015 (2007). “[A] person is seized, thereby triggering a Fourth Amendment analysis of the police action, when an officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.’ ” State v. Morris, 276 Kan. 11, 17 , 72 P.3d 570 (2003) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 19 n.16, 88 S. Ct. 1868 , 20 L. 2013See State v. Thompson, 284 Kan. 763, 772, 779-80 , 166 P.3d 1015 (2007). “[A] person is seized, thereby triggering a Fourth Amendment analysis of the police action, when an officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.’ ” State v. Morris, 276 Kan. 11, 17 , 72 P.3d 570 (2003) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 19 n.16, 88 S. Ct. 1868 , 20 L. | 3 | 4 |
United States v. Manuel Melendez-Garciagreen2 sentences2001U.S. v. Melendez-Garcia, 28 F.3d 1046, 1053 (10th Cir. 1994).” Grace argues consent was obtained during the illegal detention and was a product of the illegal detention; there were no intervening events separating the detention from the consent; and the officers had no justification for unlawfully detaining him or for the search following the detention. 2001U.S. v. Melendez-Garcia, 28 F.3d 1046, 1053 (10th Cir. 1994).” Grace argues consent was obtained during the illegal detention and was a product of the illegal detention; there were no intervening events separating the detention from the consent; and the officers had no justification for unlawfully detaining him or for the search following the detention. | 3 | 3 |
United States v. Hilario Mendoza-Salgado, United States of America v. Ramon Edwardo Garciagreen2 sentences2001U.S. v. Mendoza-Salgado, 964 F.2d 993, 1011 (10th Cir. 1992).” 20 Kan. 2001U.S. v. Mendoza-Salgado, 964 F.2d 993, 1011 (10th Cir. 1992).” 20 Kan. | 3 | 3 |
Terry v. Ohiogreen2 sentences2013The Totality of the Circumstances Test An encounter is no longer voluntary and “a person is seized, thereby triggering a Fourth Amendment analysis of the police action, when an officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.’ ” Morris, 276 Kan. at 17 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 19 n.16, 88 S. Ct. 1868 , 20 L. 2013The Totality of the Circumstances Test An encounter is no longer voluntary and “a person is seized, thereby triggering a Fourth Amendment analysis of the police action, when an officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.’ ” Morris, 276 Kan. at 17 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 19 n.16, 88 S. Ct. 1868 , 20 L. | 2 | 7 |
Florida v. Royergreen2 sentences2007Although the Court suppressed the evidence under the facts, the Court emphasized the contextual nature of a Fourth Amendment analysis: “We do not suggest that there is a litmus-paper test for distinguishing a consensual encounter from a seizure or for determining when a seizure exceeds the bounds of an investigative stop. . . . [T]here will be endless variations in the facts and circumstances, so much variation that it is unlikely that the courts can reduce to a sentence or a paragraph a rule that will provide unarguable answers to the question whether there has been an unreasonable search or 2007Although the Court suppressed the evidence under the facts, the Court emphasized the contextual nature of a Fourth Amendment analysis: “We do not suggest that there is a litmus-paper test for distinguishing a consensual encounter from a seizure or for determining when a seizure exceeds the bounds of an investigative stop. . . . [T]here will be endless variations in the facts and circumstances, so much variation that it is unlikely that the courts can reduce to a sentence or a paragraph a rule that will provide unarguable answers to the question whether there has been an unreasonable search or | 2 | 3 |
In Re IJgreen2 sentences2019See, e.g., United States v. Kim, 292 F.3d 969, 975 (9th Cir. 2002) ("[W]hether an individual . . . has been unreasonably seized for Fourth Amendment purposes and whether that individual is 'in custody' for Miranda purposes are two different issues."); 11 see also In re I.J., 906 A.2d 249 , 257 (D.C. 2006) ("[T]he Fourth Amendment inquiry is not the same as, nor does it ultimately decide, the question of whether there was custody under the Fifth Amendment."); accord United States v. Acosta, 363 F.3d 1141, 1148-50 (11th Cir. 2004). 2019See, e.g., **1253 United States v. Kim , 292 F.3d 969 , 975 (9th Cir. 2002) ("[W]hether an individual ... has been unreasonably seized for Fourth Amendment purposes and whether that individual is 'in custody' for Miranda purposes are two different issues."); see also In re I.J. , 906 A.2d 249 , 257 (D.C. 2006) ("[T]he Fourth Amendment inquiry is not the same as, nor does it ultimately decide, the question of whether there was custody under the Fifth Amendment."); accord United States v. Acosta , 363 F.3d 1141 , 1148-50 (11th Cir. 2004). | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Insook Kim, AKA in Sook Kimgreen2 sentences2019See, e.g., United States v. Kim, 292 F.3d 969, 975 (9th Cir. 2002) ("[W]hether an individual . . . has been unreasonably seized for Fourth Amendment purposes and whether that individual is 'in custody' for Miranda purposes are two different issues."); 11 see also In re I.J., 906 A.2d 249 , 257 (D.C. 2006) ("[T]he Fourth Amendment inquiry is not the same as, nor does it ultimately decide, the question of whether there was custody under the Fifth Amendment."); accord United States v. Acosta, 363 F.3d 1141, 1148-50 (11th Cir. 2004). 2019See, e.g., **1253 United States v. Kim , 292 F.3d 969 , 975 (9th Cir. 2002) ("[W]hether an individual ... has been unreasonably seized for Fourth Amendment purposes and whether that individual is 'in custody' for Miranda purposes are two different issues."); see also In re I.J. , 906 A.2d 249 , 257 (D.C. 2006) ("[T]he Fourth Amendment inquiry is not the same as, nor does it ultimately decide, the question of whether there was custody under the Fifth Amendment."); accord United States v. Acosta , 363 F.3d 1141 , 1148-50 (11th Cir. 2004). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Jamesgreen2 sentences2016See State v. James, 301 Kan. 898, 910 , 349 P.3d 457 (2015) (where case turns on Fourth Amendment analysis, constitutional error may be declared harmless when party benefitting from error demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt that error did affect outcome of trial in light of the entire record). 2016See State v. James, 301 Kan. 898, 910 , 349 P.3d 457 (2015) (where case turns on Fourth Amendment analysis, constitutional error may be declared harmless when party benefitting from error demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt that error did affect outcome of trial in light of the entire record). | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Mabrygreen2 sentences2016Although Samson focused on the legality of a California statute, it has been interpreted as standing for the proposition that "'[t]he Fourth Amendment does not prohibit a police officer from conducting a suspicionless search of a parolee' when such a search is authorized by state law. [Citation omitted.]" (Emphasis added.) United States v. Mabry, 728 F.3d 1163, 1167 (10th Cir. 2013), cert. denied 134 S. Ct. 1354 (2014). 2016Although Samson focused on the legality of a California statute, it has been interpreted as standing for the proposition that “’[t]he Fourth Amendment does not prohibit a police officer from conducting a suspicionless search of a parolee’ when such a search is authorized by state law. [Citation omitted.]” (Emphasis added.) United States v. Mabry, 728 F.3d 1163, 1167 (10th Cir. 2013), cert. denied 134 S. Ct. 1354 (2014). | 2 | 2 |
| United States v. John E. Parkergreen | 2 | 2 |
| United States v. Timothy D. Wilburn, Sr.green | 2 | 2 |
State v. Estrada-Vitalgreen2 sentences2026See Estrada-Vital, 302 Kan. at 557-58 (rejecting the defendant's suggestion that "the State must refute all possible theories of unlawfulness that might flow from the stated facts, and . . . that the district court is expected to connect the dots between the stated facts in order to intuit the defense's theory of how they constitute a Fourth Amendment violation"). 2026See Estrada-Vital, 302 Kan. at 557-58 (rejecting the defendant's suggestion that "the State must refute all possible theories of unlawfulness that might flow from the stated facts, and . . . that the district court is expected to connect the dots between the stated facts in order to intuit the defense's theory of how they constitute a Fourth Amendment violation"). | 1 | 3 |
State v. Eppersongreen2 sentences2020See State v. Epperson, 237 Kan. 707, 718-19 , 703 P.2d 761 (1985) (evidence discovered as result of Fourth Amendment violation subject to exclusion as fruit of poisonous tree). 2020See State v. Epperson, 237 Kan. 707, 718-19 , 703 P.2d 761 (1985) (evidence discovered as result of Fourth Amendment violation subject to exclusion as fruit of poisonous tree). | 1 | 3 |
State v. Morrisgreen2 sentences2013The Totality of the Circumstances Test An encounter is no longer voluntary and “a person is seized, thereby triggering a Fourth Amendment analysis of the police action, when an officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.’ ” Morris, 276 Kan. at 17 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 19 n.16, 88 S. Ct. 1868 , 20 L. 2013The Totality of the Circumstances Test An encounter is no longer voluntary and “a person is seized, thereby triggering a Fourth Amendment analysis of the police action, when an officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.’ ” Morris, 276 Kan. at 17 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 19 n.16, 88 S. Ct. 1868 , 20 L. | 1 | 3 |
Brendlin v. Californiagreen2 sentences2007The Court stated: "Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis." 517 U.S. at 813 , 116 S.Ct. 1769 ; see also Brendlin v. California, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 2400 , 168 L.Ed.2d 132, 141-42 (2007) (rejecting analysis that passenger was not seized because officer's subjective intent in stopping car did not focus on passenger). 2007The Court stated: "Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis." 517 U.S. at 813 , 116 S.Ct. 1769 ; see also Brendlin v. California, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 2400 , 168 L.Ed.2d 132, 141-42 (2007) (rejecting analysis that passenger was not seized because officer's subjective intent in stopping car did not focus on passenger). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2019See State v. Williams , 297 Kan. 370 , 380, 300 P.3d 1072 (2013) (holding under Fourth Amendment analysis that circumstance of law enforcement encounter occurring at 2:30 a.m. on a deserted sidewalk would contribute to a belief that defendant was not free to leave). 2019See State v. Williams , 297 Kan. 370 , 380, 300 P.3d 1072 (2013) (holding under Fourth Amendment analysis that circumstance of law enforcement encounter occurring at 2:30 a.m. on a deserted sidewalk would contribute to a belief that defendant was not free to leave). | 1 | 2 |
| Davis v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 2 |
| Rakas v. Illinoisgreen | 1 | 2 |
| State v. Tatrogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Smith v. Marylandred | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Moretzgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Knowles v. Mirzayancegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Grueninger v. Director, Virginia Department of Correctionsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Patanegreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Kornegaygreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Shannon Rajda / State v. Albert Lee Lape, Jr.green | 1 | 1 |
| Kenneth D. Widgren, Jr. And Kenneth D. Widgren, Sr. v. Maple Grove Township H. Wayne Beldo Louis Lenz, Jr.green | 1 | 1 |
| Brown v. Illinoisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Mosleygreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Jorge Nicolas Acostagreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Sotogreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Sotogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Montoya v. Tecolote Land Grantgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Poultongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Eppersongreen2 sentences2020See State v. Epperson, 237 Kan. 707, 718-19 , 703 P.2d 761 (1985) (evidence discovered as result of Fourth Amendment violation subject to exclusion as fruit of poisonous tree). 2020See State v. Epperson, 237 Kan. 707, 718-19 , 703 P.2d 761 (1985) (evidence discovered as result of Fourth Amendment violation subject to exclusion as fruit of poisonous tree). | 1 | 3 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Crowder
green
2 sentences2002“This analysis requires consideration of the proximity in time of the Fourth Amendment violation and tire consent, intervening circumstances, and particularly the 'purpose and flagrancy’ of the officers’ misconduct. [Citation omitted.]” Crowder, 20 Kan. 2002“This analysis requires consideration of the proximity in time of the Fourth Amendment violation and tire consent, intervening circumstances, and particularly the 'purpose and flagrancy’ of the officers’ misconduct. [Citation omitted.]” Crowder, 20 Kan. | 5 | 1997–2002 |
Herring v. United States
green
2 sentences2010But as the Court noted in Herring , “The fact that a Fourth Amendment violation occurred — i.e., that a search or arrest was unreasonable — does not necessarily mean that the exclusionary rule applies.” 555 U.S. at 140 . 2010But as the Court noted in Herring , “The fact that a Fourth Amendment violation occurred — i.e., that a search or arrest was unreasonable — does not necessarily mean that the exclusionary rule applies.” 555 U.S. at 140 . | 4 | 2010–2022 |
Simmons v. United States
green
2 sentences2014On appeal, the Supreme Court explained that if the defendant’s testimony at the motion hearing was admissible at trial, the defendant was forced to either “give up” a potentially valid Fourth Amendment challenge by not testifying or “waive” his Fifth Amendment constitutional right against self-incrimination by having the testimony admitted against him at trial. 390 U.S. at 393-94 . 2006The Supreme Court agreed, stating that the defendant "was obliged to either give up what he believed, with advice of counsel, to be a valid Fourth Amendment claim or, in legal effect, to waive his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination." 390 U.S. at 394 . | 4 | 2005–2014 |
Whren v. United States
green
2 sentences2013In Devenpeck , the Court repeated its often-stated articulation of the objective standard governing Fourth Amendment analysis: “ ‘ “[T]he fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer’s action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.” ’ ” 543 U.S. at 153 (quoting Whren, 517 U.S. at 813 . 2008Categorically stating its “unwilling[ness] to entertain Fourth Amendment challenges based on the actual motivations of individual officers,” Whren held unanimously that “[sjubjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.” 517 U.S. at 813 . “[Ijndeed, Whren itself relied on United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 [, 38 L. | 4 | 1998–2013 |
State v. Mendez
green
2 sentences2006In State v. Mendez, 275 Kan. 412, 421 , 66 P.3d 811 (2003), we stated: “There are several recognized exceptions to the Fourth Amendment requirement of a lawfully issued search warrant. 2006In State v. Mendez, 275 Kan. 412, 421 , 66 P.3d 811 (2003), we stated: “There are several recognized exceptions to the Fourth Amendment requirement of a lawfully issued search warrant. | 4 | 2004–2007 |
Mapp v. Ohio
green
2 sentences2013Ed. 2d 677 (1984) (“The Court has, to be sure, not seriously questioned, "in the absence of a more efficacious sanction, the continued application of the rule to suppress evidence from the [prosecution’s] case where a Fourth Amendment violation has been substantial and deliberate.’ ”); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-55 , 81 S. Ct. 1684 , 6 L. 2013Ed. 2d 677 (1984) (“The Court has, to be sure, not seriously questioned, "in the absence of a more efficacious sanction, the continued application of the rule to suppress evidence from the [prosecution’s] case where a Fourth Amendment violation has been substantial and deliberate.’ ”); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-55 , 81 S. Ct. 1684 , 6 L. | 3 | 2010–2013 |
State v. Rice
green
2 sentences2006Factors to be considered in determining whether consent purged the taint of an illegal detention are “ ‘the proximity in time of the Fourth Amendment violation and the consent, intervening circumstances, and particularly the “purpose and flagrancy” of the officers’ misconduct.’ [Citations omitted.]” State v. Rice, 264 Kan. 232, 242 , 955 P.2d 1258 (1998). 2006Factors to be considered in determining whether consent purged the taint of an illegal detention are “ ‘the proximity in time of the Fourth Amendment violation and the consent, intervening circumstances, and particularly the “purpose and flagrancy” of the officers’ misconduct.’ [Citations omitted.]” State v. Rice, 264 Kan. 232, 242 , 955 P.2d 1258 (1998). | 3 | 2001–2007 |
Alderman v. United States
green
2 sentences2004“The established principle is that suppression of the product of a Fourth Amendment violation can be successfully urged only by those whose rights were violated by the search itself, not by those who are aggrieved solely by the introduction of damaging evidence.” Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 171-72 , 22 L. 2004“The established principle is that suppression of the product of a Fourth Amendment violation can be successfully urged only by those whose rights were violated by the search itself, not by those who are aggrieved solely by the introduction of damaging evidence.” Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 171-72 , 22 L. | 3 | 1980–2004 |
New Jersey v. T. L. O.
green
2 sentences2003App. 2d at 815 : “Although our appellate courts also frequently refer generally to ‘reasonableness’ as the guiding principle of Fourth Amendment analysis, see, e.g., In re L.A., 270 Kan. 879 , 21 P.3d 952 (2001) (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 , 83 L. 2003App. 2d at 815 : “Although our appellate courts also frequently refer generally to ‘reasonableness’ as the guiding principle of Fourth Amendment analysis, see, e.g., In re L.A., 270 Kan. 879 , 21 P.3d 952 (2001) (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 , 83 L. | 3 | 1988–2003 |
Devenpeck v. Alford
green
2 sentences2013In Devenpeck , the Court repeated its often-stated articulation of the objective standard governing Fourth Amendment analysis: “ ‘ “[T]he fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer’s action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.” ’ ” 543 U.S. at 153 (quoting Whren, 517 U.S. at 813 . 2013The Court found no Fourth Amendment violation although Alford had never been arrested or charged with impersonating an officer or with obstruction. 543 U.S. at 153 . | 2 | 2013–2020 |
Wong Sun v. United States
green
2 sentences2019Given this direct causal connection, the eventual development of probable cause would not trigger the attenuation doctrine." Gaines , 918 F.3d at 802 (citing Wong Sun v. United States , 371 U.S. 471 , 487-88, 83 S. Ct. 407 , 9 L. 2019Given this direct causal connection, the eventual development of probable cause would not trigger the attenuation doctrine." Gaines , 918 F.3d at 802 (citing Wong Sun v. United States , 371 U.S. 471 , 487-88, 83 S. Ct. 407 , 9 L. | 2 | 1981–2019 |
Martin v. Kansas Department of Revenue
green
2 sentences2019The court held that in view of the fact that a driver's license is a privilege rather than a right, the exclusion of a Fourth Amendment claim as an issue that can be decided at an administrative suspension hearing under K.S.A. 8-1020(h)(2) does not violate procedural due process. 285 Kan. at 633 , 176 P.3d 938 . 2019The court held that in view of the fact that a driver's license is a privilege rather than a right, the exclusion of a Fourth Amendment claim as an issue that can be decided at an administrative suspension hearing under K.S.A. 8-1020(h)(2) does not violate procedural due process. 285 Kan. at 633 , 176 P.3d 938 . | 2 | 2013–2019 |
State v. Ryce
green
2 sentences2017More specifically, he argues the law enforcement officer coerced his consent by advising him, as the law required at that time, that if he refused consent "you may be charged with a separate crime of refusing to submit to a test to determine the presence of alcohol or drugs, which carries criminal penalties equal to or greater than those for the crime of driving under the influence." In State v. Ryce, 303 Kan. 899 , 368 P.3d 342 (2016) (Ryce I), we discussed K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 8-1025, which provides for the separate crime of refusal to submit that was referenced by law enforcement's advisory wa 2017More specifically, he argues the law enforcement officer coerced his consent by advising him, as the law required at that time, that if he refused consent "you may be charged with a separate crime of refusing to submit to a test to determine the presence of alcohol or drugs, which carries criminal penalties equal to or greater than those for the crime of driving under the influence." In State v. Ryce, 303 Kan. 899 , 368 P.3d 342 (2016) (Ryce I), we discussed K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 8-1025, which provides for the separate crime of refusal to submit that was referenced by law enforcement's advisory wa | 2 | 2016–2017 |
Mattox v. United States
neutral
2 sentences2016Although Samson focused on the legality of a California statute, it has been interpreted as standing for the proposition that "'[t]he Fourth Amendment does not prohibit a police officer from conducting a suspicionless search of a parolee' when such a search is authorized by state law. [Citation omitted.]" (Emphasis added.) United States v. Mabry, 728 F.3d 1163, 1167 (10th Cir. 2013), cert. denied 134 S. Ct. 1354 (2014). 2016Although Samson focused on the legality of a California statute, it has been interpreted as standing for the proposition that “’[t]he Fourth Amendment does not prohibit a police officer from conducting a suspicionless search of a parolee’ when such a search is authorized by state law. [Citation omitted.]” (Emphasis added.) United States v. Mabry, 728 F.3d 1163, 1167 (10th Cir. 2013), cert. denied 134 S. Ct. 1354 (2014). | 2 | 2016–2016 |
Illinois v. Krull
green
2 sentences2014Therefore, its application is “ ‘restricted to those situations in which its remedial purpose is effectively advanced.’ ” 291 Kan. at 496 (quoting Krull, 480 U.S. at 347 ). “[Q]uestions regarding whether evidence should be excluded as a sanction for a Fourth Amendment violation should be answered by weighing the costs and benefits of preventing the prosecution’s use of illegally obtained evidence.” 291 Kan. at 497 (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 907 ); see also Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 236-37 , 131 S. Ct. 2419 , 180 L. 2014Therefore, its application is “ ‘restricted to those situations in which its remedial purpose is effectively advanced.’ ” 291 Kan. at 496 (quoting Krull, 480 U.S. at 347 ). “[Q]uestions regarding whether evidence should be excluded as a sanction for a Fourth Amendment violation should be answered by weighing the costs and benefits of preventing the prosecution’s use of illegally obtained evidence.” 291 Kan. at 497 (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 907 ); see also Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 236-37 , 131 S. Ct. 2419 , 180 L. | 2 | 2011–2014 |
| United States v. David Lee Green green | 2 | 2010–2010 |
| United States v. Gonzalo Uscanga-Ramirez green | 2 | 2007–2009 |
| State v. Kermoade green | 2 | 2006–2007 |
| Oliver v. United States green | 2 | 1989–2006 |
| Katz v. United States green | 2 | 1993–2006 |
| State v. Baughman green | 2 | 2003–2006 |
| State v. Schmitter green | 2 | 2001–2005 |
| State v. Jones green | 2 | 2004–2004 |
| In Re LA green | 2 | 2001–2003 |
| State v. Jones green | 2 | 2001–2003 |
| Ohio v. Robinette green | 2 | 1997–1998 |
| Jones v. United States red | 2 | 1980–1991 |
| United States v. Dionisio green | 2 | 1973–1979 |
| Kyllo v. United States green | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| Illinois v. Gates green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| State v. Scheuerman green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| State v. Ellis green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Hudson v. Michigan green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| State v. Powell green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| United States of America, Cross-Appellant/appellee v. Thomas Jeffrey Raines, Appellant/cross-Appellee green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| State v. Gray green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Kimmelman v. Morrison green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| State v. Martinez green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| United States v. Gaines green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| United States v. Sharpe green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.