Fourth Amendment violation in Arizona

2018See, e.g., Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105 (1980) (rejecting a defendant’s Fourth Amendment claim when he had no “right to exclude other persons from access” to a friend’s purse into which he had placed drugs); Rakas, 439 U.S. at 148-49 (denying Fourth Amendment protection to defendants who “asserted neither a property nor a possessory interest in [an] automobile” and had no right to exclude others from the areas searched); Lyall, 807 F.3d at 1188 , 1189 & n.10 (in evaluating 8 STATE V.

2018See, e.g., Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105 (1980) (rejecting a defendant’s Fourth Amendment claim when he had no “right to exclude other persons from access” to a friend’s purse into which he had placed drugs); Rakas, 439 U.S. at 148-49 (denying Fourth Amendment protection to defendants who “asserted neither a property nor a possessory interest in [an] automobile” and had no right to exclude others from the areas searched); Lyall, 807 F.3d at 1188 , 1189 & n.10 (in evaluating 8 STATE V.

2018Cf. Whren v. United States , 517 U.S. 806 , 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769 , 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) ("Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis."). ¶ 10 Taylor is likewise distinguishable, as it did not concern any question of a delay.

2018Cf. Whren v. United States , 517 U.S. 806 , 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769 , 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) ("Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis."). ¶ 10 Taylor is likewise distinguishable, as it did not concern any question of a delay.

2024He argues that the Trooper lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct a drug investigation after the traffic stop concluded, and that the Trooper unreasonably prolonged the traffic stop to perform the dog sniff. ¶17 "In reviewing a trial court's decision on a motion to suppress evidence based on an alleged Fourth Amendment violation, we defer to the trial court's factual findings . . . but we review de novo mixed questions of law and fact and the trial court's ultimate legal conclusions as to whether the totality of the circumstances warranted an investigative detention and whether its duration wa

2024He argues that the Trooper lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct a drug investigation after the traffic stop concluded, and that the Trooper unreasonably prolonged the traffic stop to perform the dog sniff. ¶17 "In reviewing a trial court's decision on a motion to suppress evidence based on an alleged Fourth Amendment violation, we defer to the trial court's factual findings . . . but we review de novo mixed questions of law and fact and the trial court's ultimate legal conclusions as to whether the totality of the circumstances warranted an investigative detention and whether its duration wa

2008See United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 91-92 , 100 S.Ct. 2547 , 65 L.Ed.2d 619 (1980) (possessory interest in property alone insufficient to permit challenge to search); see also Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 105-06 , 100 S.Ct. 2556 (defendant could not challenge search of another person’s purse based solely on claimed property interest in drugs found in purse). 3 *371 Because Tarkington has properly conceded he had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the apartment, he cannot raise any claims concerning the search of the apartment. ¶ 8 Tarkington nevertheless contends Soldal v. Cook County, 5

2008See United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 91-92 , 100 S.Ct. 2547 , 65 L.Ed.2d 619 (1980) (possessory interest in property alone insufficient to permit challenge to search); see also Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 105-06 , 100 S.Ct. 2556 (defendant could not challenge search of another person’s purse based solely on claimed property interest in drugs found in purse). 3 *371 Because Tarkington has properly conceded he had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the apartment, he cannot raise any claims concerning the search of the apartment. ¶ 8 Tarkington nevertheless contends Soldal v. Cook County, 5

2026See Roseberry, 237 Ariz. at 508, ¶ 7 . ¶12 To state a colorable IAC claim under the Fourth Amendment, the defendant must show “that his Fourth Amendment claim is meritorious and that there is a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different absent the excludable evidence.” State v. Reasoner, 154 Ariz. 377 , 382–83 (App. 1987) (quoting Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375 (1986)). ¶13 Dudley fails to show his claim is meritorious.

2024See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375 (1986) (stating that a defendant must "prove that his Fourth Amendment claim is meritorious" to show ineffective assistance of counsel); State v. Fillmore, 187 Ariz. 174, 181 (App. 1996) (noting that counsel may fall below professional norms by failing to file a motion to suppress if the evidence was "clearly of questionable validity"). 5 STATE v. DUDLEY Decision of the Court ¶15 Dudley also argues the breath sample operational checklist was unsigned by either the officer administering the test or Dudley and should have been inadmissible at trial.

2017In Campbell, this Court rejected a Fourth Amendment challenge to Arizona’s implied consent law (including the unconscious clause) “in light of the holding in Schmerber.” 106 Ariz. at 545, 554 , 479 P.2d at 688, 697 .

2017In Campbell, this Court rejected a Fourth Amendment challenge to Arizona’s implied consent law (including the unconscious clause) “in light of the holding in Schmerber.” 106 Ariz. at 545, 554 , 479 P.2d at 688, 697 .

2023P. 16.2(c). ¶17 The language of this rule tracks Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968), which held that when a defendant testifies at a suppression hearing based on a fourth amendment claim, then his testimony may not be admitted at trial on the issue of guilt.

2015Cf. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 , 88 S.Ct. 967 , 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968) (holding that forcing a defendant to either waive a valid Fourth Amendment claim or waive his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is unconstitutional); Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 610-11 , 92 S.Ct. 1891 , 32 L.Ed.2d 358 (1972) (holding that a statute requiring defendant to testify, if at all, before any other defense witnesses is unconstitutional).

2019In State v. Havatone , we held that "[w]hen the Fourth Amendment violation occurred not as the result of an officer's fact-specific determination that obtaining a warrant is infeasible but pursuant to department practice making such determination unnecessary, we impute to the law enforcement agency the responsibility to assure that unlawful seizures will not occur." 241 Ariz. 506 , 511 ¶ 22, 389 P.3d 1251 , 1256 (2017) (citing Davis , 564 U.S. at 240 , 131 S.Ct. 2419 ).

2019In State v. Havatone , we held that "[w]hen the Fourth Amendment violation occurred not as the result of an officer's fact-specific determination that obtaining a warrant is infeasible but pursuant to department practice making such determination unnecessary, we impute to the law enforcement agency the responsibility to assure that unlawful seizures will not occur." 241 Ariz. 506 , 511 ¶ 22, 389 P.3d 1251 , 1256 (2017) (citing Davis , 564 U.S. at 240 , 131 S.Ct. 2419 ).

2017In reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress for an alleged Fourth Amendment violation, “we defer to the trial court’s factual findings, but we review de novo mixed questions of law and fact and the trial court’s ultimate legal conclusion.” State v. Wyman, 197 Ariz. 10, ¶ 5 , 3 P.3d 392, 395 (App. 2000).

2017In reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress for an alleged Fourth Amendment violation, “we defer to the trial court’s factual findings, but we review de novo mixed questions of law and fact and the trial court’s ultimate legal conclusion.” State v. Wyman, 197 Ariz. 10, ¶ 5 , 3 P.3d 392, 395 (App. 2000).

2003Id. at 465 , 724 P.2d at 551 . ¶ 10 Concern that the Fourth Amendment might not bar a warrantless entry for police to "secure" and inspect a home while awaiting a warrant led the court, in State v. Bolt, to clarify that "[s]uch entries are `per se unlawful' under our state constitution." 142 Ariz. 260, 264-65 , 689 P.2d 519, 523-24 (1984) (quoting State v. Cook, 115 Ariz. 188, 194 , 564 P.2d 877, 883 (1977)).

2003Id. at 465 , 724 P.2d at 551 . ¶ 10 Concern that the Fourth Amendment might not bar a warrantless entry for police to "secure" and inspect a home while awaiting a warrant led the court, in State v. Bolt, to clarify that "[s]uch entries are `per se unlawful' under our state constitution." 142 Ariz. 260, 264-65 , 689 P.2d 519, 523-24 (1984) (quoting State v. Cook, 115 Ariz. 188, 194 , 564 P.2d 877, 883 (1977)).

2011See State v. Evans, 177 Ariz. 201, 203 , 866 P.2d 869, 871 (1994) (stating that an arrest made pursuant to a quashed warrant is “warrant-less” and “plainly illegal,” despite the arresting officer relying on an erroneous computer entry), rev’d on other grounds, 514 U.S. 1 , 115 S.Ct. 1185 , 131 L.Ed.2d 34 (1995); cf. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 139 , 129 S.Ct. 695 , 172 L.Ed.2d 496 (2009) (accepting parties’ assumption of Fourth Amendment violation when arrest was based on recalled warrant, but noting that arrest “on reasonable but mistaken assumptions” does not necessarily result i

2011See State v. Evans, 177 Ariz. 201, 203 , 866 P.2d 869, 871 (1994) (stating that an arrest made pursuant to a quashed warrant is “warrant-less” and “plainly illegal,” despite the arresting officer relying on an erroneous computer entry), rev’d on other grounds, 514 U.S. 1 , 115 S.Ct. 1185 , 131 L.Ed.2d 34 (1995); cf. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 139 , 129 S.Ct. 695 , 172 L.Ed.2d 496 (2009) (accepting parties’ assumption of Fourth Amendment violation when arrest was based on recalled warrant, but noting that arrest “on reasonable but mistaken assumptions” does not necessarily result i

2015This is the test by which we determine whether a “fair probability” of criminal activity exists under the Fourth Amendment standard articulated in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983).

2015This is the test by which we determine whether a “fair probability” of criminal activity exists under the Fourth Amendment standard articulated in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983).

2010See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 , 116 S.Ct. 1769 , 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (“Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.”); accord State v. Spreitz, 190 Ariz. 129, 144 , 945 P.2d 1260, 1275 (1997).

2010See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 , 116 S.Ct. 1769 , 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (“Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.”); accord State v. Spreitz, 190 Ariz. 129, 144 , 945 P.2d 1260, 1275 (1997).

2022State v. Hyde, 186 Ariz. 252, 266 (1996); see also Ariz. R.

2022State v. Hyde, 186 Ariz. 252, 266 (1996); see also Ariz. R.

2019See State v. Hernandez , 244 Ariz. 1 , ¶ 23, 417 P.3d 207 (2018) ("Arizona Constitution's protections under article 2, section 8 are generally coextensive with Fourth Amendment analysis" except in context of law enforcement's warrantless physical entry into a home); State v. Peltz , 242 Ariz. 23 , n.3, 391 P.3d 1215 (App. 2017) ("[T]he right of privacy under article II, § 8 has not been expanded beyond that provided by the Fourth Amendment, except in cases involving unlawful, warrantless home entries.").

2019See State v. Hernandez , 244 Ariz. 1 , ¶ 23, 417 P.3d 207 (2018) ("Arizona Constitution's protections under article 2, section 8 are generally coextensive with Fourth Amendment analysis" except in context of law enforcement's warrantless physical entry into a home); State v. Peltz , 242 Ariz. 23 , n.3, 391 P.3d 1215 (App. 2017) ("[T]he right of privacy under article II, § 8 has not been expanded beyond that provided by the Fourth Amendment, except in cases involving unlawful, warrantless home entries.").

2016See id. at 10-11 ¶ 22, 239 Ariz. at 306 , 3714 P.3d at 634; Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 , 131 S.Ct. 2419, 2423 , 180 L.Ed.2d 285 (2011) (stating that the exclusionary rule “bars the prosecution from introducing evidence obtained by way of a Fourth Amendment violation”).

2016See id. at 10-11 ¶ 22, 239 Ariz. at 306 , 3714 P.3d at 634; Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 , 131 S.Ct. 2419, 2423 , 180 L.Ed.2d 285 (2011) (stating that the exclusionary rule “bars the prosecution from introducing evidence obtained by way of a Fourth Amendment violation”).

2016See Johnson, 555 U.S. at 325 . ¶15 Regarding Defendant’s consent to the vehicle search, the record reflects that he read—or at least had the opportunity to read—and signed a consent form that, in both English and Spanish, explained he could refuse to allow the search, he could withdraw his consent at any time, and any evidence discovered during a search could be used in court.

2015See Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 326-27 (2009); State v. Serna, 235 Ariz. 270, 275, ¶ 21 (2014).

1997In State v. Jeney, the court of appeals pointed out that the United States Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment analysis focuses on “ ‘an objective assessment of the officer’s actions in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him at the time.’ ” 163 Ariz. 293, 295 , 787 P.2d 1089, 1091 (App.1989) (quoting Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 471 , 105 S.Ct. 2778, 2783 , 86 L.Ed.2d 370 (1985)); see also Whren v. United States,-U.S.-, -, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 1774 , 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (eliminating pretext defense and holding that “subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fou

1997In State v. Jeney, the court of appeals pointed out that the United States Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment analysis focuses on “ ‘an objective assessment of the officer’s actions in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him at the time.’ ” 163 Ariz. 293, 295 , 787 P.2d 1089, 1091 (App.1989) (quoting Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 471 , 105 S.Ct. 2778, 2783 , 86 L.Ed.2d 370 (1985)); see also Whren v. United States,-U.S.-, -, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 1774 , 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (eliminating pretext defense and holding that “subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fou

2018See, e.g., Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105 (1980) (rejecting a defendant’s Fourth Amendment claim when he had no “right to exclude other persons from access” to a friend’s purse into which he had placed drugs); Rakas, 439 U.S. at 148-49 (denying Fourth Amendment protection to defendants who “asserted neither a property nor a possessory interest in [an] automobile” and had no right to exclude others from the areas searched); Lyall, 807 F.3d at 1188 , 1189 & n.10 (in evaluating 8 STATE V.

2018See, e.g., Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105 (1980) (rejecting a defendant’s Fourth Amendment claim when he had no “right to exclude other persons from access” to a friend’s purse into which he had placed drugs); Rakas, 439 U.S. at 148-49 (denying Fourth Amendment protection to defendants who “asserted neither a property nor a possessory interest in [an] automobile” and had no right to exclude others from the areas searched); Lyall, 807 F.3d at 1188 , 1189 & n.10 (in evaluating 8 STATE V.

2003Id. at 465 , 724 P.2d at 551 . ¶ 10 Concern that the Fourth Amendment might not bar a warrantless entry for police to "secure" and inspect a home while awaiting a warrant led the court, in State v. Bolt, to clarify that "[s]uch entries are `per se unlawful' under our state constitution." 142 Ariz. 260, 264-65 , 689 P.2d 519, 523-24 (1984) (quoting State v. Cook, 115 Ariz. 188, 194 , 564 P.2d 877, 883 (1977)).

2003Id. at 465 , 724 P.2d at 551 . ¶ 10 Concern that the Fourth Amendment might not bar a warrantless entry for police to "secure" and inspect a home while awaiting a warrant led the court, in State v. Bolt, to clarify that "[s]uch entries are `per se unlawful' under our state constitution." 142 Ariz. 260, 264-65 , 689 P.2d 519, 523-24 (1984) (quoting State v. Cook, 115 Ariz. 188, 194 , 564 P.2d 877, 883 (1977)).

2019Id. ¶11 Citing Carrillo , Diaz argues that § 28-1321"unquestionably imposes a consent requirement." And relying on State v. Butler , 232 Ariz. 84 , 302 P.3d 609 (2013), she contends that requirement "is governed not just by the statute, but also by traditional Fourth Amendment analysis" requiring that the consent be voluntary.

2019Id. ¶11 Citing Carrillo , Diaz argues that § 28-1321"unquestionably imposes a consent requirement." And relying on State v. Butler , 232 Ariz. 84 , 302 P.3d 609 (2013), she contends that requirement "is governed not just by the statute, but also by traditional Fourth Amendment analysis" requiring that the consent be voluntary.

2016See State v. Gonzalez–Gutierrez, 187 Ariz. 116, 118 (1996). ¶5 Parker’s motion sought to suppress “all evidence gathered from his pockets.” It did not challenge the search of the backpack.

2007“When officers make traffic stops based on facts that neither constitute a violation of the law nor constitute reasonable *395 grounds to suspect the driver has committed an offense, they run afoul of the Fourth Amendment requirement that they possess objectively reasonable grounds for the intrusion.” Id. ¶ 7 Resolution of this case hinges on whether A.R.S. § 28-751(2) requires a driver making a left turn to turn only into the leftmost lane of the street onto which he or she is turning.

2010“Because the Fourth Amendment prohibits only unreasonable seizures, the first step in analyzing an alleged Fourth Amendment violation is determining whether a seizure oc *256 curred.” State v. Childress, 222 Ariz. 334, ¶ 10 , 214 P.3d 422, 426 (App.2009); see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).

2010“Because the Fourth Amendment prohibits only unreasonable seizures, the first step in analyzing an alleged Fourth Amendment violation is determining whether a seizure oc *256 curred.” State v. Childress, 222 Ariz. 334, ¶ 10 , 214 P.3d 422, 426 (App.2009); see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).

2010Cf. South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 559 , 103 S.Ct. 916 , 74 L.Ed.2d 748 (1983) (stating that under Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966), a state may “force a person suspected of driving while intoxicated to submit to a blood alcohol test”) (footnote omitted); Campbell, 106 Ariz. at 554 , 479 P.2d at 697 (rejecting Fourth Amendment challenge to implied consent law as meritless in light of Schmerber).

2010Cf. South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 559 , 103 S.Ct. 916 , 74 L.Ed.2d 748 (1983) (stating that under Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966), a state may “force a person suspected of driving while intoxicated to submit to a blood alcohol test”) (footnote omitted); Campbell, 106 Ariz. at 554 , 479 P.2d at 697 (rejecting Fourth Amendment challenge to implied consent law as meritless in light of Schmerber).