63 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1970–2025 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Berniergreen2 sentences2000State v. Pittman , 209 Conn. 596 , 601 , 553 A.2d 155 (1989); see State v. Bernier , 246 Conn. 63 , 76 717 A.2d 652 (1998) (holding that "[t]he defendant bears the burden of proving that his privacy interests in the place searched are reasonable."); see generally Minnesota v. Carter , supra 525 U.S. 88 (discussing a defendant's ability to prove a Fourth Amendment violation); see also Rawlings v. Kentucky , 448 U.S. 98 , 104 , 100 S.Ct. 2556 , 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980). 2000State v. Pittman , 209 Conn. 596 , 601 , 553 A.2d 155 (1989); see State v. Bernier , 246 Conn. 63 , 76 717 A.2d 652 (1998) (holding that "[t]he defendant bears the burden of proving that his privacy interests in the place searched are reasonable."); see generally Minnesota v. Carter , supra 525 U.S. 88 (discussing a defendant's ability to prove a Fourth Amendment violation); see also Rawlings v. Kentucky , 448 U.S. 98 , 104 , 100 S.Ct. 2556 , 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980). | 3 | 3 |
Rawlings v. Kentuckygreen2 sentences2000State v. Pittman , 209 Conn. 596 , 601 , 553 A.2d 155 (1989); see State v. Bernier , 246 Conn. 63 , 76 717 A.2d 652 (1998) (holding that "[t]he defendant bears the burden of proving that his privacy interests in the place searched are reasonable."); see generally Minnesota v. Carter , supra 525 U.S. 88 (discussing a defendant's ability to prove a Fourth Amendment violation); see also Rawlings v. Kentucky , 448 U.S. 98 , 104 , 100 S.Ct. 2556 , 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980). 2000State v. Pittman , 209 Conn. 596 , 601 , 553 A.2d 155 (1989); see State v. Bernier , 246 Conn. 63 , 76 717 A.2d 652 (1998) (holding that "[t]he defendant bears the burden of proving that his privacy interests in the place searched are reasonable."); see generally Minnesota v. Carter , supra 525 U.S. 88 (discussing a defendant's ability to prove a Fourth Amendment violation); see also Rawlings v. Kentucky , 448 U.S. 98 , 104 , 100 S.Ct. 2556 , 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980). | 3 | 3 |
State v. Marrogreen2 sentences2021See, e.g., State v. Marro, 68 Conn. App. 849, 859 , 795 A.2d 555 (2002); see also Diaz v. Commissioner of Correction, 125 Conn. App. 57 , 63 n.6, 6 A.3d 213 (2010), cert. denied, 299 Conn. 926 , 11 A.3d 150 (2011); Coleman v. Commissioner of Correction, 111 Conn. App. 138 , 140 n.1, 958 A.2d 790 (2008), cert. denied, 290 Conn. 905 , 962 A.2d 793 (2009). 2021See, e.g., State v. Marro, 68 Conn. App. 849, 859 , 795 A.2d 555 (2002); see also Diaz v. Commissioner of Correction, 125 Conn. App. 57 , 63 n.6, 6 A.3d 213 (2010), cert. denied, 299 Conn. 926 , 11 A.3d 150 (2011); Coleman v. Commissioner of Correction, 111 Conn. App. 138 , 140 n.1, 958 A.2d 790 (2008), cert. denied, 290 Conn. 905 , 962 A.2d 793 (2009). | 2 | 2 |
Diaz v. Commissioner of Correctiongreen2 sentences2021See, e.g., State v. Marro, 68 Conn. App. 849, 859 , 795 A.2d 555 (2002); see also Diaz v. Commissioner of Correction, 125 Conn. App. 57 , 63 n.6, 6 A.3d 213 (2010), cert. denied, 299 Conn. 926 , 11 A.3d 150 (2011); Coleman v. Commissioner of Correction, 111 Conn. App. 138 , 140 n.1, 958 A.2d 790 (2008), cert. denied, 290 Conn. 905 , 962 A.2d 793 (2009). 2021See, e.g., State v. Marro, 68 Conn. App. 849, 859 , 795 A.2d 555 (2002); see also Diaz v. Commissioner of Correction, 125 Conn. App. 57 , 63 n.6, 6 A.3d 213 (2010), cert. denied, 299 Conn. 926 , 11 A.3d 150 (2011); Coleman v. Commissioner of Correction, 111 Conn. App. 138 , 140 n.1, 958 A.2d 790 (2008), cert. denied, 290 Conn. 905 , 962 A.2d 793 (2009). | 2 | 2 |
Diaz v. Commissioner of Correctiongreen2 sentences2021See, e.g., State v. Marro, 68 Conn. App. 849, 859 , 795 A.2d 555 (2002); see also Diaz v. Commissioner of Correction, 125 Conn. App. 57 , 63 n.6, 6 A.3d 213 (2010), cert. denied, 299 Conn. 926 , 11 A.3d 150 (2011); Coleman v. Commissioner of Correction, 111 Conn. App. 138 , 140 n.1, 958 A.2d 790 (2008), cert. denied, 290 Conn. 905 , 962 A.2d 793 (2009). 2021See, e.g., State v. Marro, 68 Conn. App. 849, 859 , 795 A.2d 555 (2002); see also Diaz v. Commissioner of Correction, 125 Conn. App. 57 , 63 n.6, 6 A.3d 213 (2010), cert. denied, 299 Conn. 926 , 11 A.3d 150 (2011); Coleman v. Commissioner of Correction, 111 Conn. App. 138 , 140 n.1, 958 A.2d 790 (2008), cert. denied, 290 Conn. 905 , 962 A.2d 793 (2009). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Faisongreen2 sentences2020See State v. Faison, 112 Conn. App. 373, 380 , 962 A.2d 860 (trial counsel’s ‘‘general exhortation[s]’’ were inadequate to preserve claims presented on appeal), cert. denied, 291 Conn. 903 , 967 A.2d 507 (2009). 12 Under Golding, ‘‘a defendant can prevail on a claim of constitutional error not preserved at trial only if all of the following conditions are met: (1) the record is adequate to review the alleged claim of error; (2) the claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental right; (3) the alleged constitutional violation . . . exists and . . . deprived the def 2020See State v. Faison, 112 Conn. App. 373, 380 , 962 A.2d 860 (trial counsel’s ‘‘general exhortation[s]’’ were inadequate to preserve claims presented on appeal), cert. denied, 291 Conn. 903 , 967 A.2d 507 (2009). 12 Under Golding, ‘‘a defendant can prevail on a claim of constitutional error not preserved at trial only if all of the following conditions are met: (1) the record is adequate to review the alleged claim of error; (2) the claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental right; (3) the alleged constitutional violation . . . exists and . . . deprived the def | 2 | 2 |
State v. Faisongreen2 sentences2020See State v. Faison, 112 Conn. App. 373, 380 , 962 A.2d 860 (trial counsel’s ‘‘general exhortation[s]’’ were inadequate to preserve claims presented on appeal), cert. denied, 291 Conn. 903 , 967 A.2d 507 (2009). 12 Under Golding, ‘‘a defendant can prevail on a claim of constitutional error not preserved at trial only if all of the following conditions are met: (1) the record is adequate to review the alleged claim of error; (2) the claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental right; (3) the alleged constitutional violation . . . exists and . . . deprived the def 2020See State v. Faison, 112 Conn. App. 373, 380 , 962 A.2d 860 (trial counsel’s ‘‘general exhortation[s]’’ were inadequate to preserve claims presented on appeal), cert. denied, 291 Conn. 903 , 967 A.2d 507 (2009). 12 Under Golding, ‘‘a defendant can prevail on a claim of constitutional error not preserved at trial only if all of the following conditions are met: (1) the record is adequate to review the alleged claim of error; (2) the claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental right; (3) the alleged constitutional violation . . . exists and . . . deprived the def | 2 | 2 |
Foxworth v. Pepegreen2 sentences2017See id. 2016See id. | 2 | 2 |
Florida v. Jardinesgreen2 sentences2017See Florida v. Jardines , 569 U.S. 1 , 133 S.Ct. 1409 , 1417, 185 L.Ed.2d 495 (2013). 2017See Florida v. Jardines , 569 U.S. 1 , 133 S.Ct. 1409 , 1417, 185 L.Ed.2d 495 (2013). | 2 | 2 |
United States v. James Thomas Cherrygreen2 sentences2006Although “[t]he intervening discovery of probable cause to support a suspect’s detention, by itself, ‘cannot assure in every case that the Fourth Amendment violation has not been unduly exploited’ United States v. Cherry, 759 F.2d 1196, 1212 (5th Cir. 1985), quoting Brown v. Illinois, supra, 422 U.S. 603 ; “the intervening acquisition of probable cause is an important attenuating factor in the analysis.” United States v. Cherry, supra, 1212 ; see also Oliver v. United States, 656 A.2d 1159 , 1172 n.22 (D.C. 2006Although “[t]he intervening discovery of probable cause to support a suspect’s detention, by itself, ‘cannot assure in every case that the Fourth Amendment violation has not been unduly exploited’ United States v. Cherry, 759 F.2d 1196, 1212 (5th Cir. 1985), quoting Brown v. Illinois, supra, 422 U.S. 603 ; “the intervening acquisition of probable cause is an important attenuating factor in the analysis.” United States v. Cherry, supra, 1212 ; see also Oliver v. United States, 656 A.2d 1159 , 1172 n.22 (D.C. | 2 | 2 |
Oliver v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2006Although “[t]he intervening discovery of probable cause to support a suspect’s detention, by itself, ‘cannot assure in every case that the Fourth Amendment violation has not been unduly exploited’ United States v. Cherry, 759 F.2d 1196, 1212 (5th Cir. 1985), quoting Brown v. Illinois, supra, 422 U.S. 603 ; “the intervening acquisition of probable cause is an important attenuating factor in the analysis.” United States v. Cherry, supra, 1212 ; see also Oliver v. United States, 656 A.2d 1159 , 1172 n.22 (D.C. 2006Although “[t]he intervening discovery of probable cause to support a suspect’s detention, by itself, ‘cannot assure in every case that the Fourth Amendment violation has not been unduly exploited’ United States v. Cherry, 759 F.2d 1196, 1212 (5th Cir. 1985), quoting Brown v. Illinois, supra, 422 U.S. 603 ; “the intervening acquisition of probable cause is an important attenuating factor in the analysis.” United States v. Cherry, supra, 1212 ; see also Oliver v. United States, 656 A.2d 1159 , 1172 n.22 (D.C. | 2 | 2 |
Rakas v. Illinoisgreen2 sentences2016In Rakas v. Illinois, supra, 439 U.S. at 143 , 99 S.Ct. 421 , the United States Supreme Court recognized that a person has standing to raise a fourth amendment challenge to a search of a motor vehicle only if that person can demonstrate "a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place." As our Supreme Court has observed, "[a]bsent such an expectation, the subsequent police action has no constitutional ramifications." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Mooney, 218 Conn. 85 , 94, 588 A.2d 145 , cert. denied, 502 U.S. 919 , 112 S.Ct. 330 , 116 L.Ed.2d 270 (1991). 2016In Rakas v. Illinois, supra, 439 U.S. at 143 , 99 S.Ct. 421 , the United States Supreme Court recognized that a person has standing to raise a fourth amendment challenge to a search of a motor vehicle only if that person can demonstrate "a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place." As our Supreme Court has observed, "[a]bsent such an expectation, the subsequent police action has no constitutional ramifications." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Mooney, 218 Conn. 85 , 94, 588 A.2d 145 , cert. denied, 502 U.S. 919 , 112 S.Ct. 330 , 116 L.Ed.2d 270 (1991). | 1 | 4 |
Brown v. Illinoisgreen2 sentences2005Although "[t]he intervening discovery of probable cause to support a suspect's detention, by itself, `cannot assure in every case that the Fourth Amendment violation has not been unduly exploited'"; United States v. Cherry, 759 F.2d 1196, 1212 (5th Cir.1985), quoting Brown v. Illinois, supra, 422 U.S. at 603 , 95 S.Ct. 2254 ; "the intervening acquisition of probable cause is an important attenuating factor in the analysis." United States v. Cherry, supra, at 1212; see also Oliver v. United States, 656 A.2d 1159 , 1172 n. 22 (D.C.App.1995) ("[m]any courts have found that the acquisition of prob 2005Although "[t]he intervening discovery of probable cause to support a suspect's detention, by itself, `cannot assure in every case that the Fourth Amendment violation has not been unduly exploited'"; United States v. Cherry, 759 F.2d 1196, 1212 (5th Cir.1985), quoting Brown v. Illinois, supra, 422 U.S. at 603 , 95 S.Ct. 2254 ; "the intervening acquisition of probable cause is an important attenuating factor in the analysis." United States v. Cherry, supra, at 1212; see also Oliver v. United States, 656 A.2d 1159 , 1172 n. 22 (D.C.App.1995) ("[m]any courts have found that the acquisition of prob | 1 | 3 |
| Willie D. White, Jr. v. Rick Olig, James M. Gilmore, and Fond Du Lac County, a Municipal Corporationgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Niles B. Wanger and Shirley Wanger v. Ray Bonner, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Sheriff of Dekalb County, Robert W. McCullough Etc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Ward v. Greenegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Moore v. McNamaragreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Scottgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Kalphatgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Davisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Dalia v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Trinity Marine Products, Inc. v. Chaogreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Grahamgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Becker v. Krollgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Madruga Ex Rel. Madruga v. County of Riversidegreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. David A. Titemoregreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Morrillgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Oquendogreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. DeFuscogreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Altruigreen | 1 | 1 |
| Scott v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Mooney
green
2 sentences2016In Rakas v. Illinois, supra, 439 U.S. at 143 , 99 S.Ct. 421 , the United States Supreme Court recognized that a person has standing to raise a fourth amendment challenge to a search of a motor vehicle only if that person can demonstrate "a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place." As our Supreme Court has observed, "[a]bsent such an expectation, the subsequent police action has no constitutional ramifications." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Mooney, 218 Conn. 85 , 94, 588 A.2d 145 , cert. denied, 502 U.S. 919 , 112 S.Ct. 330 , 116 L.Ed.2d 270 (1991). 2016In Rakas v. Illinois, supra, 439 U.S. at 143 , 99 S.Ct. 421 , the United States Supreme Court recognized that a person has standing to raise a fourth amendment challenge to a search of a motor vehicle only if that person can demonstrate "a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place." As our Supreme Court has observed, "[a]bsent such an expectation, the subsequent police action has no constitutional ramifications." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Mooney, 218 Conn. 85 , 94, 588 A.2d 145 , cert. denied, 502 U.S. 919 , 112 S.Ct. 330 , 116 L.Ed.2d 270 (1991). | 3 | 2009–2016 |
Early v. United States
green
2 sentences2016In Rakas v. Illinois, supra, 439 U.S. at 143 , 99 S.Ct. 421 , the United States Supreme Court recognized that a person has standing to raise a fourth amendment challenge to a search of a motor vehicle only if that person can demonstrate "a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place." As our Supreme Court has observed, "[a]bsent such an expectation, the subsequent police action has no constitutional ramifications." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Mooney, 218 Conn. 85 , 94, 588 A.2d 145 , cert. denied, 502 U.S. 919 , 112 S.Ct. 330 , 116 L.Ed.2d 270 (1991). 2009However, “the place searched is highly relevant to the fourth amendment analysis because expectations of privacy in some places are afforded greater constitutional legitimacy than in others.” (Internal quotation *866 marks omitted.) State v. Mooney, 218 Conn. 85, 94-95 , 588 A.2d 145 , cert. denied, 502 U.S. 919 , 112 S. Ct. 330 , 116 L. | 3 | 2009–2016 |
Cumber v. United States
green
2 sentences2016In Rakas v. Illinois, supra, 439 U.S. at 143 , 99 S.Ct. 421 , the United States Supreme Court recognized that a person has standing to raise a fourth amendment challenge to a search of a motor vehicle only if that person can demonstrate "a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place." As our Supreme Court has observed, "[a]bsent such an expectation, the subsequent police action has no constitutional ramifications." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Mooney, 218 Conn. 85 , 94, 588 A.2d 145 , cert. denied, 502 U.S. 919 , 112 S.Ct. 330 , 116 L.Ed.2d 270 (1991). 2009However, “the place searched is highly relevant to the fourth amendment analysis because expectations of privacy in some places are afforded greater constitutional legitimacy than in others.” (Internal quotation *866 marks omitted.) State v. Mooney, 218 Conn. 85, 94-95 , 588 A.2d 145 , cert. denied, 502 U.S. 919 , 112 S. Ct. 330 , 116 L. | 3 | 2009–2016 |
Grumman Aerospace Corp. v. United States
green
2 sentences2016In Rakas v. Illinois, supra, 439 U.S. at 143 , 99 S.Ct. 421 , the United States Supreme Court recognized that a person has standing to raise a fourth amendment challenge to a search of a motor vehicle only if that person can demonstrate "a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place." As our Supreme Court has observed, "[a]bsent such an expectation, the subsequent police action has no constitutional ramifications." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Mooney, 218 Conn. 85 , 94, 588 A.2d 145 , cert. denied, 502 U.S. 919 , 112 S.Ct. 330 , 116 L.Ed.2d 270 (1991). 2009However, “the place searched is highly relevant to the fourth amendment analysis because expectations of privacy in some places are afforded greater constitutional legitimacy than in others.” (Internal quotation *866 marks omitted.) State v. Mooney, 218 Conn. 85, 94-95 , 588 A.2d 145 , cert. denied, 502 U.S. 919 , 112 S. Ct. 330 , 116 L. | 3 | 2009–2016 |
State v. Pittman
green
2 sentences2000State v. Pittman , 209 Conn. 596 , 601 , 553 A.2d 155 (1989); see State v. Bernier , 246 Conn. 63 , 76 717 A.2d 652 (1998) (holding that "[t]he defendant bears the burden of proving that his privacy interests in the place searched are reasonable."); see generally Minnesota v. Carter , supra 525 U.S. 88 (discussing a defendant's ability to prove a Fourth Amendment violation); see also Rawlings v. Kentucky , 448 U.S. 98 , 104 , 100 S.Ct. 2556 , 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980). 2000State v. Pittman , 209 Conn. 596 , 601 , 553 A.2d 155 (1989); see State v. Bernier , 246 Conn. 63 , 76 717 A.2d 652 (1998) (holding that "[t]he defendant bears the burden of proving that his privacy interests in the place searched are reasonable."); see generally Minnesota v. Carter , supra 525 U.S. 88 (discussing a defendant's ability to prove a Fourth Amendment violation); see also Rawlings v. Kentucky , 448 U.S. 98 , 104 , 100 S.Ct. 2556 , 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980). | 3 | 2000–2000 |
Mincey v. Arizona
green
2 sentences1990The leading United States Supreme Court case of Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 , 392 , 98 S.Ct. 2408 , 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978), recognized the right of police to respond to emergency situations, and held that "the Fourth Amendment does not bar police officers from making warrantless entries and searches when they reasonably believe that a person within is in need of immediate aid." In the recent case of State v. Klauss, 19 Conn. App. 296 , 300 (1989), the Appellate Court said that the "emergency" exception refers to a "type of warrantless entry that evolves outside the context of a criminal inv 1990The leading United States Supreme Court case of Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 , 392 , 98 S.Ct. 2408 , 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978), recognized the right of police to respond to emergency situations, and held that "the Fourth Amendment does not bar police officers from making warrantless entries and searches when they reasonably believe that a person within is in need of immediate aid." In the recent case of State v. Klauss, 19 Conn. App. 296 , 300 (1989), the Appellate Court said that the "emergency" exception refers to a "type of warrantless entry that evolves outside the context of a criminal inv | 3 | 1989–1998 |
Terry v. Ohio
green
2 sentences2025We therefore are satisfied that the court resolved the factual and legal merits of the fourth amendment claim on which the peti- tioner relied to demonstrate prejudice in his habeas case. 0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 25 0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 27 Gusan v. Commissioner of Correction the validity of [an investigatory detention pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S. Ct. 1868 , 20 L. 2025We therefore are satisfied that the court resolved the factual and legal merits of the fourth amendment claim on which the peti- tioner relied to demonstrate prejudice in his habeas case. 0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 25 0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 27 Gusan v. Commissioner of Correction the validity of [an investigatory detention pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S. Ct. 1868 , 20 L. | 2 | 2002–2025 |
Coleman v. Commissioner of Correction
green
2 sentences2021See, e.g., State v. Marro, 68 Conn. App. 849, 859 , 795 A.2d 555 (2002); see also Diaz v. Commissioner of Correction, 125 Conn. App. 57 , 63 n.6, 6 A.3d 213 (2010), cert. denied, 299 Conn. 926 , 11 A.3d 150 (2011); Coleman v. Commissioner of Correction, 111 Conn. App. 138 , 140 n.1, 958 A.2d 790 (2008), cert. denied, 290 Conn. 905 , 962 A.2d 793 (2009). 2021See, e.g., State v. Marro, 68 Conn. App. 849, 859 , 795 A.2d 555 (2002); see also Diaz v. Commissioner of Correction, 125 Conn. App. 57 , 63 n.6, 6 A.3d 213 (2010), cert. denied, 299 Conn. 926 , 11 A.3d 150 (2011); Coleman v. Commissioner of Correction, 111 Conn. App. 138 , 140 n.1, 958 A.2d 790 (2008), cert. denied, 290 Conn. 905 , 962 A.2d 793 (2009). | 2 | 2021–2021 |
Coleman v. Commissioner of Correction
green
2 sentences2021See, e.g., State v. Marro, 68 Conn. App. 849, 859 , 795 A.2d 555 (2002); see also Diaz v. Commissioner of Correction, 125 Conn. App. 57 , 63 n.6, 6 A.3d 213 (2010), cert. denied, 299 Conn. 926 , 11 A.3d 150 (2011); Coleman v. Commissioner of Correction, 111 Conn. App. 138 , 140 n.1, 958 A.2d 790 (2008), cert. denied, 290 Conn. 905 , 962 A.2d 793 (2009). 2021See, e.g., State v. Marro, 68 Conn. App. 849, 859 , 795 A.2d 555 (2002); see also Diaz v. Commissioner of Correction, 125 Conn. App. 57 , 63 n.6, 6 A.3d 213 (2010), cert. denied, 299 Conn. 926 , 11 A.3d 150 (2011); Coleman v. Commissioner of Correction, 111 Conn. App. 138 , 140 n.1, 958 A.2d 790 (2008), cert. denied, 290 Conn. 905 , 962 A.2d 793 (2009). | 2 | 2021–2021 |
BRIDGEPORT HARBOUR PLACE I, LLC v. Ganim
green
2 sentences2021See, e.g., State v. Marro, 68 Conn. App. 849, 859 , 795 A.2d 555 (2002); see also Diaz v. Commissioner of Correction, 125 Conn. App. 57 , 63 n.6, 6 A.3d 213 (2010), cert. denied, 299 Conn. 926 , 11 A.3d 150 (2011); Coleman v. Commissioner of Correction, 111 Conn. App. 138 , 140 n.1, 958 A.2d 790 (2008), cert. denied, 290 Conn. 905 , 962 A.2d 793 (2009). 2021See, e.g., State v. Marro, 68 Conn. App. 849, 859 , 795 A.2d 555 (2002); see also Diaz v. Commissioner of Correction, 125 Conn. App. 57 , 63 n.6, 6 A.3d 213 (2010), cert. denied, 299 Conn. 926 , 11 A.3d 150 (2011); Coleman v. Commissioner of Correction, 111 Conn. App. 138 , 140 n.1, 958 A.2d 790 (2008), cert. denied, 290 Conn. 905 , 962 A.2d 793 (2009). | 2 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Klauss
green
2 sentences2003Ed. 2d 290 (1978), the United States Supreme Court recognized that “the fourth amendment does not bar police officers, when responding to emergencies, from making warrantless entries into premises and warrantless searches when they reasonably believe that a person within is in need of immediate aid.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Klauss, 19 Conn. App. 296, 300-301 , 562 A.2d 558 (1989). 2003Ed. 2d 290 (1978), the United States Supreme Court recognized that “the fourth amendment does not bar police officers, when responding to emergencies, from making warrantless entries into premises and warrantless searches when they reasonably believe that a person within is in need of immediate aid.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Klauss, 19 Conn. App. 296, 300-301 , 562 A.2d 558 (1989). | 2 | 1990–2003 |
Kimmelman v. Morrison
green
2 sentences2001Where defense counsel's failure to litigate a Fourth Amendment claim competently is the principal allegation of ineffectiveness, the defendant must also prove that his Fourth Amendment claim is meritorious and that there is a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different absent the excludable evidence in order to demonstrate actual prejudice." (Emphasis added.) (Internal citations and quotations omitted.) Kimmelman v. Morrison , 477 U.S. 365 , 375 , 106 S.Ct. 2574 , 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986). 2001Where defense counsel's failure to litigate a Fourth Amendment claim competently is the principal allegation of ineffectiveness, the defendant must also prove that his Fourth Amendment claim is meritorious and that there is a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different absent the excludable evidence in order to demonstrate actual prejudice." (Emphasis added.) (Internal citations and quotations omitted.) Kimmelman v. Morrison , 477 U.S. 365 , 375 , 106 S.Ct. 2574 , 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986). | 2 | 2001–2002 |
State v. Eady
green
2 sentences2001Katz, Connecticut Criminal Caselaw Handbook (1992) pp. 107-108.” State v. DaEria, 51 Conn. App. 149, 161 , 721 A.2d 539 (1998). “ [ W]hether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred turns on an objective assessment of the officer’s actions in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him at the time . . . and not on the officer’s actual state of mind at the time the challenged action was taken.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Eady, 249 Conn. 431,441 , 733 A.2d 112 , cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1030 , 120 S. Ct. 551 , 145 L. 2001Katz, Connecticut Criminal Caselaw Handbook (1992) pp. 107-108.” State v. DaEria, 51 Conn. App. 149, 161 , 721 A.2d 539 (1998). “ [ W]hether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred turns on an objective assessment of the officer’s actions in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him at the time . . . and not on the officer’s actual state of mind at the time the challenged action was taken.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Eady, 249 Conn. 431,441 , 733 A.2d 112 , cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1030 , 120 S. Ct. 551 , 145 L. | 2 | 2000–2001 |
Osorio de Escobar v. United States
green
2 sentences2001Katz, Connecticut Criminal Caselaw Handbook (1992) pp. 107-108.” State v. DaEria, 51 Conn. App. 149, 161 , 721 A.2d 539 (1998). “ [ W]hether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred turns on an objective assessment of the officer’s actions in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him at the time . . . and not on the officer’s actual state of mind at the time the challenged action was taken.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Eady, 249 Conn. 431,441 , 733 A.2d 112 , cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1030 , 120 S. Ct. 551 , 145 L. 2001Katz, Connecticut Criminal Caselaw Handbook (1992) pp. 107-108.” State v. DaEria, 51 Conn. App. 149, 161 , 721 A.2d 539 (1998). “ [ W]hether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred turns on an objective assessment of the officer’s actions in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him at the time . . . and not on the officer’s actual state of mind at the time the challenged action was taken.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Eady, 249 Conn. 431,441 , 733 A.2d 112 , cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1030 , 120 S. Ct. 551 , 145 L. | 2 | 2000–2001 |
Foster v. United States
green
2 sentences2001Katz, Connecticut Criminal Caselaw Handbook (1992) pp. 107-108.” State v. DaEria, 51 Conn. App. 149, 161 , 721 A.2d 539 (1998). “ [ W]hether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred turns on an objective assessment of the officer’s actions in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him at the time . . . and not on the officer’s actual state of mind at the time the challenged action was taken.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Eady, 249 Conn. 431,441 , 733 A.2d 112 , cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1030 , 120 S. Ct. 551 , 145 L. 2001Katz, Connecticut Criminal Caselaw Handbook (1992) pp. 107-108.” State v. DaEria, 51 Conn. App. 149, 161 , 721 A.2d 539 (1998). “ [ W]hether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred turns on an objective assessment of the officer’s actions in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him at the time . . . and not on the officer’s actual state of mind at the time the challenged action was taken.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Eady, 249 Conn. 431,441 , 733 A.2d 112 , cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1030 , 120 S. Ct. 551 , 145 L. | 2 | 2000–2001 |
Hooks v. Easley
green
2 sentences2001Katz, Connecticut Criminal Caselaw Handbook (1992) pp. 107-108.” State v. DaEria, 51 Conn. App. 149, 161 , 721 A.2d 539 (1998). “ [ W]hether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred turns on an objective assessment of the officer’s actions in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him at the time . . . and not on the officer’s actual state of mind at the time the challenged action was taken.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Eady, 249 Conn. 431,441 , 733 A.2d 112 , cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1030 , 120 S. Ct. 551 , 145 L. 2001Katz, Connecticut Criminal Caselaw Handbook (1992) pp. 107-108.” State v. DaEria, 51 Conn. App. 149, 161 , 721 A.2d 539 (1998). “ [ W]hether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred turns on an objective assessment of the officer’s actions in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him at the time . . . and not on the officer’s actual state of mind at the time the challenged action was taken.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Eady, 249 Conn. 431,441 , 733 A.2d 112 , cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1030 , 120 S. Ct. 551 , 145 L. | 2 | 2000–2001 |
Stone v. Powell
green
2 sentences1997At the time of the petitioner’s habeas, it had been established as a matter of federal constitutional law “that where the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial.” Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 , 96 S. Ct. 3037 , 49 L. 1997At the time of the petitioner’s habeas, it had been established as a matter of federal constitutional law “that where the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial.” Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 , 96 S. Ct. 3037 , 49 L. | 2 | 1991–1997 |
| State v. Browne green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| State v. Smith green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| West v. Cabell green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Michigan v. Summers green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| State v. Houghtaling green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| United States v. Jose Abreu green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Patrick v. United States green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Haidar v. United States green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| State v. Banks green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Martinez-Segura v. United States green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Martinez-Brambila v. United States green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Roman v. United States green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| State v. Gonzalez green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| United States v. David C. Brock green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| United States v. White green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| California v. Ciraolo green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| State v. Ramirez green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| State v. Palmer green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| State v. Ramirez neutral | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| State v. Conger green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Oliver v. United States green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| State v. Walker green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Saybrook Bank & Trust Co. v. O'Reilly green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.