Fourth Amendment violation in Virginia

2024That “includes, of course, an officer’s ‘common-sense conclusions about human behavior.’” Id. at 623 (quoting Dist. of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 587 (2018)). - 11 - Though an officer’s “[s]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis,” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996), “a police officer may draw inferences based on his own experience in deciding whether probable cause exists,” Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 700 .

2023That “includes, of course, an officer’s ‘common-sense conclusions about human behavior.’” Id. at 623 (quoting Dist. of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 587 (2018)). - 11 - Though an officer’s “[s]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis,” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996), “a police officer may draw inferences based on his own experience in deciding whether probable cause exists,” Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 700 .

2010Where a Fourth Amendment challenge is at issue, “ ‘ultimate questions of reasonable suspicion and probable cause’ ” as here presented “involve questions of both law and fact.” Id. at 197-98, 487 S.E.2d at 261 (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 691 , 116 S.Ct. 1657, 1659 , 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996)).

2010Where a Fourth Amendment challenge is at issue, “ ‘ultimate questions of reasonable suspicion and probable cause’ ” as here presented “involve questions of both law and fact.” Id. at 197-98, 487 S.E.2d at 261 (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 691 , 116 S.Ct. 1657, 1659 , 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996)).

2024That “includes, of course, an officer’s ‘common-sense conclusions about human behavior.’” Id. at 623 (quoting Dist. of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 587 (2018)). - 11 - Though an officer’s “[s]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis,” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996), “a police officer may draw inferences based on his own experience in deciding whether probable cause exists,” Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 700 .

2023That “includes, of course, an officer’s ‘common-sense conclusions about human behavior.’” Id. at 623 (quoting Dist. of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 587 (2018)). - 11 - Though an officer’s “[s]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis,” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996), “a police officer may draw inferences based on his own experience in deciding whether probable cause exists,” Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 700 .

2024The determination of “[w]hether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred ‘turns on an objective assessment of the officer’s actions in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him at the time,’ and not on the officer’s actual state of mind at the time the challenged action was taken.” Limonja v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 416, 422 (1988) (quoting Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470-71 (1985)).

2024The determination of “[w]hether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred ‘turns on an objective assessment of the officer’s actions in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him at the time,’ and not on the officer’s actual state of mind at the time the challenged action was taken.” Limonja v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 416, 422 (1988) (quoting Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470-71 (1985)).

2017Originally a separate inquiry, the United States Supreme Court has held that this Fourth Amendment standing requirement is “subsumed under substantive Fourth Amendment doctrine.” Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 134 (1978).

2013On appeal, we review “de novo the trial court’s application of defined legal standards such as whether a defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy sufficient to permit him to raise a Fourth Amendment challenge to a search.” Sharpe v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 448, 454 , 605 S.E.2d 346, 349 (2004) (citing United States v. Gordon, 168 F.3d 1222, 1225 (10th Cir. 3 Although appellant asserts, as did the trial court, that the issue is standing, this Court has previously noted that, [a]lthough many courts “characterize this as a question of ‘standing,’ the Supreme Court expressly rejected a

2006However, the determination of whether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred is based on “ ‘an objective assessment of the officer’s actions ... and not on the officer’s state of mind at the time the challenged action was taken.’ ” Limonja, v. Commonwealth, 8 Va.App. 532, 538, 383 S.E.2d 476, 480 (1989) (en banc) (quoting Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470-71 , 105 S.Ct. 2778, 2783 , 86 L.Ed.2d 370 (1985)); see also Deer v. Commonwealth, 17 Va.App. 730, 734 , 441 S.E.2d 33, 36 (1994) (“Attention must be focused on objective reasonableness rather than on the police officer’s subjective int

2006However, the determination of whether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred is based on “ ‘an objective assessment of the officer’s actions ... and not on the officer’s state of mind at the time the challenged action was taken.’ ” Limonja, v. Commonwealth, 8 Va.App. 532, 538, 383 S.E.2d 476, 480 (1989) (en banc) (quoting Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470-71 , 105 S.Ct. 2778, 2783 , 86 L.Ed.2d 370 (1985)); see also Deer v. Commonwealth, 17 Va.App. 730, 734 , 441 S.E.2d 33, 36 (1994) (“Attention must be focused on objective reasonableness rather than on the police officer’s subjective int

2014See Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470-71 (1985) (“Whether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred ‘turns on an objective assessment of the officer’s actions in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him at the time,’ and not on the officer’s actual state of mind at the time the challenged action was taken.” (quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 136 (1978))). -7- the record that suggests that Bailey’s free will was overborne and his consent to search was therefore valid.

2014See Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470-71 (1985) (“Whether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred ‘turns on an objective assessment of the officer’s actions in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him at the time,’ and not on the officer’s actual state of mind at the time the challenged action was taken.” (quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 136 (1978))). -7- the record that suggests that Bailey’s free will was overborne and his consent to search was therefore valid.

2014On appeal, we review “de novo the trial court’s application of defined legal standards such as whether a defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy sufficient to *786 permit him to raise a Fourth Amendment challenge to a search.” Sharpe v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 448, 454 , 605 S.E.2d 346, 349 (2004) (citing United States v. Gordon, 168 F.3d 1222, 1225 (10th Cir.1999)).

2014On appeal, we review “de novo the trial court’s application of defined legal standards such as whether a defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy sufficient to *786 permit him to raise a Fourth Amendment challenge to a search.” Sharpe v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 448, 454 , 605 S.E.2d 346, 349 (2004) (citing United States v. Gordon, 168 F.3d 1222, 1225 (10th Cir.1999)).

2025See Salahuddin v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 190, 202-03 (2017) (“Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), ‘the touchstone’ of Fourth Amendment analysis has been ‘the question whether a person 12 Highlander’s complaint seeks relief under Code § 19.2-59 only for the search of the camera, therefore we do not address its seizure. - 24 - has a “constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.”’” (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984))).

2020The appellant does not allege, nor does the evidence indicate, that Nathanson did anything other than look at the firearm in order to see its serial number, which was visible on the gun.5 “[T]he touchstone” of Fourth Amendment analysis is “whether a person has a ‘constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.’” Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)).

2018The United States Supreme Court reasoned that it was “unrealistic to require police officers to always inform detainees that they are free to go before a consent to search may be deemed voluntary” and held that the “Fourth Amendment test for a valid consent to search is that the consent be voluntary, and voluntariness is a question of fact to be determined from all the circumstances.” Id. at 40 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2012A consensual encounter is not a seizure, and thus does not implicate the Fourth Amendment, provided “‘a reasonable person would understand that he or she could refuse to cooperate.’” Payne, 14 Va. App. at 88 , 414 S.E.2d at 870 (quoting United States v. Wilson, 953 F.2d 116, 121 (4th Cir. 1991)). “‘The Fourth Amendment test for a valid consent to search is that the consent be voluntary, and voluntariness is a question of fact to be determined from all the circumstances.’” Bay v. Commonwealth, 60 Va. App. 520, 535 , 729 S.E.2d 768, 775 (2012) (quoting Robinette, 519 U.S. at 40 ).

2025See Salahuddin v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 190, 202-03 (2017) (“Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), ‘the touchstone’ of Fourth Amendment analysis has been ‘the question whether a person 12 Highlander’s complaint seeks relief under Code § 19.2-59 only for the search of the camera, therefore we do not address its seizure. - 24 - has a “constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.”’” (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984))).

2024IV. “‘[T]he touchstone’ of Fourth Amendment analysis has been ‘the question whether a person has a “constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.”’” Sanders, 64 Va. App. at 743 (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984)).

2022Officer Mawyer testified that when Turay was detained, he “was wearing a black jacket with a distinct red stripe . . . down the sleeves.” -9- fruits of the police officers’ Fourth Amendment violation.10 See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-88 (1963).

2022Officer Mawyer testified that when Turay was detained, he “was wearing a black jacket with a distinct red stripe . . . down the sleeves.” -9- fruits of the police officers’ Fourth Amendment violation.10 See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-88 (1963).

2025ANALYSIS When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress the evidence based on an alleged Fourth Amendment violation, “we defer to the trial court’s ‘findings of historical fact,’ taking care to review them ‘only for clear error and to give due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges.’” Bagley v. Commonwealth, 73 Va. App. 1 , 13 (2021) (quoting Malbrough v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 163, 169 (2008)).

2025ANALYSIS When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress the evidence based on an alleged Fourth Amendment violation, “we defer to the trial court’s ‘findings of historical fact,’ taking care to review them ‘only for clear error and to give due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges.’” Bagley v. Commonwealth, 73 Va. App. 1 , 13 (2021) (quoting Malbrough v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 163, 169 (2008)).

2017See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996) (concluding that officer who observes traffic violation may stop vehicle without violating Fourth Amendment); Mason, 291 Va. at 371-72 , 786 S.E.2d at 153 (finding no Fourth Amendment violation where police officer stopped vehicle in which defendant was riding to determine if object dangling from rearview mirror violated Code § 46.2-1054); McCain v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 546, 553 , 659 S.E.2d 512, 516 (2008) (finding police officer had reasonable suspicion to stop vehicle for equipment violation where officer observed that expiration

2017See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996) (concluding that officer who observes traffic violation may stop vehicle without violating Fourth Amendment); Mason, 291 Va. at 371-72 , 786 S.E.2d at 153 (finding no Fourth Amendment violation where police officer stopped vehicle in which defendant was riding to determine if object dangling from rearview mirror violated Code § 46.2-1054); McCain v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 546, 553 , 659 S.E.2d 512, 516 (2008) (finding police officer had reasonable suspicion to stop vehicle for equipment violation where officer observed that expiration

2014On appeal, we review “de novo the trial court’s application of defined legal standards such as whether a defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy sufficient to *786 permit him to raise a Fourth Amendment challenge to a search.” Sharpe v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 448, 454 , 605 S.E.2d 346, 349 (2004) (citing United States v. Gordon, 168 F.3d 1222, 1225 (10th Cir.1999)).

2014On appeal, we review “de novo the trial court’s application of defined legal standards such as whether a defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy sufficient to *786 permit him to raise a Fourth Amendment challenge to a search.” Sharpe v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 448, 454 , 605 S.E.2d 346, 349 (2004) (citing United States v. Gordon, 168 F.3d 1222, 1225 (10th Cir.1999)).

2003“Whether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred ‘turns on an objective assessment of the officer’s actions in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him at the time,’ and not on the officer’s actual state of mind at the time the challenged action was taken.” Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470-71 (1985) (quoting Scott, 436 U.S. at 136, 138-39, n. 13 ). “[I]n determining whether an investigative stop is invalid as pretextual, the proper inquiry is whether a reasonable officer would have made the seizure in the absence of illegitimate motivation.” United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 7

2003“Whether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred ‘turns on an objective assessment of the officer’s actions in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him at the time,’ and not on the officer’s actual state of mind at the time the challenged action was taken.” Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470-71 (1985) (quoting Scott, 436 U.S. at 136, 138-39, n. 13 ). “[I]n determining whether an investigative stop is invalid as pretextual, the proper inquiry is whether a reasonable officer would have made the seizure in the absence of illegitimate motivation.” United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 7

2023Cf. Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54 , 57 (2014) (Under the Fourth Amendment, “a search or seizure may be permissible even though the justification for the action includes a reasonable factual mistake.”); Collins v. Commonwealth, 297 Va. 207 , 218 (2019) (holding that suppression is not a proper remedy for a Fourth Amendment violation where the police acted with an objectively reasonable, good faith belief that the search and seizure were constitutional). -8- 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968) (establishing that the court should consider “the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizu

2023Cf. Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54 , 57 (2014) (Under the Fourth Amendment, “a search or seizure may be permissible even though the justification for the action includes a reasonable factual mistake.”); Collins v. Commonwealth, 297 Va. 207 , 218 (2019) (holding that suppression is not a proper remedy for a Fourth Amendment violation where the police acted with an objectively reasonable, good faith belief that the search and seizure were constitutional). -8- 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968) (establishing that the court should consider “the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizu

2012“The Fourth Amendment test for a valid consent to search is that the consent be voluntary, and ‘voluntariness is a question of fact to be determined from all the circumstances.’ ” Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 40 , 117 S.Ct. 417, 421 , 136 L.Ed.2d 347 (1996) (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 , 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2059 , 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973)).

2012“The Fourth Amendment test for a valid consent to search is that the consent be voluntary, and ‘voluntariness is a question of fact to be determined from all the circumstances.’ ” Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 40 , 117 S.Ct. 417, 421 , 136 L.Ed.2d 347 (1996) (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 , 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2059 , 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973)).

2024The modern emergency-aid exception traces its origins to Mincey v. Arizona, where the Court said that “the Fourth Amendment does not bar police officers from making warrantless entries and searches when they reasonably believe that a person within is in need of immediate aid.” 437 U.S. at 392 .1 The Court applied that doctrine in Brigham City, explaining that “[o]ne exigency obviating the requirement of a warrant is the need to assist persons who are seriously injured or threatened with such injury.” 547 U.S. at 403 .

2024“The need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is justification for what would be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or emergency.” Id. (quoting Mincey, 437 U.S. at 392 ).

2015Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 251 , 127 S.Ct. 2400, 2403 , 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007). .

2015Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 251 , 127 S.Ct. 2400, 2403 , 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007). .

2024IV. “‘[T]he touchstone’ of Fourth Amendment analysis has been ‘the question whether a person has a “constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.”’” Sanders, 64 Va. App. at 743 (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984)).

2017Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 , 88 S.Ct. 507 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), “the touchstone” of Fourth Amendment analysis has been “the *203 question whether a person has a ‘constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.’ ” Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 , 104 S.Ct. 1735, 1740-41 , 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 , 88 S.Ct. at 516 (Harlan, J., concurring)), quoted with approval in Sanders v. Commonwealth, 64 Va.App. 734, 743 , 772 S.E.2d 15, 19 (2015).

2021See, e.g., Rakas, 439 U.S. at 140 (addressing the parties’ Fourth Amendment standing argument before concluding that the issue is better described using the privacy rubric “of substantive Fourth Amendment law”); Hurley v. Commonwealth, 36 Va. App. 83 , 88 n.1 (2001) (defining the Fourth Amendment “standing” inquiry as whether a person has “a legitimate expectation of privacy” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Commonwealth v. Holloway, 9 Va. App. 11, 18 (1989) (recognizing that a person who lacks an “expectation of privacy” in an object lacks “standing to complain of the propert

2021See, e.g., Rakas, 439 U.S. at 140 (addressing the parties’ Fourth Amendment standing argument before concluding that the issue is better described using the privacy rubric “of substantive Fourth Amendment law”); Hurley v. Commonwealth, 36 Va. App. 83 , 88 n.1 (2001) (defining the Fourth Amendment “standing” inquiry as whether a person has “a legitimate expectation of privacy” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Commonwealth v. Holloway, 9 Va. App. 11, 18 (1989) (recognizing that a person who lacks an “expectation of privacy” in an object lacks “standing to complain of the propert

2017See Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 540 (finding no Fourth Amendment violation where officer mistakenly interpreted “stop lamp” provision of a North Carolina statute to require two brake lights, as statute had not been construed by state appellate courts and officer reasonably interpreted law).4 For these reasons, we uphold the ruling of the trial court denying the motion to suppress and affirm appellant’s conviction.

2015In those cases, however, a Fourth Amendment violation already had been found or presumed, and therefore “[a]ny consideration of the reasonableness of an officer’s mistake was limited to the separate matter of remedy.” Id.

2010Thus, “we give deference to the factual findings of the trial court but independently decide whether, under the applicable law, the manner in which the challenged evidence was obtained satisfies constitutional requirements.” Jackson v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 666, 672 , 594 S.E.2d 595, 598 (2004) (citation omitted).

2010Thus, “we give deference to the factual findings of the trial court but independently decide whether, under the applicable law, the manner in which the challenged evidence was obtained satisfies constitutional requirements.” Jackson v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 666, 672 , 594 S.E.2d 595, 598 (2004) (citation omitted).

2022To “supplement the bare text,” the United States Supreme Court “created the exclusionary rule, a deterrent sanction that bars the prosecution from introducing evidence obtained by way of a Fourth Amendment violation.” Id. at 231-32 .

2022To “supplement the bare text,” the United States Supreme Court “created the exclusionary rule, a deterrent sanction that bars the prosecution from introducing evidence obtained by way of a Fourth Amendment violation.” Id. at 231-32 .

2010“Miranda warnings . . . do not alone sufficiently deter a Fourth Amendment violation.” Brown, 422 U.S. at 601 .

2010“Miranda warnings . . . do not alone sufficiently deter a Fourth Amendment violation.” Brown, 422 U.S. at 601 .