Fourth Amendment violation in California

2025(Doty, supra, 165 Cal.App.3d at p. 1066 ; Katz, supra, 389 U.S. at p. 351 ; accord, United States v. Dunn (1987) 480 U.S. 294, 304 [ 94 L.Ed.2d 326 ] [“the Fourth Amendment ‘has never been extended to require law 8 enforcement officers to shield their eyes when passing by a [private structure] on public thoroughfares’ ”].) We similarly reject defendant’s reliance on the fact that he was a passenger in the back seat at the time of the traffic stop to prove a Fourth Amendment violation.

2025(Doty, supra, 165 Cal.App.3d at p. 1066 ; Katz, supra, 389 U.S. at p. 351 ; accord, United States v. Dunn (1987) 480 U.S. 294, 304 [ 94 L.Ed.2d 326 ] [“the Fourth Amendment ‘has never been extended to require law 8 enforcement officers to shield their eyes when passing by a [private structure] on public thoroughfares’ ”].) We similarly reject defendant’s reliance on the fact that he was a passenger in the back seat at the time of the traffic stop to prove a Fourth Amendment violation.

2025“Where a search is found to be invalid, ‘a Fourth Amendment violation is shown and the question . . . becomes whether such constitutional violation is appropriately remedied by the application of the judicially created exclusionary rule which prohibits the admission at trial of the evidence obtained during the unlawful search.’ (People v. Downing (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1641 , 1650–1651 . . ., citing United States v. Leon (1984) 468 U.S. 897, 906 [ 82 L.Ed.2d 677 ] . . . .) Exclusion of the evidence is compelled ‘only where it “ ‘result[s] in appreciable deterrence.’ ” ’ (Herring v. United State

2025“Where a search is found to be invalid, ‘a Fourth Amendment violation is shown and the question . . . becomes whether such constitutional violation is appropriately remedied by the application of the judicially created exclusionary rule which prohibits the admission at trial of the evidence obtained during the unlawful search.’ (People v. Downing (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1641 , 1650–1651 . . ., citing United States v. Leon (1984) 468 U.S. 897, 906 [ 82 L.Ed.2d 677 ] . . . .) Exclusion of the evidence is compelled ‘only where it “ ‘result[s] in appreciable deterrence.’ ” ’ (Herring v. United State

2024The United States Supreme Court has long held that, under the Fourth Amendment, “the constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops” does not depend “on the actual motivations of the individual officers involved.” (Whren v. United States (1996) 517 U.S. 806, 813 (Whren).) This is because “[w]hether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred ‘turns on an objective assessment of the officer’s actions in light of the facts and circumstances confronting [him or her] at the time,’ [citation], and not on the officer’s actual state of mind at the time the challenged action was taken.” (Maryland v. Mac

2024The United States Supreme Court has long held that, under the Fourth Amendment, “the constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops” does not depend “on the actual motivations of the individual officers involved.” (Whren v. United States (1996) 517 U.S. 806, 813 (Whren).) This is because “[w]hether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred ‘turns on an objective assessment of the officer’s actions in light of the facts and circumstances confronting [him or her] at the time,’ [citation], and not on the officer’s actual state of mind at the time the challenged action was taken.” (Maryland v. Mac

2024(See, e.g., People v. Williams (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 949, 961 [deferring to trial court’s finding that the defendant’s consent was voluntary where officers “went out of their way to be courteous,” even where the defendant was in custody].) But this does not end our inquiry because where, as here, a defendant “claims a consent to search is tainted by a prior Fourth Amendment violation, mere voluntariness of the consent is not enough.” (People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 450 .) Instead, pursuant to “the so-called attenuation doctrine” (McWilliams, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 437), we must exami

2024(See, e.g., People v. Williams (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 949, 961 [deferring to trial court’s finding that the defendant’s consent was voluntary where officers “went out of their way to be courteous,” even where the defendant was in custody].) But this does not end our inquiry because where, as here, a defendant “claims a consent to search is tainted by a prior Fourth Amendment violation, mere voluntariness of the consent is not enough.” (People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 450 .) Instead, pursuant to “the so-called attenuation doctrine” (McWilliams, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 437), we must exami

2025(See Wong Sun v. United States (1963) 371 U.S. 471, 485 [“The exclusionary rule has traditionally barred from trial physical, tangible materials obtained either during or as a direct result” of a Fourth Amendment violation]; Mapp v. Ohio (1961) 367 U.S. 643 , 655–656.) without explanation—what extrinsic evidence C.T. hoped to introduce that would be relevant enough for admission, even in a relaxed evidentiary setting such as this. 13.

2025(See Wong Sun v. United States (1963) 371 U.S. 471, 485 [“The exclusionary rule has traditionally barred from trial physical, tangible materials obtained either during or as a direct result” of a Fourth Amendment violation]; Mapp v. Ohio (1961) 367 U.S. 643 , 655–656.) without explanation—what extrinsic evidence C.T. hoped to introduce that would be relevant enough for admission, even in a relaxed evidentiary setting such as this. 13.

2018Thus, we must ‘view the facts upon which the suppression motions were submitted in the light most favorable to the People, drawing therefrom all reasonable inferences in support of the trial court’s order denying 5 the motions.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Dominguez (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 345, 353 ; see also People v. Woods (1999) 21 Cal.4th 668, 673 .) Substantial Evidence Supports the Finding that Appellant Freely and Voluntarily Consented to the Blood Draw “[A] court may exclude . . . evidence [pursuant to section 1538.5] only if exclusion is . . . mandated by the federal exclusionary rule appli

2018Thus, we must ‘view the facts upon which the suppression motions were submitted in the light most favorable to the People, drawing therefrom all reasonable inferences in support of the trial court’s order denying 5 the motions.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Dominguez (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 345, 353 ; see also People v. Woods (1999) 21 Cal.4th 668, 673 .) Substantial Evidence Supports the Finding that Appellant Freely and Voluntarily Consented to the Blood Draw “[A] court may exclude . . . evidence [pursuant to section 1538.5] only if exclusion is . . . mandated by the federal exclusionary rule appli

2025Not only must he subjectively entertain such a suspicion, but it must be objectively reasonable for him to do so: the facts must be such as would cause any reasonable police officer in a like position, drawing when appropriate on his training and experience [citation], to suspect the same criminal activity and the same involvement by the person in question.” (In re Tony C. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 888, 893 (Tony C.); see also Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 21 (Terry).) The Fourth Amendment standard “ ‘ “depends on the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prud

2025Not only must he subjectively entertain such a suspicion, but it must be objectively reasonable for him to do so: the facts must be such as would cause any reasonable police officer in a like position, drawing when appropriate on his training and experience [citation], to suspect the same criminal activity and the same involvement by the person in question.” (In re Tony C. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 888, 893 (Tony C.); see also Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 21 (Terry).) The Fourth Amendment standard “ ‘ “depends on the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prud

2022An interaction between a police officer and citizen changes from a consensual encounter to a detention, and “a person has been ‘seized’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.” (United States v. Mendenhall (1980) 446 U.S. 544, 554 ; see also Wilson v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Cal.3d 777, 790 ; People v. Rivera (2007) 41 Cal.4th 304, 309 [“There is no Fourth Amendment violation as long as circumstances are such that a reasonable person would feel free

1984In Wilson v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Cal.3d 777, 784 [ 195 Cal.Rptr. 671 , 670 P.2d 325 ], our Supreme Court observed that, “For purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis, there are basically three different categories or levels of police ‘contacts’ . . . with individuals, ranging from the least to the most intrusive.” These categories are the “consensual encounter” which results in no restraint of an individual’s liberty, the “detention” which is a limited investigatory seizure based upon reasonable suspicion the individual is involved in criminal conduct and, finally, formal arrest or comparabl

2025We agree that Baldonado is not entitled to assert a Fourth Amendment violation here.7 For that reason, we do not address the merits of the claim.8 6 According to the respondent’s brief, Sanchez’s case ended in a mistrial, but he was later convicted of Villasenor’s murder in a subsequent trial. 7 As noted in the respondent’s brief, the United States Supreme Court explained that when a criminal defendant seeks to exclude evidence based on a violation of the Fourth Amendment, “the analysis belongs more properly under the heading of substantive Fourth Amendment doctrine than under the heading of s

2025We agree that Baldonado is not entitled to assert a Fourth Amendment violation here.7 For that reason, we do not address the merits of the claim.8 6 According to the respondent’s brief, Sanchez’s case ended in a mistrial, but he was later convicted of Villasenor’s murder in a subsequent trial. 7 As noted in the respondent’s brief, the United States Supreme Court explained that when a criminal defendant seeks to exclude evidence based on a violation of the Fourth Amendment, “the analysis belongs more properly under the heading of substantive Fourth Amendment doctrine than under the heading of s

2025“Where a search is found to be invalid, ‘a Fourth Amendment violation is shown and the question . . . becomes whether such constitutional violation is appropriately remedied by the application of the judicially created exclusionary rule which prohibits the admission at trial of the evidence obtained during the unlawful search.’ (People v. Downing (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1641 , 1650–1651 . . ., citing United States v. Leon (1984) 468 U.S. 897, 906 [ 82 L.Ed.2d 677 ] . . . .) Exclusion of the evidence is compelled ‘only where it “ ‘result[s] in appreciable deterrence.’ ” ’ (Herring v. United State

2025“Where a search is found to be invalid, ‘a Fourth Amendment violation is shown and the question . . . becomes whether such constitutional violation is appropriately remedied by the application of the judicially created exclusionary rule which prohibits the admission at trial of the evidence obtained during the unlawful search.’ (People v. Downing (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1641 , 1650–1651 . . ., citing United States v. Leon (1984) 468 U.S. 897, 906 [ 82 L.Ed.2d 677 ] . . . .) Exclusion of the evidence is compelled ‘only where it “ ‘result[s] in appreciable deterrence.’ ” ’ (Herring v. United State

2022(People v. Camacho (2000) 23 Cal.4th 824 , 829–830.) Central to the Fourth Amendment analysis is whether a person has a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy; that is, “a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the challenged search [that] society [is] willing to recognize . . . 6 as reasonable.” (California v. Ciraolo (1986) 476 U.S. 207, 211 .) Using equipment to hear confidential communications that are inaudible to the unaided ear generally violates reasonable expectations of privacy; however, when communications are not confidential, this rule does not ap

2022(People v. Camacho (2000) 23 Cal.4th 824 , 829–830.) Central to the Fourth Amendment analysis is whether a person has a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy; that is, “a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the challenged search [that] society [is] willing to recognize . . . 6 as reasonable.” (California v. Ciraolo (1986) 476 U.S. 207, 211 .) Using equipment to hear confidential communications that are inaudible to the unaided ear generally violates reasonable expectations of privacy; however, when communications are not confidential, this rule does not ap

2025A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 694 .) “Where defense counsel’s failure to litigate a Fourth Amendment claim competently is the principal allegation of ineffectiveness, the defendant must also prove that his Fourth Amendment claim is meritorious and that there is a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different absent the excludable evidence in order to demonstrate actual prejudice.” (Kimmelman v. Morrison (1986) 477 U.S. 365, 375 [ 106 S.Ct. 2574 , 91 L.Ed.2d 305 ].) 2.

2025A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 694 .) “Where defense counsel’s failure to litigate a Fourth Amendment claim competently is the principal allegation of ineffectiveness, the defendant must also prove that his Fourth Amendment claim is meritorious and that there is a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different absent the excludable evidence in order to demonstrate actual prejudice.” (Kimmelman v. Morrison (1986) 477 U.S. 365, 375 [ 106 S.Ct. 2574 , 91 L.Ed.2d 305 ].) 2.

2024There is no Fourth Amendment violation [if the] circumstances 6 are such that a reasonable person would feel free to leave or end the encounter.” (People v. Rivera (2007) 41 Cal.4th 304, 309 .) In contrast, a detention occurs when the police, by physical force or show of authority, communicate to a reasonable person, in view of all the circumstances, that they are not free to leave, or otherwise terminate the encounter, and if the person actually submits to the show of authority. ( Tacardon, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 241- 242; accord, Florida v. Bostick (1991) 501 U.S. 429, 439 (Bostick).) “The

2019On the Fourth Amendment analysis, our review is independent. ( People v. Zamudio , supra , 43 Cal.4th at p. 342 , 75 Cal.Rptr.3d 289 , 181 P.3d 105 .) Federal law controls this review. ( People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789 , 794, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 914 , 3 P.3d 311 .) A consensual encounter between a police officer and a citizen does not implicate the Fourth Amendment. ( Florida v. Bostick (1991) 501 U.S. 429 , 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382 , 115 L.Ed.2d 389 .) An encounter is consensual if a reasonable and innocent person would feel free to leave or to refuse to *929 cooperate with the police. ( Id. at

2019Numerous state and federal cases have recognized that the Fourth Amendment does not bar police officers from making warrantless entries and searches when they reasonably believe that a person within is in need of immediate aid. ... 'The need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is justification for what would be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or emergency.' [Citation.] And the police may seize any evidence that is in plain view during the course of their legitimate emergency activities." ( Mincey, supra, 437 U.S. at pp. 392-393, 98 S.Ct. 2408 , fns. omitted.) "Accordingly,

2013I, § 28, subd. (f)(2).) “In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we defer to that court’s factual findings, express or implied, if they are supported by substantial evidence. [Citation.] We exercise our independent judgment in determining whether, on the facts presented, the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” (Lenart, at p. 1119.) “The touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis is whether a person has a ‘constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.’ ” (California v. Ciraolo (1986) 476 U.S. 207, 211 [ 90 L.Ed.2d 210 , 106 S.

2013(United States v. Salvucci (1980) 448 U.S. 83, 91-92 ; People v. Carter, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 1141 ; People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 972 .) ―‗The legitimate expectation of privacy must exist in the particular area searched or thing seized in order to bring a Fourth Amendment challenge.‘ [Citation.]‖ (People v. McPeters, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1171 .) Defendant had the burden of establishing he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the attic at the time of the warrantless entry.

2013(United States v. Salvucci (1980) 448 U.S. 83, 91-92 ; People v. Carter, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 1141 ; People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 972 .) ―‗The legitimate expectation of privacy must exist in the particular area searched or thing seized in order to bring a Fourth Amendment challenge.‘ [Citation.]‖ (People v. McPeters, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1171 .) Defendant had the burden of establishing he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the attic at the time of the warrantless entry.

2025(People v. Superior Court (Walker) (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1183, 1215 .) We may not disregard a Fourth Amendment violation “ ‘simply because the police, had they thought about the situation more carefully, could have come up with a lawful means of achieving their desired results.’ ” (Id. at p. 1216, fn. 30; see also People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789 , 800–801.) This argument is unpersuasive because we have no doubt that, as the People argue, independent of any information obtained as a result of warrantless police entries into Sibilio’s apartment, the court, whether on August 26 or soon th

2025(People v. Superior Court (Walker) (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1183, 1215 .) We may not disregard a Fourth Amendment violation “ ‘simply because the police, had they thought about the situation more carefully, could have come up with a lawful means of achieving their desired results.’ ” (Id. at p. 1216, fn. 30; see also People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789 , 800–801.) This argument is unpersuasive because we have no doubt that, as the People argue, independent of any information obtained as a result of warrantless police entries into Sibilio’s apartment, the court, whether on August 26 or soon th

2020Good Faith Exception "Under the 'fruit of the poisonous tree' doctrine, both direct and indirect products of an unreasonable search are subject to exclusion." (People v. Werner (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1195, 1213 .) Nonetheless, "[t]he United States Supreme Court has 'repeatedly rejected the argument that exclusion is a necessary consequence of a Fourth Amendment violation.' [Citations.] 'Indeed, exclusion "has always been our last resort, not our first impulse . . . ." ' [Citation.] [¶] 'Whether the exclusionary sanction is appropriately imposed in a particular case . . . is "an issue separate

2020Good Faith Exception "Under the 'fruit of the poisonous tree' doctrine, both direct and indirect products of an unreasonable search are subject to exclusion." (People v. Werner (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1195, 1213 .) Nonetheless, "[t]he United States Supreme Court has 'repeatedly rejected the argument that exclusion is a necessary consequence of a Fourth Amendment violation.' [Citations.] 'Indeed, exclusion "has always been our last resort, not our first impulse . . . ." ' [Citation.] [¶] 'Whether the exclusionary sanction is appropriately imposed in a particular case . . . is "an issue separate

2025Not only must he subjectively entertain such a suspicion, but it must be objectively reasonable for him to do so: the facts must be such as would cause any reasonable police officer in a like position, drawing when appropriate on his training and experience [citation], to suspect the same criminal activity and the same involvement by the person in question.” (In re Tony C. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 888, 893 (Tony C.); see also Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 21 (Terry).) The Fourth Amendment standard “ ‘ “depends on the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prud

2025Not only must he subjectively entertain such a suspicion, but it must be objectively reasonable for him to do so: the facts must be such as would cause any reasonable police officer in a like position, drawing when appropriate on his training and experience [citation], to suspect the same criminal activity and the same involvement by the person in question.” (In re Tony C. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 888, 893 (Tony C.); see also Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 21 (Terry).) The Fourth Amendment standard “ ‘ “depends on the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prud

2016Rather, the more apt question in such a case is ‘whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.’ ” ’ [Citations.] ‘[B]ut-for cause, or “causation in the logical sense alone,” [citation] can be too attenuated to justify exclusion . . . .’ [Citations.]” (People v. Brendlin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 262, 268 (Brendlin).) In determining whether an intervening circumstance was sufficient to break the causal connec

2016Rather, the more apt question in such a case is ‘whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.’ ” ’ [Citations.] ‘[B]ut-for cause, or “causation in the logical sense alone,” [citation] can be too attenuated to justify exclusion . . . .’ [Citations.]” (People v. Brendlin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 262, 268 (Brendlin).) In determining whether an intervening circumstance was sufficient to break the causal connec

2013To determine if evidence is admissible despite a defect in the initial stop, we must decide “ ‘whether the chain of causation proceeding from the unlawful conduct has become so attenuated or has been interrupted by some intervening circumstance so as to remove the “taint” imposed upon that evidence by the original illegality.’ ” (People v. Brendlin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 262, 269 [ 85 Cal.Rptr.3d 496 , 195 P.3d 1074 ], quoting United States v. Crews (1980) 445 U.S. 463, 471 [ 63 L.Ed.2d 537 , 100 S.Ct. 1244 ].) Three factors are used to determine whether the taint of the illegal detention has been

2013To determine if evidence is admissible despite a defect in the initial stop, we must decide “ ‘whether the chain of causation proceeding from the unlawful conduct has become so attenuated or has been interrupted by some intervening circumstance so as to remove the “taint” imposed upon that evidence by the original illegality.’ ” (People v. Brendlin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 262, 269 [ 85 Cal.Rptr.3d 496 , 195 P.3d 1074 ], quoting United States v. Crews (1980) 445 U.S. 463, 471 [ 63 L.Ed.2d 537 , 100 S.Ct. 1244 ].) Three factors are used to determine whether the taint of the illegal detention has been

2022An interaction between a police officer and citizen changes from a consensual encounter to a detention, and “a person has been ‘seized’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.” (United States v. Mendenhall (1980) 446 U.S. 544, 554 ; see also Wilson v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Cal.3d 777, 790 ; People v. Rivera (2007) 41 Cal.4th 304, 309 [“There is no Fourth Amendment violation as long as circumstances are such that a reasonable person would feel free

2013There is no Fourth Amendment violation as long as circumstances are such that a reasonable person would feel free to leave or end the encounter. [Citations.]” (People v. Rivera (2007) 41 Cal.4th 304, 309 .) “„[I]n order to determine whether a particular encounter constitutes a seizure, a court must consider all the circumstances surrounding the encounter to determine whether the police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that the person was not free to decline the officers‟ requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.‟ [Citation.] This test assesses the coercive effect of

2021(See People v. Woods (1999) 21 Cal.4th 668, 673 .) We review independently whether the search or seizure was legal under the Fourth Amendment requirement of reasonableness.

2018Thus, we must ‘view the facts upon which the suppression motions were submitted in the light most favorable to the People, drawing therefrom all reasonable inferences in support of the trial court’s order denying 5 the motions.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Dominguez (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 345, 353 ; see also People v. Woods (1999) 21 Cal.4th 668, 673 .) Substantial Evidence Supports the Finding that Appellant Freely and Voluntarily Consented to the Blood Draw “[A] court may exclude . . . evidence [pursuant to section 1538.5] only if exclusion is . . . mandated by the federal exclusionary rule appli

2025When, as here, a defendant is lawfully arrested based on probable cause, “a search incident to the arrest requires no additional justification.” (People v. Macabeo (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1206, 1213 .) Further, a search incident to arrest extends to items on the defendant’s person and in his or her 8 possession. “ ‘It is settled Fourth Amendment doctrine that a police officer may, incident to a lawful arrest, conduct a contemporaneous warrantless search of the arrestee’s person and of the area into which the arrestee might reach to retrieve a weapon or destroy evidence.’ [Citation.] Such searches may

2024(Id. at pp. 995–996.) The court held that “the search warrants were written with sufficient particularity because the items listed on the warrants were qualified by phrases that emphasized that the items sought were those related to child pornography,” and thus, “[p]olice officers executing the warrants were not unguided and free to rummage through Hall’s property.” (Id. at pp. 996–997, fn. omitted.) 33 “Exclusion of evidence due to a Fourth Amendment violation is not automatic.” (People v. Macabeo (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1206, 1219 (Macabeo).) “The exclusionary rule applies only ‘where its deterrenc

2021“The touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis is whether a person has a ‘constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.’ ” (California v. Ciraolo (1986) 476 U.S. 207, 211 ; Robey v. Superior Court (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1218, 1224 .) “ ‘ “An illegal search or seizure violates the federal constitutional rights only of those who have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded [space] or the seized thing. [Citation.] The legitimate expectation of privacy must exist in the particular area searched or thing seized in order to bring a Fourth Amendment challenge.” ’ ” (People v. Cart

2021Defendant relies on Robey v. Superior Court (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1218, 1242 , for the position that we should not consider Fourth Amendment exception theories that were not the basis of the trial court’s determination.

2018Particularly in a case such as this, where time had to be taken to bring the accused to a hospital and to investigate the scene of the accident, there was no time to seek out a magistrate and secure a warrant." ( Id . at pp. 770-771, 86 S.Ct. 1826 .) But the court noted that its "judgment that there had been no Fourth Amendment violation was strictly based 'on the facts of the present record.' " ( McNeely , supra , 569 U.S. at p. 152 , 133 S.Ct. 1552 (quoting Schmerber , at p. 772, 86 S.Ct. 1826 ).) Four months before the accident in this case, the United States Supreme Court revisited Schmerb

2018Particularly in a case such as this, where time had to be taken to bring the accused to a hospital and to investigate the scene of the accident, there was no time to seek out a magistrate and secure a warrant." ( Id . at pp. 770-771, 86 S.Ct. 1826 .) But the court noted that its "judgment that there had been no Fourth Amendment violation was strictly based 'on the facts of the present record.' " ( McNeely , supra , 569 U.S. at p. 152 , 133 S.Ct. 1552 (quoting Schmerber , at p. 772, 86 S.Ct. 1826 ).) Four months before the accident in this case, the United States Supreme Court revisited Schmerb