Fourth Amendment violation in Utah

2024When a defendant bases his ineffective assistance claim on his counsel’s failure to raise a Fourth Amendment challenge, he cannot show actual prejudice unless he “prove[s] that his Fourth Amendment claim is meritorious and that there is a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different absent the excludable evidence.” Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375 (1986).

2024When a defendant bases his ineffective assistance claim on his counsel’s failure to raise a Fourth Amendment challenge, he cannot show actual prejudice unless he “prove[s] that his Fourth Amendment claim is meritorious and that there is a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different absent the excludable evidence.” Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375 (1986).

2003This court, in State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730, 736 (Utah Ct.App.1991), rev'd, 850 P.2d 427 (Utah 1992), made the remarkable statement that abandonment is "primarily a factual question of intent." However, not only do I believe that the abandonment issue in Rowe was erroneously decided, see State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1269 (Utah 1993), I see nothing to support this court's decision to separate Fourth Amendment abandonment analysis from our normal Fourth Amendment analysis.

1995The second Arroyo factor examines whether defendant’s consent was the product of police exploitation of the illegal stop, “or in other words, “whether the “taint” of the Fourth Amendment violation was sufficiently attenuated to permit introduction of the evidence.’ ” State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1263 (quoting New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 19 , 110 S.Ct. 1640, 1643-44 , 109 L.Ed.2d 13 (1990)).

2004State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 1234-37 (Utah 1996); State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 469-70 (Utah 1990).

1992See, e.g., State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132, 1137 (Utah 1989) (Utah Supreme Court held that officer’s opening of a vehicle door to ask passenger for identification was “a search that was not incidental to the routine traffic stop and not justified by any exception to the Fourth Amendment requirement of probable cause.”); see also State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990) (Utah Supreme Court held that opening an unoccupied vehicle’s door to inspect the VIN constituted an unreasonable search under Utah Constitution). 3 .

2000A warrantless search is a per se Fourth Amendment violation unless the State can establish one of the " 'few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions. " State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 687 (Utah 1990) (quoting Kaitz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 , 88 S.Ct. 507, 514 , 19 LEd.2d 576 (1967) (citations omitted)); accord State v. Sepulveda, 842 P.2d 913, 918 (Utah App.1992).

2000A warrantless search is a per se Fourth Amendment violation unless the State can establish one of the "`few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.'" State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 687 (Utah 1990) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 , 88 S.Ct. 507, 514 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) (citations omitted)); accord State v. Sepulveda, 842 P.2d 913, 918 (Utah App.1992).

2015Thus, a "brief time lapse" between a Fourth Amendment violation and the *542 evidence obtained may "indicate[ ] exploitation because the effects of the misconduct have not had time to dissipate," Id.

2015Thus, a "brief time lapse" between a Fourth Amendment violation and the *542 evidence obtained may "indicate[ ] exploitation because the effects of the misconduct have not had time to dissipate," Id.

2007Brigham City v. Stuart, - U.S, --, --, 126 S.Ct. 1943, 1948 , 164 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006) (quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128 , 98 S.Ct. 1717 , 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978)); accord Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 , 116 S.Ct. 1769 , 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) ("Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis."); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 , 109 S.Ct. 1865 , 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (indicating that a Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry requires the court to consider "whether the officers' actions are 'objectively reasonable' in light of th

2007Brigham City v. Stuart, - U.S, --, --, 126 S.Ct. 1943, 1948 , 164 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006) (quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128 , 98 S.Ct. 1717 , 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978)); accord Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 , 116 S.Ct. 1769 , 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) ("Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis."); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 , 109 S.Ct. 1865 , 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (indicating that a Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry requires the court to consider "whether the officers' actions are 'objectively reasonable' in light of th

2003See State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 437 (Utah Ct.App.1990) (finding Fourth Amendment violation where police did not have "the reasonable suspicion of criminal activity necessary to justify their continued detention and questioning of [defendants] once ... the purpose for the initial stop had been accomplished").

1991In determining whether a consent to search is lawfully obtained following a fourth amendment violation, a two prong test must be met for the evidence to be admissible: “(1) the consent must be voluntary in fact; and (2) the consent must not be obtained by police exploitation of the prior illegality.” State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 437 (Utah Ct.App.1990) (citing Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 688 ).

2022See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375 (1986) (“Where defense counsel’s failure to litigate a Fourth Amendment claim competently is the principal allegation of ineffectiveness, the defendant must also prove that his Fourth Amendment claim is meritorious and that there is a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different absent the excludable evidence in order to demonstrate actual prejudice.”); see also State v. Martinez-Castellanos, 2018 UT 46, ¶ 45 , 428 P.3d 1038 (“A trial counsel’s failure to file a . . . motion to suppress can only cause harm to a defendant when th

2022See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375 (1986) (“Where defense counsel’s failure to litigate a Fourth Amendment claim competently is the principal allegation of ineffectiveness, the defendant must also prove that his Fourth Amendment claim is meritorious and that there is a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different absent the excludable evidence in order to demonstrate actual prejudice.”); see also State v. Martinez-Castellanos, 2018 UT 46, ¶ 45 , 428 P.3d 1038 (“A trial counsel’s failure to file a . . . motion to suppress can only cause harm to a defendant when th

2002"The core inquiry in a Fourth Amendment analysis is 'whether a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area searched." Id. (quoting United States v. Bilanzich, 771 F.2d 292, 296 (7th Cir.1985)).

2002"The core inquiry in a Fourth Amendment analysis is 'whether a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area searched." Id. (quoting United States v. Bilanzich, 771 F.2d 292, 296 (7th Cir.1985)).

2000See Jackson, 805 P.2d at 767-69 .

1992State v. Jackson, 805 P.2d 765, 766 (Utah App.1990).

2000A warrantless search is a per se Fourth Amendment violation unless the State can establish one of the " 'few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions. " State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 687 (Utah 1990) (quoting Kaitz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 , 88 S.Ct. 507, 514 , 19 LEd.2d 576 (1967) (citations omitted)); accord State v. Sepulveda, 842 P.2d 913, 918 (Utah App.1992).

2000A warrantless search is a per se Fourth Amendment violation unless the State can establish one of the "`few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.'" State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 687 (Utah 1990) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 , 88 S.Ct. 507, 514 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) (citations omitted)); accord State v. Sepulveda, 842 P.2d 913, 918 (Utah App.1992).

1993The second determination to be made in deciding whether a consent following police illegality is valid is “whether the consent was obtained by police exploitation of the prior illegality,” Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 688 ; see also Sims, 841 P.2d at 10 ; cf Allen, 839 P.2d at 300 , or in other words, “whether the ‘taint’ of the Fourth Amendment violation was sufficiently attenuated to permit introduction of the evidence,” Harris, 495 U.S. at 19 , 110 S.Ct. at 1643 -44 (citing Crews, 445 U.S. at 471 , 100 S.Ct. at 1436 ).

1993The second determination to be made in deciding whether a consent following police illegality is valid is “whether the consent was obtained by police exploitation of the prior illegality,” Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 688 ; see also Sims, 841 P.2d at 10 ; cf Allen, 839 P.2d at 300 , or in other words, “whether the ‘taint’ of the Fourth Amendment violation was sufficiently attenuated to permit introduction of the evidence,” Harris, 495 U.S. at 19 , 110 S.Ct. at 1643 -44 (citing Crews, 445 U.S. at 471 , 100 S.Ct. at 1436 ).

2025ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶14 “We review a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress for an alleged Fourth Amendment violation as a mixed question of law and fact.” State v. Fuller, 2014 UT 29, ¶ 17 , 332 P.3d 937 .

2025ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶14 “We review a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress for an alleged Fourth Amendment violation as a mixed question of law and fact.” State v. Fuller, 2014 UT 29, ¶ 17 , 332 P.3d 937 .

2007We criticized the failure of the appellant to raise and argue the state claims, and observed: "Where the parties do not raise or adequately brief state constitutional issues, our holdings become inevitably contingent." Id. ¶ 12. ¶ 35 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari "in light of differences among state courts and the federal courts of appeals concerning the appropriate Fourth Amendment standard governing warrantless entry by law enforcement in an emergency situation." Brigham City, 126 S.Ct. at 1947 .

2007We criticized the failure of the appellant to raise and argue the state claims, and observed: "Where the parties do not raise or adequately brief state constitutional issues, our holdings become inevitably contingent." Id. ¶ 12. ¶ 35 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari "in light of differences among state courts and the federal courts of appeals concerning the appropriate Fourth Amendment standard governing warrantless entry by law enforcement in an emergency situation." Brigham City, 126 S.Ct. at 1947 .

2017When counsel’s “failure to litigate a ■ Fourth Amendment claim competently is the principal allegation of ineffectiveness, the defendant must also prove that his Fourth Amendment claim is meritorious ... to demonstrate actual prejudice.” Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375 , 106 S.Ct. 2574 , 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986). ¶ 20 Here, Taylor has offered no analysis designed to overcome the rule “that counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 .

2017When counsel’s “failure to litigate a ■ Fourth Amendment claim competently is the principal allegation of ineffectiveness, the defendant must also prove that his Fourth Amendment claim is meritorious ... to demonstrate actual prejudice.” Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375 , 106 S.Ct. 2574 , 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986). ¶ 20 Here, Taylor has offered no analysis designed to overcome the rule “that counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 .

2024And when assessing reasonableness in a Fourth Amendment inquiry, courts seek to “balance[] the nature and quality of the intrusion on personal security against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.” State v. Hubbard, 861 P.2d 1053, 1054 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (quotation simplified). ¶23 As noted, an investigatory detention is permitted if an “officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person has been, is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity.” State v. Alverez, 2006 UT 61, ¶ 14 (quotation simplified).

2024And when assessing reasonableness in a Fourth Amendment inquiry, courts seek to “balance[] the nature and quality of the intrusion on personal security against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.” State v. Hubbard, 861 P.2d 1053, 1054 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (quotation simplified). ¶23 As noted, an investigatory detention is permitted if an “officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person has been, is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity.” State v. Alverez, 2006 UT 61, ¶ 14 (quotation simplified).

2002“A brief time lapse between a Fourth Amendment violation and consent often indicates exploitation because the effects of the misconduct have not had time to dissipate.” Skoulderblade, 905 P.2d at 293 (citing Melendez-Garcia, 28 F.3d at 1055 ).

2002“A brief time lapse between a Fourth Amendment violation and consent often indicates exploitation because the effects of the misconduct have not had time to dissipate.” Skoulderblade, 905 P.2d at 293 (citing Melendez-Garcia, 28 F.3d at 1055 ).

1992Prior to State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1989), standing to raise a Fourth Amendment challenge was viewed as a jurisdictional issue that could be raised by the parties at any time, or by the court sua sponte.

1992Prior to State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1989), standing to raise a Fourth Amendment challenge was viewed as a jurisdictional issue that could be raised by the parties at any time, or by the court sua sponte.