Fourth Amendment violation in Massachusetts

2019"It is true that the absence of such penetration was at one time thought to foreclose further Fourth Amendment inquiry ... [but] we have since departed from [that] narrow view." See id . 352-353 , 88 S.Ct. 507 (extending Fourth Amendment protections to "the recording of oral statements overheard without any technical trespass under ... local property law" [quotation and citation omitted] ). 8 The court disputes whether, in 2012, the capacity existed for police to associate the GPS coordinates with the former girlfriend's home.

1991They got most of it.” The threshold question in examining a Fourth Amendment issue is whether a person had a “constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.” California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986), quoting Katz v. United States, *686 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).

1995Finally, we recognize that, “[i]n examining the expectation of privacy question under art. 14, we do not necessarily reach the same result as under Fourth Amendment analysis.” Commonwealth v. Montanez, supra at 301 , citing Commonwealth v. Panetti, 406 Mass. 230, 234 (1989).

1991Commonwealth v. Panetti, supra at 234 .

2014See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282, 285 (1983) (no Fourth Amendment violation when, without warrant, police used electronic tracking device to track defendant’s movement on public roads).

2012Compare United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984) (use of short-range radio transmitter tracking device to obtain information about interior of defendant’s home constitutes search under Fourth Amendment), with United Stales v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) (use of same technology to track defendant’s movements along public thoroughfare not a search within ambit of Fourth Amendment).

2013Our cases have not deviated from this basic Fourth Amendment principle.” United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984).

2012Compare United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984) (use of short-range radio transmitter tracking device to obtain information about interior of defendant’s home constitutes search under Fourth Amendment), with United Stales v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) (use of same technology to track defendant’s movements along public thoroughfare not a search within ambit of Fourth Amendment).

2004“Evidence obtained subsequent to unlawful police conduct does not automatically become sacred and inaccessible.” Commonwealth v. Fredette, 396 Mass. 455, 459 (1985).

2004“Evidence obtained subsequent to unlawful police conduct does not automatically become sacred and inaccessible.” Commonwealth v. Fredette, 396 Mass. 455, 459 (1985).

2017The Supreme Judicial Court has specified that these unique attributes result in a violation of 4 "[W]e must assur[e] preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted." Jones, supra at 406 (quotation omitted). 5 In fact, the Court had already held that a Fourth Amendment violation did not require a trespass.

2017The Supreme Judicial Court has specified that these unique attributes result in a violation of 4 "[W]e must assur[e] preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted." Jones, supra at 406 (quotation omitted). 5 In fact, the Court had already held that a Fourth Amendment violation did not require a trespass.

2010See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 139 (1978) (standing requirement “is more properly subsumed under substantive Fourth Amendment doctrine”).

2010See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 139 (1978) (standing requirement "is more properly subsumed under substantive Fourth Amendment doctrine").

1986The pretrial identifications flowed directly from the illegal arrest, 445 U.S. at 469 n.10, and were “conceded to be suppressible fruits of the Fourth Amendment violation.” Id. at 472 .

1986The pretrial identifications flowed directly from the illegal arrest, 445 U.S. at 469 n.10, and were “conceded to be suppressible fruits of the Fourth Amendment violation.” Id. at 472 .

1986The judge’s finding that Pathiakis had no invitation or license to pass over the area does not advance the analysis because “[t]he fact that the officers may have committed a technical trespass does not create a Fourth Amendment violation when no expectation of privacy exists.” Commonwealth v. Simmons, 392 Mass. at 49 .

1986The judge’s finding that Pathiakis had no invitation or license to pass over the area does not advance the analysis because “[t]he fact that the officers may have committed a technical trespass does not create a Fourth Amendment violation when no expectation of privacy exists.” Commonwealth v. Simmons, 392 Mass. at 49 .

1985See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968).

1985See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968).

2023L. c. 276 essentially track the particularity requirements of art. 14 and the Fourth Amendment.' [The Supreme Judicial Court has] never held that art. 14 requires greater particularity than the Fourth Amendment, and therefore we make no distinction between art. 14 and the Fourth Amendment in our analysis." Commonwealth v. Walsh, 409 Mass. 642 , 644–645 (1991), quoting Commonwealth v. Sheppard, 394 Mass. 381, 389 (1985). 3 search, in two ways.

2019See United States v. Olivares-Rangel , 458 F.3d 1104 , 1117 (10th Cir. 2006) ("While the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine applies only when the defendant has standing regarding the Fourth Amendment violation which constitutes the poisonous tree, ... the law imposes no separate standing requirement regarding the evidence which constitutes the fruit of that poisonous tree"); United States v. Green , 275 F.3d 694 , 699 (8th Cir. 2001).

2019See United States v. Olivares-Rangel , 458 F.3d 1104 , 1117 (10th Cir. 2006) ("While the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine applies only when the defendant has standing regarding the Fourth Amendment violation which constitutes the poisonous tree, ... the law imposes no separate standing requirement regarding the evidence which constitutes the fruit of that poisonous tree"); United States v. Green , 275 F.3d 694 , 699 (8th Cir. 2001).

2019See also Andrews , 227 Md.

2019See United States v. Olivares-Rangel , 458 F.3d 1104 , 1117 (10th Cir. 2006) ("While the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine applies only when the defendant has standing regarding the Fourth Amendment violation which constitutes the poisonous tree, ... the law imposes no separate standing requirement regarding the evidence which constitutes the fruit of that poisonous tree"); United States v. Green , 275 F.3d 694 , 699 (8th Cir. 2001).

2019See United States v. Olivares-Rangel , 458 F.3d 1104 , 1117 (10th Cir. 2006) ("While the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine applies only when the defendant has standing regarding the Fourth Amendment violation which constitutes the poisonous tree, ... the law imposes no separate standing requirement regarding the evidence which constitutes the fruit of that poisonous tree"); United States v. Green , 275 F.3d 694 , 699 (8th Cir. 2001).

2019See, e.g., People v. Trujillo , 15 Cal. App. 5th 574 , 584, 223 Cal.Rptr.3d 268 (2017) ("If [defendant] is successful at his probation, the Fourth Amendment waiver will terminate and his electronic devices will again be completely private").

2019See, e.g., People v. Trujillo , 15 Cal. App. 5th 574 , 584, 223 Cal.Rptr.3d 268 (2017) ("If [defendant] is successful at his probation, the Fourth Amendment waiver will terminate and his electronic devices will again be completely private").

2019See, e.g., Tracey v. State , 152 So.3d 504 , 524-526 (Fla. 2014) (applying Fourth Amendment analysis); State v. Earls , 214 N.J. 564 , 568-569, 70 A.3d 630 (2013) (applying State constitution).

2018Santana is predicated on the general constitutional principle, reflected in both art. 14 and Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, that "police conduct is to be judged 'under a standard of objective reasonableness without regard to the underlying intent or motivation of the officers involved.' " Santana , 420 Mass. at 208 , 649 N.E.2d 717 , quoting Commonwealth v. Ceria , 13 Mass. App. Ct. 230 , 235, 431 N.E.2d 608 (1982). 11 See Lora , 451 Mass. at 436 , 886 N.E.2d 688 , quoting Whren , 517 U.S. at 813 , 116 S.Ct. 1769 ("Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable cause Fourth Amendmen

2018Santana is predicated on the general constitutional principle, reflected in both art. 14 and Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, that "police conduct is to be judged 'under a standard of objective reasonableness without regard to the underlying intent or motivation of the officers involved.' " Santana , 420 Mass. at 208 , 649 N.E.2d 717 , quoting Commonwealth v. Ceria , 13 Mass. App. Ct. 230 , 235, 431 N.E.2d 608 (1982). 11 See Lora , 451 Mass. at 436 , 886 N.E.2d 688 , quoting Whren , 517 U.S. at 813 , 116 S.Ct. 1769 ("Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable cause Fourth Amendmen

2018Santana is predicated on the general constitutional principle, reflected in both art. 14 and Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, that "police conduct is to be judged 'under a standard of objective reasonableness without regard to the underlying intent or motivation of the officers involved.' " Santana , 420 Mass. at 208 , 649 N.E.2d 717 , quoting Commonwealth v. Ceria , 13 Mass. App. Ct. 230 , 235, 431 N.E.2d 608 (1982). 11 See Lora , 451 Mass. at 436 , 886 N.E.2d 688 , quoting Whren , 517 U.S. at 813 , 116 S.Ct. 1769 ("Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable cause Fourth Amendmen

2018Santana is predicated on the general constitutional principle, reflected in both art. 14 and Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, that "police conduct is to be judged 'under a standard of objective reasonableness without regard to the underlying intent or motivation of the officers involved.' " Santana , 420 Mass. at 208 , 649 N.E.2d 717 , quoting Commonwealth v. Ceria , 13 Mass. App. Ct. 230 , 235, 431 N.E.2d 608 (1982). 11 See Lora , 451 Mass. at 436 , 886 N.E.2d 688 , quoting Whren , 517 U.S. at 813 , 116 S.Ct. 1769 ("Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable cause Fourth Amendmen

2018Santana is predicated on the general constitutional principle, reflected in both art. 14 and Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, that "police conduct is to be judged 'under a standard of objective reasonableness without regard to the underlying intent or motivation of the officers involved.' " Santana , 420 Mass. at 208 , 649 N.E.2d 717 , quoting Commonwealth v. Ceria , 13 Mass. App. Ct. 230 , 235, 431 N.E.2d 608 (1982). 11 See Lora , 451 Mass. at 436 , 886 N.E.2d 688 , quoting Whren , 517 U.S. at 813 , 116 S.Ct. 1769 ("Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable cause Fourth Amendmen

2018Santana is predicated on the general constitutional principle, reflected in both art. 14 and Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, that "police conduct is to be judged 'under a standard of objective reasonableness without regard to the underlying intent or motivation of the officers involved.' " Santana , 420 Mass. at 208 , 649 N.E.2d 717 , quoting Commonwealth v. Ceria , 13 Mass. App. Ct. 230 , 235, 431 N.E.2d 608 (1982). 11 See Lora , 451 Mass. at 436 , 886 N.E.2d 688 , quoting Whren , 517 U.S. at 813 , 116 S.Ct. 1769 ("Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable cause Fourth Amendmen

2017"The Fourth Amendment does not bar a search for evidence to prove the commission of a crime[,] provided there is probable cause for the belief that the evidence sought will aid in a particular apprehension or conviction." Murray, 359 Mass. at 547 .

2017See Matter of Lavigne, 418 Mass. 831, 835 (1994), quoting Murray, supra ("a search for evidence to prove the commission of a crime [is not barred] provided there is probable cause for the 21 belief that the evidence sought will aid in a particular apprehension or conviction." The orange sweatshirt, if found in the defendant's apartment, would have been relevant to his identification as the seller in the transaction.

2017See Matter of Lavigne, 418 Mass. 831, 835 (1994), quoting Murray, supra ("a search for evidence to prove the commission of a crime [is not barred] provided there is probable cause for the 21 belief that the evidence sought will aid in a particular apprehension or conviction." The orange sweatshirt, if found in the defendant's apartment, would have been relevant to his identification as the seller in the transaction.