Fourth Amendment violation in Alaska

2013Medina v. Cram, 252 F.3d 1124, 1132 (10th Cir.2001). 30 . 739 P.2d 150 (Alaska 1987). 31 . 22 P.3d 445 (Alaska 2001). 32 . 739 P.2d 150 (Alaska 1987).

2013Medina v. Cram, 252 F.3d 1124, 1132 (10th Cir.2001). 30 . 739 P.2d 150 (Alaska 1987). 31 . 22 P.3d 445 (Alaska 2001). 32 . 739 P.2d 150 (Alaska 1987).

2005Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 389 , 91 S.Ct. 1999 , 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971) (holding that Fourth Amendment violation by federal agent acting under color of his authority gave rise to cause of action for damages directly under U.S. Constitution). [23] Brown v. Ely, 14 P.3d 257, 261 (Alaska 2000) ("We have neither adopted nor rejected the Bivens approach with respect to state constitutional violations."); King v. Alaska State Hous.

2005Auth., 633 P.2d 256, 261 (Alaska 1981). [24] Brown v. Ely, 14 P.3d 257, 261 (Alaska 2000); Thoma v. Hickel, 947 P.2d 816, 824 (Alaska 1997); Dick Fischer Dev.

1981Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. at 217 , 99 S.Ct. at 2258-2259 , 60 L.Ed.2d at 839 (footnote omitted), citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 604 , 95 S.Ct. 2254, 2262 , 45 L.Ed.2d 416, 427 (1975). [8] Brown v. Illinois identified several factors to be considered in determining whether a confession is obtained by exploitation of an illegal arrest: the use of Miranda warnings, the temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession, the presence of intervening events, and, particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct are all relevant.

1981Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. at 217 , 99 S.Ct. at 2258-2259 , 60 L.Ed.2d at 839 (footnote omitted), citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 604 , 95 S.Ct. 2254, 2262 , 45 L.Ed.2d 416, 427 (1975). [8] Brown v. Illinois identified several factors to be considered in determining whether a confession is obtained by exploitation of an illegal arrest: the use of Miranda warnings, the temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession, the presence of intervening events, and, particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct are all relevant.

1981See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 , 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). [A]lthough a confession after proper Miranda warnings may be found "voluntary" for purposes of the Fifth Amendment, this type of "voluntariness" is merely a "threshold requirement" for Fourth Amendment analysis... .

1981See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 , 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). [A]lthough a confession after proper Miranda warnings may be found "voluntary" for purposes of the Fifth Amendment, this type of "voluntariness" is merely a "threshold requirement" for Fourth Amendment analysis... .

1981Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. at 217 , 99 S.Ct. at 2258-2259 , 60 L.Ed.2d at 839 (footnote omitted), citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 604 , 95 S.Ct. 2254, 2262 , 45 L.Ed.2d 416, 427 (1975). [8] Brown v. Illinois identified several factors to be considered in determining whether a confession is obtained by exploitation of an illegal arrest: the use of Miranda warnings, the temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession, the presence of intervening events, and, particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct are all relevant.

1981Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. at 217 , 99 S.Ct. at 2258-2259 , 60 L.Ed.2d at 839 (footnote omitted), citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 604 , 95 S.Ct. 2254, 2262 , 45 L.Ed.2d 416, 427 (1975). [8] Brown v. Illinois identified several factors to be considered in determining whether a confession is obtained by exploitation of an illegal arrest: the use of Miranda warnings, the temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession, the presence of intervening events, and, particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct are all relevant.

2007See Nevers v. State, Dep't of Admin., Div. of Motor Vehicles, 123 P.3d 958 , 963 n. 21 (Alaska 2005) (holding that although exclusionary rule does not apply to search and seizure violations in administrative driver's license revocation proceedings, there may be potential exceptions, as when "a Fourth Amendment violation stems from a lack of probable cause for a DWI arrest").

2007See Nevers v. State, Dep't of Admin., Div. of Motor Vehicles, 123 P.3d 958 , 963 n. 21 (Alaska 2005) (holding that although exclusionary rule does not apply to search and seizure violations in administrative driver's license revocation proceedings, there may be potential exceptions, as when "a Fourth Amendment violation stems from a lack of probable cause for a DWI arrest").

2025In three of our prior cases — Murdock v. State, Kvasnikoff v. State, and D’Antorio v. State — we determined that the defendant had sufficiently asserted, during the trial court proceedings, an interest in the location or object that was searched, triggering the State’s duty to contest standing in order to preserve the argument for appeal. 45 For example, in Murdock, the defendant “clearly asserted that he had standing in his suppression memorandum filed in the trial court,” but the State waited until the appeal to object to Murdock’s standing. 46 Similarly, in D’Antorio, the defendant 43 See M

2025In three of our prior cases — Murdock v. State, Kvasnikoff v. State, and D’Antorio v. State — we determined that the defendant had sufficiently asserted, during the trial court proceedings, an interest in the location or object that was searched, triggering the State’s duty to contest standing in order to preserve the argument for appeal. 45 For example, in Murdock, the defendant “clearly asserted that he had standing in his suppression memorandum filed in the trial court,” but the State waited until the appeal to object to Murdock’s standing. 46 Similarly, in D’Antorio, the defendant 43 See M

2025In three of our prior cases — Murdock v. State, Kvasnikoff v. State, and D’Antorio v. State — we determined that the defendant had sufficiently asserted, during the trial court proceedings, an interest in the location or object that was searched, triggering the State’s duty to contest standing in order to preserve the argument for appeal. 45 For example, in Murdock, the defendant “clearly asserted that he had standing in his suppression memorandum filed in the trial court,” but the State waited until the appeal to object to Murdock’s standing. 46 Similarly, in D’Antorio, the defendant 43 See M

2025In three of our prior cases — Murdock v. State, Kvasnikoff v. State, and D’Antorio v. State — we determined that the defendant had sufficiently asserted, during the trial court proceedings, an interest in the location or object that was searched, triggering the State’s duty to contest standing in order to preserve the argument for appeal. 45 For example, in Murdock, the defendant “clearly asserted that he had standing in his suppression memorandum filed in the trial court,” but the State waited until the appeal to object to Murdock’s standing. 46 Similarly, in D’Antorio, the defendant 43 See M

2025At the same time, Lookhart did not provide any basis for asserting a privacy interest in Cranford’s phone, and it appears that the superior court itself did not interpret 41 D’Antorio v. State, 837 P.2d 727, 730 (Alaska App. 1992). 42 The Ninth Circuit has provided this explanation of what “standing” means in the context of Fourth Amendment claims: The term “standing” is often used to describe an inquiry into who may assert a particular fourth amendment claim.

2025In three of our prior cases — Murdock v. State, Kvasnikoff v. State, and D’Antorio v. State — we determined that the defendant had sufficiently asserted, during the trial court proceedings, an interest in the location or object that was searched, triggering the State’s duty to contest standing in order to preserve the argument for appeal. 45 For example, in Murdock, the defendant “clearly asserted that he had standing in his suppression memorandum filed in the trial court,” but the State waited until the appeal to object to Murdock’s standing. 46 Similarly, in D’Antorio, the defendant 43 See M

2025In three of our prior cases — Murdock v. State, Kvasnikoff v. State, and D’Antorio v. State — we determined that the defendant had sufficiently asserted, during the trial court proceedings, an interest in the location or object that was searched, triggering the State’s duty to contest standing in order to preserve the argument for appeal. 45 For example, in Murdock, the defendant “clearly asserted that he had standing in his suppression memorandum filed in the trial court,” but the State waited until the appeal to object to Murdock’s standing. 46 Similarly, in D’Antorio, the defendant 43 See M

2025In three of our prior cases — Murdock v. State, Kvasnikoff v. State, and D’Antorio v. State — we determined that the defendant had sufficiently asserted, during the trial court proceedings, an interest in the location or object that was searched, triggering the State’s duty to contest standing in order to preserve the argument for appeal. 45 For example, in Murdock, the defendant “clearly asserted that he had standing in his suppression memorandum filed in the trial court,” but the State waited until the appeal to object to Murdock’s standing. 46 Similarly, in D’Antorio, the defendant 43 See M

2022Compare the Supreme Court’s decision in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 , 6 S.Ct. 524 , 29 L.Ed.746 (1886), which involved a Fourth Amendment challenge to a statute that allowed customs agents to board a vessel, search it for contraband, and seize suspected contraband, all without a warrant.

2022Compare the Supreme Court’s decision in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 , 6 S.Ct. 524 , 29 L.Ed.746 (1886), which involved a Fourth Amendment challenge to a statute that allowed customs agents to board a vessel, search it for contraband, and seize suspected contraband, all without a warrant.

2013In his briefing before the superior court, Maness relied in part on a theory of excessive force liability set forth in a line of cases from the Ninth Circuit holding that “where an officer intentionally or recklessly provokes a violent confrontation, if the 21 Olson, 251 P.3d at 1032 (quoting Sheldon v. City of Ambler, 178 P.3d 459, 466 (Alaska 2008)). 22 Id. (quoting Sheldon, 178 P.3d at 467 ). 23 Sheldon, 178 P.3d at 466 ; see also Russell, 258 P.3d at 802 -04 and Olson, 251 P.3d at1031-32 (discussing federal and state law with respect to excessive force and qualified immunity). 24 Sheldon,

2013In his briefing before the superior court, Maness relied in part on a theory of excessive force liability set forth in a line of cases from the Ninth Circuit holding that “where an officer intentionally or recklessly provokes a violent confrontation, if the 21 Olson, 251 P.3d at 1032 (quoting Sheldon v. City of Ambler, 178 P.3d 459, 466 (Alaska 2008)). 22 Id. (quoting Sheldon, 178 P.3d at 467 ). 23 Sheldon, 178 P.3d at 466 ; see also Russell, 258 P.3d at 802 -04 and Olson, 251 P.3d at1031-32 (discussing federal and state law with respect to excessive force and qualified immunity). 24 Sheldon,

2013Sheriff’s Dep’t, 267 P.3d 1022, 1033 (Wash. App. 2011) (quoting Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 372 (5th Cir. 2011)). -14- 6807 theory only if there is an “independent Fourth Amendment violation.”28 Here, the troopers were acting under a valid court order establishing that “there is probable cause to believe that the respondent . . . presents a likelihood of causing serious harm to [himself] or others” and requiring the troopers to take Maness into custody.

2013Sheriff’s Dep’t, 267 P.3d 1022, 1033 (Wash. App. 2011) (quoting Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 372 (5th Cir. 2011)). -14- 6807 theory only if there is an “independent Fourth Amendment violation.”28 Here, the troopers were acting under a valid court order establishing that “there is probable cause to believe that the respondent . . . presents a likelihood of causing serious harm to [himself] or others” and requiring the troopers to take Maness into custody.

2013In his briefing before the superior court, Maness relied in part on a theory of excessive force liability set forth in a line of cases from the Ninth Circuit holding that “where an officer intentionally or recklessly provokes a violent confrontation, if the 21 Olson, 251 P.3d at 1032 (quoting Sheldon v. City of Ambler, 178 P.3d 459, 466 (Alaska 2008)). 22 Id. (quoting Sheldon, 178 P.3d at 467 ). 23 Sheldon, 178 P.3d at 466 ; see also Russell, 258 P.3d at 802 -04 and Olson, 251 P.3d at1031-32 (discussing federal and state law with respect to excessive force and qualified immunity). 24 Sheldon,

2013In his briefing before the superior court, Maness relied in part on a theory of excessive force liability set forth in a line of cases from the Ninth Circuit holding that “where an officer intentionally or recklessly provokes a violent confrontation, if the 21 Olson, 251 P.3d at 1032 (quoting Sheldon v. City of Ambler, 178 P.3d 459, 466 (Alaska 2008)). 22 Id. (quoting Sheldon, 178 P.3d at 467 ). 23 Sheldon, 178 P.3d at 466 ; see also Russell, 258 P.3d at 802 -04 and Olson, 251 P.3d at1031-32 (discussing federal and state law with respect to excessive force and qualified immunity). 24 Sheldon,

2011Second, . . . a search for blood evidence in direct violation of . . . statutory prohibitions would probably require exclusion of the test results in a subsequent administrative license revocation proceeding.. . . [35] Id. at 964 (quoting State v. Sears, 553 P.2d 907, 914 (Alaska 1976)).

2011Second, . . . a search for blood evidence in direct violation of . . . statutory prohibitions would probably require exclusion of the test results in a subsequent administrative license revocation proceeding.. . . [35] Id. at 964 (quoting State v. Sears, 553 P.2d 907, 914 (Alaska 1976)).

2008See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 , 111 S.Ct. 2382, 2386 , 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991) ("mere police questioning does not constitute a seizure"). [9] Childs, 277 F.3d at 954 ; United States v. Purcell, 236 F.3d 1274, 1280 (11th Cir.2001) (confirming a police officer's authority to question a motorist on topics unrelated to the ground for the traffic stop, so long as the duration of the stop is not significantly lengthened: "only unrelated questions which unreasonably prolong the detention are unlawful"); United States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 436 (5th Cir.1993) ("[W]e reject any notion tha

2008See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 , 111 S.Ct. 2382, 2386 , 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991) ("mere police questioning does not constitute a seizure"). [9] Childs, 277 F.3d at 954 ; United States v. Purcell, 236 F.3d 1274, 1280 (11th Cir.2001) (confirming a police officer's authority to question a motorist on topics unrelated to the ground for the traffic stop, so long as the duration of the stop is not significantly lengthened: "only unrelated questions which unreasonably prolong the detention are unlawful"); United States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 436 (5th Cir.1993) ("[W]e reject any notion tha

2008See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 , 111 S.Ct. 2382, 2386 , 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991) ("mere police questioning does not constitute a seizure"). [9] Childs, 277 F.3d at 954 ; United States v. Purcell, 236 F.3d 1274, 1280 (11th Cir.2001) (confirming a police officer's authority to question a motorist on topics unrelated to the ground for the traffic stop, so long as the duration of the stop is not significantly lengthened: "only unrelated questions which unreasonably prolong the detention are unlawful"); United States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 436 (5th Cir.1993) ("[W]e reject any notion tha

2008See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 , 111 S.Ct. 2382, 2386 , 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991) ("mere police questioning does not constitute a seizure"). [9] Childs, 277 F.3d at 954 ; United States v. Purcell, 236 F.3d 1274, 1280 (11th Cir.2001) (confirming a police officer's authority to question a motorist on topics unrelated to the ground for the traffic stop, so long as the duration of the stop is not significantly lengthened: "only unrelated questions which unreasonably prolong the detention are unlawful"); United States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 436 (5th Cir.1993) ("[W]e reject any notion tha

2008See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 , 111 S.Ct. 2382, 2386 , 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991) ("mere police questioning does not constitute a seizure"). [9] Childs, 277 F.3d at 954 ; United States v. Purcell, 236 F.3d 1274, 1280 (11th Cir.2001) (confirming a police officer's authority to question a motorist on topics unrelated to the ground for the traffic stop, so long as the duration of the stop is not significantly lengthened: "only unrelated questions which unreasonably prolong the detention are unlawful"); United States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 436 (5th Cir.1993) ("[W]e reject any notion tha

2008See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 , 111 S.Ct. 2382, 2386 , 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991) ("mere police questioning does not constitute a seizure"). [9] Childs, 277 F.3d at 954 ; United States v. Purcell, 236 F.3d 1274, 1280 (11th Cir.2001) (confirming a police officer's authority to question a motorist on topics unrelated to the ground for the traffic stop, so long as the duration of the stop is not significantly lengthened: "only unrelated questions which unreasonably prolong the detention are unlawful"); United States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 436 (5th Cir.1993) ("[W]e reject any notion tha

2008See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 , 111 S.Ct. 2382, 2386 , 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991) ("mere police questioning does not constitute a seizure"). [9] Childs, 277 F.3d at 954 ; United States v. Purcell, 236 F.3d 1274, 1280 (11th Cir.2001) (confirming a police officer's authority to question a motorist on topics unrelated to the ground for the traffic stop, so long as the duration of the stop is not significantly lengthened: "only unrelated questions which unreasonably prolong the detention are unlawful"); United States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 436 (5th Cir.1993) ("[W]e reject any notion tha

2008See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 , 111 S.Ct. 2382, 2386 , 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991) ("mere police questioning does not constitute a seizure"). [9] Childs, 277 F.3d at 954 ; United States v. Purcell, 236 F.3d 1274, 1280 (11th Cir.2001) (confirming a police officer's authority to question a motorist on topics unrelated to the ground for the traffic stop, so long as the duration of the stop is not significantly lengthened: "only unrelated questions which unreasonably prolong the detention are unlawful"); United States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 436 (5th Cir.1993) ("[W]e reject any notion tha

2005Auth., 633 P.2d 256, 261 (Alaska 1981). [24] Brown v. Ely, 14 P.3d 257, 261 (Alaska 2000); Thoma v. Hickel, 947 P.2d 816, 824 (Alaska 1997); Dick Fischer Dev.

2005Auth., 633 P.2d 256, 261 (Alaska 1981). [24] Brown v. Ely, 14 P.3d 257, 261 (Alaska 2000); Thoma v. Hickel, 947 P.2d 816, 824 (Alaska 1997); Dick Fischer Dev.

2002Specifically, we conclude that (a) Trooper Baergen had probable cause to suspect Snyder of DWI even before subjecting him to field sobriety testing; (b) Snyder waived his Miranda claim by failing to argue it at the initial administrative hearing, cf. Moreau v. State, 588 P.2d 275, 279 (Alaska 1978) (finding that failure to assert Fourth Amendment claim at trial amounts to waiver absent an egregious violation); and (c) dismissal of Snyder's DWI charges provides no basis for collateral estoppel, see Borrego v. State, Dep't of Pub.

2002Safety, 815 P.2d 360, 364 (Alaska 1991), and Snyder has failed to establish that an administrative license revocation amounts to a *162 criminal sanction that would be barred by double jeopardy.

2001See United States v. Taketa, 923 F.2d 665, 677 (9th Cir.1991) (treating intrusiveness against personal dignity as reason for finding search unreasonable in video surveillance case); State v. Bonnell, 75 Haw. 124 , 856 P.2d 1265, 1277 (1993) (same).

2001See United States v. Taketa, 923 F.2d 665, 677 (9th Cir.1991) (treating intrusiveness against personal dignity as reason for finding search unreasonable in video surveillance case); State v. Bonnell, 75 Haw. 124 , 856 P.2d 1265, 1277 (1993) (same).