Fourth Amendment violation in North Carolina

2021“Searches conducted without warrants have been held unlawful notwithstanding facts unquestionably showing probable cause, for the Constitution requires that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer . . . be interposed between the citizen and the police.” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576, 585 (1967) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). ¶ 93 In Maryland v. King, the Supreme Court of the United States reviewed a Fourth Amendment challenge to a Maryland statute authorizing the collection of DNA samples taken upon booking after arrest for certai

2021“Searches conducted without warrants have been held unlawful notwithstanding facts unquestionably showing probable cause, for the Constitution requires that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer . . . be interposed between the citizen and the police.” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576, 585 (1967) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). ¶ 93 In Maryland v. King, the Supreme Court of the United States reviewed a Fourth Amendment challenge to a Maryland statute authorizing the collection of DNA samples taken upon booking after arrest for certai

2022Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975). ¶ 36 Here, the officers entered a private residence, without a warrant or probable cause, within seconds of engaging Thompson at the door.

2022Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975). ¶ 36 Here, the officers entered a private residence, without a warrant or probable cause, within seconds of engaging Thompson at the door.

2022IV. “[T]he touchstone of the Fourth Amendment analysis has been whether a person has a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.” State v. Phillips, 132 N.C.App. 765, 770 , 513 S.E.2d 568, 572 (internal quotation marks omitted), disc. review denied and appeal dismissed, 350 N.C. 846 , 539 S.E.2d 3 (1999).

2022IV. “[T]he touchstone of the Fourth Amendment analysis has been whether a person has a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.” State v. Phillips, 132 N.C.App. 765, 770 , 513 S.E.2d 568, 572 (internal quotation marks omitted), disc. review denied and appeal dismissed, 350 N.C. 846 , 539 S.E.2d 3 (1999).

2023Legal Framework for Selective Enforcement The U.S. Constitution “prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on considerations such as race.” Whren, 517 U.S. at 813 (declaring that a Fourth Amendment challenge of a traffic stop as racially motivated should have been brought under the Equal Protection Clause); Ivey, 360 N.C. at 564 (citing Whren to conclude that “this Court will not tolerate discriminatory application of the law based upon a citizen’s race”).

2023Legal Framework for Selective Enforcement The U.S. Constitution “prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on considerations such as race.” Whren, 517 U.S. at 813 (declaring that a Fourth Amendment challenge of a traffic stop as racially motivated should have been brought under the Equal Protection Clause); Ivey, 360 N.C. at 564 (citing Whren to conclude that “this Court will not tolerate discriminatory application of the law based upon a citizen’s race”).

2022See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996); State v. McClendon, 350 N.C. 630, 635-36 , 517 S.E.2d 128, 131-32 (1999).

2022See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996); State v. McClendon, 350 N.C. 630, 635-36 , 517 S.E.2d 128, 131-32 (1999).

2022Summers, 452 U.S. at 700-01 (noting the Fourth Amendment exception for “momentary, on-the- street detention accompanied by a frisk for weapons involved in Terry” before explaining the separate exception applicable to detention incident to a search based upon “the character of the official intrusion and its justification”).

2022Summers, 452 U.S. at 700-01 (noting the Fourth Amendment exception for “momentary, on-the- street detention accompanied by a frisk for weapons involved in Terry” before explaining the separate exception applicable to detention incident to a search based upon “the character of the official intrusion and its justification”).

2018As the Supreme Court stated in Miller , "[t]o allow plain error review in a case like this one ... would penalize the government for failing to introduce evidence on probable cause for arrest or other matters bearing on the Fourth Amendment claim when defendant's failure to raise an objection before or during trial seemed to make such a showing unnecessary." Id. at ----, 814 S.E.2d at 84 (citation, quotation marks, and brackets omitted).

2018As the Supreme Court stated in Miller , "[t]o allow plain error review in a case like this one ... would penalize the government for failing to introduce evidence on probable cause for arrest or other matters bearing on the Fourth Amendment claim when defendant's failure to raise an objection before or during trial seemed to make such a showing unnecessary." Id. at ----, 814 S.E.2d at 84 (citation, quotation marks, and brackets omitted).

2023The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized that “the State’s intrusion into a particular area, whether in an automobile or elsewhere, cannot result in a Fourth Amendment violation unless the area is one in which there is a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.” New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 112 , 89 L.

2023The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized that “the State’s intrusion into a particular area, whether in an automobile or elsewhere, cannot result in a Fourth Amendment violation unless the area is one in which there is a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.” New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 112 , 89 L.

2019Cf. United States v. Chavez-Valencia , 116 F.3d 127 , 132 (5th Cir. 1997) ("If, at trial, the government assumes that a defendant will not seek to suppress certain evidence, the government may justifiably conclude that it need not introduce the quality or quantity of evidence needed otherwise to prevail.").

2018Cf. United States v. Chavez-Valencia , 116 F.3d 127 , 132 (5th Cir.) ("If, at trial, the government assumes that a defendant will not seek to suppress certain evidence, the government may justifiably conclude that it need not introduce the quality or quantity of evidence needed *85 otherwise to prevail."), cert. denied , 522 U.S. 926 , 118 S.Ct. 325 , 139 L.Ed.2d 252 (1997).

1983“Indeed, if the Fifth Amendment has been violated, the Fourth Amendment issue would not have to be reached.” Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 217 , 60 L.Ed. 2d 824, 839 , 99 S.Ct. 2248, 2259 (1979).

1983“Indeed, if the Fifth Amendment has been violated, the Fourth Amendment issue would not have to be reached.” Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 217 , 60 L.Ed. 2d 824, 839 , 99 S.Ct. 2248, 2259 (1979).

2022See, e.g., United States v. Gray, 491 F.3d 138, 153 (4th Cir. 2007) (“[W]e have recognized that persons other 6 Courts often denote this inquiry as whether a defendant has “standing” to press a Fourth Amendment claim.

2022See, e.g., United States v. Gray, 491 F.3d 138, 153 (4th Cir. 2007) (“[W]e have recognized that persons other 6 Courts often denote this inquiry as whether a defendant has “standing” to press a Fourth Amendment claim.

2022However, the Supreme Court has explained that this analysis “is not distinct from the merits” of a Fourth Amendment Claim but “‘is more properly subsumed under substantive Fourth Amendment doctrine.’” Id. (quoting Rakas, 439 U.S. at 139 ). than overnight guests can have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the home of another,” typically “in the context of social visitors with near-familial relationships”); Bonner v. Anderson, 81 F.3d 472, 475 (4th Cir. 1996) (frequent visitor with close relationship to homeowner, whose relative was raised in home, and who formerly lived nearby, had reasonab

2022However, the Supreme Court has explained that this analysis “is not distinct from the merits” of a Fourth Amendment Claim but “‘is more properly subsumed under substantive Fourth Amendment doctrine.’” Id. (quoting Rakas, 439 U.S. at 139 ). than overnight guests can have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the home of another,” typically “in the context of social visitors with near-familial relationships”); Bonner v. Anderson, 81 F.3d 472, 475 (4th Cir. 1996) (frequent visitor with close relationship to homeowner, whose relative was raised in home, and who formerly lived nearby, had reasonab

2022However, the Supreme Court has explained that this analysis “is not distinct from the merits” of a Fourth Amendment Claim but “‘is more properly subsumed under substantive Fourth Amendment doctrine.’” Id. (quoting Rakas, 439 U.S. at 139 ). than overnight guests can have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the home of another,” typically “in the context of social visitors with near-familial relationships”); Bonner v. Anderson, 81 F.3d 472, 475 (4th Cir. 1996) (frequent visitor with close relationship to homeowner, whose relative was raised in home, and who formerly lived nearby, had reasonab

2022However, the Supreme Court has explained that this analysis “is not distinct from the merits” of a Fourth Amendment Claim but “‘is more properly subsumed under substantive Fourth Amendment doctrine.’” Id. (quoting Rakas, 439 U.S. at 139 ). than overnight guests can have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the home of another,” typically “in the context of social visitors with near-familial relationships”); Bonner v. Anderson, 81 F.3d 472, 475 (4th Cir. 1996) (frequent visitor with close relationship to homeowner, whose relative was raised in home, and who formerly lived nearby, had reasonab

2022Such an unreasonable search “occurs when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed.” United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 , 104 S.Ct. 1652 , 80 L.Ed.2d 85, 94 (1984).

2022Such an unreasonable search “occurs when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed.” United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 , 104 S.Ct. 1652 , 80 L.Ed.2d 85, 94 (1984).

2020Snelgrove, 208 N.C. at 672 , 182 S.E. at 336 (emphasis added); cf. State v. Bishop, 255 N.C. App. 767, 770 , 805 S.E.2d 367, 370 (2017) (“As Bishop concedes, he cannot prevail on [his Fourth Amendment challenge to the trial court’s order imposing lifetime satellite-based monitoring] without the use of Rule 2 because his constitutional argument is waived on appeal.

2020Snelgrove, 208 N.C. at 672 , 182 S.E. at 336 (emphasis added); cf. State v. Bishop, 255 N.C. App. 767, 770 , 805 S.E.2d 367, 370 (2017) (“As Bishop concedes, he cannot prevail on [his Fourth Amendment challenge to the trial court’s order imposing lifetime satellite-based monitoring] without the use of Rule 2 because his constitutional argument is waived on appeal.

2020Snelgrove, 208 N.C. at 672 , 182 S.E. at 336 (emphasis added); cf. State v. Bishop, 255 N.C. App. 767, 770 , 805 S.E.2d 367, 370 (2017) (“As Bishop concedes, he cannot prevail on [his Fourth Amendment challenge to the trial court’s order imposing lifetime satellite-based monitoring] without the use of Rule 2 because his constitutional argument is waived on appeal.

2020Snelgrove, 208 N.C. at 672 , 182 S.E. at 336 (emphasis added); cf. State v. Bishop, 255 N.C. App. 767, 770 , 805 S.E.2d 367, 370 (2017) (“As Bishop concedes, he cannot prevail on [his Fourth Amendment challenge to the trial court’s order imposing lifetime satellite-based monitoring] without the use of Rule 2 because his constitutional argument is waived on appeal.

2018See 370 N.C. at 256 -57 , 805 S.E.2d at 673 .

2018See 370 N.C. at 256 -57 , 805 S.E.2d at 673 .

2011Public schools are one context where balancing government against private interests “suggests that the public interest is best served by a Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness that stops short of probable cause.” Id. at 341 , 83 L.

2011Public schools are one context where balancing government against private interests “suggests that the public interest is best served by a Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness that stops short of probable cause.” Id. at 341 , 83 L.

2018LaFave, Search and Seizure § 11.7(e), at 584 (5th ed. 2012) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Meadows , 523 F.2d 365 , 368 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied , 424 U.S. 970 , 96 S.Ct. 1469 , 47 L.Ed.2d 738 (1976) ).

2018LaFave, Search and Seizure § 11.7(e), at 584 (5th ed. 2012) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Meadows , 523 F.2d 365 , 368 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied , 424 U.S. 970 , 96 S.Ct. 1469 , 47 L.Ed.2d 738 (1976) ).

2003In sum, a defendant challenging a Fourth Amendment violation occurring in the home of another must demonstrate a “legitimate expectation of privacy, which has two components: (1) the person must have an actual expectation of privacy, and (2) the person’s subjective expectation must be one that society deems to be reasonable.” State v. Wiley, 355 N.C. 592, 602 , 565 S.E.2d 22, 32 (2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 117 , 154 L.

2003In sum, a defendant challenging a Fourth Amendment violation occurring in the home of another must demonstrate a “legitimate expectation of privacy, which has two components: (1) the person must have an actual expectation of privacy, and (2) the person’s subjective expectation must be one that society deems to be reasonable.” State v. Wiley, 355 N.C. 592, 602 , 565 S.E.2d 22, 32 (2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 117 , 154 L.