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100 Iowa opinions name it 2 courts 1969–2026 21 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Iowa courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Jonesgreen2 sentences2024Iowa 2023) (granting motion to suppress and holding that canine’s actions of “insert[ing] his head into the open window of [a] vehicle” as the dog hung on the side of the car door to sniff for drugs was “[t]he same conduct” of “physically occup[ying] private property for the purpose of obtaining information” that oc- curred in Jones and noting that prior cases that “found no Fourth Amendment violation when a drug-sniffing dog breaks the plane of an open window . . . were largely prior to Jones and Jardines” (third quoting Jones, 565 U.S. at 404 )); State v. Dorff, 526 P.3d 988 , 998-99 (Idaho 2024Id. at 404. 11 Jones did link its Fourth Amendment analysis to common law concepts of trespass. | 6 | 6 |
Whren v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2026Because we apply an objective standard in determining whether an exception to the warrant requirement applies, an officer’s “subjective motivations for conducting the search are irrelevant.” Scullark, 23 N.W.3d at 54; see also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (“Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.”). 2022An officer’s “[s]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). | 4 | 7 |
Maryland v. MacOngreen2 sentences2017See State v. Kubit, 627 N.W.2d 914 , 918–19 (Iowa 2001) (“Whether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred turns on an objective assessment of the officer’s actions in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him at the time and not on the officer’s actual state of mind . . . .” (quoting Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470 (1985))), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601 (Iowa 2001). 2017See State v. Kubit, 627 N.W.2d 914 , 918–19 (Iowa 2001) (“Whether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred turns on an objective assessment of the officer’s actions in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him at the time and not on the officer’s actual state of mind . . . .” (quoting Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470 (1985))), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601 (Iowa 2001). | 4 | 4 |
State v. Edgingtongreen2 sentences2020The trial court denied Domenig’s motion to suppress, concluding the search fell under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. “[T]he automobile exception to the fourth amendment requirement of a search warrant is applicable if probable cause and exigent circumstances exist at the time the automobile is 3 stopped by police.” State v. Edgington, 487 N.W.2d 675, 678 (Iowa 1992). 2008See Edgington, 487 N.W.2d at 677-78 (“Previously, we have stated that the automobile exception to the fourth amendment requirement of a search warrant is applicable if probable cause and exigent circumstances exist at the time the automobile is stopped by police.”); Holderness, 301 N.W.2d at 736-37 (“[EJxigent circumstances are necessary only initially; the absence of exigent circumstances at the time of the actual search is irrelevant.”); see also State v. Olsen, 293 N.W.2d 216, 220 (Iowa 1980) (“It is now *797 clear that the absence of exigent circumstances for the later search is wholly irr | 3 | 4 |
State v. Breuergreen2 sentences2003In State v. Breuer, 577 N.W.2d 41, 42 (Iowa 1998), we considered whether the defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the stairway/hallway "leading from the outer door of [his] apartment building to his upstairs apartment door” as part of our broader analysis of the defendant’s Fourth Amendment claim. 2003In State v. Breuer, 577 N.W.2d 41, 42 (Iowa 1998), we considered whether the defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the stairway/hallway "leading from the outer door of [his] apartment building to his upstairs apartment door” as part of our broader analysis of the defendant’s Fourth Amendment claim. | 3 | 4 |
Florida v. Jardinesgreen2 sentences2024In siding with cases finding a Fourth Amendment violation, the Florida Supreme Court concluded that a dog sniff at a person’s front door “does not only reveal the presence of contraband, as was the case in the federal ‘sui generis’ dog sniff cases discussed above, but it also constitutes an intrusive procedure that may expose the resident to public opprobrium, humiliation and embarrassment, and it raises the specter of arbitrary and discriminatory application.” Id. at 49 (majority opinion) (“Given the special status accorded a citizen’s home under the Fourth Amendment, we conclude that a ‘snif 2024In siding with cases finding a Fourth Amendment violation, the Florida Supreme Court concluded that a dog sniff at a person’s front door “does not only reveal the presence of contraband, as was the case in the federal ‘sui generis’ dog sniff cases discussed above, but it also constitutes an intrusive procedure that may expose the resident to public opprobrium, humiliation and embarrassment, and it raises the specter of arbitrary and discriminatory application.” Id. at 49 (majority opinion) (“Given the special status accorded a citizen’s home under the Fourth Amendment, we conclude that a ‘snif | 3 | 3 |
State of Iowa v. Justin Dean Shortgreen2 sentences2021See Short, 851 N.W.2d at 500 . 2021See Short, 851 N.W.2d at 500 . | 3 | 3 |
State v. Hillgreen2 sentences2017See, e.g., United States v. Elmore, 304 F.3d 557 , 561 n.1 (6th Cir. 2002) (concluding no Fourth Amendment violation resulted when officer approached driver to request license and registration after pulling over for no license plate and then seeing temporary tag in window); State v. Godwin, 826 P.2d 452, 456 (Idaho 1992) (‘‘[A] police officer’s brief detention of a driver to run a status check on the driver's license, after making a valid, lawful contact with the driver, is reasonable for purposes of the fourth amendment.”); State v. Hill, 606 A.2d 793, 795 (Me. 1992) (determining after valid 2017Vance did not decide the issue and did not have the guidance of Rodriguez, which was decided five years later. 10See e.g., United States v. Elmore, 304 F.3d 557 , 561 n.1 (6th Cir. 2002) (concluding no Fourth Amendment violation resulted when officer approached driver to request license and registration after pulling over for no license plate and then seeing temporary tag in window); State v. Godwin, 826 P.2d 452, 456 (Idaho 1992) (“[A] police officer’s brief detention of a driver to run a status check on the driver’s license, after making a valid, lawful contact with the driver, is reasonable | 3 | 3 |
State v. Godwingreen2 sentences2017See, e.g., United States v. Elmore, 304 F.3d 557 , 561 n.1 (6th Cir. 2002) (concluding no Fourth Amendment violation resulted when officer approached driver to request license and registration after pulling over for no license plate and then seeing temporary tag in window); State v. Godwin, 826 P.2d 452, 456 (Idaho 1992) (‘‘[A] police officer’s brief detention of a driver to run a status check on the driver's license, after making a valid, lawful contact with the driver, is reasonable for purposes of the fourth amendment.”); State v. Hill, 606 A.2d 793, 795 (Me. 1992) (determining after valid 2017Vance did not decide the issue and did not have the guidance of Rodriguez, which was decided five years later. 10See e.g., United States v. Elmore, 304 F.3d 557 , 561 n.1 (6th Cir. 2002) (concluding no Fourth Amendment violation resulted when officer approached driver to request license and registration after pulling over for no license plate and then seeing temporary tag in window); State v. Godwin, 826 P.2d 452, 456 (Idaho 1992) (“[A] police officer’s brief detention of a driver to run a status check on the driver’s license, after making a valid, lawful contact with the driver, is reasonable | 3 | 3 |
State v. Kubitgreen2 sentences2017See State v. Kubit, 627 N.W.2d 914 , 918–19 (Iowa 2001) (“Whether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred turns on an objective assessment of the officer’s actions in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him at the time and not on the officer’s actual state of mind . . . .” (quoting Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470 (1985))), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601 (Iowa 2001). 2017See State v. Kubit, 627 N.W.2d 914 , 918–19 (Iowa 2001) (“Whether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred turns on an objective assessment of the officer’s actions in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him at the time and not on the officer’s actual state of mind . . . .” (quoting Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470 (1985))), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601 (Iowa 2001). | 3 | 3 |
Hart v. Stategreen2 sentences2017See, e.g., United States v. Elmore, 304 F.3d 557 , 561 n.1 (6th Cir. 2002) (concluding no Fourth Amendment violation resulted when officer approached driver to request license and registration after pulling over for no license plate and then seeing temporary tag in window); State v. Godwin, 826 P.2d 452, 456 (Idaho 1992) (‘‘[A] police officer’s brief detention of a driver to run a status check on the driver's license, after making a valid, lawful contact with the driver, is reasonable for purposes of the fourth amendment.”); State v. Hill, 606 A.2d 793, 795 (Me. 1992) (determining after valid 2017Vance did not decide the issue and did not have the guidance of Rodriguez, which was decided five years later. 10See e.g., United States v. Elmore, 304 F.3d 557 , 561 n.1 (6th Cir. 2002) (concluding no Fourth Amendment violation resulted when officer approached driver to request license and registration after pulling over for no license plate and then seeing temporary tag in window); State v. Godwin, 826 P.2d 452, 456 (Idaho 1992) (“[A] police officer’s brief detention of a driver to run a status check on the driver’s license, after making a valid, lawful contact with the driver, is reasonable | 3 | 3 |
United States v. Fullergreen2 sentences2017See, e.g., United States v. Fuller, 120 F. Supp. 3d 669 , 681–82, 685 (E.D. 2017See, e.g., United States v. Fuller, 120 F. Supp. 3d 669 , 681–82, 685 (E.D. | 3 | 3 |
State v. Brooksgreen2 sentences2015State v. Brooks, 760 N.W.2d 197, 204 (Iowa 2009). 2015State v. Brooks, 760 N.W.2d 197, 204 (Iowa 2009). | 3 | 3 |
State v. Holdernessgreen2 sentences2008See Edgington, 487 N.W.2d at 677-78 (“Previously, we have stated that the automobile exception to the fourth amendment requirement of a search warrant is applicable if probable cause and exigent circumstances exist at the time the automobile is stopped by police.”); Holderness, 301 N.W.2d at 736-37 (“[EJxigent circumstances are necessary only initially; the absence of exigent circumstances at the time of the actual search is irrelevant.”); see also State v. Olsen, 293 N.W.2d 216, 220 (Iowa 1980) (“It is now *797 clear that the absence of exigent circumstances for the later search is wholly irr 2008See Edgington, 487 N.W.2d at 677–78 (“Previously, we have stated that the automobile exception to the fourth amendment requirement of a search warrant is applicable if probable cause and exigent circumstances exist at the time the automobile is stopped by police.”); Holderness, 301 N.W.2d at 736–37 (“[E]xigent circumstances are necessary only initially; the absence of exigent circumstances at the time of the actual search is irrelevant.”); see also State v. Olsen, 293 N.W.2d 216, 220 (Iowa 1980) (“It is now clear that the absence of exigent circumstances for the later search is wholly irreleva | 2 | 3 |
State of Iowa v. Kyra Rose Baulergreen2 sentences2024See id. at 902 (plurality opinion) (“We find the dog sniff of Bauler’s vehicle did not violate the Fourth Amendment, notwithstanding the brief touching of the exterior of the vehicle.”), id. at 907 (stating that “the dog sniff of Bauler’s vehicle did not violate article I, section 8”); id. at 913 (McDonald, J., concurring specially) (stating that “momentary touching of Bauler’s vehicle in a public place during a lawful traffic stop was not unlawful, tortious, or otherwise prohibited under Iowa law” and that there was thus “no obligation to obtain a search warrant prior to conducting the search 2024See id. at 902 (plurality opinion) (“We find the dog sniff of Bauler’s vehicle did not violate the Fourth Amendment, notwithstanding the brief touching of the exterior of the vehicle.”), id. at 907 (stating that “the dog sniff of Bauler’s vehicle did not violate article I, section 8”); id. at 913 (McDonald, J., concurring specially) (stating that “momentary touching of Bauler’s vehicle in a public place during a lawful traffic stop was not unlawful, tortious, or otherwise prohibited under Iowa law” and that there was thus “no obligation to obtain a search warrant prior to conducting the search | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Malik Ngumezigreen2 sentences2024Police ordinarily cannot search the interior of an automobile unless they have probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband or other evidence of a crime.” United States v. Pulido-Ayala, 892 F.3d 315 , 317–19 (8th Cir. 2018) (concluding that probable cause to search the vehicle existed “before the [drug] dog entered the interior” based on the drug dog “immediately” pulling the canine officer toward the open passenger door such that there was no unlawful search when the dog jumped 20 into the defendant’s vehicle); see also United States v. Ngumezi, 980 F.3d 1285, 1289 (9th Cir. 2024Police ordinarily cannot search the interior of an automobile unless they have probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband or other evidence of a crime.” United States v. Pulido-Ayala, 892 F.3d 315 , 317–19 (8th Cir. 2018) (concluding that probable cause to search the vehicle existed “before the [drug] dog entered the interior” based on the drug dog “immediately” pulling the canine officer toward the open passenger door such that there was no unlawful search when the dog jumped 20 into the defendant’s vehicle); see also United States v. Ngumezi, 980 F.3d 1285, 1289 (9th Cir. | 2 | 2 |
Illinois v. Caballesgreen2 sentences2024The majority continues to hide behind Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005), even though its Katz-based holding “is irrelevant to” a property-based Fourth Amendment challenge. 2024The majority continues to hide behind Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005), even though its Katz-based holding “is irrelevant to” a property-based Fourth Amendment challenge. | 2 | 2 |
Stone v. Powellgreen2 sentences1979One of its most recent statements on the rule was in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494-95 , 96 S.Ct. 3037, 3052-53 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1067, 1088 (1976): [WJhere the State has provided an oppor-' tunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief or. the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial. 1979One of its most recent statements on the rule was in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494-95 , 96 S.Ct. 3037, 3052-53 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1067, 1088 (1976): [WJhere the State has provided an oppor-' tunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief or. the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial. | 2 | 2 |
Herring v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2023Instead, the exclusionary rule is a “judicial remedy to deter Fourth Amendment violations.” Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. 232 , 237 (2016); see Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141 (2009) (“We have repeatedly rejected the argument that exclusion is a necessary consequence of a Fourth Amendment violation”); Scott, 524 U.S. at 363 (“The 40 exclusionary rule is instead a judicially created means of deterring illegal searches and seizures.”); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (“[T]he [exclusionary] rule is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment righ 2023Instead, the exclusionary rule is a “judicial remedy to deter Fourth Amendment violations.” Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. 232 , 237 (2016); see Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141 (2009) (“We have repeatedly rejected the argument that exclusion is a necessary consequence of a Fourth Amendment violation”); Scott, 524 U.S. at 363 (“The 40 exclusionary rule is instead a judicially created means of deterring illegal searches and seizures.”); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (“[T]he [exclusionary] rule is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment righ | 2 | 2 |
State v. Taguegreen2 sentences2022The test is whether “the totality of the circumstances as viewed by a reasonable and prudent person would lead that person to believe that a crime has been or is being committed and that the arrestee committed or is committing it.” State v. Tague, 676 N.W.2d 197, 201 (Iowa 2004) (citation omitted). 2010State v. Tague, 676 N.W.2d 197, 204 (Iowa 2004). | 2 | 2 |
Holland v. Stategreen2 sentences2019See, e.g. , State v. Ossana , 199 Ariz. 459 , 18 P.3d 1258 , 1260 (Ct. App. 2001) (relying on Whren for a Fourth Amendment claim and holding "[t]he officers had the right to stop appellant's car if they reasonably believed he had committed a traffic violation"); State v. Mancia-Sandoval , 2010 Ark. 134 , 361 S.W.3d 835 , 839-40 (2010) ("As previously noted, a pretextual stop is not impermissible under either the federal or Arkansas Constitution and, thus, does not invalidate an otherwise lawful stop of the vehicle."); People v. Miranda , 17 Cal.App.4th 917 , 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 785 , 789 (1993) ( 2019See, e.g. , State v. Ossana , 199 Ariz. 459 , 18 P.3d 1258 , 1260 (Ct. App. 2001) (relying on Whren for a Fourth Amendment claim and holding "[t]he officers had the right to stop appellant's car if they reasonably believed he had committed a traffic violation"); State v. Mancia-Sandoval , 2010 Ark. 134 , 361 S.W.3d 835 , 839-40 (2010) ("As previously noted, a pretextual stop is not impermissible under either the federal or Arkansas Constitution and, thus, does not invalidate an otherwise lawful stop of the vehicle."); People v. Miranda , 17 Cal.App.4th 917 , 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 785 , 789 (1993) ( | 2 | 2 |
| State v. Mancia-Sandovalgreen | 2 | 2 |
| City of Dayton v. Ericksongreen | 2 | 2 |
| State v. Georgegreen | 2 | 2 |
| Harris v. Com.green | 2 | 2 |
| State v. Vineyardgreen | 2 | 2 |
| State v. Bjerkegreen | 2 | 2 |
| State v. Watersgreen | 2 | 2 |
| State v. McBreairtygreen | 2 | 2 |
| Mitchell v. Stategreen | 2 | 2 |
| State v. McClendongreen | 2 | 2 |
Dufries v. Stategreen2 sentences2019See, e.g. , State v. Ossana , 199 Ariz. 459 , 18 P.3d 1258 , 1260 (Ct. App. 2001) (relying on Whren for a Fourth Amendment claim and holding "[t]he officers had the right to stop appellant's car if they reasonably believed he had committed a traffic violation"); State v. Mancia-Sandoval , 2010 Ark. 134 , 361 S.W.3d 835 , 839-40 (2010) ("As previously noted, a pretextual stop is not impermissible under either the federal or Arkansas Constitution and, thus, does not invalidate an otherwise lawful stop of the vehicle."); People v. Miranda , 17 Cal.App.4th 917 , 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 785 , 789 (1993) ( 2019See, e.g. , State v. Ossana , 199 Ariz. 459 , 18 P.3d 1258 , 1260 (Ct. App. 2001) (relying on Whren for a Fourth Amendment claim and holding "[t]he officers had the right to stop appellant's car if they reasonably believed he had committed a traffic violation"); State v. Mancia-Sandoval , 2010 Ark. 134 , 361 S.W.3d 835 , 839-40 (2010) ("As previously noted, a pretextual stop is not impermissible under either the federal or Arkansas Constitution and, thus, does not invalidate an otherwise lawful stop of the vehicle."); People v. Miranda , 17 Cal.App.4th 917 , 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 785 , 789 (1993) ( | 2 | 2 |
| Commonwealth v. Buckleygreen | 2 | 2 |
| State v. Philip M. Tetreaultgreen | 2 | 2 |
| People v. Robinsongreen | 2 | 2 |
| State v. Myersgreen | 2 | 2 |
| State of Maine v. John E. Sassogreen | 2 | 2 |
| People v. Mirandagreen | 2 | 2 |
| State v. Tawian Bacome(075953)green | 2 | 2 |
| State v. Bartholomewgreen | 2 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| United States v. Kenny Eugene Smartgreen | 1 | 2 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Williams
green
2 sentences2017See, e.g., United States v. Elmore, 304 F.3d 557 , 561 n.1 (6th Cir. 2002) (concluding no Fourth Amendment violation resulted when officer approached driver to request license and registration after pulling over for no license plate and then seeing temporary tag in window); State v. Godwin, 826 P.2d 452, 456 (Idaho 1992) (‘‘[A] police officer’s brief detention of a driver to run a status check on the driver's license, after making a valid, lawful contact with the driver, is reasonable for purposes of the fourth amendment.”); State v. Hill, 606 A.2d 793, 795 (Me. 1992) (determining after valid 2017Vance did not decide the issue and did not have the guidance of Rodriguez, which was decided five years later. 10See e.g., United States v. Elmore, 304 F.3d 557 , 561 n.1 (6th Cir. 2002) (concluding no Fourth Amendment violation resulted when officer approached driver to request license and registration after pulling over for no license plate and then seeing temporary tag in window); State v. Godwin, 826 P.2d 452, 456 (Idaho 1992) (“[A] police officer’s brief detention of a driver to run a status check on the driver’s license, after making a valid, lawful contact with the driver, is reasonable | 3 | 2017–2017 |
United States v. Javier Pulido-Ayala
green
2 sentences2024Police ordinarily cannot search the interior of an automobile unless they have probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband or other evidence of a crime.” United States v. Pulido-Ayala, 892 F.3d 315 , 317–19 (8th Cir. 2018) (concluding that probable cause to search the vehicle existed “before the [drug] dog entered the interior” based on the drug dog “immediately” pulling the canine officer toward the open passenger door such that there was no unlawful search when the dog jumped 20 into the defendant’s vehicle); see also United States v. Ngumezi, 980 F.3d 1285, 1289 (9th Cir. 2024See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, No. 22–20100, 2024 WL 3634199 , at *2 & n.1 (5th Cir. Aug. 2, 2024) (per curiam) (holding that there was no search where dog instinctively entered cabin without direction and collecting cases); United States v. Pulido-Ayala, 892 F.3d 315 , 318–19 (8th Cir. 2018) (concluding that officers had probable cause to search the vehicle prior to K-9’s entry into vehicle cabin); United States v. Pierce, 622 F.3d 209 , 214–15 (3rd Cir. 2010) (finding no Fourth Amendment violation); United States v. Handley, No. 23–CR–57–CJW–MAR, 2024 WL 1536750 , at *6–7 (N.D. | 2 | 2024–2024 |
State of Iowa v. Jasmaine R. Warren
green
2 sentences2023Cf. State v. Warren, 955 N.W.2d 848 , 859 (Iowa 2021) (declining, but not foreclosing, a separate analysis of whether to depart from the Fourth Amendment framework under article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution where the defendant suggested the Iowa Constitution should provide greater protection but did not actually ask us to depart from the federal framework or separately brief and analyze the state constitutional argument). 3Booker’s trial was held under our modified COVID-19 pandemic measures, one of which required limiting the number of people in a courtroom, which in turn necessitate 2023Cf. State v. Warren, 955 N.W.2d 848 , 859 (Iowa 2021) (declining, but not foreclosing, a separate analysis of whether to depart from the Fourth Amendment framework under article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution where the defendant suggested the Iowa Constitution should provide greater protection but did not actually ask us to depart from the federal framework or separately brief and analyze the state constitutional argument). 3Booker’s trial was held under our modified COVID-19 pandemic measures, one of which required limiting the number of people in a courtroom, which in turn necessitate | 2 | 2023–2023 |
Fitzgerald v. People
green
2 sentences2021The State then notes that in Fitzgerald v. People, the Colorado Supreme Court rejected a Fourth Amendment claim that the state is prohibited from introducing the refusal to consent to a blood test under the authority of Neville. 394 P.3d 671 , 674-76 (Colo. 2017) (en banc). 2021The State then notes that in Fitzgerald v. People, the Colorado Supreme Court rejected a Fourth Amendment claim that the state is prohibited from introducing the refusal to consent to a blood test under the authority of Neville. 394 P.3d 671 , 674-76 (Colo. 2017) (en banc). | 2 | 2021–2021 |
| Floyd v. City of Crystal Springs green | 2 | 2019–2019 |
| State v. Farabee green | 2 | 2019–2019 |
| State v. Rutzinski green | 2 | 2019–2019 |
| Chambers v. Maroney green | 2 | 2019–2019 |
| People v. Kazmierczak red | 2 | 2019–2019 |
| Karamychev v. District of Columbia green | 2 | 2019–2019 |
| State v. Tucker green | 2 | 2019–2019 |
| Wilkes v. State green | 2 | 2019–2019 |
| Commonwealth v. Chase green | 2 | 2019–2019 |
| Devenpeck v. Alford green | 2 | 2019–2019 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.