Fourth Amendment violation in Iowa

2024Id. at 404. 11 Jones did link its Fourth Amendment analysis to common law concepts of trespass.

2024Iowa 2023) (granting motion to suppress and holding that canine’s actions of “insert[ing] his head into the open window of [a] vehicle” as the dog hung on the side of the car door to sniff for drugs was “[t]he same conduct” of “physically occup[ying] private property for the purpose of obtaining information” that oc- curred in Jones and noting that prior cases that “found no Fourth Amendment violation when a drug-sniffing dog breaks the plane of an open window . . . were largely prior to Jones and Jardines” (third quoting Jones, 565 U.S. at 404 )); State v. Dorff, 526 P.3d 988 , 998–99 (Idaho

2026Because we apply an objective standard in determining whether an exception to the warrant requirement applies, an officer’s “subjective motivations for conducting the search are irrelevant.” Scullark, 23 N.W.3d at 54; see also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (“Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.”).

2022An officer’s “[s]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).

2017See State v. Kubit, 627 N.W.2d 914 , 918–19 (Iowa 2001) (“Whether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred turns on an objective assessment of the officer’s actions in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him at the time and not on the officer’s actual state of mind . . . .” (quoting Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470 (1985))), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601 (Iowa 2001).

2017See State v. Kubit, 627 N.W.2d 914 , 918–19 (Iowa 2001) (“Whether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred turns on an objective assessment of the officer’s actions in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him at the time and not on the officer’s actual state of mind . . . .” (quoting Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470 (1985))), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601 (Iowa 2001).

2020The trial court denied Domenig’s motion to suppress, concluding the search fell under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. “[T]he automobile exception to the fourth amendment requirement of a search warrant is applicable if probable cause and exigent circumstances exist at the time the automobile is 3 stopped by police.” State v. Edgington, 487 N.W.2d 675, 678 (Iowa 1992).

2008See Edgington, 487 N.W.2d at 677–78 (“Previously, we have stated that the automobile exception to the fourth amendment requirement of a search warrant is applicable if probable cause and exigent circumstances exist at the time the automobile is stopped by police.”); Holderness, 301 N.W.2d at 736–37 (“[E]xigent circumstances are necessary only initially; the absence of exigent circumstances at the time of the actual search is irrelevant.”); see also State v. Olsen, 293 N.W.2d 216, 220 (Iowa 1980) (“It is now clear that the absence of exigent circumstances for the later search is wholly irreleva

2003In State v. Breuer, 577 N.W.2d 41, 42 (Iowa 1998), we considered whether the defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the stairway/hallway "leading from the outer door of [his] apartment building to his upstairs apartment door” as part of our broader analysis of the defendant’s Fourth Amendment claim.

2003In State v. Breuer, 577 N.W.2d 41, 42 (Iowa 1998), we considered whether the defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the stairway/hallway "leading from the outer door of [his] apartment building to his upstairs apartment door” as part of our broader analysis of the defendant’s Fourth Amendment claim.

2024In siding with cases finding a Fourth Amendment violation, the Florida Supreme Court concluded that a dog sniff at a person’s front door “does not only reveal the presence of contraband, as was the case in the federal ‘sui generis’ dog sniff cases discussed above, but it also constitutes an intrusive procedure that may expose the resident to public opprobrium, humiliation and embarrassment, and it raises the specter of arbitrary and discriminatory application.” Id. at 49 (majority opinion) (“Given the special status accorded a citizen’s home under the Fourth Amendment, we conclude that a ‘snif

2024In siding with cases finding a Fourth Amendment violation, the Florida Supreme Court concluded that a dog sniff at a person’s front door “does not only reveal the presence of contraband, as was the case in the federal ‘sui generis’ dog sniff cases discussed above, but it also constitutes an intrusive procedure that may expose the resident to public opprobrium, humiliation and embarrassment, and it raises the specter of arbitrary and discriminatory application.” Id. at 49 (majority opinion) (“Given the special status accorded a citizen’s home under the Fourth Amendment, we conclude that a ‘snif

2021See Short, 851 N.W.2d at 500 .

2021See Short, 851 N.W.2d at 500 .

2017See, e.g., United States v. Fuller, 120 F. Supp. 3d 669 , 681–82, 685 (E.D.

2017See, e.g., United States v. Fuller, 120 F. Supp. 3d 669 , 681–82, 685 (E.D.

2017Vance did not decide the issue and did not have the guidance of Rodriguez, which was decided five years later. 10See e.g., United States v. Elmore, 304 F.3d 557 , 561 n.1 (6th Cir. 2002) (concluding no Fourth Amendment violation resulted when officer approached driver to request license and registration after pulling over for no license plate and then seeing temporary tag in window); State v. Godwin, 826 P.2d 452, 456 (Idaho 1992) (“[A] police officer’s brief detention of a driver to run a status check on the driver’s license, after making a valid, lawful contact with the driver, is reasonable

2017Vance did not decide the issue and did not have the guidance of Rodriguez, which was decided five years later. 10See e.g., United States v. Elmore, 304 F.3d 557 , 561 n.1 (6th Cir. 2002) (concluding no Fourth Amendment violation resulted when officer approached driver to request license and registration after pulling over for no license plate and then seeing temporary tag in window); State v. Godwin, 826 P.2d 452, 456 (Idaho 1992) (“[A] police officer’s brief detention of a driver to run a status check on the driver’s license, after making a valid, lawful contact with the driver, is reasonable

2017See State v. Kubit, 627 N.W.2d 914 , 918–19 (Iowa 2001) (“Whether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred turns on an objective assessment of the officer’s actions in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him at the time and not on the officer’s actual state of mind . . . .” (quoting Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470 (1985))), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601 (Iowa 2001).

2017See State v. Kubit, 627 N.W.2d 914 , 918–19 (Iowa 2001) (“Whether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred turns on an objective assessment of the officer’s actions in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him at the time and not on the officer’s actual state of mind . . . .” (quoting Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470 (1985))), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601 (Iowa 2001).

2017Vance did not decide the issue and did not have the guidance of Rodriguez, which was decided five years later. 10See e.g., United States v. Elmore, 304 F.3d 557 , 561 n.1 (6th Cir. 2002) (concluding no Fourth Amendment violation resulted when officer approached driver to request license and registration after pulling over for no license plate and then seeing temporary tag in window); State v. Godwin, 826 P.2d 452, 456 (Idaho 1992) (“[A] police officer’s brief detention of a driver to run a status check on the driver’s license, after making a valid, lawful contact with the driver, is reasonable

2017Vance did not decide the issue and did not have the guidance of Rodriguez, which was decided five years later. 10See e.g., United States v. Elmore, 304 F.3d 557 , 561 n.1 (6th Cir. 2002) (concluding no Fourth Amendment violation resulted when officer approached driver to request license and registration after pulling over for no license plate and then seeing temporary tag in window); State v. Godwin, 826 P.2d 452, 456 (Idaho 1992) (“[A] police officer’s brief detention of a driver to run a status check on the driver’s license, after making a valid, lawful contact with the driver, is reasonable

2017Vance did not decide the issue and did not have the guidance of Rodriguez, which was decided five years later. 10See e.g., United States v. Elmore, 304 F.3d 557 , 561 n.1 (6th Cir. 2002) (concluding no Fourth Amendment violation resulted when officer approached driver to request license and registration after pulling over for no license plate and then seeing temporary tag in window); State v. Godwin, 826 P.2d 452, 456 (Idaho 1992) (“[A] police officer’s brief detention of a driver to run a status check on the driver’s license, after making a valid, lawful contact with the driver, is reasonable

2017Vance did not decide the issue and did not have the guidance of Rodriguez, which was decided five years later. 10See e.g., United States v. Elmore, 304 F.3d 557 , 561 n.1 (6th Cir. 2002) (concluding no Fourth Amendment violation resulted when officer approached driver to request license and registration after pulling over for no license plate and then seeing temporary tag in window); State v. Godwin, 826 P.2d 452, 456 (Idaho 1992) (“[A] police officer’s brief detention of a driver to run a status check on the driver’s license, after making a valid, lawful contact with the driver, is reasonable

2015State v. Brooks, 760 N.W.2d 197, 204 (Iowa 2009).

2015State v. Brooks, 760 N.W.2d 197, 204 (Iowa 2009).

2008See Edgington, 487 N.W.2d at 677-78 (“Previously, we have stated that the automobile exception to the fourth amendment requirement of a search warrant is applicable if probable cause and exigent circumstances exist at the time the automobile is stopped by police.”); Holderness, 301 N.W.2d at 736-37 (“[EJxigent circumstances are necessary only initially; the absence of exigent circumstances at the time of the actual search is irrelevant.”); see also State v. Olsen, 293 N.W.2d 216, 220 (Iowa 1980) (“It is now *797 clear that the absence of exigent circumstances for the later search is wholly irr

2008See Edgington, 487 N.W.2d at 677–78 (“Previously, we have stated that the automobile exception to the fourth amendment requirement of a search warrant is applicable if probable cause and exigent circumstances exist at the time the automobile is stopped by police.”); Holderness, 301 N.W.2d at 736–37 (“[E]xigent circumstances are necessary only initially; the absence of exigent circumstances at the time of the actual search is irrelevant.”); see also State v. Olsen, 293 N.W.2d 216, 220 (Iowa 1980) (“It is now clear that the absence of exigent circumstances for the later search is wholly irreleva

2024The majority continues to hide behind Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005), even though its Katz-based holding “is irrelevant to” a property-based Fourth Amendment challenge.

2024The majority continues to hide behind Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005), even though its Katz-based holding “is irrelevant to” a property-based Fourth Amendment challenge.

2024Police ordinarily cannot search the interior of an automobile unless they have probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband or other evidence of a crime.” United States v. Pulido-Ayala, 892 F.3d 315 , 317–19 (8th Cir. 2018) (concluding that probable cause to search the vehicle existed “before the [drug] dog entered the interior” based on the drug dog “immediately” pulling the canine officer toward the open passenger door such that there was no unlawful search when the dog jumped 20 into the defendant’s vehicle); see also United States v. Ngumezi, 980 F.3d 1285, 1289 (9th Cir.

2024Police ordinarily cannot search the interior of an automobile unless they have probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband or other evidence of a crime.” United States v. Pulido-Ayala, 892 F.3d 315 , 317–19 (8th Cir. 2018) (concluding that probable cause to search the vehicle existed “before the [drug] dog entered the interior” based on the drug dog “immediately” pulling the canine officer toward the open passenger door such that there was no unlawful search when the dog jumped 20 into the defendant’s vehicle); see also United States v. Ngumezi, 980 F.3d 1285, 1289 (9th Cir.

2023Instead, the exclusionary rule is a “judicial remedy to deter Fourth Amendment violations.” Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. 232 , 237 (2016); see Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141 (2009) (“We have repeatedly rejected the argument that exclusion is a necessary consequence of a Fourth Amendment violation”); Scott, 524 U.S. at 363 (“The 40 exclusionary rule is instead a judicially created means of deterring illegal searches and seizures.”); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (“[T]he [exclusionary] rule is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment righ

2023Instead, the exclusionary rule is a “judicial remedy to deter Fourth Amendment violations.” Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. 232 , 237 (2016); see Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141 (2009) (“We have repeatedly rejected the argument that exclusion is a necessary consequence of a Fourth Amendment violation”); Scott, 524 U.S. at 363 (“The 40 exclusionary rule is instead a judicially created means of deterring illegal searches and seizures.”); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (“[T]he [exclusionary] rule is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment righ

1979One of its most recent statements on the rule was in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494-95 , 96 S.Ct. 3037, 3052-53 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1067, 1088 (1976): [WJhere the State has provided an oppor-' tunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief or. the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial.

1979One of its most recent statements on the rule was in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494-95 , 96 S.Ct. 3037, 3052-53 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1067, 1088 (1976): [WJhere the State has provided an oppor-' tunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief or. the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial.

2022The test is whether “the totality of the circumstances as viewed by a reasonable and prudent person would lead that person to believe that a crime has been or is being committed and that the arrestee committed or is committing it.” State v. Tague, 676 N.W.2d 197, 201 (Iowa 2004) (citation omitted).

2010State v. Tague, 676 N.W.2d 197, 204 (Iowa 2004).

2019See, e.g. , State v. Ossana , 199 Ariz. 459 , 18 P.3d 1258 , 1260 (Ct. App. 2001) (relying on Whren for a Fourth Amendment claim and holding "[t]he officers had the right to stop appellant's car if they reasonably believed he had committed a traffic violation"); State v. Mancia-Sandoval , 2010 Ark. 134 , 361 S.W.3d 835 , 839-40 (2010) ("As previously noted, a pretextual stop is not impermissible under either the federal or Arkansas Constitution and, thus, does not invalidate an otherwise lawful stop of the vehicle."); People v. Miranda , 17 Cal.App.4th 917 , 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 785 , 789 (1993) (

2019See, e.g. , State v. Ossana , 199 Ariz. 459 , 18 P.3d 1258 , 1260 (Ct. App. 2001) (relying on Whren for a Fourth Amendment claim and holding "[t]he officers had the right to stop appellant's car if they reasonably believed he had committed a traffic violation"); State v. Mancia-Sandoval , 2010 Ark. 134 , 361 S.W.3d 835 , 839-40 (2010) ("As previously noted, a pretextual stop is not impermissible under either the federal or Arkansas Constitution and, thus, does not invalidate an otherwise lawful stop of the vehicle."); People v. Miranda , 17 Cal.App.4th 917 , 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 785 , 789 (1993) (