Fourth Amendment violation in Maryland

2023Such “investigatory” stops have been upheld against Fourth Amendment challenge by the United States Supreme Court, see Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996), but are often criticized as “pretextual,” see, e.g., Wayne R.

2017See also Whren, 517 U.S. at 813 , 116 S.Ct. 1769 (“Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.”).

1998Observing that the federal cases addressing post-seizure abandonments “suggest that when an alleged abandonment follows a Fourth Amendment violation the issue is whether the abandonment of property was voluntary,” the court reversed Ward’s conviction, holding that voluntariness must be addressed by determining whether “based on the totality of the circumstances, the abandonment is voluntary in fact, while giving sufficient weight to the three factors emphasized in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 , 95 S.Ct. 2254 , 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975).” Id. at 1535.

1998Observing that the federal cases addressing post-seizure abandonments “suggest that when an alleged abandonment follows a Fourth Amendment violation the issue is whether the abandonment of property was voluntary,” the court reversed Ward’s conviction, holding that voluntariness must be addressed by determining whether “based on the totality of the circumstances, the abandonment is voluntary in fact, while giving sufficient weight to the three factors emphasized in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 , 95 S.Ct. 2254 , 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975).” Id. at 1535.

2024Kodi asserted that he had “consistently maintained that [he] can proceed and was proceeding on his § 1983 claims under the Fourteenth Amendment as an independent basis from the Fourth Amendment at the time of trial.” Kodi further argued that under the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Rucker v. Harford County, 946 F.2d 278, 281 (4th Cir. 1991), an innocent bystander can bring a substantive due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment if the person was physically injured, regardless of whether the injury was intended.

2024Kodi asserted that he had “consistently maintained that [he] can proceed and was proceeding on his § 1983 claims under the Fourteenth Amendment as an independent basis from the Fourth Amendment at the time of trial.” Kodi further argued that under the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Rucker v. Harford County, 946 F.2d 278, 281 (4th Cir. 1991), an innocent bystander can bring a substantive due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment if the person was physically injured, regardless of whether the injury was intended.

2024Third, as a result, the jury was never presented with the appropriate standard applicable to Kodi’s Substantive Due Process Claim—whether the conduct “shocks the conscience,” Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846-47 (1998)—and was never asked whether Corporal Ruby’s conduct met that standard.

2024Third, as a result, the jury was never presented with the appropriate standard applicable to Kodi’s Substantive Due Process Claim—whether the conduct “shocks the conscience,” Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846-47 (1998)—and was never asked whether Corporal Ruby’s conduct met that standard.

2024In Cunningham I, the Appellate Court reversed on that issue. 246 Md. App. 630, 700-02 (2020). 18 a viable Fourth Amendment claim that was subject to a more permissive legal standard, it seems that Kodi was content to focus primarily on the Fourth Amendment.

2024In Cunningham I, the Appellate Court reversed on that issue. 246 Md. App. 630, 700-02 (2020). 18 a viable Fourth Amendment claim that was subject to a more permissive legal standard, it seems that Kodi was content to focus primarily on the Fourth Amendment.

2020“The exclusionary rule is not itself an individual right; therefore, suppression of evidence ‘is not an automatic consequence of a Fourth Amendment violation.’” Copes, 454 Md. at 605 (quoting Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 137 (2009)). “[T]he exclusionary rule is designed to deter police misconduct[.]” United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 916 (1984).

2020“The exclusionary rule is not itself an individual right; therefore, suppression of evidence ‘is not an automatic consequence of a Fourth Amendment violation.’” Copes, 454 Md. at 605 (quoting Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 137 (2009)). “[T]he exclusionary rule is designed to deter police misconduct[.]” United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 916 (1984).

2017The Supreme Court has cautioned that suppression “has always been our last resort, not our first impulse.” Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006).

2017The Supreme Court has cautioned that suppression “has always been our last resort, not our first impulse.” Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006).

2026E Terry teaches that the Fourth Amendment analysis turns on “the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security.” 392 U.S. at 19 .

2026E Terry teaches that the Fourth Amendment analysis turns on “the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security.” 392 U.S. at 19 .

2018Yet even where evidence is discovered after a Fourth Amendment violation, it should not be excluded if it was obtained " 'by means sufficiently distinguishable' " from the illegality, rather than " 'by exploitation of that illegality[.]' " Cox v. State , 421 Md. 630 , 651, 28 A.3d 687 (2011) (quoting Wong Sun v. United States , 371 U.S. at 488 , 83 S.Ct. 407 ).

2018Yet even where evidence is discovered after a Fourth Amendment violation, it should not be excluded if it was obtained " 'by means sufficiently distinguishable' " from the illegality, rather than " 'by exploitation of that illegality[.]' " Cox v. State , 421 Md. 630 , 651, 28 A.3d 687 (2011) (quoting Wong Sun v. United States , 371 U.S. at 488 , 83 S.Ct. 407 ).

2001The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment analysis is Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 , 88 S.Ct. 507 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), which tested whether the placement of a listening device on the roof of a public telephone booth constituted a violation of the Fourth Amendment rights of persons using the booth.

2001The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment analysis is Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 , 88 S.Ct. 507 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), which tested whether the placement of a listening device on the roof of a public telephone booth constituted a violation of the Fourth Amendment rights of persons using the booth.

2026See, e.g., Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000) (explaining that “an officer may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.”); Greenstreet v. State, 392 Md. 652, 667-68 (2006) (noting that a magistrate’s issuance of a search warrant must depend on probable cause, or a fair probability that the search will uncover contraband or evidence of a crime (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39 (2006)); Shuler v. State, 267 Md. App. 465, 485 (2025) (“The objective s

2026See, e.g., Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000) (explaining that “an officer may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.”); Greenstreet v. State, 392 Md. 652, 667-68 (2006) (noting that a magistrate’s issuance of a search warrant must depend on probable cause, or a fair probability that the search will uncover contraband or evidence of a crime (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39 (2006)); Shuler v. State, 267 Md. App. 465, 485 (2025) (“The objective s

2022“Recognizing that the constitutional gauge for purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis is reasonableness[,]” id. at 254 , 249 A.3d at 839 , Terry, 392 U.S. at 30 , permits an officer with reasonable suspicion “that criminal activity may be afoot” to briefly detain a person after observing “unusual conduct” in order to resolve the suspicion.

2022“Recognizing that the constitutional gauge for purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis is reasonableness[,]” id. at 254 , 249 A.3d at 839 , Terry, 392 U.S. at 30 , permits an officer with reasonable suspicion “that criminal activity may be afoot” to briefly detain a person after observing “unusual conduct” in order to resolve the suspicion.

2003In Rakas v. *80 Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 , 99 S.Ct. 421 , 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978), the Supreme Court further developed this analysis by minimizing the distinction between substantive Fourth Amendment analysis and Fourth Amendment standing.

2003In Rakas v. *80 Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 , 99 S.Ct. 421 , 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978), the Supreme Court further developed this analysis by minimizing the distinction between substantive Fourth Amendment analysis and Fourth Amendment standing.

2013In other words, an officer’s “subjective reason for making the arrest need not be the criminal offense as to which the known facts provide probable cause.” Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153 , 125 S.Ct. 588, 594 , 160 L.Ed.2d 537 (2004); see also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 , 116 S.Ct. 1769 , 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (holding that an officer’s subjective intention in making an arrest has no bearing on a probable cause determination if, before the stop, the officer observed the individual committing an infraction); Brown v. State, 171 Md.App. 489 , 910 A.2d 571 (2006) (holding that th

2013In other words, an officer’s “subjective reason for making the arrest need not be the criminal offense as to which the known facts provide probable cause.” Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153 , 125 S.Ct. 588, 594 , 160 L.Ed.2d 537 (2004); see also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 , 116 S.Ct. 1769 , 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (holding that an officer’s subjective intention in making an arrest has no bearing on a probable cause determination if, before the stop, the officer observed the individual committing an infraction); Brown v. State, 171 Md.App. 489 , 910 A.2d 571 (2006) (holding that th

2001See Ferris, 355 Md. at 368-69 , 735 A.2d 491 ; Charity, 132 Md.App. at 607-08 , 753 A.2d 556 ; Martin v. State, 113 Md.App. 190, 236 , 686 A.2d 1130 (1996) (recognizing de novo review concerning question of whether defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy); Sproates v. State, 58 Md.App. 547, 563 , 473 A.2d 1289 (1984) (“A trial court’s determination that a reasonable expectation of privacy exists ‘is a legal conclusion involving substantive Fourth Amendment analysis’ subject to appellate review.”) (citation omitted).

2001See Ferris, 355 Md. at 368-69 , 735 A.2d 491 ; Charity, 132 Md.App. at 607-08 , 753 A.2d 556 ; Martin v. State, 113 Md.App. 190, 236 , 686 A.2d 1130 (1996) (recognizing de novo review concerning question of whether defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy); Sproates v. State, 58 Md.App. 547, 563 , 473 A.2d 1289 (1984) (“A trial court’s determination that a reasonable expectation of privacy exists ‘is a legal conclusion involving substantive Fourth Amendment analysis’ subject to appellate review.”) (citation omitted).

2026The attenuation doctrine allows evidence to be used notwithstanding a Fourth Amendment violation where the “connection between unconstitutional police conduct and the evidence is remote or has been interrupted by some intervening circumstance[.]” Strieff, 579 U.S. at 238 .

2026The attenuation doctrine allows evidence to be used notwithstanding a Fourth Amendment violation where the “connection between unconstitutional police conduct and the evidence is remote or has been interrupted by some intervening circumstance[.]” Strieff, 579 U.S. at 238 .

2026See, e.g., Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000) (explaining that “an officer may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.”); Greenstreet v. State, 392 Md. 652, 667-68 (2006) (noting that a magistrate’s issuance of a search warrant must depend on probable cause, or a fair probability that the search will uncover contraband or evidence of a crime (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39 (2006)); Shuler v. State, 267 Md. App. 465, 485 (2025) (“The objective s

2026Id. at 125 .

2026Id. at 152, 350 A.3d 786 (Gould, J., dissenting).

2026Id. at 152, 350 A.3d 786 (Gould, J., dissenting).

1998In United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 , 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1877 , 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980)(opinion of Stewart, J.), the Supreme Court set out a test to determine whether a person has been seized, thereby triggering a Fourth Amendment analysis of the police action.

1998In United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 , 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1877 , 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980)(opinion of Stewart, J.), the Supreme Court set out a test to determine whether a person has been seized, thereby triggering a Fourth Amendment analysis of the police action.

2024Thus, any claim of excessive force by the subject of a seizure—including 2 a seizure by a shooting—is analyzed as a Fourth Amendment claim.3 Id.

2024Thus, any claim of excessive force by the subject of a seizure—including 2 a seizure by a shooting—is analyzed as a Fourth Amendment claim.3 Id.

2024As the Supreme Court has held, “[w]here the alleged Fourth Amendment violation involves a search or seizure pursuant to a warrant, the fact that a neutral magistrate has issued a warrant is the clearest indication that the officers acted in an objectively reasonable manner or,” as we have sometimes put it, “in ‘objective good faith.’” Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535, 546 (2012) (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 922–23).

2024As the Supreme Court has held, “[w]here the alleged Fourth Amendment violation involves a search or seizure pursuant to a warrant, the fact that a neutral magistrate has issued a warrant is the clearest indication that the officers acted in an objectively reasonable manner or,” as we have sometimes put it, “in ‘objective good faith.’” Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535, 546 (2012) (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 922–23).

2010The Supreme Court addressed a Fourth Amendment issue of first impression: “Because we are dealing with intrusion into the human body ... we write on a clean slate.” 384 U.S. at 767-68 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 .

2010The Supreme Court addressed a Fourth Amendment issue of first impression: “Because we are dealing with intrusion into the human body ... we write on a clean slate.” 384 U.S. at 767-68 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 .

2003Although Williams v. State, 372 Md. 386, 418-20 , 813 A.2d 231 (2002); Holmes v. State, 368 Md. 506, 515-16 , 796 A.2d 90 (2002); and United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 719 , 104 S.Ct. 3296 , 82 L.Ed.2d 530 (1984) do not expressly address the hierarchal relationship between 1) the requirement of factoring out Fourth Amendment tainted information from a warrant application and 2) “good faith” police reliance on even an erroneously issued warrant, they represent an imposing predicate from which the conclusion may readily be drawn that in the case of an antecedent Fourth Amendment violation whi

2003Although Williams v. State, 372 Md. 386, 418-20 , 813 A.2d 231 (2002); Holmes v. State, 368 Md. 506, 515-16 , 796 A.2d 90 (2002); and United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 719 , 104 S.Ct. 3296 , 82 L.Ed.2d 530 (1984) do not expressly address the hierarchal relationship between 1) the requirement of factoring out Fourth Amendment tainted information from a warrant application and 2) “good faith” police reliance on even an erroneously issued warrant, they represent an imposing predicate from which the conclusion may readily be drawn that in the case of an antecedent Fourth Amendment violation whi