Fourth Amendment violation in Colorado

2018In such cases, the Court has either found or assumed a Fourth Amendment violation, and the evaluation of the reasonableness of an officer's mistake of law has been "limited to the separate matter of remedy." Id. ¶ 47 Moreover, Casillas ignores that, since mere negligence by a government official is insufficient to constitute a Fourth Amendment violation, it certainly cannot "meet the more stringent test for triggering the exclusionary rule." Herring , 555 U.S. at 145 , 129 S.Ct. 695 .

2018In such cases, the Court has either found or assumed a Fourth Amendment violation, and the evaluation of the reasonableness of an officer's mistake of law has been "limited to the separate matter of remedy." Id. ¶ 47 Moreover, Casillas ignores that, since mere negligence by a government official is insufficient to constitute a Fourth Amendment violation, it certainly cannot "meet the more stringent test for triggering the exclusionary rule." Herring , 555 U.S. at 145 , 129 S.Ct. 695 .

2021It is intended “to compel respect for the c onstitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way — by removing the incentive to disregard it.” Elkins v. United States , 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960). ¶ 54 Nevertheless, the Colorado Suprem e Court has cautioned that the exclusionary rule “should not automatically apply every time a Fourth Amendment violation is fou nd . . . .” Casillas v. People , 2018 CO 78M, ¶ 21 , 427 P.3d 804, 810 (quoting People v. Gutierrez , 222 P.3d 925, 941 (Colo. 2009)).

2021It is intended “to compel respect for the c onstitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way — by removing the incentive to disregard it.” Elkins v. United States , 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960). ¶ 54 Nevertheless, the Colorado Suprem e Court has cautioned that the exclusionary rule “should not automatically apply every time a Fourth Amendment violation is fou nd . . . .” Casillas v. People , 2018 CO 78M, ¶ 21 , 427 P.3d 804, 810 (quoting People v. Gutierrez , 222 P.3d 925, 941 (Colo. 2009)).

1999To this end, the Court held that the fact that statements were made pursuant to an otherwise valid, voluntary waiver following Miranda warnings does not necessarily purge the taint of an underlying Fourth Amendment violation, such as an illegal arrest. 18 See id. at 603, 605 , 95 S.Ct. 2254 ; see also Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 216-17 , 99 S.Ct. 2248 ; People v. Madson, 638 P.2d 18, 33 (Colo.1981); McCall, 623 P.2d at 398 .

1999To this end, the Court held that the fact that statements were made pursuant to an otherwise valid, voluntary waiver following Miranda warnings does not necessarily purge the taint of an underlying Fourth Amendment violation, such as an illegal arrest. 18 See id. at 603, 605 , 95 S.Ct. 2254 ; see also Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 216-17 , 99 S.Ct. 2248 ; People v. Madson, 638 P.2d 18, 33 (Colo.1981); McCall, 623 P.2d at 398 .

2021The Impeachment Exception to the Exclusionary Rule ¶19 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article II, section 7 of the Colorado Constitution protect against “unreasonable searches and seizures.” However, because the Fourth Amendment is silent regarding how this right is to be enforced, the Supreme Court adopted the “exclusionary rule,” which serves as a “deterrent sanction that bars the prosecution from introducing evidence obtained by way of a Fourth Amendment violation.” Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 , 231–32 (2011); see Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961).

2021The Impeachment Exception to the Exclusionary Rule ¶19 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article II, section 7 of the Colorado Constitution protect against “unreasonable searches and seizures.” However, because the Fourth Amendment is silent regarding how this right is to be enforced, the Supreme Court adopted the “exclusionary rule,” which serves as a “deterrent sanction that bars the prosecution from introducing evidence obtained by way of a Fourth Amendment violation.” Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 , 231–32 (2011); see Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961).

2025If a warrantless search violates the Fourth Amendment , the "use of the seized evidence involve [s] a 'denial of the constitutional rights of the accused,' " and thus, " 'the Fourth Amendment bar [s] the use of evidence secured through an illegal search . . . .' " Mapp v. Ohio , 367 U.S. 643, 648 ( 1961 ) ( first quoting Weeks v. United States , 232 U.S. 383, 398 ( 1914 ) ; and then quoting Wolf v. Colorado , 338 U.S. 25, 28 ( 1949 ) ) ; see also Zuniga , ¶ 14 , 372 P.3d at 1057 ( requiring suppression of the evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search ) . ¶17 One exception to the warrant

2025If a warrantless search violates the Fourth Amendment, the "use of the seized evidence involve[s] a 'denial of the constitutional rights of the accused,'" and thus, "'the Fourth Amendment bar[s] the use of evidence secured through an illegal search . . . .'" Mapp v. Ohio , 367 U.S. 643, 648 (1961) (first quoting Weeks v. United States , 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914); and then quoting Wolf v. Colorado , 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949)); see also Zuniga , ¶ 14, 372 P.3d at 1057 (requiring suppression of the evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search). 10 ¶17 One exception to the warrant requirement is th

2025If a warrantless search violates the Fourth Amendment , the "use of the seized evidence involve [s] a 'denial of the constitutional rights of the accused,' " and thus, " 'the Fourth Amendment bar [s] the use of evidence secured through an illegal search . . . .' " Mapp v. Ohio , 367 U.S. 643, 648 ( 1961 ) ( first quoting Weeks v. United States , 232 U.S. 383, 398 ( 1914 ) ; and then quoting Wolf v. Colorado , 338 U.S. 25, 28 ( 1949 ) ) ; see also Zuniga , ¶ 14 , 372 P.3d at 1057 ( requiring suppression of the evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search ) . ¶17 One exception to the warrant

2025If a warrantless search violates the Fourth Amendment, the "use of the seized evidence involve[s] a 'denial of the constitutional rights of the accused,'" and thus, "'the Fourth Amendment bar[s] the use of evidence secured through an illegal search . . . .'" Mapp v. Ohio , 367 U.S. 643, 648 (1961) (first quoting Weeks v. United States , 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914); and then quoting Wolf v. Colorado , 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949)); see also Zuniga , ¶ 14, 372 P.3d at 1057 (requiring suppression of the evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search). 10 ¶17 One exception to the warrant requirement is th

2021The rule is “intended to deter improper police conduct,” and thus “should not be applied in cases where the ‘deterrence purpose is not served, or where the benefits associated with the rule are minimal in comparison to the costs associated with the exclusion of probative evidence.’” People v. Altman, 960 P.2d 1164, 1168 (Colo. 1998) (citation omitted). ¶ 53 The attenuation doctrine is one exception to the exclusionary rule.

2021The rule is “intended to deter improper police conduct,” and thus “should not be applied in cases where the ‘deterrence purpose is not served, or where the benefits associated with the rule are minimal in comparison to the costs associated with the exclusion of probative evidence.’” People v. Altman, 960 P.2d 1164, 1168 (Colo. 1998) (citation omitted). ¶ 53 The attenuation doctrine is one exception to the exclusionary rule.

1999See Crews, 445 U.S. at 475-76 , 100 S.Ct. 1244 (distinguishing case where police knew defendant’s identity and suspected him of criminal involvement before occurrence of Fourth Amendment violation from case where defendant’s identity and connection to the illicit activity were only first discovered through an illegal arrest or search); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 722-23, 724, 726 , 89 S.Ct. 1394 , 22 L.Ed.2d 676 (1969) (suppressing fingerprint evidence gathered without probable cause because defendant never would have become a suspect were it not for his illegal detention).

1999See Crews, 445 U.S. at 475-76 , 100 S.Ct. 1244 (distinguishing case where police knew defendant’s identity and suspected him of criminal involvement before occurrence of Fourth Amendment violation from case where defendant’s identity and connection to the illicit activity were only first discovered through an illegal arrest or search); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 722-23, 724, 726 , 89 S.Ct. 1394 , 22 L.Ed.2d 676 (1969) (suppressing fingerprint evidence gathered without probable cause because defendant never would have become a suspect were it not for his illegal detention).

1998See, e.g., T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351 , 105 S.Ct. 733 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("Only in those exceptional circumstances in which special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable, is a court entitled to substitute its balancing of interests for that of the Framers."); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873-74 , 107 S.Ct. 3164 , 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987) (explaining the Fourth Amendment analysis in special needs cases); Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619-20 , 109 S.Ct. 1402 (same); Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665-66 , 109 S.Ct. 1384 (same). [2

1998See, e.g., T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351 , 105 S.Ct. 733 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("Only in those exceptional circumstances in which special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable, is a court entitled to substitute its balancing of interests for that of the Framers."); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873-74 , 107 S.Ct. 3164 , 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987) (explaining the Fourth Amendment analysis in special needs cases); Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619-20 , 109 S.Ct. 1402 (same); Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665-66 , 109 S.Ct. 1384 (same). [2

1985In Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 , 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963), the Supreme Court held that, as in the case of tangible objects, visual observations and verbal evidence are no less within the scope of the exclusionary rule when acquired as the result of a Fourth Amendment violation: The exclusionary rule has traditionally barred from trial physical, tangible materials obtained either during or as a direct result of an unlawful invasion.

1985In Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 , 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963), the Supreme Court held that, as in the case of tangible objects, visual observations and verbal evidence are no less within the scope of the exclusionary rule when acquired as the result of a Fourth Amendment violation: The exclusionary rule has traditionally barred from trial physical, tangible materials obtained either during or as a direct result of an unlawful invasion.

2022We agree with the People that the officers had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity once they smelled burnt marijuana, even though Officer Galvan stated that he was “not worried about the weed.” See Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 772 (2001) (“[S]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.” (quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996))).

2014As the United States Supreme Court has made clear, " '[slubjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis."" Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 772 , 121 S.Ct. 1876 , 149 L.Ed.2d 994 (2001) (alteration in original) (quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 , 116 S.Ct. 1769 , 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996)).

1992Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344 , 110 S.Ct. 1176 , 108 L.Ed.2d 293 (1990) (no Sixth Amendment violation); Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 , 100 S.Ct. 2124 , 65 L.Ed.2d 86 (1980) (no Fifth Amendment violation); United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 , 100 S.Ct. 1912 , 64 L.Ed.2d 559 (1980) (no Fourth Amendment violation); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 , 95 S.Ct. 1215 , 43 L.Ed.2d 570 (1975) (no Fifth Amendment violation); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 , 91 S.Ct. 643 , 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (no Fifth Amendment violation).

1992Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344 , 110 S.Ct. 1176 , 108 L.Ed.2d 293 (1990) (no Sixth Amendment violation); Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 , 100 S.Ct. 2124 , 65 L.Ed.2d 86 (1980) (no Fifth Amendment violation); United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 , 100 S.Ct. 1912 , 64 L.Ed.2d 559 (1980) (no Fourth Amendment violation); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 , 95 S.Ct. 1215 , 43 L.Ed.2d 570 (1975) (no Fifth Amendment violation); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 , 91 S.Ct. 643 , 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (no Fifth Amendment violation).

2021Or, put another way, “[e]vidence is admissible when the connection between unconstitutional police conduct and the evidence is remote or has been interrupted by some intervening circumstance, so that ‘the interest protected by the constitutional guarantee that has been violated would not be served by suppression of the evidence obtained.’” Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. ___ , 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2061 (2016) (quoting Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 593 (2006)). ¶ 54 The attenuation doctrine frequently applies when an individual responds to an officer’s Fourth Amendment violation with a criminal act o

2021Or, put another way, “[e]vidence is admissible when the connection between unconstitutional police conduct and the evidence is remote or has been interrupted by some intervening circumstance, so that ‘the interest protected by the constitutional guarantee that has been violated would not be served by suppression of the evidence obtained.’” Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. ___ , 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2061 (2016) (quoting Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 593 (2006)). ¶ 54 The attenuation doctrine frequently applies when an individual responds to an officer’s Fourth Amendment violation with a criminal act o

2021Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960). ¶20 Because the exclusionary rule bars the prosecution from introducing evidence obtained through a Fourth Amendment violation, there is tension between the Fourth Amendment rights the exclusionary rule protects and the future search and seizure violations it seeks to deter, on the one hand, and the courts’ truth-seeking function, on the other.

2021Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960). ¶20 Because the exclusionary rule bars the prosecution from introducing evidence obtained through a Fourth Amendment violation, there is tension between the Fourth Amendment rights the exclusionary rule protects and the future search and seizure violations it seeks to deter, on the one hand, and the courts’ truth-seeking function, on the other.

1992Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344 , 110 S.Ct. 1176 , 108 L.Ed.2d 293 (1990) (no Sixth Amendment violation); Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 , 100 S.Ct. 2124 , 65 L.Ed.2d 86 (1980) (no Fifth Amendment violation); United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 , 100 S.Ct. 1912 , 64 L.Ed.2d 559 (1980) (no Fourth Amendment violation); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 , 95 S.Ct. 1215 , 43 L.Ed.2d 570 (1975) (no Fifth Amendment violation); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 , 91 S.Ct. 643 , 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (no Fifth Amendment violation).

1992Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344 , 110 S.Ct. 1176 , 108 L.Ed.2d 293 (1990) (no Sixth Amendment violation); Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 , 100 S.Ct. 2124 , 65 L.Ed.2d 86 (1980) (no Fifth Amendment violation); United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 , 100 S.Ct. 1912 , 64 L.Ed.2d 559 (1980) (no Fourth Amendment violation); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 , 95 S.Ct. 1215 , 43 L.Ed.2d 570 (1975) (no Fifth Amendment violation); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 , 91 S.Ct. 643 , 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (no Fifth Amendment violation).

2016Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 937 , 102 S.Ct. 2744 , 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982); cf. Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 662 , 100 S.Ct. 2395 , 65 L.Ed.2d 410 (1980) (Black-mun, J., dissenting) ("[The Fourth Amendment proseribes only governmental action, and does not apply to a search or seizure, even an unreasonable one, effected by a private individual not acting as an agent of the Government or with the participation or knowledge of any government official."); Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 , 41 S.Ct. 574 , 65 L.Ed. 1048 (1921) (holding that there was no Fourth Amend

2016Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982); cf. Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 662 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Fourth Amendment proscribes only governmental action, and does not apply to a search or seizure, even an unreasonable one, effected by a private individual not acting as an agent of the Government or with the participation or knowledge of any government official."); Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921) (holding that there was no Fourth Amendment violation where "no official of the . . . government had anything to do with the wrongful seiz

2016Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 937 , 102 S.Ct. 2744 , 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982); cf. Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 662 , 100 S.Ct. 2395 , 65 L.Ed.2d 410 (1980) (Black-mun, J., dissenting) ("[The Fourth Amendment proseribes only governmental action, and does not apply to a search or seizure, even an unreasonable one, effected by a private individual not acting as an agent of the Government or with the participation or knowledge of any government official."); Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 , 41 S.Ct. 574 , 65 L.Ed. 1048 (1921) (holding that there was no Fourth Amend

2016Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982); cf. Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 662 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Fourth Amendment proscribes only governmental action, and does not apply to a search or seizure, even an unreasonable one, effected by a private individual not acting as an agent of the Government or with the participation or knowledge of any government official."); Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921) (holding that there was no Fourth Amendment violation where "no official of the . . . government had anything to do with the wrongful seiz

2016Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 937 , 102 S.Ct. 2744 , 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982); cf. Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 662 , 100 S.Ct. 2395 , 65 L.Ed.2d 410 (1980) (Black-mun, J., dissenting) ("[The Fourth Amendment proseribes only governmental action, and does not apply to a search or seizure, even an unreasonable one, effected by a private individual not acting as an agent of the Government or with the participation or knowledge of any government official."); Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 , 41 S.Ct. 574 , 65 L.Ed. 1048 (1921) (holding that there was no Fourth Amend

2016Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982); cf. Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 662 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Fourth Amendment proscribes only governmental action, and does not apply to a search or seizure, even an unreasonable one, effected by a private individual not acting as an agent of the Government or with the participation or knowledge of any government official."); Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921) (holding that there was no Fourth Amendment violation where "no official of the . . . government had anything to do with the wrongful seiz

2003“The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine excludes evidence discovered as a result of a Fourth Amendment violation.” People v. McFall, 672 P.2d 534, 537 (Colo.1983).

2003“The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine excludes evidence discovered as a result of a Fourth Amendment violation.” People v. McFall, 672 P.2d 534, 537 (Colo.1983).

2024See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 ; see also Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375 (1986) 9 (“Where defense counsel’s failure to litigate a Fourth Amendment claim competently is the principal allegation of ineffectiveness, the defendant must also prove that his Fourth Amendment claim is meritorious and that there is a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different absent the excludable evidence in order to demonstrate actual prejudice.”). ¶ 18 According to Anderson, his trial counsel should have moved to suppress evidence obtained from his cell phone that law enforcement se

2024See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 ; see also Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375 (1986) 9 (“Where defense counsel’s failure to litigate a Fourth Amendment claim competently is the principal allegation of ineffectiveness, the defendant must also prove that his Fourth Amendment claim is meritorious and that there is a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different absent the excludable evidence in order to demonstrate actual prejudice.”). ¶ 18 According to Anderson, his trial counsel should have moved to suppress evidence obtained from his cell phone that law enforcement se

2021See United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 626 (1980) (“There is no gainsaying that arriving at the truth is a fundamental 9 goal of our legal system.”); Davis, 564 U.S. at 237 (discussing the social costs generated by the exclusionary rule, including that its “bottom-line effect, in many cases, is to suppress the truth”); see also James, 493 U.S. at 311–12 (explaining that the Court has “carved out exceptions to the exclusionary rule . . . where the introduction of reliable and probative evidence would significantly further the truthseeking function of a criminal trial and the likelihood that

2021See United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 626 (1980) (“There is no gainsaying that arriving at the truth is a fundamental 9 goal of our legal system.”); Davis, 564 U.S. at 237 (discussing the social costs generated by the exclusionary rule, including that its “bottom-line effect, in many cases, is to suppress the truth”); see also James, 493 U.S. at 311–12 (explaining that the Court has “carved out exceptions to the exclusionary rule . . . where the introduction of reliable and probative evidence would significantly further the truthseeking function of a criminal trial and the likelihood that

2017In Doke , which *893 involved facts remarkably similar to those in this case, the supreme court held that "where a defendant responds to an alleged Fourth Amendment violation with a physical attack or threat of attack upon the officer making the illegal arrest or search, ... evidence of this new crime is admissible." Id. at 239 ; see id. at 240 (the defendant's menacing of the officer with a gun "dissipated the taint of the prior illegality"); see also People v. Brown , 217 P.3d 1252 , 1257 (Colo. 2009) ("A defendant may not respond to an unreasonable search or seizure by a threat of violence

2017In Doke , which *893 involved facts remarkably similar to those in this case, the supreme court held that "where a defendant responds to an alleged Fourth Amendment violation with a physical attack or threat of attack upon the officer making the illegal arrest or search, ... evidence of this new crime is admissible." Id. at 239 ; see id. at 240 (the defendant's menacing of the officer with a gun "dissipated the taint of the prior illegality"); see also People v. Brown , 217 P.3d 1252 , 1257 (Colo. 2009) ("A defendant may not respond to an unreasonable search or seizure by a threat of violence

2019Id. at 140, 129 S.Ct. 695 . ¶11 Although we must weigh the deterrent benefits of the exclusionary rule against the "substantial social costs" of excluding evidence, we note that excluding evidence "has always been our last resort, not our first impulse." Hudson v. Michigan , 547 U.S. 586 , 591, 126 S.Ct. 2159 , 165 L.Ed.2d 56 (2006) (quoting Leon , 468 U.S. at 907 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 ).

2019Id. at 140, 129 S.Ct. 695 . ¶11 Although we must weigh the deterrent benefits of the exclusionary rule against the "substantial social costs" of excluding evidence, we note that excluding evidence "has always been our last resort, not our first impulse." Hudson v. Michigan , 547 U.S. 586 , 591, 126 S.Ct. 2159 , 165 L.Ed.2d 56 (2006) (quoting Leon , 468 U.S. at 907 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 ).

2004Here, the trial court properly applied the standard set forth in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 , 88 S.Ct. 507 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), that a Fourth Amendment violation occurs only if a defendant has a justifiable expectation of privacy.

2004Here, the trial court properly applied the standard set forth in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 , 88 S.Ct. 507 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), that a Fourth Amendment violation occurs only if a defendant has a justifiable expectation of privacy.

2018To invoke the Fourth Amendment’s protections, a defendant must show that “the disputed search and seizure has infringed an interest of the defendant which the Fourth Amendment was designed to protect.” Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 140 (1978). ¶ 24 While often referred to as an issue of standing, the Rakas Court recognized that this threshold question “belongs more 11 properly under the heading of substantive Fourth Amendment doctrine than under the heading of standing.” Id.; see also Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 106 (noting that, after Rakas, the standing inquiry merged with the substantive quest

2008Rakas, 439 U.S. at 132 , 99 S.Ct. 421 (requiring that "the person seeking to challenge the legality of a search ... was himself the 'vietim' of the search or seizure") (internal citation omitted); see also Crim.

1990The Court noted in Delgado, 466 U.S. at 216 , 104 S.Ct. at 1762 , that "[w]hat is apparent from Royer and Brown [ v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 , 99 S.Ct. 2637 , 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979),] is that police questioning, by itself, is unlikely to result in a Fourth Amendment violation." "Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a `seizure' has occurred." Delgado, 466 U.S. at 215 , 104 S.Ct. at 1762 ; accord Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 19 n. 16, 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 1879 n. 16, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); People v. Harper, 726 P

1990The Court noted in Delgado, 466 U.S. at 216 , 104 S.Ct. at 1762 , that "[w]hat is apparent from Royer and Brown [ v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 , 99 S.Ct. 2637 , 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979),] is that police questioning, by itself, is unlikely to result in a Fourth Amendment violation." "Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a `seizure' has occurred." Delgado, 466 U.S. at 215 , 104 S.Ct. at 1762 ; accord Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 19 n. 16, 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 1879 n. 16, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); People v. Harper, 726 P

2025See People v. Tomaske, 2019 CO 35, ¶ 10 (“When there is a Fourth Amendment violation, courts can apply the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence that was discovered as a result of the violation.”). ¶ 25 Saltzman’s trial strategy was to mitigate his criminal culpability.

2025See People v. Tomaske, 2019 CO 35, ¶ 10 (“When there is a Fourth Amendment violation, courts can apply the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence that was discovered as a result of the violation.”). ¶ 25 Saltzman’s trial strategy was to mitigate his criminal culpability.

2022We agree with the People that the officers had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity once they smelled burnt marijuana, even though Officer Galvan stated that he was “not worried about the weed.” See Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 772 (2001) (“[S]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.” (quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996))).

2014As the United States Supreme Court has made clear, " '[slubjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis."" Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 772 , 121 S.Ct. 1876 , 149 L.Ed.2d 994 (2001) (alteration in original) (quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 , 116 S.Ct. 1769 , 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996)).

2021It is intended “to compel respect for the c onstitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way — by removing the incentive to disregard it.” Elkins v. United States , 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960). ¶ 54 Nevertheless, the Colorado Suprem e Court has cautioned that the exclusionary rule “should not automatically apply every time a Fourth Amendment violation is fou nd . . . .” Casillas v. People , 2018 CO 78M, ¶ 21 , 427 P.3d 804, 810 (quoting People v. Gutierrez , 222 P.3d 925, 941 (Colo. 2009)).

2021It is intended “to compel respect for the c onstitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way — by removing the incentive to disregard it.” Elkins v. United States , 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960). ¶ 54 Nevertheless, the Colorado Suprem e Court has cautioned that the exclusionary rule “should not automatically apply every time a Fourth Amendment violation is fou nd . . . .” Casillas v. People , 2018 CO 78M, ¶ 21 , 427 P.3d 804, 810 (quoting People v. Gutierrez , 222 P.3d 925, 941 (Colo. 2009)).

2019See id. at 7, 11-12, 133 S.Ct. 1409 . ¶10 When there is a Fourth Amendment violation, courts can apply the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence that was discovered as a result of the violation.

2019See id. at 7, 11-12, 133 S.Ct. 1409 . ¶10 When there is a Fourth Amendment violation, courts can apply the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence that was discovered as a result of the violation.