128 Missouri opinions name it 3 courts 1969–2025 9 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Missouri courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Millergreen2 sentences2023"Evidence discovered and later found to be derivative of a Fourth Amendment violation must be excluded as fruit of the poisonous tree." State v. Oliver, 293 S.W.3d 437, 442 (Mo. banc 2009) (quoting State v. Miller, 894 S.W.2d 649, 654 (Mo. banc 1995)). 2023"Evidence discovered and later found to be derivative of a Fourth Amendment violation must be excluded as fruit of the poisonous tree." State v. Oliver, 293 S.W.3d 437, 442 (Mo. banc 2009) (quoting State v. Miller, 894 S.W.2d 649, 654 (Mo. banc 1995)). | 13 | 16 |
State v. Lanegreen2 sentences2022“Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable- cause Fourth Amendment analysis.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). “[T]he Fourth Amendment’s concern with ‘reasonableness’ allows certain actions to be taken in certain circumstances, whatever the subjective intent.” Id. at 814 (emphasis in original) (see also State v. Lane, 937 S.W.2d 721, 723 (Mo. banc 1997)) ("Constitutionally sound probable cause is not dependent upon the subjective intentions of the officer.") Here, even though Officer Popielarz admitted that race was a subjective factor, by the time Higgs was act 2019"Constitutionally sound probable cause is not dependent upon the subjective intentions of the officer. 'Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.'" State v. Lane, 937 S.W.2d 721, 723 (Mo. 11 banc 1997) (quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996)). | 5 | 6 |
Herring v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2025See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 140 (2009) (“The fact that a Fourth Amendment violation occurred—i.e., that a search or arrest was unreasonable— does not necessarily mean that the exclusionary rule applies. 2025See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 140 (2009) (“The fact that a Fourth Amendment violation occurred—i.e., that a search or arrest was unreasonable— does not necessarily mean that the exclusionary rule applies. | 3 | 4 |
State v. Olivergreen2 sentences2023"Evidence discovered and later found to be derivative of a Fourth Amendment violation must be excluded as fruit of the poisonous tree." State v. Oliver, 293 S.W.3d 437, 442 (Mo. banc 2009) (quoting State v. Miller, 894 S.W.2d 649, 654 (Mo. banc 1995)). 2023"Evidence discovered and later found to be derivative of a Fourth Amendment violation must be excluded as fruit of the poisonous tree." State v. Oliver, 293 S.W.3d 437, 442 (Mo. banc 2009) (quoting State v. Miller, 894 S.W.2d 649, 654 (Mo. banc 1995)). | 3 | 3 |
Whren v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2022“Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable- cause Fourth Amendment analysis.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). “[T]he Fourth Amendment’s concern with ‘reasonableness’ allows certain actions to be taken in certain circumstances, whatever the subjective intent.” Id. at 814 (emphasis in original) (see also State v. Lane, 937 S.W.2d 721, 723 (Mo. banc 1997)) ("Constitutionally sound probable cause is not dependent upon the subjective intentions of the officer.") Here, even though Officer Popielarz admitted that race was a subjective factor, by the time Higgs was act 2022“Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable- cause Fourth Amendment analysis.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). “[T]he Fourth Amendment’s concern with ‘reasonableness’ allows certain actions to be taken in certain circumstances, whatever the subjective intent.” Id. at 814 (emphasis in original) (see also State v. Lane, 937 S.W.2d 721, 723 (Mo. banc 1997)) ("Constitutionally sound probable cause is not dependent upon the subjective intentions of the officer.") Here, even though Officer Popielarz admitted that race was a subjective factor, by the time Higgs was act | 2 | 7 |
Maryland v. MacOngreen2 sentences2014“Whether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred turns on an objective assessment of the officer’s actions in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him at the time, and not on the officer’s actual state of mind at the time the challenged action was taken.” Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470-71 , 105 S.Ct. 2778 , 86 L.Ed.2d 370 (1985) (citation omitted) (internal quotation omitted). 2014“Whether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred turns on an objective assessment of the officer’s actions in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him at the time, and not on the officer’s actual state of mind at the time the challenged action was taken.” Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470-71 , 105 S.Ct. 2778 , 86 L.Ed.2d 370 (1985) (citation omitted) (internal quotation omitted). | 2 | 7 |
Kaiser v. Stategreen2 sentences2010Those cases stand for the proposition that " 'the failure of the issuing police agency to have reasonable suspicion to stop ... cannot be immunized from a Fourth Amendment objection by passing the information on to another police officer [who] then acts upon it.’ ” Franklin, 841 S.W.2d at 642 n. 1 (quoting Kaiser v. State, 296 Ark. 125 , 752 S.W.2d 271, 274 (1988)). 2010Those cases stand for the proposition that " 'the failure of the issuing police agency to have reasonable suspicion to stop ... cannot be immunized from a Fourth Amendment objection by passing the information on to another police officer [who] then acts upon it.’ ” Franklin, 841 S.W.2d at 642 n. 1 (quoting Kaiser v. State, 296 Ark. 125 , 752 S.W.2d 271, 274 (1988)). | 2 | 3 |
State v. Faruqigreen2 sentences2023Though the concept of "standing" is often referred to when discussing whether a defendant is properly positioned to complain of a search or seizure of property, in the context of an alleged Fourth Amendment violation, an argument that a defendant lacks "standing" to challenge the constitutional validity of a search "is another way of stating that the search and seizure did not infringe upon an interest that is protected by the Fourth Amendment." State v. Faruqi, 344 S.W.3d 193, 204 (Mo. banc 2011) (citing Rakas, 439 U.S. at 139 - 40). 11 O'Connor had an objectively reasonable expectation of pr 2023Though the concept of "standing" is often referred to when discussing whether a defendant is properly positioned to complain of a search or seizure of property, in the context of an alleged Fourth Amendment violation, an argument that a defendant lacks "standing" to challenge the constitutional validity of a search "is another way of stating that the search and seizure did not infringe upon an interest that is protected by the Fourth Amendment." State v. Faruqi, 344 S.W.3d 193, 204 (Mo. banc 2011) (citing Rakas, 439 U.S. at 139 - 40). 11 O'Connor had an objectively reasonable expectation of pr | 2 | 2 |
State v. Soltgreen2 sentences2023"Ordinarily, a defendant who voluntarily abandons property has no standing to contest its search and seizure, but this is not true if the abandonment results from a Fourth Amendment violation, as such an abandonment cannot be voluntary." State v. Solt, 48 S.W.3d 677, 682 (Mo. App. S.D. 2001). 2023"Ordinarily, a defendant who voluntarily abandons property has no standing to contest its search and seizure, but this is not true if the abandonment results from a Fourth Amendment violation, as such an abandonment cannot be voluntary." State v. Solt, 48 S.W.3d 677, 682 (Mo. App. S.D. 2001). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Looneygreen2 sentences2023Though the concept of "standing" is often referred to when discussing whether a defendant is properly positioned to complain of a search or seizure of property, in the context of an alleged Fourth Amendment violation, an argument that a defendant lacks "standing" to challenge the constitutional validity of a search "is another way of stating that the search and seizure did not infringe upon an interest that is protected by the Fourth Amendment." State v. Faruqi, 344 S.W.3d 193, 204 (Mo. banc 2011) (citing Rakas, 439 U.S. at 139 - 40). 11 O'Connor had an objectively reasonable expectation of pr 2023Though the concept of "standing" is often referred to when discussing whether a defendant is properly positioned to complain of a search or seizure of property, in the context of an alleged Fourth Amendment violation, an argument that a defendant lacks "standing" to challenge the constitutional validity of a search "is another way of stating that the search and seizure did not infringe upon an interest that is protected by the Fourth Amendment." State v. Faruqi, 344 S.W.3d 193, 204 (Mo. banc 2011) (citing Rakas, 439 U.S. at 139 - 40). 11 O'Connor had an objectively reasonable expectation of pr | 2 | 2 |
State v. Westgreen2 sentences2019"Whether 'reasonable suspicion' exists depends on the totality of the circumstances." State v. West, 58 S.W.3d 563, 568 (Mo. App. W.D. 2001). 2006Id. at 568. | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Carl Eugene Stephens, Opiniongreen2 sentences2016"The law is well-settled that abandonment will be found only when incriminating evidence has been abandoned voluntarily, and that abandonment is not voluntary if it results from an illegal seizure." Grayson, 336 S.W.3d at 151 n.7 (citing United States v. Stephens, 206 F.3d 914, 917 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that "abandonment must be voluntary, and an abandonment that results from [a] Fourth Amendment violation cannot be voluntary"); United States v. Austin, 66 16 F.3d 1115, 1118 (10th Cir. 1995) (same); United States v. Segars, 31 F.3d 655, 658 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding "abandonment cannot be th 2001U.S. v. Stephens, 206 F.3d 914, 917 (9th Cir.2000). | 2 | 2 |
| State v. Renfrowgreen | 2 | 2 |
| State v. Riddlegreen | 2 | 2 |
Davis v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2016“The fact that a Fourth Amendment violation occurred . . . does not necessarily mean that the exclusionary rule applies”; instead, “exclusion has always been our last resort, not our first impulse.” Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 140 (2009) (citations omitted). “[T]he exclusionary rule is triggered only when police practices are ‘deliberate enough to yield meaningful deterrence, and culpable enough to be worth the price paid by the justice system.’” State v. Johnson, 354 S.W.3d 627, 633 (Mo. banc 2011) (quoting Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 , 240 (2011)); see also State v. Carr 2016“The fact that a Fourth Amendment violation occurred . . . does not necessarily mean that the exclusionary rule applies”; instead, “exclusion has always been our last resort, not our first impulse.” Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 140 (2009) (citations omitted). “[T]he exclusionary rule is triggered only when police practices are ‘deliberate enough to yield meaningful deterrence, and culpable enough to be worth the price paid by the justice system.’” State v. Johnson, 354 S.W.3d 627, 633 (Mo. banc 2011) (quoting Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 , 240 (2011)); see also State v. Carr | 1 | 3 |
Brown v. Illinoisgreen2 sentences1995See United States v. Cherry, 759 F.2d 1196, 1210, 1211 (5th Cir.1985); See also Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 , 95 S.Ct. 2254 , 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975) (voluntariness of confession only threshold requirement for Fourth Amendment analysis). 1995See United States v. Cherry, 759 F.2d 1196, 1210, 1211 (5th Cir.1985); See also Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 , 95 S.Ct. 2254 , 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975) (voluntariness of confession only threshold requirement for Fourth Amendment analysis). | 1 | 3 |
State v. Graysongreen2 sentences2023Accordingly, the evidence obtained from the subsequent investigation by Missouri law enforcement is not considered the “fruit of the poisonous tree.” See State v. Grayson, 336 S.W.3d 138, 147 (Mo. banc 2011). 2016"The law is well-settled that abandonment will be found only when incriminating evidence has been abandoned voluntarily, and that abandonment is not voluntary if it results from an illegal seizure." Grayson, 336 S.W.3d at 151 n.7 (citing United States v. Stephens, 206 F.3d 914, 917 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that "abandonment must be voluntary, and an abandonment that results from [a] Fourth Amendment violation cannot be voluntary"); United States v. Austin, 66 16 F.3d 1115, 1118 (10th Cir. 1995) (same); United States v. Segars, 31 F.3d 655, 658 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding "abandonment cannot be th | 1 | 2 |
Clampitt v. Nixongreen2 sentences2020See id. (citing State v. Miller, 894 S.W.2d 649, 654 (Mo. banc 1995)). 2020See id. (citing State v. Miller, 894 S.W.2d 649, 654 (Mo. banc 1995)). | 1 | 2 |
Kimmelman v. Morrisongreen2 sentences2019When defense counsel fails to raise a Fourth Amendment claim, the defendant must “prove that [the defendant’s] Fourth Amendment claim is meritorious and that there is a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different absent the excludable evidence.” Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375 (1986). 2019When defense counsel fails to raise a Fourth Amendment claim, the defendant must “prove that [the defendant’s] Fourth Amendment claim is meritorious and that there is a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different absent the excludable evidence.” Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375 (1986). | 1 | 2 |
United States v. Karogreen2 sentences2018It concludes checking the corpse clause created merely the potential for a Fourth Amendment violation and the Supreme Court has "never held that potential, as opposed to actual, invasions of privacy constitute searches for purposes of the Fourth Amendment." United States v. Karo , 468 U.S. 705 , 712, 104 S.Ct. 3296 , 82 L.Ed.2d 530 (1984). 12 But there is no question that an invasion of privacy occurred in this case because there was, in fact, a search of Mr. Douglass and Ms. Gaulter's residence. 2018It concludes checking the corpse clause created merely the potential for a Fourth Amendment violation and the Supreme Court has "never held that potential, as opposed to actual, invasions of privacy constitute searches for purposes of the Fourth Amendment." United States v. Karo , 468 U.S. 705 , 712, 104 S.Ct. 3296 , 82 L.Ed.2d 530 (1984). 12 But there is no question that an invasion of privacy occurred in this case because there was, in fact, a search of Mr. Douglass and Ms. Gaulter's residence. | 1 | 2 |
New York v. Classgreen2 sentences2018Furthermore, "the State's intrusion into a particular area ... cannot result in a Fourth Amendment violation unless the area is one in which there is a 'constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.' " New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106 , 112, 106 S.Ct. 960 , 89 L.Ed.2d 81 (1986) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 , 88 S.Ct. 507 (Harlan, J., concurring)). 2018Furthermore, "the State's intrusion into a particular area ... cannot result in a Fourth Amendment violation unless the area is one in which there is a 'constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.' " New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106 , 112, 106 S.Ct. 960 , 89 L.Ed.2d 81 (1986) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 , 88 S.Ct. 507 (Harlan, J., concurring)). | 1 | 2 |
Oliver v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2018The Fourth Amendment provides, in pertinent part: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated...." "Since Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 , 88 S.Ct. 507 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 ... (1967), the touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis has been the question whether a person has a 'constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.' " Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 , 177, 104 S.Ct. 1735 , 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984) ( quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 , 88 S.Ct. 507 (Harlan, J., concurrin 2018The Fourth Amendment provides, in pertinent part: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated...." "Since Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 , 88 S.Ct. 507 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 ... (1967), the touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis has been the question whether a person has a 'constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.' " Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 , 177, 104 S.Ct. 1735 , 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984) ( quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 , 88 S.Ct. 507 (Harlan, J., concurrin | 1 | 2 |
| Oregon v. Elstadgreen | 1 | 2 |
| State v. McCrarygreen | 1 | 2 |
| South Dakota v. Oppermangreen | 1 | 2 |
| State v. Stavricosgreen | 1 | 2 |
| City of Kansas City v. Buttersgreen | 1 | 2 |
| United States v. Sharon Legail Welchgreen | 1 | 1 |
| UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Duk Kyung KIM, Defendant-Appellantgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn.green | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Courtneygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Carpenter v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Carsten Rosenowgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Westgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Riche v. Director of Revenuegreen | 1 | 1 |
| McLaughlin v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Williamsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| White v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. McDonaldgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Pikegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Missouri. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Rakas v. Illinois
green
2 sentences2023Though the concept of "standing" is often referred to when discussing whether a defendant is properly positioned to complain of a search or seizure of property, in the context of an alleged Fourth Amendment violation, an argument that a defendant lacks "standing" to challenge the constitutional validity of a search "is another way of stating that the search and seizure did not infringe upon an interest that is protected by the Fourth Amendment." State v. Faruqi, 344 S.W.3d 193, 204 (Mo. banc 2011) (citing Rakas, 439 U.S. at 139 - 40). 11 O'Connor had an objectively reasonable expectation of pr 2023Though the concept of "standing" is often referred to when discussing whether a defendant is properly positioned to complain of a search or seizure of property, in the context of an alleged Fourth Amendment violation, an argument that a defendant lacks "standing" to challenge the constitutional validity of a search "is another way of stating that the search and seizure did not infringe upon an interest that is protected by the Fourth Amendment." State v. Faruqi, 344 S.W.3d 193, 204 (Mo. banc 2011) (citing Rakas, 439 U.S. at 139 - 40). 11 O'Connor had an objectively reasonable expectation of pr | 9 | 1979–2023 |
Terry v. Ohio
green
2 sentences2018When assessing the totality of the circumstances relevant to a Fourth Amendment claim, there is a "demand for specificity in the information upon which police action is predicated." Terry, 392 U.S. at 22 n.18, 88 S.Ct. 1868 . 2018When assessing the totality of the circumstances relevant to a Fourth Amendment claim, there is a "demand for specificity in the information upon which police action is predicated." Terry, 392 U.S. at 22 n.18, 88 S.Ct. 1868 . | 6 | 1974–2018 |
Carroll v. United States
green
2 sentences1979Chambers v. Maroney, supra. The actions of the police in this case conform to the Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness, Cady v. Dombrowski, supra, 413 U.S. at 439 , 93 S.Ct. 2523 , 37 L.Ed.2d 706 ; Carroll v. U. S., supra, 267 U.S. at 147 , 45 S.Ct. 280 . 1979Chambers v. Maroney, supra. The actions of the police in this case conform to the Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness, Cady v. Dombrowski, supra, 413 U.S. at 439 , 93 S.Ct. 2523 , 37 L.Ed.2d 706 ; Carroll v. U. S., supra, 267 U.S. at 147 , 45 S.Ct. 280 . | 5 | 1974–1979 |
Harris v. United States
red
2 sentences1979The Fourth Amendment’s absolute admonition against unreasonable searches is not violated, (1) by search incident to lawful arrest, Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 , 67 S.Ct. 1098 , 91 L.Ed. 1399 (1947) and United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 , 94 S.Ct. 467 , 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973), (2) by protective searches by officers for weapons upon less than probable cause to arrest, Terry v. State of Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), (3) by seizure of items falling within the “plain view” doctrine, Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 , 88 S.Ct. 992 , 19 L.Ed.2d 1067 (19 1979The Fourth Amendment’s absolute admonition against unreasonable searches is not violated, (1) by search incident to lawful arrest, Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 , 67 S.Ct. 1098 , 91 L.Ed. 1399 (1947) and United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 , 94 S.Ct. 467 , 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973), (2) by protective searches by officers for weapons upon less than probable cause to arrest, Terry v. State of Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), (3) by seizure of items falling within the “plain view” doctrine, Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 , 88 S.Ct. 992 , 19 L.Ed.2d 1067 (19 | 4 | 1974–1979 |
Harris v. United States
green
2 sentences1979The Fourth Amendment’s absolute admonition against unreasonable searches is not violated, (1) by search incident to lawful arrest, Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 , 67 S.Ct. 1098 , 91 L.Ed. 1399 (1947) and United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 , 94 S.Ct. 467 , 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973), (2) by protective searches by officers for weapons upon less than probable cause to arrest, Terry v. State of Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), (3) by seizure of items falling within the “plain view” doctrine, Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 , 88 S.Ct. 992 , 19 L.Ed.2d 1067 (19 1979The Fourth Amendment’s absolute admonition against unreasonable searches is not violated, (1) by search incident to lawful arrest, Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 , 67 S.Ct. 1098 , 91 L.Ed. 1399 (1947) and United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 , 94 S.Ct. 467 , 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973), (2) by protective searches by officers for weapons upon less than probable cause to arrest, Terry v. State of Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), (3) by seizure of items falling within the “plain view” doctrine, Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 , 88 S.Ct. 992 , 19 L.Ed.2d 1067 (19 | 4 | 1974–1979 |
Chambers v. Maroney
green
2 sentences1979The Fourth Amendment’s absolute admonition against unreasonable searches is not violated, (1) by search incident to lawful arrest, Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 , 67 S.Ct. 1098 , 91 L.Ed. 1399 (1947) and United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 , 94 S.Ct. 467 , 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973), (2) by protective searches by officers for weapons upon less than probable cause to arrest, Terry v. State of Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), (3) by seizure of items falling within the “plain view” doctrine, Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 , 88 S.Ct. 992 , 19 L.Ed.2d 1067 (19 1979The Fourth Amendment’s absolute admonition against unreasonable searches is not violated, (1) by search incident to lawful arrest, Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 , 67 S.Ct. 1098 , 91 L.Ed. 1399 (1947) and United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 , 94 S.Ct. 467 , 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973), (2) by protective searches by officers for weapons upon less than probable cause to arrest, Terry v. State of Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), (3) by seizure of items falling within the “plain view” doctrine, Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 , 88 S.Ct. 992 , 19 L.Ed.2d 1067 (19 | 4 | 1974–1979 |
United States v. Robinson
green
2 sentences1979The Fourth Amendment’s absolute admonition against unreasonable searches is not violated, (1) by search incident to lawful arrest, Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 , 67 S.Ct. 1098 , 91 L.Ed. 1399 (1947) and United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 , 94 S.Ct. 467 , 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973), (2) by protective searches by officers for weapons upon less than probable cause to arrest, Terry v. State of Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), (3) by seizure of items falling within the “plain view” doctrine, Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 , 88 S.Ct. 992 , 19 L.Ed.2d 1067 (19 1979The Fourth Amendment’s absolute admonition against unreasonable searches is not violated, (1) by search incident to lawful arrest, Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 , 67 S.Ct. 1098 , 91 L.Ed. 1399 (1947) and United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 , 94 S.Ct. 467 , 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973), (2) by protective searches by officers for weapons upon less than probable cause to arrest, Terry v. State of Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), (3) by seizure of items falling within the “plain view” doctrine, Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 , 88 S.Ct. 992 , 19 L.Ed.2d 1067 (19 | 4 | 1974–1979 |
Wong Sun v. United States
green
2 sentences2001The court also specified that the concept of suppressing the “fruits of the poisonous tree” (drawn from Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 , 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963)) follows from a Fourth Amendment violation, where a broad application of the “fruits” doctrine is necessary to deter unreasonable searches. 2001The court also specified that the concept of suppressing the “fruits of the poisonous tree” (drawn from Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 , 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963)) follows from a Fourth Amendment violation, where a broad application of the “fruits” doctrine is necessary to deter unreasonable searches. | 3 | 1978–2001 |
Ex parte Smart
neutral
2 sentences1979The Fourth Amendment’s absolute admonition against unreasonable searches is not violated, (1) by search incident to lawful arrest, Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 , 67 S.Ct. 1098 , 91 L.Ed. 1399 (1947) and United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 , 94 S.Ct. 467 , 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973), (2) by protective searches by officers for weapons upon less than probable cause to arrest, Terry v. State of Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), (3) by seizure of items falling within the “plain view” doctrine, Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 , 88 S.Ct. 992 , 19 L.Ed.2d 1067 (19 1978The Fourth Amendment’s absolute admonition against unreasonable searches is not violated, (1) by a search incident to a lawful arrest, Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 , 67 S.Ct. 1098 , 91 L.Ed. 1399 (1947) and United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 , 94 S.Ct. 467 , 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973), (2) by protective searches by officers for weapons upon less than probable cause to arrest, Terry v. State of Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), (3) by seizure of items falling within the ‘plain view’ doctrine, Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 , 88 S.Ct. 992 , 19 L.Ed.2d 1067 | 3 | 1974–1979 |
State v. Ramires
green
2 sentences2019Ardini, Jr., and Thomas N. Chapman, Judges, concur. 99 S.Ct. 421 , 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978), held that this determination “belongs more properly under the heading of substantive Fourth Amendment doctrine than under the heading of standing.” “Nonetheless, our courts, including the Missouri Supreme Court, and the U.S. Supreme Court have continued to use ‘standing’ as a shorthand reference in describing whether a defendant is ‘aggrieved’ by the challenged search or seizure.” State v. Ramires, 152 S.W.3d 385 , 394 n.3 (Mo. App. W.D. 2004) (citations omitted). 14 Mr. Boyd also claims that the allegedl 2012Ramires, 152 S.W.3d at 394 n. 3. | 2 | 2012–2019 |
| State v. Qualls green | 2 | 1995–2013 |
| Delaware v. Prouse green | 2 | 1984–2001 |
| United States v. Brignoni-Ponce green | 2 | 1994–2001 |
| Scott v. United States green | 2 | 1992–1993 |
| Dunaway v. New York green | 2 | 1983–1988 |
| United States v. Mark Ringland green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| United States v. Meals green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| United States v. Jacobsen green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Virginia v. Moore green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Alderman v. United States green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Groh v. Ramirez green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| United States v. Jones green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| United States v. Alan Riggs green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Katz v. United States green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Larkin v. American United Life Insurance Co. green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| State of Missouri v. Blaec James Lammers green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| State of Missouri v. Fredrick Williams green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Schatz v. COMMONWEALTH ANNUITY AND LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| United States v. Hamilton green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| State v. Douglass green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| United States v. Dunn green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| State v. Martines green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| State v. Taber green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| State v. Slavin green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.