Fourth Amendment violation in Delaware

2026See Dorsey v. State, 761 A.2d 807, 817 (Del. 2000) (“In Jones, this Court concluded that the history of the search and seizure provisions in the Delaware Constitution reflected different and broader protections than those guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.”) (emphasis in original). 3 Maryland. v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 446-47 (2013) (“The Fourth Amendment’s proper function is to constrain, not against all intrusions as such, but against intrusions which are not justified in the circumstances, or which are made in an improper manner.”) (cleaned up). 4 Id. 5 “The touchstone of Fourth Amendment ana

2019The steps taken in Dunn and Collins to ensure privacy vastly differ from Defendant’s case. 25 Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924) (“[T]he special protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment to the people in their ‘persons, houses, papers and effects,’ is not extended to the open fields.”); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928), overruled in part by Berger v. State of N.Y., 388 U.S. 41 (1967), and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (holding that a Fourth Amendment violation occurs when there has been “an official search and seizure of [a] person .. . a seizure

2019And that “[p]robable cause does not require proof 34 See, e.g., n.22, supra. (the cases listed never expressly identify whether the names used were those of real or fictitious persons); Def’s Opening Br., at 6 (“Whether a defendant must have provided the name of a real person, and not merely that of a fictitious individual, appears to be an issue of first impression in Delaware.”); Oral Argument Transcript, Apr. 20, 2018, at 14-15 (DI. 19) (State concedes this question has never been explicitly answered by a Delaware court). 25 Stafford v. State, 59 A.3d 1223, 1229 (Del. 2012). -10- beyond a r

2019And that “[p]robable cause does not require proof 34 See, e.g., n.22, supra. (the cases listed never expressly identify whether the names used were those of real or fictitious persons); Def’s Opening Br., at 6 (“Whether a defendant must have provided the name of a real person, and not merely that of a fictitious individual, appears to be an issue of first impression in Delaware.”); Oral Argument Transcript, Apr. 20, 2018, at 14-15 (DI. 19) (State concedes this question has never been explicitly answered by a Delaware court). 25 Stafford v. State, 59 A.3d 1223, 1229 (Del. 2012). -10- beyond a r

2017See also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (“[s]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis”); Turrzer v. State, 25 A.3d 774, 777 (Del. 2011) (questioning Heath). 5 was invalid unless independently supported by reasonable suspicion.18 The Court must therefore turn to consider whether Officer Macauley had reasonable suspicion warranting the continued detention of Mr. Bordley. 15.

2001Supr., 708 A.2d 631 (1998) (ORDER), applied the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment analysis in Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 , 116 S.Ct. 1769 , 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996), but it did not address the defendant's rights under the Delaware Constitution.

2026See Dorsey v. State, 761 A.2d 807, 817 (Del. 2000) (“In Jones, this Court concluded that the history of the search and seizure provisions in the Delaware Constitution reflected different and broader protections than those guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.”) (emphasis in original). 3 Maryland. v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 446-47 (2013) (“The Fourth Amendment’s proper function is to constrain, not against all intrusions as such, but against intrusions which are not justified in the circumstances, or which are made in an improper manner.”) (cleaned up). 4 Id. 5 “The touchstone of Fourth Amendment ana

2026See Dorsey v. State, 761 A.2d 807, 817 (Del. 2000) (“In Jones, this Court concluded that the history of the search and seizure provisions in the Delaware Constitution reflected different and broader protections than those guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.”) (emphasis in original). 3 Maryland. v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 446-47 (2013) (“The Fourth Amendment’s proper function is to constrain, not against all intrusions as such, but against intrusions which are not justified in the circumstances, or which are made in an improper manner.”) (cleaned up). 4 Id. 5 “The touchstone of Fourth Amendment ana

2026See Dorsey v. State, 761 A.2d 807, 817 (Del. 2000) (“In Jones, this Court concluded that the history of the search and seizure provisions in the Delaware Constitution reflected different and broader protections than those guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.”) (emphasis in original). 3 Maryland. v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 446-47 (2013) (“The Fourth Amendment’s proper function is to constrain, not against all intrusions as such, but against intrusions which are not justified in the circumstances, or which are made in an improper manner.”) (cleaned up). 4 Id. 5 “The touchstone of Fourth Amendment ana

2026See Dorsey v. State, 761 A.2d 807, 817 (Del. 2000) (“In Jones, this Court concluded that the history of the search and seizure provisions in the Delaware Constitution reflected different and broader protections than those guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.”) (emphasis in original). 3 Maryland. v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 446-47 (2013) (“The Fourth Amendment’s proper function is to constrain, not against all intrusions as such, but against intrusions which are not justified in the circumstances, or which are made in an improper manner.”) (cleaned up). 4 Id. 5 “The touchstone of Fourth Amendment ana

2025It makes sense that Johnson framed the principle with federal courts in mind, since Johnson involved a federal, Fourth Amendment issue that was hotly debated at the time and that generated a split of authority in federal 59 Morales, 133 A.3d at 532 (quoting Whittle v. State, 77 A.3d 239, 248 (Del.2013)). 60 813 A.2d 161, 166 (Del. 2001); see also United States v. Flores-Juarez, 723 F. App'x 84, 89 (3d Cir. 2018) (“For an error to be ‘plain,’ it must be ‘clear or obvious rather than subject to reasonable dispute.’ The existence of divergent interpretations among the Courts of Appeals demonstrat

2025It makes sense that Johnson framed the principle with federal courts in mind, since Johnson involved a federal, Fourth Amendment issue that was hotly debated at the time and that generated a split of authority in federal 59 Morales, 133 A.3d at 532 (quoting Whittle v. State, 77 A.3d 239, 248 (Del.2013)). 60 813 A.2d 161, 166 (Del. 2001); see also United States v. Flores-Juarez, 723 F. App'x 84, 89 (3d Cir. 2018) (“For an error to be ‘plain,’ it must be ‘clear or obvious rather than subject to reasonable dispute.’ The existence of divergent interpretations among the Courts of Appeals demonstrat

2025It makes sense that Johnson framed the principle with federal courts in mind, since Johnson involved a federal, Fourth Amendment issue that was hotly debated at the time and that generated a split of authority in federal 59 Morales, 133 A.3d at 532 (quoting Whittle v. State, 77 A.3d 239, 248 (Del.2013)). 60 813 A.2d 161, 166 (Del. 2001); see also United States v. Flores-Juarez, 723 F. App'x 84, 89 (3d Cir. 2018) (“For an error to be ‘plain,’ it must be ‘clear or obvious rather than subject to reasonable dispute.’ The existence of divergent interpretations among the Courts of Appeals demonstrat

2025It makes sense that Johnson framed the principle with federal courts in mind, since Johnson involved a federal, Fourth Amendment issue that was hotly debated at the time and that generated a split of authority in federal 59 Morales, 133 A.3d at 532 (quoting Whittle v. State, 77 A.3d 239, 248 (Del.2013)). 60 813 A.2d 161, 166 (Del. 2001); see also United States v. Flores-Juarez, 723 F. App'x 84, 89 (3d Cir. 2018) (“For an error to be ‘plain,’ it must be ‘clear or obvious rather than subject to reasonable dispute.’ The existence of divergent interpretations among the Courts of Appeals demonstrat

2025It makes sense that Johnson framed the principle with federal courts in mind, since Johnson involved a federal, Fourth Amendment issue that was hotly debated at the time and that generated a split of authority in federal 59 Morales, 133 A.3d at 532 (quoting Whittle v. State, 77 A.3d 239, 248 (Del.2013)). 60 813 A.2d 161, 166 (Del. 2001); see also United States v. Flores-Juarez, 723 F. App'x 84, 89 (3d Cir. 2018) (“For an error to be ‘plain,’ it must be ‘clear or obvious rather than subject to reasonable dispute.’ The existence of divergent interpretations among the Courts of Appeals demonstrat

2025To the contrary, we are satisfied 19 Mills v. State, 947 A.2d 1122 , 2007 WL 4245464, at *4 (Del.

2025It makes sense that Johnson framed the principle with federal courts in mind, since Johnson involved a federal, Fourth Amendment issue that was hotly debated at the time and that generated a split of authority in federal 59 Morales, 133 A.3d at 532 (quoting Whittle v. State, 77 A.3d 239, 248 (Del.2013)). 60 813 A.2d 161, 166 (Del. 2001); see also United States v. Flores-Juarez, 723 F. App'x 84, 89 (3d Cir. 2018) (“For an error to be ‘plain,’ it must be ‘clear or obvious rather than subject to reasonable dispute.’ The existence of divergent interpretations among the Courts of Appeals demonstrat

2025It makes sense that Johnson framed the principle with federal courts in mind, since Johnson involved a federal, Fourth Amendment issue that was hotly debated at the time and that generated a split of authority in federal 59 Morales, 133 A.3d at 532 (quoting Whittle v. State, 77 A.3d 239, 248 (Del.2013)). 60 813 A.2d 161, 166 (Del. 2001); see also United States v. Flores-Juarez, 723 F. App'x 84, 89 (3d Cir. 2018) (“For an error to be ‘plain,’ it must be ‘clear or obvious rather than subject to reasonable dispute.’ The existence of divergent interpretations among the Courts of Appeals demonstrat

2025It makes sense that Johnson framed the principle with federal courts in mind, since Johnson involved a federal, Fourth Amendment issue that was hotly debated at the time and that generated a split of authority in federal 59 Morales, 133 A.3d at 532 (quoting Whittle v. State, 77 A.3d 239, 248 (Del.2013)). 60 813 A.2d 161, 166 (Del. 2001); see also United States v. Flores-Juarez, 723 F. App'x 84, 89 (3d Cir. 2018) (“For an error to be ‘plain,’ it must be ‘clear or obvious rather than subject to reasonable dispute.’ The existence of divergent interpretations among the Courts of Appeals demonstrat

2025It makes sense that Johnson framed the principle with federal courts in mind, since Johnson involved a federal, Fourth Amendment issue that was hotly debated at the time and that generated a split of authority in federal 59 Morales, 133 A.3d at 532 (quoting Whittle v. State, 77 A.3d 239, 248 (Del.2013)). 60 813 A.2d 161, 166 (Del. 2001); see also United States v. Flores-Juarez, 723 F. App'x 84, 89 (3d Cir. 2018) (“For an error to be ‘plain,’ it must be ‘clear or obvious rather than subject to reasonable dispute.’ The existence of divergent interpretations among the Courts of Appeals demonstrat

2024Inevitable Discovery Doctrine i. Introduction Under the inevitable discovery doctrine, evidence will not be excluded if “the evidence found because of a Fourth Amendment violation would inevitably be 100 Exhibit A ¶ 16 (emphasis added). 101 Id. ¶ 18 (emphasis added). 102 See Chaffier, 2023 WL 1872284 at *3 (citing Hooks v. State, 416 A.2d 189, 203 (Del. 1980) (For a search warrant to be valid, “a nexus [must appear] between the items…sought and [the] place to be searched.”). discovered through lawful means in the absence of the illegality . . . .”103 In Cook v. State, the Delaware Supreme Cour

2024Inevitable Discovery Doctrine i. Introduction Under the inevitable discovery doctrine, evidence will not be excluded if “the evidence found because of a Fourth Amendment violation would inevitably be 100 Exhibit A ¶ 16 (emphasis added). 101 Id. ¶ 18 (emphasis added). 102 See Chaffier, 2023 WL 1872284 at *3 (citing Hooks v. State, 416 A.2d 189, 203 (Del. 1980) (For a search warrant to be valid, “a nexus [must appear] between the items…sought and [the] place to be searched.”). discovered through lawful means in the absence of the illegality . . . .”103 In Cook v. State, the Delaware Supreme Cour

2023There is no citation or mention of Article I, § 6 in the briefs or opinion in Lambert. 172 See, e.g., Chest v. State, 922 N.E.2d 621 , 625 n.6 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (noting that “[u]nder a Fourth Amendment analysis, the likelihood the evidence would have been discovered during the inventory search might support the admission of the evidence under the doctrine of inevitable discovery,” but noting, however, that “inevitability has not been adopted as an exception to the exclusionary rule under the Article I, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.”); State v. Winterstein, 220 P.3d 1226, 1232 (Was

2023There is no citation or mention of Article I, § 6 in the briefs or opinion in Lambert. 172 See, e.g., Chest v. State, 922 N.E.2d 621 , 625 n.6 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (noting that “[u]nder a Fourth Amendment analysis, the likelihood the evidence would have been discovered during the inventory search might support the admission of the evidence under the doctrine of inevitable discovery,” but noting, however, that “inevitability has not been adopted as an exception to the exclusionary rule under the Article I, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.”); State v. Winterstein, 220 P.3d 1226, 1232 (Was

2023In support of his Fourth Amendment argument, Mr. Holmes relies heavily on a three-justice concurrence in Florida v. Jardines,33 where Justice Kagan compared 30 Id. ¶ 78 (“For the same reasons [explained under the Fourth Amendment analysis], the drug- dog search violated Article I, Section 6 of the Constitution of the State of Delaware.” (citing Jones v. State, 745 A.2d 856, 866 (Del. 1999)); see id. (“If this Court had any doubt about whether to adopt our argument as a matter of federal constitutional principles, the greater protections available under our [state] Constitution justify its adop

2023In support of his Fourth Amendment argument, Mr. Holmes relies heavily on a three-justice concurrence in Florida v. Jardines,33 where Justice Kagan compared 30 Id. ¶ 78 (“For the same reasons [explained under the Fourth Amendment analysis], the drug- dog search violated Article I, Section 6 of the Constitution of the State of Delaware.” (citing Jones v. State, 745 A.2d 856, 866 (Del. 1999)); see id. (“If this Court had any doubt about whether to adopt our argument as a matter of federal constitutional principles, the greater protections available under our [state] Constitution justify its adop

2023Under that exception, if evidence found because of a Fourth Amendment violation would inevitably have 39 Id. (quoting People v. Bondi, 474 N.E.2d 733, 736 (Ill.

2023Under that exception, if evidence found because of a Fourth Amendment violation would inevitably have 39 Id. (quoting People v. Bondi, 474 N.E.2d 733, 736 (Ill.

2022(Gorsuch, J., concurring) (citing McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 489-93 (1991)). -14- the same.59 (20) With this backdrop, dismissal of Mr. Martin’s Rule 61 motion was proper.

2022(Gorsuch, J., concurring) (citing McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 489-93 (1991)). -14- the same.59 (20) With this backdrop, dismissal of Mr. Martin’s Rule 61 motion was proper.

2022Exercising this remedial discretion, the Court began to develop doctrines aimed at returning the Great Writ closer to its historic office.” (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (emphasis in original) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (a)). 55 See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 481-82 (1976) (“[W]here the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, the Constitution does not require that a state prisoner be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial.”). 56 See Wainwrig

2022Exercising this remedial discretion, the Court began to develop doctrines aimed at returning the Great Writ closer to its historic office.” (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (emphasis in original) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (a)). 55 See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 481-82 (1976) (“[W]here the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, the Constitution does not require that a state prisoner be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial.”). 56 See Wainwrig

2022Exercising this remedial discretion, the Court began to develop doctrines aimed at returning the Great Writ closer to its historic office.” (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (emphasis in original) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (a)). 55 See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 481-82 (1976) (“[W]here the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, the Constitution does not require that a state prisoner be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial.”). 56 See Wainwrig

2022Exercising this remedial discretion, the Court began to develop doctrines aimed at returning the Great Writ closer to its historic office.” (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (emphasis in original) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (a)). 55 See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 481-82 (1976) (“[W]here the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, the Constitution does not require that a state prisoner be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial.”). 56 See Wainwrig