generally accepted rule in Tennessee

2006Vandergriff v. Seeber, 187 Tenn. 561 , 216 S.W.2d 311 ; McGill & Daugherty v. Kefauver, 175 Tenn. 667 , 137 S.W.2d 279 ; Cummings v. Sharp, 173 Tenn. 637 , 122 S.W.2d 423 ; State v. Dyer, 171 Tenn. 66 , 100 S.W.2d 653 ; 50 Am.Jur., Statutes, Sec. 306 et seq.

2006Vandergriff v. Seeber, 187 Tenn. 561 , 216 S.W.2d 311 ; McGill & Daugherty v. Kefauver, 175 Tenn. 667 , 137 S.W.2d 279 ; Cummings v. Sharp, 173 Tenn. 637 , 122 S.W.2d 423 ; State v. Dyer, 171 Tenn. 66 , 100 S.W.2d 653 ; 50 Am.Jur., Statutes, Sec. 306 et seq.

2006Vandergriff v. Seeber, 187 Tenn. 561 , 216 S.W.2d 311 ; McGill & Daugherty v. Kefauver, 175 Tenn. 667 , 137 S.W.2d 279 ; Cummings v. Sharp, 173 Tenn. 637 , 122 S.W.2d 423 ; State v. Dyer, 171 Tenn. 66 , 100 S.W.2d 653 ; 50 Am.Jur., Statutes, Sec. 306 et seq.

2006Vandergriff v. Seeber, 187 Tenn. 561 , 216 S.W.2d 311 ; McGill & Daugherty v. Kefauver, 175 Tenn. 667 , 137 S.W.2d 279 ; Cummings v. Sharp, 173 Tenn. 637 , 122 S.W.2d 423 ; State v. Dyer, 171 Tenn. 66 , 100 S.W.2d 653 ; 50 Am.Jur., Statutes, Sec. 306 et seq.

2006Vandergriff v. Seeber, 187 Tenn. 561 , 216 S.W.2d 311 ; McGill & Daugherty v. Kefauver, 175 Tenn. 667 , 137 S.W.2d 279 ; Cummings v. Sharp, 173 Tenn. 637 , 122 S.W.2d 423 ; State v. Dyer, 171 Tenn. 66 , 100 S.W.2d 653 ; 50 Am.Jur., Statutes, Sec. 306 et seq.

2006Vandergriff v. Seeber, 187 Tenn. 561 , 216 S.W.2d 311 ; McGill & Daugherty v. Kefauver, 175 Tenn. 667 , 137 S.W.2d 279 ; Cummings v. Sharp, 173 Tenn. 637 , 122 S.W.2d 423 ; State v. Dyer, 171 Tenn. 66 , 100 S.W.2d 653 ; 50 Am.Jur., Statutes, Sec. 306 et seq.

2006Vandergriff v. Seeber, 187 Tenn. 561 , 216 S.W.2d 311 ; McGill & Daugherty v. Kefauver, 175 Tenn. 667 , 137 S.W.2d 279 ; Cummings v. Sharp, 173 Tenn. 637 , 122 S.W.2d 423 ; State v. Dyer, 171 Tenn. 66 , 100 S.W.2d 653 ; 50 Am.Jur., Statutes, Sec. 306 et seq.

2006Vandergriff v. Seeber, 187 Tenn. 561 , 216 S.W.2d 311 ; McGill & Daugherty v. Kefauver, 175 Tenn. 667 , 137 S.W.2d 279 ; Cummings v. Sharp, 173 Tenn. 637 , 122 S.W.2d 423 ; State v. Dyer, 171 Tenn. 66 , 100 S.W.2d 653 ; 50 Am.Jur., Statutes, Sec. 306 et seq.

1987Rogers states: The generally accepted rule is that where a right of way is condemned it reverts upon nonuser to the owner of the *678 fee, Brady v. Correll, 20 Tenn.App. 224 , 97 S.W.2d 448 , and that long continued nonuser is evidence of an intention to abandon. 30 C.J.S., Eminent Domain, § 458, p. 218.

1987Rogers states: The generally accepted rule is that where a right of way is condemned it reverts upon nonuser to the owner of the *678 fee, Brady v. Correll, 20 Tenn.App. 224 , 97 S.W.2d 448 , and that long continued nonuser is evidence of an intention to abandon. 30 C.J.S., Eminent Domain, § 458, p. 218.

1926This same doctrine has been sustained in Bradshaw v. Millikin, 173 N. C., 432 , 92 S. E., 161 , L.

1926This same doctrine has been sustained in Bradshaw v. Millikin, 173 N. C., 432 , 92 S. E., 161 , L.

2011Life Ins. v. Kingston Bank & Trust, 172 Tenn. 335 , 112 S.W.2d 381, 382 (Tenn.1938); Freeman v. Martin Robowash, Inc., 61 Tenn.App. 677 , 457 S.W.2d 606, 609 (Tenn.Ct.App.1970) (citing Sheffield, 222 S.W.2d at 978-79 ) (“[I]n determining the question of title, based upon the description of the property, the generally accepted rule is that if the instrument describes it in such a manner that it can be located and distinguished from other property, it is good[.]”); Wallace v. McPherson, 187 Tenn. 333, 340 , 214 S.W.2d 50, 53 (Tenn.1947) (holding that a mere street address was sufficient to ident

2001Ct. 84 4 (1970 ), that is, “W here the statute re gulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local pub lic interest, and its effects on interstate comm erce a re only inciden tal, it will be up held unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits. . . .” Id. -26- That is the generally accepted test for application of state antitrust laws.29 Emergency One, 23 F. Supp. at 969 (holding that a standard extending the scope of the Wisconsin antitrust statute to unlawful activity which has significantly and adversely affected trade and c

1999In Lee v. Hale, 562 S.W.2d 190 (Tenn. 1978), the Supreme Court held that the phrase “any other of my personal possessions which may be left” had reference to items of tangible personal property, and not to cash in banks, following the generally accepted rule that where the testator used words in a certain sense, the Court should do likewise. 80 Am.Jur.

1997Thus under the generally accepted test, an accessory after the fact could not be considered as an accomplice within the rule requiring that the testimony of an accomplice be corroborated.” Monts v. State, 214 Tenn. 171, 192 , 379 S.W.2d 34 (1964); Pennington v. State, 478 S.W.2d 892 (Tenn.Crim.App.1971).

1997Thus under the generally accepted test, an accessory after the fact could not be considered as an accomplice within the rule requiring that the testimony of an accomplice be corroborated.” Monts v. State, 214 Tenn. 171, 192 , 379 S.W.2d 34 (1964); Pennington v. State, 478 S.W.2d 892 (Tenn.Crim.App.1971).

1987The rule is based on the fundamental principle that, in the taking, there is implied a condition that the land will be devoted to a public use and where it is not being so used for an unreasonably long period of time there may be a presumption of abandonment, lb. and the burden is cast upon the condemner to disprove an intention to abandon. 40 Tenn.App. 180 , 289 S.W.2d at 873 .

1976In People v. Laird, 11 Ill.App.3d 414 , 296 N.E.2d 864 (1973), the officer stopped a van for a speeding violation and noticed that the truck had no light on its license plate.

1976In People v. Laird, 11 Ill.App.3d 414 , 296 N.E.2d 864 (1973), the officer stopped a van for a speeding violation and noticed that the truck had no light on its license plate.

1969Lampley v. State, supra, 196 Tenn. 534 , 268 S.W.2d 572 . “ ‘The effect of a presumption is to invoke a rule of law which compels the jury to return a verdict in accordance therewith, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary from the other side.

1969Lampley v. State, supra, 196 Tenn. 534 , 268 S.W.2d 572 . “ ‘The effect of a presumption is to invoke a rule of law which compels the jury to return a verdict in accordance therewith, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary from the other side.

1965The generally accepted rule governing questions of the kind is stated in 168 A.L.R. at page 1091, thus: “It is the universally accepted rule that in the absence of statutory permission, or express promise, or fraud, an action ex contractu at law, as distinguished from an action in equity, is not maintainable between partners with respect to partnership transactions, unless there has been an accounting or settlement of the partnership affairs.” Then following this statement are cases from most every jurisdiction in the United States including our Court of Appeals case of Davis v. Fisher, 27 Ten

1965The generally accepted rule governing questions of the kind is stated in 168 A.L.R. at page 1091, thus: “It is the universally accepted rule that in the absence of statutory permission, or express promise, or fraud, an action ex contractu at law, as distinguished from an action in equity, is not maintainable between partners with respect to partnership transactions, unless there has been an accounting or settlement of the partnership affairs.” Then following this statement are cases from most every jurisdiction in the United States including our Court of Appeals case of Davis v. Fisher, 27 Ten

1953In Denison v. Jowers, snpra, 192 Tenn. at page 359 , 241 S. W. (2d) at page 428 , referring to the class doctrine rule, Mr. Justice Qailor said: ‘ ‘ This is often a hard rule, and if there be even a slight ground upon which to base a construction of a devise to the individuals, rather than to a class, the Court will seize the opportunity to do so as a matter of equity. ” (Citing cases.) It is a generally accepted rule of construction that in a gift to a person described as standing in a certain relation to the testator and to the children (or grandchildren) of another person standing in the sa

1953In Denison v. Jowers, snpra, 192 Tenn. at page 359 , 241 S. W. (2d) at page 428 , referring to the class doctrine rule, Mr. Justice Qailor said: ‘ ‘ This is often a hard rule, and if there be even a slight ground upon which to base a construction of a devise to the individuals, rather than to a class, the Court will seize the opportunity to do so as a matter of equity. ” (Citing cases.) It is a generally accepted rule of construction that in a gift to a person described as standing in a certain relation to the testator and to the children (or grandchildren) of another person standing in the sa

1951U. S. v. County of Allegheny, 322 U. S. 174 , 64 S. Ct. 908 , 88 L.

1951U. S. v. County of Allegheny, 322 U. S. 174 , 64 S. Ct. 908 , 88 L.

1951Thus in Bigley v. Watson, 98 Tenn. 353, 359 , 39 S. W. 525 , 526, 38 L.

1948Coupled with the circumstances of its execution and relationship of the parties, as disclosed by the evidence, it meets the test as laid down by the Court in Owen v. George Cole Motor Co., 155 Tenn. 250 , 292 S. W. 1, 2 , wherein it is said, “It appears, therefore, from our decisions that, in a case free from fraud, where the language used does not tend to deceive or mislead as to the nature or amount of the debt, and where the description is enough to direct attention to sources of accurate and complete information as to the debt, a misdescription of the debt may be corrected and an imperfect

1948Coupled with the circumstances of its execution and relationship of the parties, as disclosed by the evidence, it meets the test as laid down by the Court in Owen v. George Cole Motor Co., 155 Tenn. 250 , 292 S. W. 1, 2 , wherein it is said, “It appears, therefore, from our decisions that, in a case free from fraud, where the language used does not tend to deceive or mislead as to the nature or amount of the debt, and where the description is enough to direct attention to sources of accurate and complete information as to the debt, a misdescription of the debt may be corrected and an imperfect

1944In Perry on Trusts, sections 859, 850,'it is said: “If the cestui que trust concur in the breach of the trust, he. is estopped- from proceeding against' the trustee.” In Patterson v. Hewitt, 195 U. S., 309 , 25 S. Ct., 35 , 49 L.

1944In Perry on Trusts, sections 859, 850,'it is said: “If the cestui que trust concur in the breach of the trust, he. is estopped- from proceeding against' the trustee.” In Patterson v. Hewitt, 195 U. S., 309 , 25 S. Ct., 35 , 49 L.