generally accepted rule in New Mexico

1953This generally accepted rule requires no citation of authority; however, reference is made to the case of Riley v. Robbins, 1934, 1 Cal.2d 285 , 34 P.2d 715 , because that case deals with the construction of an exemption statute and the propriety of certain deductions in determining inheritance tax.

1953This generally accepted rule requires no citation of authority; however, reference is made to the case of Riley v. Robbins, 1934, 1 Cal.2d 285 , 34 P.2d 715 , because that case deals with the construction of an exemption statute and the propriety of certain deductions in determining inheritance tax.

1995The meaning of “ ‘final and conclusive’ judgments[ ] [must be understood] in the context of the generally accepted rule that a judgment creates a lien when it is final, valid, definite, and collectible by execution against the debtor’s property.” Id.

1995The wife’s claim was unsuccessful because “a divorce decree that orders the payment of money at some future time is not conclusive enough to support a general lien.” Id.

1975This rule was followed in Woods v. State, 84 N.M. 248 , 501 P.2d 692 (Ct.App. 1972).

1975This rule was followed in Woods v. State, 84 N.M. 248 , 501 P.2d 692 (Ct.App. 1972).

1975The generally accepted rule and the one which we approve and apply today is the “same evidence” test which was first stated in New Mexico as “whether the facts offered in support of one [offense], would sustain a conviction of the other.” Owens v. Abram, 58 N.M. 682 , 274 P.2d 630 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 917 , 75 S.Ct. 300 , 99 L.Ed. 719 (1955).

1975The generally accepted rule and the one which we approve and apply today is the "same evidence" test which was first stated in New Mexico as "whether the facts offered in support of one [offense], would sustain a conviction of the other." Owens v. Abram, 58 N.M. 682 , 274 P.2d 630 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 917 , 75 S.Ct. 300 , 99 L.Ed. 719 (1955).

1975The generally accepted rule and the one which we approve and apply today is the "same evidence" test which was first stated in New Mexico as "whether the facts offered in support of one [offense], would sustain a conviction of the other." Owens v. Abram, 58 N.M. 682 , 274 P.2d 630 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 917 , 75 S.Ct. 300 , 99 L.Ed. 719 (1955).

1975The generally accepted rule and the one which we approve and apply today is the "same evidence" test which was first stated in New Mexico as "whether the facts offered in support of one [offense], would sustain a conviction of the other." Owens v. Abram, 58 N.M. 682 , 274 P.2d 630 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 917 , 75 S.Ct. 300 , 99 L.Ed. 719 (1955).

1975The generally accepted rule and the one which we approve and apply today is the "same evidence" test which was first stated in New Mexico as "whether the facts offered in support of one [offense], would sustain a conviction of the other." Owens v. Abram, 58 N.M. 682 , 274 P.2d 630 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 917 , 75 S.Ct. 300 , 99 L.Ed. 719 (1955).

1975The generally accepted rule and the one which we approve and apply today is the "same evidence" test which was first stated in New Mexico as "whether the facts offered in support of one [offense], would sustain a conviction of the other." Owens v. Abram, 58 N.M. 682 , 274 P.2d 630 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 917 , 75 S.Ct. 300 , 99 L.Ed. 719 (1955).

1971Berger v. City and County of Denver, 142 Colo. 72 , 350 P.2d 192 (1960); City of Fort Worth v. Atlas Enterprises, 311 S.W.2d 922 (Tex.Civ.App.1958); State v. Hart, 66 Idaho 217 , 157 P.2d 72 (1945). 5 E.

1971Berger v. City and County of Denver, 142 Colo. 72 , 350 P.2d 192 (1960); City of Fort Worth v. Atlas Enterprises, 311 S.W.2d 922 (Tex.Civ.App.1958); State v. Hart, 66 Idaho 217 , 157 P.2d 72 (1945). 5 E.

1971Billeci v. United States, 87 U.S.App.D.C. 274 , 184 F.2d 394 (1950), 24 A.L.R.2d 881 (1952); Beach v. United States, 46 F. 754 (C.C.Cal.1890); Annot., 24 A.L.R.2d 895 (1952), and cases cited therein.

1971Billeci v. United States, 87 U.S.App.D.C. 274 , 184 F.2d 394 (1950), 24 A.L.R.2d 881 (1952); Beach v. United States, 46 F. 754 (C.C.Cal.1890); Annot., 24 A.L.R.2d 895 (1952), and cases cited therein.

1971Berger v. City and County of Denver, 142 Colo. 72 , 350 P.2d 192 (1960); City of Fort Worth v. Atlas Enterprises, 311 S.W.2d 922 (Tex.Civ.App.1958); State v. Hart, 66 Idaho 217 , 157 P.2d 72 (1945). 5 E.

1971Berger v. City and County of Denver, 142 Colo. 72 , 350 P.2d 192 (1960); City of Fort Worth v. Atlas Enterprises, 311 S.W.2d 922 (Tex.Civ.App.1958); State v. Hart, 66 Idaho 217 , 157 P.2d 72 (1945). 5 E.

1971Billeci v. United States, 87 U.S.App.D.C. 274 , 184 F.2d 394 (1950), 24 A.L.R.2d 881 (1952); Beach v. United States, 46 F. 754 (C.C.Cal.1890); Annot., 24 A.L.R.2d 895 (1952), and cases cited therein.

1971Berger v. City and County of Denver, 142 Colo. 72 , 350 P.2d 192 (1960); City of Fort Worth v. Atlas Enterprises, 311 S.W.2d 922 (Tex.Civ.App.1958); State v. Hart, 66 Idaho 217 , 157 P.2d 72 (1945). 5 E.

1969Smith v. United States, 358 F.2d 683 (3d Cir. 1966); State v. Simmons, 148 W.Va. 340 , 135 S.E.2d 252 (1964) ; 4 Wigmore, Evidence § 1270 (3d Ed. 1940); McCormick, Evidence § 43 (1954); 1 Herrick, Underhill’s Criminal Evidence, supra, § 164.

1969Smith v. United States, 358 F.2d 683 (3d Cir. 1966); State v. Simmons, 148 W.Va. 340 , 135 S.E.2d 252 (1964) ; 4 Wigmore, Evidence § 1270 (3d Ed. 1940); McCormick, Evidence § 43 (1954); 1 Herrick, Underhill’s Criminal Evidence, supra, § 164.

1969Smith v. United States, 358 F.2d 683 (3d Cir. 1966); State v. Simmons, 148 W.Va. 340 , 135 S.E.2d 252 (1964) ; 4 Wigmore, Evidence § 1270 (3d Ed. 1940); McCormick, Evidence § 43 (1954); 1 Herrick, Underhill’s Criminal Evidence, supra, § 164.

1968State v. Roybal, 76 N.M. 337 , 414 P.2d 850 (1966) states: “ * * * It is a generally accepted rule that no person shall be called upon to stand trial or be sentenced who because of mental illness is incapable of understanding the nature and object of the proceedings, or of comprehending his own condition in reference thereto, or of making a rational defense. * * * ” On December 23, 1960, counsel moved for a psychiatric examination of defendant at the expense of the state on the ground that defendant “ * * * is mentally incapable of rationally cooperating in his defense. * * * ” The record is i

1968State v. Roybal, 76 N.M. 337 , 414 P.2d 850 (1966) states: “ * * * It is a generally accepted rule that no person shall be called upon to stand trial or be sentenced who because of mental illness is incapable of understanding the nature and object of the proceedings, or of comprehending his own condition in reference thereto, or of making a rational defense. * * * ” On December 23, 1960, counsel moved for a psychiatric examination of defendant at the expense of the state on the ground that defendant “ * * * is mentally incapable of rationally cooperating in his defense. * * * ” The record is i

1966State v. Upton, 60 N.M. 205 , 290 P.2d 440 ; State v. Folk, 56 N.M. 583 , 247 P.2d 165 ; In re Smith, 25 N.M. 48 , 176 P. 819 , 3 A.L.

1966State v. Upton, 60 N.M. 205 , 290 P.2d 440 ; State v. Folk, 56 N.M. 583 , 247 P.2d 165 ; In re Smith, 25 N.M. 48 , 176 P. 819 , 3 A.L.

1966State v. Upton, 60 N.M. 205 , 290 P.2d 440 ; State v. Folk, 56 N.M. 583 , 247 P.2d 165 ; In re Smith, 25 N.M. 48 , 176 P. 819 , 3 A.L.

1966State v. Upton, 60 N.M. 205 , 290 P.2d 440 ; State v. Folk, 56 N.M. 583 , 247 P.2d 165 ; In re Smith, 25 N.M. 48 , 176 P. 819 , 3 A.L.

1966State v. Upton, 60 N.M. 205 , 290 P.2d 440 ; State v. Folk, 56 N.M. 583 , 247 P.2d 165 ; In re Smith, 25 N.M. 48 , 176 P. 819 , 3 A.L.

1966State v. Upton, 60 N.M. 205 , 290 P.2d 440 ; State v. Folk, 56 N.M. 583 , 247 P.2d 165 ; In re Smith, 25 N.M. 48 , 176 P. 819 , 3 A.L.

1964This was a rule at common law (Vaughan v. Northup, 1841, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 1 , 10 L.Ed. 639 ), and the question is whether our statute changes the common-law rule.

1964This was a rule at common law (Vaughan v. Northup, 1841, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 1 , 10 L.Ed. 639 ), and the question is whether our statute changes the common-law rule.

1961Denbigh v. First National Bank of Seattle, 102 Wash. 546 , 174 P. 475 ; Britton, Bills and Notes, § 132.

1961Denbigh v. First National Bank of Seattle, 102 Wash. 546 , 174 P. 475 ; Britton, Bills and Notes, § 132.

1954The capacity of the accused to distinguish right from wrong in respect to the act charged as a crime at the time of its commission is made the test of his responsibility.” State v. Roy, supra [ 40 N.M. 397 , 60 P.2d 650 .] “Without going into an academic, physiological, and psychological discussion as to the difference between the irresistible impulse rule and the ‘right and wrong test’ rule as applicable to criminal guilt, we merely reassert our adherence to the rule enunciated by this court in the case of State v. Roy * * * where we said: ‘The capacity of the accused to distinguish right fro

1954The capacity of the accused to distinguish right from wrong in respect to the act charged as a crime at the time of its commission is made the test of his responsibility." State v. Roy, supra [ 40 N.M. 397 , 60 P.2d 650 .] "Without going into an academic, physiological, and psychological discussion as to the difference between the irresistible impulse rule and the `right and wrong test' rule as applicable to criminal guilt, we merely reassert our adherence to the rule enunciated by this court in the case of State v. Roy * * * where we said: `The capacity of the accused to distinguish right fro

1954The capacity of the accused to distinguish right from wrong in respect to the act charged as a crime at the time of its commission is made the test of his responsibility.” State v. Roy, supra [ 40 N.M. 397 , 60 P.2d 650 .] “Without going into an academic, physiological, and psychological discussion as to the difference between the irresistible impulse rule and the ‘right and wrong test’ rule as applicable to criminal guilt, we merely reassert our adherence to the rule enunciated by this court in the case of State v. Roy * * * where we said: ‘The capacity of the accused to distinguish right fro

1954The capacity of the accused to distinguish right from wrong in respect to the act charged as a crime at the time of its commission is made the test of his responsibility." State v. Roy, supra [ 40 N.M. 397 , 60 P.2d 650 .] "Without going into an academic, physiological, and psychological discussion as to the difference between the irresistible impulse rule and the `right and wrong test' rule as applicable to criminal guilt, we merely reassert our adherence to the rule enunciated by this court in the case of State v. Roy * * * where we said: `The capacity of the accused to distinguish right fro

1953Veterans’ Foreign Wars,, Ledbetter-McReynolds Post No. 3015 v. Hull, 1947, 51 N.M. 478 , 188 P.2d 334 ; Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry.

1953Veterans’ Foreign Wars,, Ledbetter-McReynolds Post No. 3015 v. Hull, 1947, 51 N.M. 478 , 188 P.2d 334 ; Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry.

1940There, as here, it was alleged that the oral agreement (to employ plaintiff as manager) was fraudulently made “without any intention on the part of either of the” defendants to keep or perform the same”. [ 39 Mont. 597 , 104 P. S74] There, as here, there was no complaint that the written agreement' had not been faithfully performed by the other párties thereto, nor was it claimed the defendants (occupying the position of plaintiff here) had entered into the written contract without any intention of performing it.