generally accepted rule (District of Columbia) · Go Syfert
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generally accepted rule in District of Columbia

14 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1952–2016 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (8)

CaseFollowedCited
Ali v. United Statesgreen
dc · 1987 · cited in 2 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 1999–2004
2 sentences

2004Questions assuming the existence of a factual predicate must be grounded in a good faith belief that those facts are susceptible to proof by competent evidence.” Ali v. United States, 520 A.2d 306, 313 (D.C.1987). 22 .

1999Ali v. United States, 520 A.2d 306, 313 (D.C.1987).

22
King v. Pagliaro Bros. Stone Co.green
dc · 1997 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
2 sentences

2016Stone Co., 703 A.2d 1232, 1234 (D.C.1997) (although “the negligence of the trailing car colliding with a forward car is essentially a question for the fact finder to determine and not a matter of law[,] ... [w]e have also recognized. .,. the generally accepted rule that the primary duty to avoid collision as between the motorist ahead and the motorist following lies with the motorist behind”) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).

2016Stone Co., 703 A.2d 1232, 1234 (D.C. 1997) (although “the negligence of the trailing car colliding with a forward car is essentially a question for the fact finder to determine and not a matter of law[,] . . . [w]e have also recognized . . . the generally accepted rule that the primary duty to avoid collision as between the motorist ahead and the motorist following lies with the motorist behind”) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).

11
Pazmino v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authoritygreen
dc · 1994 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 1997–1997
1 sentence

1997We have also recognized, however, the generally accepted rule that “the primary duty to avoid collision as between [the] motorist ahead and the motorist following lies with the motorist behind,” even though “a duty of care rests of course, on both motorists.” Pazmino, 638 A.2d at 679 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

11
Prosser v. Prossergreen
kan · 1945 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 1988–1988
2 sentences

1988A parent has a common-law duty to provide support and maintenance for his minor children and ... such duty extends and remains unchanged to a child who, on becoming of age, is in such feeble ... condition physically and mentally as to be unable to maintain and support itself; Prosser v. Prosser, 159 Kan. 651, 653 , 157 P.2d 544, 546 (1945) ("it is a generally accepted rule that where a child on becoming of age is in such a feeble and dependent condition physically or mentally as to be unable to support himself the parental obligations and duties toward such a child remain unchanged."); State e

1988A parent has a common-law duty to provide support and maintenance for his minor children and ... such duty extends and remains unchanged to a child who, on becoming of age, is in such feeble ... condition physically and mentally as to be unable to maintain and support itself; Prosser v. Prosser, 159 Kan. 651, 653 , 157 P.2d 544, 546 (1945) ("it is a generally accepted rule that where a child on becoming of age is in such a feeble and dependent condition physically or mentally as to be unable to support himself the parental obligations and duties toward such a child remain unchanged."); State e

11
State Ex Rel. Kramer v. Carrollgreen
moctapp · 1958 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 1988–1988
1 sentence

1988Kramer v. Carroll, 309 S.W.2d 654, 660 (Mo.App.1958) (recognizing a parental duty of support: "our courts should depart from the common law rule of nonliability to support an adult child if that rule is not suited to the conditions and needs of the people of the state....

11
Pitts v. United Statesgreen
dc · 1953 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 1985–1985
1 sentence

1985Determining whether a statement was made by way of compromise or as an admission of fact is not always easy, Firestone Tire *128 & Rubber Co. v. Hillow, supra, 65 A.2d at 339 , but if a party “hypothetically concede[s] [liability] merely for purpose of settlement,” see Pitts v. United States, 95 A.2d 588, 589 (D.C.1953), or makes a conditional concession, an offer or agreement is held not to be an admission of fact and is therefore inadmissible. 12 Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Hillow, supra, 65 A.2d at 340 .

11
Melvin McGowan v. King, Inc.green
ca5 · 1980 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 1983–1983
1 sentence

1983“It is a generally accepted rule of law that where a judgment is appealed on the ground that the damages awarded are inadequate, acceptance of payment of the amount of the unsatisfactory judgment does not, standing alone, amount to an accord and satisfaction of the entire claim.” McGowan v. King, Inc., 616 F.2d 745, 747 (5th Cir.1980), quoting United States v. Hougham, 364 U.S. 310, 312 , 81 S.Ct. 13, 15-16 , 5 L.Ed.2d 8 (1960).

11
Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co.green
cal · 1973 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 1976–1976
2 sentences

1976In numerous other cases involving similar federal or state statutes, courts have held that mere compliance with regulatory labeling requirements does not preclude a finding that additional warnings should have' been given. 19 Thus, the generally accepted rule is that such requirements prescribe only the minimum warnings required of a seller or manufacturer. 20 As one court has stated, the warnings required by federal regulations “may be only minimal in nature and when the manufacturer or supplier knows of, or has reason to know of, greater dangers not included in the warning, its duty to warn

1976In numerous other cases involving similar federal or state statutes, courts have held that mere compliance with regulatory labeling requirements does not preclude a finding that additional warnings should have' been given. 19 Thus, the generally accepted rule is that such requirements prescribe only the minimum warnings required of a seller or manufacturer. 20 As one court has stated, the warnings required by federal regulations “may be only minimal in nature and when the manufacturer or supplier knows of, or has reason to know of, greater dangers not included in the warning, its duty to warn

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (13)

CaseCitedYears
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. United States Ex Rel. Bartlett green
scotus · 1913
2 sentences

1999Jur. 2d Executors and Administrators § 1242 (1989). 8 Similarly, “a valid assignment confers upon the assignee standing to sue in place of the assignor.” Misic, supra note 7, 789 F.2d at 1378 (citing United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Bartlett, 231 U.S. 237, 243 , 34 S.Ct. 88 , 58 L.Ed. 200 (1913)).

1999Jur. 2d Executors and Administrators § 1242 (1989). 8 Similarly, “a valid assignment confers upon the assignee standing to sue in place of the assignor.” Misic, supra note 7, 789 F.2d at 1378 (citing United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Bartlett, 231 U.S. 237, 243 , 34 S.Ct. 88 , 58 L.Ed. 200 (1913)).

11999–1999
Fish v. Huddell green
cadc · 1931
2 sentences

1986See id.; Fish v. Huddell, 60 App.D.C. 263 , 51 F.2d 319 (1931).

1986See id.; Fish v. Huddell, 60 App.D.C. 263 , 51 F.2d 319 (1931).

11986–1986
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Hillow ex rel. American Automobile Ins. Co. green
dc · 1949
2 sentences

1985Determining whether a statement was made by way of compromise or as an admission of fact is not always easy, Firestone Tire *128 & Rubber Co. v. Hillow, supra, 65 A.2d at 339 , but if a party “hypothetically concede[s] [liability] merely for purpose of settlement,” see Pitts v. United States, 95 A.2d 588, 589 (D.C.1953), or makes a conditional concession, an offer or agreement is held not to be an admission of fact and is therefore inadmissible. 12 Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Hillow, supra, 65 A.2d at 340 .

1985Determining whether a statement was made by way of compromise or as an admission of fact is not always easy, Firestone Tire *128 & Rubber Co. v. Hillow, supra, 65 A.2d at 339 , but if a party “hypothetically concede[s] [liability] merely for purpose of settlement,” see Pitts v. United States, 95 A.2d 588, 589 (D.C.1953), or makes a conditional concession, an offer or agreement is held not to be an admission of fact and is therefore inadmissible. 12 Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Hillow, supra, 65 A.2d at 340 .

11985–1985
United States v. Hougham green
scotus · 1960
2 sentences

1983“It is a generally accepted rule of law that where a judgment is appealed on the ground that the damages awarded are inadequate, acceptance of payment of the amount of the unsatisfactory judgment does not, standing alone, amount to an accord and satisfaction of the entire claim.” McGowan v. King, Inc., 616 F.2d 745, 747 (5th Cir.1980), quoting United States v. Hougham, 364 U.S. 310, 312 , 81 S.Ct. 13, 15-16 , 5 L.Ed.2d 8 (1960).

1983“It is a generally accepted rule of law that where a judgment is appealed on the ground that the damages awarded are inadequate, acceptance of payment of the amount of the unsatisfactory judgment does not, standing alone, amount to an accord and satisfaction of the entire claim.” McGowan v. King, Inc., 616 F.2d 745, 747 (5th Cir.1980), quoting United States v. Hougham, 364 U.S. 310, 312 , 81 S.Ct. 13, 15-16 , 5 L.Ed.2d 8 (1960).

11983–1983
Fowler v. Equitable Trust Co. green
scotus · 1891
2 sentences

1973Before any of the cases cited in note 17 had been decided, the Supreme Court had held in Fowler v. Equitable Trust Co., 141 U.S. 411 , 12 S.Ct. 8 , 35 L.Ed. 794 (1891) that it is the total amount of interest collectible over the life of the loan that determines whether it is usurious or not.

1973Before any of the cases cited in note 17 had been decided, the Supreme Court had held in Fowler v. Equitable Trust Co., 141 U.S. 411 , 12 S.Ct. 8 , 35 L.Ed. 794 (1891) that it is the total amount of interest collectible over the life of the loan that determines whether it is usurious or not.

11973–1973
John F. English v. John Cunningham green
cadc · 1960
2 sentences

1968English v. Cunningham, 108 U.S.App.D.C. 365 , 282 F.2d 848 (1960).

1968English v. Cunningham, 108 U.S.App.D.C. 365 , 282 F.2d 848 (1960).

11968–1968
Darden v. Darden green
dc · 1958
1 sentence

1962App., 144 A.2d 697 , we recognized the generally accepted rule that where personal jurisdiction is acquired in a divorce proceeding and an order is made requiring future payments of support or alimony, a proceeding to render judgment for arrears in such payments is not a new and independent action requiring personal service.

11962–1962
Chase v. Tingdale Bros. green
minn · 1914
2 sentences

1952Chase v. Tingdale Bros., Inc., 127 Minn. 401 , 149 N.W. 654 ; Taylor v. Rierson, 210 N.C. 185 , 185 S.E. 627 ; Levin v. Twin Tanners, Inc., 318 Mass. 13 , 60 N.E.2d 6 ; Atlantic Greyhound Corporation v. Franklin, 301 Ky. 867 , 192 S.W.2d 753 ; Winfield v. Smith, 230 N.C. 392 , 53 S.E.2d 251 .

1952Chase v. Tingdale Bros., Inc., 127 Minn. 401 , 149 N.W. 654 ; Taylor v. Rierson, 210 N.C. 185 , 185 S.E. 627 ; Levin v. Twin Tanners, Inc., 318 Mass. 13 , 60 N.E.2d 6 ; Atlantic Greyhound Corporation v. Franklin, 301 Ky. 867 , 192 S.W.2d 753 ; Winfield v. Smith, 230 N.C. 392 , 53 S.E.2d 251 .

11952–1952
Levin v. Twin Tanners, Inc. green
mass · 1945
2 sentences

1952Chase v. Tingdale Bros., Inc., 127 Minn. 401 , 149 N.W. 654 ; Taylor v. Rierson, 210 N.C. 185 , 185 S.E. 627 ; Levin v. Twin Tanners, Inc., 318 Mass. 13 , 60 N.E.2d 6 ; Atlantic Greyhound Corporation v. Franklin, 301 Ky. 867 , 192 S.W.2d 753 ; Winfield v. Smith, 230 N.C. 392 , 53 S.E.2d 251 .

1952Chase v. Tingdale Bros., Inc., 127 Minn. 401 , 149 N.W. 654 ; Taylor v. Rierson, 210 N.C. 185 , 185 S.E. 627 ; Levin v. Twin Tanners, Inc., 318 Mass. 13 , 60 N.E.2d 6 ; Atlantic Greyhound Corporation v. Franklin, 301 Ky. 867 , 192 S.W.2d 753 ; Winfield v. Smith, 230 N.C. 392 , 53 S.E.2d 251 .

11952–1952
Atlantic Greyhound Corp. v. Franklin green
kyctapphigh · 1946
2 sentences

1952Chase v. Tingdale Bros., Inc., 127 Minn. 401 , 149 N.W. 654 ; Taylor v. Rierson, 210 N.C. 185 , 185 S.E. 627 ; Levin v. Twin Tanners, Inc., 318 Mass. 13 , 60 N.E.2d 6 ; Atlantic Greyhound Corporation v. Franklin, 301 Ky. 867 , 192 S.W.2d 753 ; Winfield v. Smith, 230 N.C. 392 , 53 S.E.2d 251 .

1952Chase v. Tingdale Bros., Inc., 127 Minn. 401 , 149 N.W. 654 ; Taylor v. Rierson, 210 N.C. 185 , 185 S.E. 627 ; Levin v. Twin Tanners, Inc., 318 Mass. 13 , 60 N.E.2d 6 ; Atlantic Greyhound Corporation v. Franklin, 301 Ky. 867 , 192 S.W.2d 753 ; Winfield v. Smith, 230 N.C. 392 , 53 S.E.2d 251 .

11952–1952
Head v. . Insurance Co. neutral
nc · 1936
1 sentence

1952Chase v. Tingdale Bros., Inc., 127 Minn. 401 , 149 N.W. 654 ; Taylor v. Rierson, 210 N.C. 185 , 185 S.E. 627 ; Levin v. Twin Tanners, Inc., 318 Mass. 13 , 60 N.E.2d 6 ; Atlantic Greyhound Corporation v. Franklin, 301 Ky. 867 , 192 S.W.2d 753 ; Winfield v. Smith, 230 N.C. 392 , 53 S.E.2d 251 .

11952–1952
Winfield v. Smith neutral
nc · 1949
2 sentences

1952Chase v. Tingdale Bros., Inc., 127 Minn. 401 , 149 N.W. 654 ; Taylor v. Rierson, 210 N.C. 185 , 185 S.E. 627 ; Levin v. Twin Tanners, Inc., 318 Mass. 13 , 60 N.E.2d 6 ; Atlantic Greyhound Corporation v. Franklin, 301 Ky. 867 , 192 S.W.2d 753 ; Winfield v. Smith, 230 N.C. 392 , 53 S.E.2d 251 .

1952Chase v. Tingdale Bros., Inc., 127 Minn. 401 , 149 N.W. 654 ; Taylor v. Rierson, 210 N.C. 185 , 185 S.E. 627 ; Levin v. Twin Tanners, Inc., 318 Mass. 13 , 60 N.E.2d 6 ; Atlantic Greyhound Corporation v. Franklin, 301 Ky. 867 , 192 S.W.2d 753 ; Winfield v. Smith, 230 N.C. 392 , 53 S.E.2d 251 .

11952–1952
Taylor v. . Rierson neutral
nc · 1936
1 sentence

1952Chase v. Tingdale Bros., Inc., 127 Minn. 401 , 149 N.W. 654 ; Taylor v. Rierson, 210 N.C. 185 , 185 S.E. 627 ; Levin v. Twin Tanners, Inc., 318 Mass. 13 , 60 N.E.2d 6 ; Atlantic Greyhound Corporation v. Franklin, 301 Ky. 867 , 192 S.W.2d 753 ; Winfield v. Smith, 230 N.C. 392 , 53 S.E.2d 251 .

11952–1952

Where else courts name it

CA 142 (1909–2026) NY 113 (1889–2022) TX 88 (1907–2025) IL 83 (1897–2026) FL 83 (1905–2026) MO 77 (1882–2024) MD 68 (1915–2021) AL 59 (1896–2009) OH 58 (1905–2026) NJ 54 (1934–2026) LA 53 (1904–2018) MI 50 (1904–2025) NC 49 (1906–2024) KY 45 (1907–2018) CT 38 (1910–2019) OK 36 (1916–2017) PA 34 (1891–2024) CO 33 (1913–2025) VA 32 (1907–2009) OR 32 (1897–2018) TN 31 (1895–2024) WA 31 (1897–2016) WI 30 (1898–2026) KS 28 (1871–2022) IN 26 (1888–2014) AZ 26 (1903–2024) NE 25 (1899–2026) MA 24 (1891–2025) MS 24 (1954–2014) IA 22 (1932–2026) WY 22 (1903–2026) AR 22 (1900–2026) HI 20 (1920–2020) ID 19 (1934–2023) GA 17 (1897–2015) MN 17 (1890–2013) VT 17 (1905–2024) WV 16 (1909–2009) NM 16 (1925–2021) ME 15 (1927–2017) RI 15 (1904–2021) SD 14 (1916–2017) MT 14 (1914–2017) DC 14 (1952–2016) ND 11 (1914–1985) UT 11 (1880–2020) NV 10 (1919–2020) SC 9 (1895–2022) DE 9 (1960–1996) AK 7 (1970–2000) PR 6 (1937–1969) VI 5 (1982–2025) NH 3 (1975–2012)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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