generally accepted rule in Texas

1967The law applicable here was stated by our Supreme Court in McAfee v. Travis Gas Corp., 137 Tex. 314 , 153 S.W.2d 442 (1941): “We think it is the generally accepted rule as applied to torts that ‘If the effects of the actor’s negligent conduct actively and continuously operate to bring about harm to another, the fact that the active and substantially simultaneous operation of the effects of a third person’s innocent, tortious or criminal act is also a substantial factor in bringing about the harm does not protect the actor from liability.’ Restatement of the Law of Torts, Vol. 2, p. 1184, § 439

1967The law applicable here was stated by our Supreme Court in McAfee v. Travis Gas Corp., 137 Tex. 314 , 153 S.W.2d 442 (1941): “We think it is the generally accepted rule as applied to torts that ‘If the effects of the actor’s negligent conduct actively and continuously operate to bring about harm to another, the fact that the active and substantially simultaneous operation of the effects of a third person’s innocent, tortious or criminal act is also a substantial factor in bringing about the harm does not protect the actor from liability.’ Restatement of the Law of Torts, Vol. 2, p. 1184, § 439

2015Wilkins to completely circumvent Chapter 64's arbitration requirement, it simply cannot be an accurate application of “[I]t is a generally accepted rule of statutory construction that section 64.004. when the Legislature adopts a ‘foreign’ statute it also adopts the construction of that statute by the foreign jurisdiction To the contrary, section 64.004 deals with the situation occurring prior to the Texas enactment.” State v. Moreno, in which the complaint is filed within the time necessary 807 S.W.2d 327 , 332 n. 5 (Tex.Crim.App.1991); see also to permit effective inspection under field cond

1998Evid. 403; Fed.R.Evid. 403. “[I]t is a generally accepted rule of statutory construction that when the [Court of Criminal Appeals] adopts a ‘foreign’ [rule] it also adopts the construction of that [rule] by the foreign jurisdiction[ ] occurring prior to the Texas enactment.” State v. Moreno, 807 S.W.2d 327 , 332 n. 5 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) (construing statute adopted from federal law); see also King v. State, 953 S.W.2d 266, 271 (Tex.Crim.App.1997) (using federal case to construe new harmless error rule).

1940Ass’n. v. Benson, 76 Tex. 552 , 13 S.W. 379 ; Sawtell v. Feser, Tex.Civ.App., 235 S.W. 960 ; Grand Lodge Colored K.

1938It is a generally accepted rule in this as well as in all other states of the union that one who joins a beneficial association, such as is here under consideration, assents to and accepts the law of the order and impliedly binds himself to abide by its decisions in the determination of disputes arising within the society, and where provision is made in its* constitution or by-laws for review within the society of the rulings and judgments of its officers of inferior lodges, such remedies must be exhausted before relief may be sought in a court. 5 Tex.Jur. 142; 6 Tex.Jur. 430; 5 C.J. 1364; 7 C

1938It is a generally accepted rule in this as well as in all other states of the union that one who joins a beneficial association, such as is here under consideration, assents to and accepts the law of the order and impliedly binds himself to abide by its decisions in the determination of disputes arising within the society, and where provision is made in its constitution or by-laws for review within the society of the rulings and judgments of its officers of inferior lodges, such remedies must be exhausted before relief may be sought in a court. 5 Tex.Jur. 142; 6 Tex.Jur. 430; 5 C.J. 1364; 7 C.

1938It is a generally accepted rule in this as well as in all other states of the union that one who joins a beneficial association, such as is here under consideration, assents to and accepts the law of the order and impliedly binds himself to abide by its decisions in the determination of disputes arising within the society, and where provision is made in its constitution or by-laws for review within the society of the rulings and judgments of its officers of inferior lodges, such remedies must be exhausted before relief may be sought in a court. 5 Tex.Jur. 142; 6 Tex.Jur. 430; 5 C.J. 1364; 7 C.

2015Woods v. Alvarado State Bank, 118 Tex. 586 , 19 S.W.2d 35 (1919);Cocke v. Conquest, 120 Tex. 43 , 35 S.W.2d 673 (1931); Trawick v. Harris, 8 Tex. 312 (1852); Schneider v. Bray, 59 Tex. 668 (1883).

2015Woods v. Alvarado State Bank, 118 Tex. 586 , 19 S.W.2d 35 (1919);Cocke v. Conquest, 120 Tex. 43 , 35 S.W.2d 673 (1931); Trawick v. Harris, 8 Tex. 312 (1852); Schneider v. Bray, 59 Tex. 668 (1883).

2015Woods v. Alvarado State Bank, 118 Tex. 586 , 19 S.W.2d 35 (1919);Cocke v. Conquest, 120 Tex. 43 , 35 S.W.2d 673 (1931); Trawick v. Harris, 8 Tex. 312 (1852); Schneider v. Bray, 59 Tex. 668 (1883).

1969Woods v. Alvarado State Bank, 118 Tex. 586 , 19 S.W.2d 35 (1919); Cocke v. Conquest, 120 Tex. 43 , 35 S.W.2d 673 (1931); Trawick v. Harris, 8 Tex. 312 (1852); Schneider v. Bray, 59 Tex. 668 (1883).

2015Woods v. Alvarado State Bank, 118 Tex. 586 , 19 S.W.2d 35 (1919);Cocke v. Conquest, 120 Tex. 43 , 35 S.W.2d 673 (1931); Trawick v. Harris, 8 Tex. 312 (1852); Schneider v. Bray, 59 Tex. 668 (1883).

1969Woods v. Alvarado State Bank, 118 Tex. 586 , 19 S.W.2d 35 (1919); Cocke v. Conquest, 120 Tex. 43 , 35 S.W.2d 673 (1931); Trawick v. Harris, 8 Tex. 312 (1852); Schneider v. Bray, 59 Tex. 668 (1883).

2015Woods v. Alvarado State Bank, 118 Tex. 586 , 19 S.W.2d 35 (1919);Cocke v. Conquest, 120 Tex. 43 , 35 S.W.2d 673 (1931); Trawick v. Harris, 8 Tex. 312 (1852); Schneider v. Bray, 59 Tex. 668 (1883).

2015Woods v. Alvarado State Bank, 118 Tex. 586 , 19 S.W.2d 35 (1919);Cocke v. Conquest, 120 Tex. 43 , 35 S.W.2d 673 (1931); Trawick v. Harris, 8 Tex. 312 (1852); Schneider v. Bray, 59 Tex. 668 (1883).

2005The rule is different however, in some jurisdictions, as to the forcible taking of property for the purpose of collecting uncertain, unliquidated damages, and such a taking will support a prosecution for robbery. 21: Crawford , 509 S.W.2d at 584-86 (selected footnotes and citations omitted; footnotes in original). 22: See id. at 586. 23: See Schweinle , 915 S.W.2d at 19 ; Saunders , 840 S.W.2d at 391-92 . 24: See Boykin v. State , 818 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex. Crim.

2005The rule is different however, in some jurisdictions, as to the forcible taking of property for the purpose of collecting uncertain, unliquidated damages, and such a taking will support a prosecution for robbery. [21] Crawford, 509 S.W.2d at 584-86 (selected footnotes and citations omitted; footnotes in original). [22] See id. at 586 . [23] See Schweinle, 915 S.W.2d at 19 ; Saunders, 840 S.W.2d at 391-92 . [24] See Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). [25] TEX.

1982It declares that injuries occurring during travel for the dual purpose of furthering the affairs or business of the employer and of furthering the employee’s personal or private affairs shall not be deemed in the course of employment, and therefore compensable, “unless the trip to the place of occurrence of said injury would have been made even had there been no personal or private affairs of the employee to be furthered by said trip, and unless said trip would not have been made had there been no affairs or business of the employer to be furthered by said trip.” The generally accepted test to

1964The generally accepted test tó be used in applying the “dual purpose” rule- is found in the opinion of Chief Judge Cardozo in Marks’ Dependents v. Gray, 251 N.Y. 90 , 167 N.E. 181 , in this language: “The test in brief is this: If the work of the employee creates the necessity for travel, he is in the course of his employment, though he is serving at the same time some purpose of his own. [Case cited.] If, however, the work has no part in creating the necessity for travel, if the journey would have gone forward though the business errand had been dropped, and would have been canceled upon fail

1982It declares that injuries occurring during travel for the dual purpose of furthering the affairs or business of the employer and of furthering the employee’s personal or private affairs shall not be deemed in the course of employment, and therefore compensable, “unless the trip to the place of occurrence of said injury would have been made even had there been no personal or private affairs of the employee to be furthered by said trip, and unless said trip would not have been made had there been no affairs or business of the employer to be furthered by said trip.” The generally accepted test to

1964The generally accepted test tó be used in applying the “dual purpose” rule- is found in the opinion of Chief Judge Cardozo in Marks’ Dependents v. Gray, 251 N.Y. 90 , 167 N.E. 181 , in this language: “The test in brief is this: If the work of the employee creates the necessity for travel, he is in the course of his employment, though he is serving at the same time some purpose of his own. [Case cited.] If, however, the work has no part in creating the necessity for travel, if the journey would have gone forward though the business errand had been dropped, and would have been canceled upon fail

1967Stated in another way, ‘The intervention of an unforeseen and unexpected cause is not sufficient to relieve a wrongdoer from consequences of negligence, if such negligence directly *255 and proximately co-operates with the independent cause the resulting injury.’ ” See also Walker, Inc. v. Burgdorf, 150 Tex. 603 , 244 S.W.2d 506 (1951); Tex-Jersey Oil Corp. v. Beck, 157 Tex. 541 , 305 S.W.2d 162 (1957); Biggers v. Continental Bus System, 157 Tex. 351 , 298 S.W.2d 79 , 303 S.W.2d 359 (1957).

1961“We think that it is the generally accepted rule as applied to torts that ‘If the effects of the actor’s negligent conduct actively and continuously operate to bring about harm to another, the fact that the active and substantially simultaneous operation of the effects of a third person’s innocent, tortious or criminal act is also a substantial factor in bringing about the harm does not protect the actor from liability.’ ” Restatement of the Law of Torts, Vol. 2, p. 1184, § 439, cited in McAfee et al. v. Travis Gas Corporation, 137 Tex. 314 , 153 S.W.2d 442, 447 ; Biggers v. Continental Bus Sy

1967Stated in another way, ‘The intervention of an unforeseen and unexpected cause is not sufficient to relieve a wrongdoer from consequences of negligence, if such negligence directly *255 and proximately co-operates with the independent cause the resulting injury.’ ” See also Walker, Inc. v. Burgdorf, 150 Tex. 603 , 244 S.W.2d 506 (1951); Tex-Jersey Oil Corp. v. Beck, 157 Tex. 541 , 305 S.W.2d 162 (1957); Biggers v. Continental Bus System, 157 Tex. 351 , 298 S.W.2d 79 , 303 S.W.2d 359 (1957).

1964Walker, Inc. v. Burgdorf, 150 Tex. 603 , 244 S.W.2d 506, 509 ; Texas Power & Light Co. v. Culwell (Tex.Com.App.), 34 S.W.2d 820 ; Texas Public Service Co. v. Armstrong, supra. The rule to be applied in concurrent negligence cases is to be found in the case of McAfee v. Travis Gas Corp., 137 Tex. 314 , 153 S.W.2d 442, 447 , wherein the Supreme Court said: “ * * * We think it is the generally accepted rule as. applied to torts that ‘If the effects of the actor’s negligent conduct actively and continuously operate to bring about harm to another, the fact that the active and substantially simultan

1961“We think that it is the generally accepted rule as applied to torts that ‘If the effects of the actor’s negligent conduct actively and continuously operate to bring about harm to another, the fact that the active and substantially simultaneous operation of the effects of a third person’s innocent, tortious or criminal act is also a substantial factor in bringing about the harm does not protect the actor from liability.’ ” Restatement of the Law of Torts, Vol. 2, p. 1184, § 439, cited in McAfee et al. v. Travis Gas Corporation, 137 Tex. 314 , 153 S.W.2d 442, 447 ; Biggers v. Continental Bus Sy

1961“We think that it is the generally accepted rule as applied to torts that ‘If the effects of the actor’s negligent conduct actively and continuously operate to bring about harm to another, the fact that the active and substantially simultaneous operation of the effects of a third person’s innocent, tortious or criminal act is also a substantial factor in bringing about the harm does not protect the actor from liability.’ ” Restatement of the Law of Torts, Vol. 2, p. 1184, § 439, cited in McAfee et al. v. Travis Gas Corporation, 137 Tex. 314 , 153 S.W.2d 442, 447 ; Biggers v. Continental Bus Sy

1967Stated in another way, ‘The intervention of an unforeseen and unexpected cause is not sufficient to relieve a wrongdoer from consequences of negligence, if such negligence directly *255 and proximately co-operates with the independent cause the resulting injury.’ ” See also Walker, Inc. v. Burgdorf, 150 Tex. 603 , 244 S.W.2d 506 (1951); Tex-Jersey Oil Corp. v. Beck, 157 Tex. 541 , 305 S.W.2d 162 (1957); Biggers v. Continental Bus System, 157 Tex. 351 , 298 S.W.2d 79 , 303 S.W.2d 359 (1957).

1964Walker, Inc. v. Burgdorf, 150 Tex. 603 , 244 S.W.2d 506, 509 ; Texas Power & Light Co. v. Culwell (Tex.Com.App.), 34 S.W.2d 820 ; Texas Public Service Co. v. Armstrong, supra. The rule to be applied in concurrent negligence cases is to be found in the case of McAfee v. Travis Gas Corp., 137 Tex. 314 , 153 S.W.2d 442, 447 , wherein the Supreme Court said: “ * * * We think it is the generally accepted rule as. applied to torts that ‘If the effects of the actor’s negligent conduct actively and continuously operate to bring about harm to another, the fact that the active and substantially simultan

1964Walker, Inc. v. Burgdorf, 150 Tex. 603 , 244 S.W.2d 506, 509 ; Texas Power & Light Co. v. Culwell (Tex.Com.App.), 34 S.W.2d 820 ; Texas Public Service Co. v. Armstrong, supra. The rule to be applied in concurrent negligence cases is to be found in the case of McAfee v. Travis Gas Corp., 137 Tex. 314 , 153 S.W.2d 442, 447 , wherein the Supreme Court said: “ * * * We think it is the generally accepted rule as. applied to torts that ‘If the effects of the actor’s negligent conduct actively and continuously operate to bring about harm to another, the fact that the active and substantially simultan

1959Stated in another . way, ‘The intervention of an unforeseen and unexpected cause is not sufficient to relieve a wrongdoer from consequences of negligence, if such negligence directly and proximately cooperates with the independent cause in the resulting injury.’ Texas Power & Light Co. v. Culwell, Tex.Com.App., 34 S.W.2d 820, 821 ; Texas Public Service Co. v. Armstrong, supra.” Further, we think the rule laid down in the case of Landers v. East Texas Salt Water Disposal Co., 151 Tex. 251 , 248 S.W.2d 731, 734 , is applicable here even if the child overturned the wheelbarrow.

1964Walker, Inc. v. Burgdorf, 150 Tex. 603 , 244 S.W.2d 506, 509 ; Texas Power & Light Co. v. Culwell (Tex.Com.App.), 34 S.W.2d 820 ; Texas Public Service Co. v. Armstrong, supra. The rule to be applied in concurrent negligence cases is to be found in the case of McAfee v. Travis Gas Corp., 137 Tex. 314 , 153 S.W.2d 442, 447 , wherein the Supreme Court said: “ * * * We think it is the generally accepted rule as. applied to torts that ‘If the effects of the actor’s negligent conduct actively and continuously operate to bring about harm to another, the fact that the active and substantially simultan

1959Stated in another . way, ‘The intervention of an unforeseen and unexpected cause is not sufficient to relieve a wrongdoer from consequences of negligence, if such negligence directly and proximately cooperates with the independent cause in the resulting injury.’ Texas Power & Light Co. v. Culwell, Tex.Com.App., 34 S.W.2d 820, 821 ; Texas Public Service Co. v. Armstrong, supra.” Further, we think the rule laid down in the case of Landers v. East Texas Salt Water Disposal Co., 151 Tex. 251 , 248 S.W.2d 731, 734 , is applicable here even if the child overturned the wheelbarrow.

1963Rolater v. Rolater, (Tex.Civ.App.), 198 S.W. 391 .

1963The Court of Civil Appeals stated the generally accepted rule to be “that an insurable interest exists when the assured derives pecuniary benefit or advantage by the preservation and continued existence of the property or would sustain pecuniary loss from its destruction,” citing Rolater v. Rolater, (Tex.Civ.App.) 198 S.W. 391 , and Canfield v. Newman, (Tex.Civ.App.) 265 S.W. 1052 .

1956And where the testimony of parties is full, though sharply' conflicting, the generally accepted rule is that (1) we must accept the trial court’s decision upon the point, as we possess no power to pass upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony (citations); and (2) considering the wide discretionary powers of a trial judge in matters of divorce, their determination that the testimony is clear and satisfactory in a given case will not be disturbed by an appellate court, absent a showing of clear abuse of power (citations).” See also Moon v. Moon, Tex.Civ.App.,

1946And where the testimony of parties is full, though sharp-' ]y conflicting) the generally accepted rule jg tbat ^ we must accept the trial court’s decision upon the point, as we possess no power tQ pass upon the credibility of wit-nesses and ⅛£ weight t0 be given their testimony; Mortensen v. Mortensen, Tex. Civ.App.; 186 S.W.2d 297, 305 , Moon v. Moon, Tex.Civ.App., 186 S.W.2d 362 ; and (2) COnsidering the wide descretionary powers 0f a trial judge in matters of divorce, their determination that the testi-mony is clear and satisfactory in a given case will not be disturbed by an appellate cour

2025The generally accepted standard of care in healthcare-liability cases is “what an ordinary prudent [healthcare provider] would do under the same or similar circumstances.” Id. at 880 .

2025The report must explain how the healthcare provider breached that standard of care, see id., and explain “how and why” the alleged breach caused the injury in question, Abshire, 563 S.W.3d at 224 .