generally accepted rule in South Dakota

2017For example, “[i]n some instances, difficulties in enforcement of mandamus may call for denial of relief.” Willoughby, 1998 S.D. 68 , ¶ 12, 581 N.W.2d at 169 .

2017It is also “the generally accepted rule that there may be considerations of justice which will justify a refusal of the writ, although there may be no other appropriate and adequate remedy.” City of Sioux Falls v. Sioux Falls Traction Sys., 53 S.D. 471 , 221 N.W. 84, 85 (1928).

2000Such was the conclusion of the Florida Supreme Court in Cline v. Cline, 101 Fla. 488 , 134 So. 546 (1931).

2000Such was the conclusion of the Florida Supreme Court in Cline v. Cline, 101 Fla. 488 , 134 So. 546 (1931).

2000Furthermore, our cases recognize “the generally accepted rule that the moving party has the burden of going forward as well as the burden of persuasion in administrative hearings.” Gourley v. Boar d of Trustees of South Dakota Retirement System, 289 N.W.2d 251, 253 (S.D.1980) (citing Wonder Life Co. v. Liddy, 207 N.W.2d 27 (Iowa 1973) (emphasis added)). [¶ 25.] In worker’s compensation cases, “[t]he employee’s burden of persuasion is by a preponderance of the evidence.” Foltz, 516 N.W.2d at 341 (quoting Caldwell v. John Morrell & Co., 489 N.W.2d 353, 358 (S.D.1992)).

1992"This is the generally accepted rule which applies when a defendant has received an unlawful sentence." Id 305 N.W.2d at 61 .

1992Upchurch, supra. “This is the generally accepted rule which applies when a defendant has received an unlawful sentence.” Id 305 N.W.2d at 61 .

1984As stated in Owen, 350 N.W.2d at 50 , [i]t is the generally accepted rule of law that destruction by health authorities of animals suffering from a contagious disease, where such destruction is necessary to prevent the spread of the disease, does not deprive the owner of property without due process of law.

1972The rule is not that the substance of the words alleged must be proved, but that the words alleged in the declaration, or enough of them to amount to a charge of the particular offense alleged to have been imputed, must be substantially proved.' In other words, so many of the words alleged in the declaration 'as constitute the sting of the charge' (Smith v. Hollister, 32 Vt. 695, 708 ), or so many of such words alleged as contain 'the poison to the character and constitute the precise charge of slander averred' (Lewis v. McDaniel, 82 Mo. 577 ), must be substantially proved." The gravamen of th

1972The rule is not that the substance of the words alleged must be proved, but that the words alleged in the declaration, or enough of them to amount to a charge of the particular offense alleged to have been imputed, must be substantially proved.' In other words, so many of the words alleged in the declaration `as constitute the sting of the charge' (Smith v. Hollister, 32 Vt. 695, 708 ), or so many of such words alleged as contain `the poison to the character and constitute the precise charge of slander averred' (Lewis v. McDaniel, 82 Mo. 577 ), must be substantially proved." The gravamen of th

1972The rule is not that the substance of the words alleged must be proved, but that the words alleged in the declaration, or enough of them to amount to a charge of the particular offense alleged to have been imputed, must be substantially proved.' In other words, so many of the words alleged in the declaration 'as constitute the sting of the charge' (Smith v. Hollister, 32 Vt. 695, 708 ), or so many of such words alleged as contain 'the poison to the character and constitute the precise charge of slander averred' (Lewis v. McDaniel, 82 Mo. 577 ), must be substantially proved." The gravamen of th

1972The rule is not that the substance of the words alleged must be proved, but that the words alleged in the declaration, or enough of them to amount to a charge of the particular offense alleged to have been imputed, must be substantially proved.' In other words, so many of the words alleged in the declaration `as constitute the sting of the charge' (Smith v. Hollister, 32 Vt. 695, 708 ), or so many of such words alleged as contain `the poison to the character and constitute the precise charge of slander averred' (Lewis v. McDaniel, 82 Mo. 577 ), must be substantially proved." The gravamen of th

1970Bumbarger v. Walker, 393 Pa. 143 , 142 A.2d 171 ; Cities Service Oil Co. v. Merritt, Okl., 332 P.2d 677 ; Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. Tisdale, Okl., 366 P.2d 614 ; and Yommer v. McKenzie, Md., 257 A.2d 138 . 3 .

1970Bumbarger v. Walker, 393 Pa. 143 , 142 A.2d 171 ; Cities Service Oil Co. v. Merritt, Okl., 332 P.2d 677 ; Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. Tisdale, Okl., 366 P.2d 614 ; and Yommer v. McKenzie, Md., 257 A.2d 138 . 3 .

1970Bumbarger v. Walker, 393 Pa. 143 , 142 A.2d 171 ; Cities Service Oil Co. v. Merritt, Okl., 332 P.2d 677 ; Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. Tisdale, Okl., 366 P.2d 614 ; and Yommer v. McKenzie, Md., 257 A.2d 138 . 3 .

1970Bumbarger v. Walker, 393 Pa. 143 , 142 A.2d 171 ; Cities Service Oil Co. v. Merritt, Okl., 332 P.2d 677 ; Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. Tisdale, Okl., 366 P.2d 614 ; and Yommer v. McKenzie, Md., 257 A.2d 138 . 3 .

1970Bumbarger v. Walker, 393 Pa. 143 , 142 A.2d 171 ; Cities Service Oil Co. v. Merritt, Okl., 332 P.2d 677 ; Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. Tisdale, Okl., 366 P.2d 614 ; and Yommer v. McKenzie, Md., 257 A.2d 138 . 3 .

1959When, as the Supreme Court of our sister state of North Dakota has pointed out in Wellens v. Beck, N.D.1957, 84 N.W.2d 345 , at page 360, the generally accepted rule is that a chattel mortgage such as is involved in this action is not prasump tively fraudulent as we here affirm, but is void as to creditors, this court should not erect another shield in the hands of the parties to this claimed fraud.

1959When, as the Supreme Court of our sister state of North Dakota has pointed out in Wellens v. Beck, N.D.1957, 84 N.W.2d 345 , at page 360, the generally accepted rule is that a chattel mortgage such as is involved in this action is not presumptively fraudulent as we here affirm, but is void as to creditors, this court should not erect another shield in the hands of the parties to this claimed fraud.

1955The intention of the Legislature is to be ascertained by the court primarily from the language used in the statute, with the aid of the canons of construction. 82 C.J.S., Statutes, § 322; Boehrs v. Dewey County, 74 S.D. 75 , 48 N.W.2d 831 ; Elfring v. Paterson, 66 S.D. 458 , 285 N.W. 443 .

1955The intention of the Legislature is to be ascertained by the court primarily from the language used in the statute, with the aid of the canons of construction. 82 C.J.S., Statutes, § 322; Boehrs v. Dewey County, 74 S.D. 75 , 48 N.W.2d 831 ; Elfring v. Paterson, 66 S.D. 458 , 285 N.W. 443 .

1955The intention of the Legislature is to be ascertained by the court primarily from the language used in the statute, with the aid of the canons of construction. 82 C.J.S., Statutes, § 322; Boehrs v. Dewey County, 74 S.D. 75 , 48 N.W.2d 831 ; Elfring v. Paterson, 66 S.D. 458 , 285 N.W. 443 .

1955The intention of the Legislature is to be ascertained by the court primarily from the language used in the statute, with the aid of the canons of construction. 82 C.J.S., Statutes, § 322; Boehrs v. Dewey County, 74 S.D. 75 , 48 N.W.2d 831 ; Elfring v. Paterson, 66 S.D. 458 , 285 N.W. 443 .

1947Co., 54 S. D. 107, 222 N. W. 667 .

1928The right of the trial court to exercise sound discretion in allowing or refusing the writ was sanctioned by this court in Halverson v. Williams et al, 38 S. D. 176, 160 N. W. 730 .

1916B. 916: “When we say that there is no evidence to go to the jury, we do not mean that there is literally none, but that there is none which ought reasonably to satisfy a jury that the fact to be proved is established.” Railway Co. v. Lowery, 74 Fed. 463 , 20 C.