generally accepted rule in North Dakota

1983E.g., United States v. American Horse, 671 F.2d 286 (8th Cir.1982).

1983However, in Rehnberg v. Minnesota Homes, 236 Minn. 230 , 52 N.W.2d 454, 457 (1952), the Minnesota Supreme Court aptly summarized the generally accepted rule that, in addition to limitation as to scope and duration, an enterprise does not constitute a joint venture unless the following four elements are present: “(a) Contribution — the parties must combine their money, property, time, or skill in some common undertaking, but the contribution of each need not be equal or of the same nature. “(b) Joint proprietorship and control —there must be a proprietary interest and right of mutual control ov

1983Rippley, supra, 319 N.W.2d at 134 .

1983Rippley, supra, 319 N.W.2d at 134 .

1976Muse v. Slayton, 333 F.Supp. 1007, 1010 (D.W.Va.1971); White v. Pepersack, 352 F.2d 470 (4th Cir. 1965).

1969This court has set out the generally accepted rule with regard to admissibility of medical testimony in Vaux , at page 293, as follows: “A medical expert is qualified to express an opinion to a medical certainty, or based on medical probabilities only, but not an opinion on mere possibilities.” In the recent case of Thornburg v. Perleberg, 158 N.W.2d 188 (N.D.1968), we held that permitting a dentist to state that there was a “possibility” that plaintiff might lose more teeth, although error, was not prejudicial because the dentist later testified on cross-examination that, based on medical pro

1957It is a generally accepted rule that a motorist must exercise a higher degree of care toward children than toward adults. *420 Olesen v. Noren, 161 Minn. 113 , 201 N.W. 296 ; Volkmann v. Fidelity & Cas.

1957It is a generally accepted rule that a motorist must exercise a higher degree of care toward children than toward adults. *420 Olesen v. Noren, 161 Minn. 113 , 201 N.W. 296 ; Volkmann v. Fidelity & Cas.

1957Co. of N. Y., 248 Wis. 615 , 22 N.W.2d 660 ; Woodward v. Spring Canyon Coal Co., 90 Utah 578 , 63 P.2d 267 .

1957Co. of N. Y., 248 Wis. 615 , 22 N.W.2d 660 ; Woodward v. Spring Canyon Coal Co., 90 Utah 578 , 63 P.2d 267 .

1957Co. of N. Y., 248 Wis. 615 , 22 N.W.2d 660 ; Woodward v. Spring Canyon Coal Co., 90 Utah 578 , 63 P.2d 267 .

1957Co. of N. Y., 248 Wis. 615 , 22 N.W.2d 660 ; Woodward v. Spring Canyon Coal Co., 90 Utah 578 , 63 P.2d 267 .

1946In addition to the citations with reference to corporations in general we find in 41 CJS 342, the rule stated that, “A private hospital, — which is not exempted from liability as a charity . . . , may be held liable for injuries proximately caused by its own negligence, or for the negligence or misconduct of its officers' or employees occurring within the scope of their employment, . . . .” In Washington Gaslight Co. v. Lansden, 172 US 534, 543 , 43 *546 L ed 543, 547, 19 S Ct 296 , it is stated, “That a corporation may be held responsible in an action for the publication of a libel is no long

1946In addition to the citations with reference to corporations in general we find in 41 CJS 342, the rule stated that, “A private hospital, — which is not exempted from liability as a charity . . . , may be held liable for injuries proximately caused by its own negligence, or for the negligence or misconduct of its officers' or employees occurring within the scope of their employment, . . . .” In Washington Gaslight Co. v. Lansden, 172 US 534, 543 , 43 *546 L ed 543, 547, 19 S Ct 296 , it is stated, “That a corporation may be held responsible in an action for the publication of a libel is no long

1922“The generally accepted test of responsibility for crime is the capacity to understand the nature of the act alleged to be criminal, and the ability to distinguish between right and wrong with respect to siich act.” Philbrick v. State, 105 Neb. 120 , 179 N. W. 398 ; Osborn v. State, 143 Wis. 249 , 31 L.R.A.(N.S.) 966, 126 N. W. 737 ; State v. Mewhinney, 43 Utah 135 , L.R.A.1916D, 590, 134 Pac. 632 , Ann.

1922“The generally accepted test of responsibility for crime is the capacity to understand the nature of the act alleged to be criminal, and the ability to distinguish between right and wrong with respect to siich act.” Philbrick v. State, 105 Neb. 120 , 179 N. W. 398 ; Osborn v. State, 143 Wis. 249 , 31 L.R.A.(N.S.) 966, 126 N. W. 737 ; State v. Mewhinney, 43 Utah 135 , L.R.A.1916D, 590, 134 Pac. 632 , Ann.

1922“The generally accepted test of responsibility for crime is the capacity to understand the nature of the act alleged to be criminal, and the ability to distinguish between right and wrong with respect to siich act.” Philbrick v. State, 105 Neb. 120 , 179 N. W. 398 ; Osborn v. State, 143 Wis. 249 , 31 L.R.A.(N.S.) 966, 126 N. W. 737 ; State v. Mewhinney, 43 Utah 135 , L.R.A.1916D, 590, 134 Pac. 632 , Ann.

1922“The generally accepted test of responsibility for crime is the capacity to understand the nature of the act alleged to be criminal, and the ability to distinguish between right and wrong with respect to siich act.” Philbrick v. State, 105 Neb. 120 , 179 N. W. 398 ; Osborn v. State, 143 Wis. 249 , 31 L.R.A.(N.S.) 966, 126 N. W. 737 ; State v. Mewhinney, 43 Utah 135 , L.R.A.1916D, 590, 134 Pac. 632 , Ann.

1922“The generally accepted test of responsibility for crime is the capacity to understand the nature of the act alleged to be criminal, and the ability to distinguish between right and wrong with respect to siich act.” Philbrick v. State, 105 Neb. 120 , 179 N. W. 398 ; Osborn v. State, 143 Wis. 249 , 31 L.R.A.(N.S.) 966, 126 N. W. 737 ; State v. Mewhinney, 43 Utah 135 , L.R.A.1916D, 590, 134 Pac. 632 , Ann.

1922“The generally accepted test of responsibility for crime is the capacity to understand the nature of the act alleged to be criminal, and the ability to distinguish between right and wrong with respect to siich act.” Philbrick v. State, 105 Neb. 120 , 179 N. W. 398 ; Osborn v. State, 143 Wis. 249 , 31 L.R.A.(N.S.) 966, 126 N. W. 737 ; State v. Mewhinney, 43 Utah 135 , L.R.A.1916D, 590, 134 Pac. 632 , Ann.

1914It has been said that it is within the discretion of the court to permit medical books to be read to the jury (State v. Soper, 148 Mo. 1 , c. 235, 236, 49 S. W. 1007 , but undoubtedly the better and generally accepted doctrine is that the contents of such books are not admissible as independent evidence. [17 Cyc. 421; Union P. R.

1914It has been said that it is within the discretion of the court to permit medical books to be read to the jury (State v. Soper, 148 Mo. 1 , c. 235, 236, 49 S. W. 1007 , but undoubtedly the better and generally accepted doctrine is that the contents of such books are not admissible as independent evidence. [17 Cyc. 421; Union P. R.

1914Co. v. Yates, 40 L.R.A. 553 , 25 C.