113 New York opinions name it 11 courts 1889–2022 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In re Reissgreen2 sentences2017It is a generally accepted principle that the state where respondent lived and practiced law at the time of the offense has the greatest interest in the issue and the public policy considerations relevant to such disciplinary actions (see Matter of Reiss, 119 AD2d 1, 6 [1st Dept 1986]; see also Matter of Supino, 23 AD3d 11, 14 [1st Dept 2005]). 2014Matter of Meyers, 108 AD3d 158 [1st Dept 2013]; Matter of Cohen 40 AD3d 61 [1st Dept 2007]), respondent states that he demonstrated remorse for his action, apologized to his clients, refunded his fee, and worked diligently with successor counsel; that the Board noted that his misconduct was grounded in weakness, not malice; and that the Supreme Court of California effectively imposed a two-year reciprocal suspension (see Vohra on Discipline, 2014 Cal LEXIS 4715 [Sup Ct, Mar. 26, 2014, No. S216051]). *202 It is a generally accepted principle that the jurisdiction where respondent lived and prac | 9 | 20 |
In re Supinogreen2 sentences2017It is a generally accepted principle that the state where respondent lived and practiced law at the time of the offense has the greatest interest in the issue and the public policy considerations relevant to such disciplinary actions (see Matter of Reiss, 119 AD2d 1, 6 [1st Dept 1986]; see also Matter of Supino, 23 AD3d 11, 14 [1st Dept 2005]). 2013It is a generally accepted principle that the jurisdiction where respondent lived and practiced law at the time of the offense has the greatest interest in the issue and the public policy considerations relevant to such disciplinary actions (see Matter of Reiss, 119 AD2d 1, 6 [1st Dept 1986]; see also Matter of Supino, 23 AD3d 11 [1st Dept 2005]). | 8 | 8 |
Nestorowich v. Ricottagreen2 sentences2019"A doctor may be liable only if the doctor's treatment decisions do not reflect his or her own best judgment, or fall short of the generally accepted standard of care" ( Nestorowich v Ricotta , 97 NY2d 393, 399 ). 2019It is well settled that "a doctor may be liable only if the doctor's treatment decisions do not reflect his or her own best judgment, or fall short of the generally accepted standard of care" ( Nestorowich v Ricotta , 97 NY2d 393, 399 [2002]). | 3 | 5 |
Diaz v. New York Downtown Hospitalgreen2 sentences2012The affidavit of the plaintiffs’ expert submitted in opposition to the motion was insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendant was negligent in failing to provide the infant plaintiff with protective eye gear, as there was no evidence to show that a recommendation to use such gear reflected a generally accepted standard or practice in high school (see Diaz v New York Downtown Hosp., 99 NY2d 542 [2002]; Harris v Five Point Mission — Camp Olmstedt, 73 AD3d 1127 [2010]; Walker v Commack School Dist., 31 AD3d 752 [2006]). 2012The affidavit of the plaintiffs’ expert submitted in opposition to the motion was insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendant was negligent in failing to provide the infant plaintiff with protective eye gear, as there was no evidence to show that a recommendation to use such gear reflected a generally accepted standard or practice in high school (see Diaz v New York Downtown Hosp., 99 NY2d 542 [2002]; Harris v Five Point Mission — Camp Olmstedt, 73 AD3d 1127 [2010]; Walker v Commack School Dist., 31 AD3d 752 [2006]). | 3 | 5 |
Rosenblitt v. Rosenblittgreen2 sentences2004It is a generally accepted principle that parties to a contested custody proceeding place their physical and mental conditions in issue (see Rosenblitt v Rosenblitt, 107 AD2d 292, 293-294 [1985]). 1996It is a generally accepted principle that parties to a contested custody proceeding place their physical and mental conditions in issue (see, Rosenblitt v Rosenblitt, 107 AD2d 292, 293-294 ). | 2 | 5 |
Snyder Plumbing & Heating Corp. v. Purcellgreen2 sentences2011“Parties asserting third-party beneficiary rights under a contract must establish ‘(1) the existence of a valid and binding contract between other parties, (2) that the contract was intended for [their] benefit and (3) that the benefit to [them] is sufficiently immediate, rather than incidental, to indicate the assumption by the contracting parties of a duty to compensate [them] if the benefit is lost.’ ” (Mendel v Henry Phipps Plaza W., Inc., 6 NY3d 783 , 786 [2006], quoting Burns Jackson Miller Summit & Spitzer v Lindner, 59 NY2d 314, 336 [1983].) “It is the generally accepted rule that the 2010“It is the generally accepted rule that the intent to confer a direct benefit on a third party must clearly appear in order to enable such a party, not named in the contract, to recover thereunder.” (Snyder Plumbing & Heating Corp. v Purcell, 9 AD2d 505, 508 [1960], citing Beveridge v New York El. | 2 | 3 |
Darren v. Safiergreen2 sentences2014Although a plaintiff’s expert may have chosen a different course of treatment, this, “without more, ‘represents, at most, a difference of opinion among [medical providers], which is not sufficient to sustain a prima facie case of malpractice’ ” (Ibguy v State of New York, 261 AD2d 510 , 510 [2d Dept 1999], lv denied 93 NY2d 816 [1999], quoting Darren v Safier, 207 AD2d 473, 474 [2d Dept 1994]). 2014Although a plaintiff’s expert may have chosen a different course of treatment, this, “without more, ‘represents, at most, a difference of opinion among [medical providers], which is not sufficient to sustain a prima facie case of malpractice’ ” (Ibguy v State of New York, 261 AD2d 510 , 510 [2d Dept 1999], lv denied 93 NY2d 816 [1999], quoting Darren v Safier, 207 AD2d 473, 474 [2d Dept 1994]). | 2 | 2 |
People v. Gonzalezgreen2 sentences2012The generally accepted standard for appellate review in a nonprimary residence action is whether “it is obvious that the [fact-finding] court’s conclusions could not be reached under any fair interpretation of the evidence.” (Claridge Gardens v Menotti, 160 AD2d 544, 545 [1st Dept 1990]; see also 542 E. 14th St. 2012The generally accepted standard for appellate review in a nonprimary residence action is whether “it is obvious that the [fact-finding] court’s conclusions could not be reached under any fair interpretation of the evidence.” (Claridge Gardens v Menotti, 160 AD2d 544, 545 [1st Dept 1990]; see also 542 E. 14th St. | 2 | 2 |
Burgel v. Burgelgreen2 sentences2008Although the ‘broad scope of discovery permitted under the CPLR takes on particular significance in child custody disputes’ (Burgel v Burgel, 141 AD2d 215, 216 [1988]), ‘because the potential for abuse in matrimonial and custody cases is “so great” (see, Lohmiller v Lohmiller, 118 AD2d 760 [1986]; cf., Wegman v Wegman, 37 NY2d 940 [1975]; Rosenblitt v Rosenblitt[, 107 AD2d 292 ]), the court’s discretionary power to limit disclosure and grant protective orders is equally broad’ (Garvin v Garvin, 162 AD2d 497, 499 [1990]).” In the case at bar a deposition of the husband’s treating therapist woul 2008Although the “broad scope of discovery permitted under the CPLR takes on particular significance in child custody disputes” (Burgel v Burgel, 141 AD2d 215, 216 [1988]), “because the potential for abuse in matrimonial and custody cases is ‘so great’ (see, Lohmiller v Lohmiller, 118 AD2d 760 ; cf., Wegman v Wegman, 37 NY2d 940 ; Rosenblitt v Rosenblitt [ 107 AD2d 292 ]), the court’s discretionary power to limit disclosure and grant protective orders is equally broad” (Garvin v Garvin, 162 AD2d 497, 499 [1990]). | 2 | 2 |
Garvin v. Garvingreen2 sentences2008Although the ‘broad scope of discovery permitted under the CPLR takes on particular significance in child custody disputes’ (Burgel v Burgel, 141 AD2d 215, 216 [1988]), ‘because the potential for abuse in matrimonial and custody cases is “so great” (see, Lohmiller v Lohmiller, 118 AD2d 760 [1986]; cf., Wegman v Wegman, 37 NY2d 940 [1975]; Rosenblitt v Rosenblitt[, 107 AD2d 292 ]), the court’s discretionary power to limit disclosure and grant protective orders is equally broad’ (Garvin v Garvin, 162 AD2d 497, 499 [1990]).” In the case at bar a deposition of the husband’s treating therapist woul 2008Although the “broad scope of discovery permitted under the CPLR takes on particular significance in child custody disputes” (Burgel v Burgel, 141 AD2d 215, 216 [1988]), “because the potential for abuse in matrimonial and custody cases is ‘so great’ (see, Lohmiller v Lohmiller, 118 AD2d 760 ; cf., Wegman v Wegman, 37 NY2d 940 ; Rosenblitt v Rosenblitt [ 107 AD2d 292 ]), the court’s discretionary power to limit disclosure and grant protective orders is equally broad” (Garvin v Garvin, 162 AD2d 497, 499 [1990]). | 2 | 2 |
Anonymous v. Anonymousgreen2 sentences2008It is a generally accepted principle that parties to a contested custody proceeding place their physical and mental conditions in issue’ (Anonymous v Anonymous, 5 AD3d 516, 517 [2004]). 2008It is a generally accepted principle that parties to a contested custody proceeding place their physical and mental conditions in issue” (Anonymous v Anonymous, 5 AD3d 516, 517 [2004]). | 2 | 2 |
Elliott v. City of New Yorkgreen2 sentences2003In pertinent part the Court noted that “[t]he defendant [failed to offer a] reason to cause [the] Court to deviate from the generally-accepted principle that the violation of a statute constitutes negligence per se, and the violation of an ordinance constitutes some evidence of negligence.” (Id. at 392.) In Elliott v City of New York ( 95 NY2d 730, 734 [2001]), the Court of Appeals noted that “[a]s a rule, violation of a State statute that imposes a specific duty constitutes negligence per se, or may even create absolute liability ... 2003In pertinent part the Court noted that "[t]he defendant [failed to offer a] reason to cause [the] Court to deviate from the generally-accepted principle that the violation of a statute constitutes negligence per se, and the violation of an ordinance constitutes some evidence of negligence." ( Id . at 392.) In Elliott v City of New York ( 95 NY2d 730, 734 [2001]), the Court of Appeals noted that "[a]s a rule, violation of a State statute that imposes a specific duty constitutes negligence per se, or may even create absolute liability . . . | 2 | 2 |
In re Vohragreen2 sentences2017Moreover, a censure is in accord with this Court’s precedent under similar circumstances (see Matter of Hoffman, 34 AD3d 1 [1st Dept 2006] [attorney reciprocally censured for failing to appear and provide adequate representation to client]; Matter of Vohra, 303 AD2d at 63-64 ; Matter of LaSalle, 194 AD2d 28 [1st Dept 1993] [attorney censured for neglecting client matter and misrepresenting status of the case]). 2004On the issue of the appropriate sanction, it is a generally accepted principle that the jurisdiction where the respondent lived and practiced law at the time of the offense has the greatest interest in the issue and the public policy considerations relevant to such disciplinary actions (Matter of Vohra, 303 AD2d 61, 63 [2003]). | 1 | 3 |
Walker v. Commack School Districtgreen2 sentences2012The affidavit of the plaintiffs’ expert submitted in opposition to the motion was insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendant was negligent in failing to provide the infant plaintiff with protective eye gear, as there was no evidence to show that a recommendation to use such gear reflected a generally accepted standard or practice in high school (see Diaz v New York Downtown Hosp., 99 NY2d 542 [2002]; Harris v Five Point Mission — Camp Olmstedt, 73 AD3d 1127 [2010]; Walker v Commack School Dist., 31 AD3d 752 [2006]). 2012The affidavit of the plaintiffs’ expert submitted in opposition to the motion was insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendant was negligent in failing to provide the infant plaintiff with protective eye gear, as there was no evidence to show that a recommendation to use such gear reflected a generally accepted standard or practice in high school (see Diaz v New York Downtown Hosp., 99 NY2d 542 [2002]; Harris v Five Point Mission — Camp Olmstedt, 73 AD3d 1127 [2010]; Walker v Commack School Dist., 31 AD3d 752 [2006]). | 1 | 3 |
In re Lowellgreen2 sentences2014Only in rare instances will we depart from this general rule (see Matter of Lowell, 14 AD3d 41, 48 [1st Dept 2004], appeal dismissed 4 NY3d 846 [2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 708 [2005]). 2006While we agree with the generally accepted and well-grounded principle of reciprocal discipline and virtually always defer to the home state when sanctioning a respondent, 2 here we must decline to follow the reciprocal discipline doctrine as the sanction New Jersey has imposed is, in our view, significantly too lenient (see Matter of Lowell, 14 AD3d 41 [2004], appeal dismissed, 4 NY3d 846 [2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 708 [2005]). | 1 | 2 |
| Bunk v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Utica-Watertowngreen | 1 | 1 |
| Tsitrin v. New York Community Hospitalgreen | 1 | 1 |
| In re Davisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Rospierski v. Haargreen | 1 | 1 |
| Burns Jackson Miller Summit & Spitzer v. Lindnergreen | 1 | 1 |
| In re Anschellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Carlino v. Triboro Coach Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| In re Bieluchgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Light v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Davis v. Patelgreen | 1 | 1 |
| In re DeSalvogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Miller v. Continental Insurancegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Kircher v. City of Jamestowngreen | 1 | 1 |
| Cuffy v. City of New Yorkgreen | 1 | 1 |
| In re Grossfieldgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In re Power
green
2 sentences2013In this matter, the New Jersey Supreme Court imposed a public reprimand, which is the equivalent of public censure in this State (see Matter of Power, 3 AD3d 21 [1st Dept 2003]; Matter of Maiorino, 301 AD2d 53 [1st Dept 2002]). 2013In this matter, the New Jersey Supreme Court imposed a public reprimand, which is the equivalent of public censure in this State (see Matter of Power, 3 AD3d 21 [1st Dept 2003]; Matter of Maiorino, 301 AD2d 53 [1st Dept 2002]). | 5 | 2007–2013 |
In re Maiorino
green
2 sentences2013In this matter, the New Jersey Supreme Court imposed a public reprimand, which is the equivalent of public censure in this State (see Matter of Power, 3 AD3d 21 [1st Dept 2003]; Matter of Maiorino, 301 AD2d 53 [1st Dept 2002]). 2013In this matter, the New Jersey Supreme Court imposed a public reprimand, which is the equivalent of public censure in this State (see Matter of Power, 3 AD3d 21 [1st Dept 2003]; Matter of Maiorino, 301 AD2d 53 [1st Dept 2002]). | 5 | 2007–2013 |
In re LaSalle
green
2 sentences2017Moreover, a censure is in accord with this Court’s precedent under similar circumstances (see Matter of Hoffman, 34 AD3d 1 [1st Dept 2006] [attorney reciprocally censured for failing to appear and provide adequate representation to client]; Matter of Vohra, 303 AD2d at 63-64 ; Matter of LaSalle, 194 AD2d 28 [1st Dept 1993] [attorney censured for neglecting client matter and misrepresenting status of the case]). 2009Moreover, a censure is in accord with the mit igation presented and this Court’s precedent under similar circumstances (see Matter of Hoffman, 34 AD3d 1 [2006] [attorney reciprocally censured for failing to appear and provide adequate representation to client]; Matter of Vohra, supra; Matter of LaSalle, 194 AD2d 28 [1993] [attorney censured for neglecting client matter and misrepresenting status of the case]). | 3 | 2004–2017 |
J.L.B. Equities, Inc. v. Mind Over Money, Ltd.
green
2 sentences2014Although a plaintiff’s expert may have chosen a different course of treatment, this, “without more, ‘represents, at most, a difference of opinion among [medical providers], which is not sufficient to sustain a prima facie case of malpractice’ ” (Ibguy v State of New York, 261 AD2d 510 , 510 [2d Dept 1999], lv denied 93 NY2d 816 [1999], quoting Darren v Safier, 207 AD2d 473, 474 [2d Dept 1994]). 2014Although a plaintiff’s expert may have chosen a different course of treatment, this, “without more, ‘represents, at most, a difference of opinion among [medical providers], which is not sufficient to sustain a prima facie case of malpractice’ ” (Ibguy v State of New York, 261 AD2d 510 , 510 [2d Dept 1999], lv denied 93 NY2d 816 [1999], quoting Darren v Safier, 207 AD2d 473, 474 [2d Dept 1994]). | 3 | 2002–2014 |
In re Hoffman
green
2 sentences2017Moreover, a censure is in accord with this Court’s precedent under similar circumstances (see Matter of Hoffman, 34 AD3d 1 [1st Dept 2006] [attorney reciprocally censured for failing to appear and provide adequate representation to client]; Matter of Vohra, 303 AD2d at 63-64 ; Matter of LaSalle, 194 AD2d 28 [1st Dept 1993] [attorney censured for neglecting client matter and misrepresenting status of the case]). 2009Moreover, a censure is in accord with the mit igation presented and this Court’s precedent under similar circumstances (see Matter of Hoffman, 34 AD3d 1 [2006] [attorney reciprocally censured for failing to appear and provide adequate representation to client]; Matter of Vohra, supra; Matter of LaSalle, 194 AD2d 28 [1993] [attorney censured for neglecting client matter and misrepresenting status of the case]). | 2 | 2009–2017 |
Fredrick v. Fried
green
2 sentences2014Only in rare instances will we depart from this general rule (see Matter of Lowell, 14 AD3d 41, 48 [1st Dept 2004], appeal dismissed 4 NY3d 846 [2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 708 [2005]). 2006While we agree with the generally accepted and well-grounded principle of reciprocal discipline and virtually always defer to the home state when sanctioning a respondent, 2 here we must decline to follow the reciprocal discipline doctrine as the sanction New Jersey has imposed is, in our view, significantly too lenient (see Matter of Lowell, 14 AD3d 41 [2004], appeal dismissed, 4 NY3d 846 [2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 708 [2005]). | 2 | 2006–2014 |
Moody v. SOROKINA
green
2 sentences2014Only in rare instances will we depart from this general rule (see Matter of Lowell, 14 AD3d 41, 48 [1st Dept 2004], appeal dismissed 4 NY3d 846 [2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 708 [2005]). 2006While we agree with the generally accepted and well-grounded principle of reciprocal discipline and virtually always defer to the home state when sanctioning a respondent, 2 here we must decline to follow the reciprocal discipline doctrine as the sanction New Jersey has imposed is, in our view, significantly too lenient (see Matter of Lowell, 14 AD3d 41 [2004], appeal dismissed, 4 NY3d 846 [2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 708 [2005]). | 2 | 2006–2014 |
Harris v. Five Point Mission—Camp Olmstedt
green
2 sentences2012The affidavit of the plaintiffs’ expert submitted in opposition to the motion was insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendant was negligent in failing to provide the infant plaintiff with protective eye gear, as there was no evidence to show that a recommendation to use such gear reflected a generally accepted standard or practice in high school (see Diaz v New York Downtown Hosp., 99 NY2d 542 [2002]; Harris v Five Point Mission — Camp Olmstedt, 73 AD3d 1127 [2010]; Walker v Commack School Dist., 31 AD3d 752 [2006]). 2012The affidavit of the plaintiffs’ expert submitted in opposition to the motion was insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendant was negligent in failing to provide the infant plaintiff with protective eye gear, as there was no evidence to show that a recommendation to use such gear reflected a generally accepted standard or practice in high school (see Diaz v New York Downtown Hosp., 99 NY2d 542 [2002]; Harris v Five Point Mission — Camp Olmstedt, 73 AD3d 1127 [2010]; Walker v Commack School Dist., 31 AD3d 752 [2006]). | 2 | 2012–2012 |
Capotosto v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Rockville Centre
green
2 sentences2009Assuming that such regulations or laws existed at the time of the accident, there was no competent proof that they reflected a generally-accepted standard or practice in middle school settings (see Walker v Commack School Dist., 31 AD3d 752, 753 [2006]; Capotosto v Roman Catholic Diocese of Rockville Ctr., 2 AD3d 384 [2003]). 2006In this case, the plaintiffs expert “made no reference either to [his] own personal knowledge acquired through professional experience or to evidence that any [middle schools] have implemented [the NIRSA] standard” (Diaz v New York Downtown Hosp., supra at 545; see also Carlino v Triboro Coach Corp., 22 AD3d 624 [2005]; Tanon v Eppler, 5 AD3d 667 [2004]; Capotosto v Roman Catholic Diocese of Rockville Ctr., 2 AD3d 384 [2003]; Ambrosio v South Huntington Union Free School Dist., 249 AD2d 346 [1998]; cf. Delgado v Markwort Sporting Goods Co., 11 Misc 3d 1072[A] , 2006 NY Slip Op 50528[U] [2006]) | 2 | 2006–2009 |
Lohmiller v. Lohmiller
green
2 sentences2008Although the ‘broad scope of discovery permitted under the CPLR takes on particular significance in child custody disputes’ (Burgel v Burgel, 141 AD2d 215, 216 [1988]), ‘because the potential for abuse in matrimonial and custody cases is “so great” (see, Lohmiller v Lohmiller, 118 AD2d 760 [1986]; cf., Wegman v Wegman, 37 NY2d 940 [1975]; Rosenblitt v Rosenblitt[, 107 AD2d 292 ]), the court’s discretionary power to limit disclosure and grant protective orders is equally broad’ (Garvin v Garvin, 162 AD2d 497, 499 [1990]).” In the case at bar a deposition of the husband’s treating therapist woul 2008Although the “broad scope of discovery permitted under the CPLR takes on particular significance in child custody disputes” (Burgel v Burgel, 141 AD2d 215, 216 [1988]), “because the potential for abuse in matrimonial and custody cases is ‘so great’ (see, Lohmiller v Lohmiller, 118 AD2d 760 ; cf., Wegman v Wegman, 37 NY2d 940 ; Rosenblitt v Rosenblitt [ 107 AD2d 292 ]), the court’s discretionary power to limit disclosure and grant protective orders is equally broad” (Garvin v Garvin, 162 AD2d 497, 499 [1990]). | 2 | 2008–2008 |
Wegman v. Wegman
green
2 sentences2008Although the ‘broad scope of discovery permitted under the CPLR takes on particular significance in child custody disputes’ (Burgel v Burgel, 141 AD2d 215, 216 [1988]), ‘because the potential for abuse in matrimonial and custody cases is “so great” (see, Lohmiller v Lohmiller, 118 AD2d 760 [1986]; cf., Wegman v Wegman, 37 NY2d 940 [1975]; Rosenblitt v Rosenblitt[, 107 AD2d 292 ]), the court’s discretionary power to limit disclosure and grant protective orders is equally broad’ (Garvin v Garvin, 162 AD2d 497, 499 [1990]).” In the case at bar a deposition of the husband’s treating therapist woul 2008Although the “broad scope of discovery permitted under the CPLR takes on particular significance in child custody disputes” (Burgel v Burgel, 141 AD2d 215, 216 [1988]), “because the potential for abuse in matrimonial and custody cases is ‘so great’ (see, Lohmiller v Lohmiller, 118 AD2d 760 ; cf., Wegman v Wegman, 37 NY2d 940 ; Rosenblitt v Rosenblitt [ 107 AD2d 292 ]), the court’s discretionary power to limit disclosure and grant protective orders is equally broad” (Garvin v Garvin, 162 AD2d 497, 499 [1990]). | 2 | 2008–2008 |
In re Darlene T.
green
2 sentences1988Where both parties seek sole custody of the infant issue of their marriage, a parent’s health is a relevant yet certainly not the only consideration (Matter of Darlene T., 28 NY2d 391 [1971]). 1985Where both parties are seeking custody of the infant issue of their marriage, the health of a parent is clearly a relevant, although by no means the sole, consideration (Matter of Darlene T., 28 NY2d 391, 395 ). | 2 | 1985–1988 |
People v. Jackerson
green
2 sentences1972A witness may be stamped as an accomplice only if there is “ a showing that [he] took part in the preparation or perpetration of the crime with the intent to assist therein [cases cited], or that the witness counseled, induced or encouraged the crime [case cited] ” (People v. White, 26 N Y 2d 276, 278), for, as we held more than 40 years ago, ‘ ‘ The generally accepted test as to whether a witness is an accomplice is whether he himself could have been convicted * * * either as principal or accessory * * * The question of intent must always enter as an element of the crime.” (People v. Jackerso 1936(People v. Richardson, 222 N. Y. 103, p. 114 .) ” (People v. Jackerson, 247 N. Y. 36, 42 .) The modern doctrine of accomplices as witnesses is a development of the ancient, and now obsolete, doctrine of “ approvement.” (Bishop’s New Criminal Procedure, supra, § 1156.) “ And that is when a person indicted of treason or felony, and arraigned for the same, doth confess the fact before plea pleaded, and appeals or accuses others, his accomplices, in the same crime in order to obtain his pardon.” If the persons so implicated were convicted, the “ approver ” received his pardon; if, after his having | 2 | 1936–1972 |
In re the Estate of Slade
green
2 sentences1967Where the law of her domicile gives a widow no right to take against the will, she gains none from the fact that the property and administration are in a jurisdiction where there is such a right (Matter of Slade, 154 Misc. 275 , Foley, S.; Matter of Thorold, 147 Misc. 899 ). “ That decision [Matter of Slade] is in full accord with the generally accepted rule that a widow’s right to take personal property against the will of her husband is regulated by the law of his domicile. ’ ’ (Matter of Sahadi, 30 Misc 2d 166, 167-168 , affd. 283 App. Div. 1012 .) On the other hand, where the laws of the w 1953The new right of election to take against the will is not available to a surviving spouse of a nonresident maker of a will.” (Matter of Slade, 154 Misc. 275, 277 .) That decision is in full accord with the generally accepted rule that a widow’s right to take personal property against the will of her husband is regulated by the law of his domicile. | 2 | 1953–1967 |
Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co.
green
2 sentences1961The corporate defendant, Starr Associates, Inc., also executed the agreement in New York by its president, the defendant William Starr.' It would appear that “ [defendants confuse the doctrine of forum non conveniens with lack of jurisdiction. ■ While it is a generally accepted rule of law that the courts of one State will not take jurisdiction of controversies affecting the internal affairs of a corporation organized under the laws of another State (Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 288 U. S. 123, 130 ), close scrutiny of the controlling authorities makes it clear that such refusal is based on co 1934While it is a generally accepted rule of law that the courts of one State will not take jurisdiction of controversies affecting the internal affairs of a corporation organized under the laws of another State (Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 288 U. S. 123, 130 ), close scrutiny of the controlling authorities makes it clear that such refusal is based on considerations of convenience and expediency rather than of power. | 2 | 1934–1961 |
| People Ex Rel. McCabe v. . Matthies neutral | 2 | 1953–1953 |
| People v. . Richardson green | 2 | 1928–1936 |
| Shedlinsky v. . Budweiser Brewing Co. green | 2 | 1928–1930 |
| Longtemps v. Oliva green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Furman v. Desimone green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| In re Meyers green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| In re Cohen green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| In THE MATTER OF BRILLIANT v. Gamache green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Anderson v. House of Good Samaritan Hospital green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Tanon v. Eppler green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| In re Dranov green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Ambrosio v. South Huntington Union Free School District green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Benjamin v. State green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| In re Gifis green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| In re Gilbert green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| In re Thomas neutral | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| In re Linney neutral | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| In re Neufeld green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Alvarez v. Eviles green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| In re Newhoff green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| In re the Estate of Rothko green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Morris v. New York State Department of Taxation & Finance green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Total Care Health Industries, Inc. v. Department of Social Services green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Hyland Meat Co. v. Tsagarakis green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Gibson v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corp. green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.