54 New Jersey opinions name it 3 courts 1934–2026 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Crisantos (Arriagas)green2 sentences2026"The generally-accepted rule is that words alone, no matter how offensive or insulting, do not constitute adequate provocation to reduce murder to A-3280-22 14 manslaughter." State v. Crisantos, 102 N.J. 265, 274 (1986); see also Mauricio, 117 N.J. at 413 ("[W]ords alone do not constitute adequate provocation."); Carrero, 229 N.J. at 129 ("Words alone are insufficient to create adequate provocation . . . but the presence of a gun or knife can satisfy the provocation requirement."). 2026"The generally-accepted rule is that words alone, no matter how offensive or insulting, do not constitute adequate provocation to reduce murder to manslaughter." Crisantos, 102 N.J. at 274 (citations omitted). | 7 | 10 |
State v. Lee Funderburg (074760)green2 sentences2026"The generally accepted rule is that words alone, no matter how offensive or insulting, do not constitute adequate provocation to reduce murder to manslaughter." Funderburg, 225 N.J. at 80 (quoting State v. Crisantos, 102 N.J 265, 274 (1986)). 2026"The generally accepted rule is that words alone, no matter how offensive or insulting, do not constitute adequate provocation to reduce murder to manslaughter." Funderburg, 225 N.J. at 80 (quoting State v. Crisantos, 102 N.J 265, 274 (1986)). | 2 | 9 |
State v. Mauriciogreen2 sentences2026"The generally-accepted rule is that words alone, no matter how offensive or insulting, do not constitute adequate provocation to reduce murder to A-3280-22 14 manslaughter." State v. Crisantos, 102 N.J. 265, 274 (1986); see also Mauricio, 117 N.J. at 413 ("[W]ords alone do not constitute adequate provocation."); Carrero, 229 N.J. at 129 ("Words alone are insufficient to create adequate provocation . . . but the presence of a gun or knife can satisfy the provocation requirement."). 2017N.J.S.A. 2C:1-8(e); see State v. Funderburg, 225 N.J. 66, 81 (2016). "[P]assion/provocation manslaughter is comprised of four elements: "[1] the provocation must be adequate; [2] the defendant must not have had time to cool off between the provocation and the slaying; [3] the provocation must have actually impassioned the defendant; and [4] the defendant must not have actually cooled off before the slaying." Funderburg, supra, 225 N.J. at 80 (quoting State v. Mauricio, 117 N.J. 402, 411 (1990) (citation omitted)). "'The generally accepted rule is that words alone, no matter how offensive or in | 2 | 8 |
State v. Guidogreen2 sentences1986See State v. Williams, 29 N.J. 27, 42-43 (1959). [State v. Guido, 40 N.J. 191, 209-10 (1963).] The generally-accepted rule is that words alone, no matter how offensive or insulting, do not constitute adequate provocation to reduce murder to manslaughter. 2 C. 1986See State v. Williams, 29 N.J. 27, 42-43 (1959). [ State v. Guido, 40 N.J. 191, 209-10 (1963).] The generally-accepted rule is that words alone, no matter how offensive or insulting, do not constitute adequate provocation to reduce murder to manslaughter. 2 C. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Perrygreen2 sentences2026A-1148-22 10 Notwithstanding these parameters, the Supreme Court has "acknowledge[d] and embrace[d] the 'trend away from the usual practice of placing the various types of provocatory conduct into pigeon-holes . . . .'" State v. Perry, 124 N.J. 128, 159 (1991) (internal citations omitted). 2026A-1148-22 10 Notwithstanding these parameters, the Supreme Court has "acknowledge[d] and embrace[d] the 'trend away from the usual practice of placing the various types of provocatory conduct into pigeon-holes . . . .'" State v. Perry, 124 N.J. 128, 159 (1991) (internal citations omitted). | 2 | 2 |
A-13-16 State v. Fernando Carrero, Jr. (078071) (Bergen County and Statewide)green2 sentences2026"The generally-accepted rule is that words alone, no matter how offensive or insulting, do not constitute adequate provocation to reduce murder to A-3280-22 14 manslaughter." State v. Crisantos, 102 N.J. 265, 274 (1986); see also Mauricio, 117 N.J. at 413 ("[W]ords alone do not constitute adequate provocation."); Carrero, 229 N.J. at 129 ("Words alone are insufficient to create adequate provocation . . . but the presence of a gun or knife can satisfy the provocation requirement."). 2021"Battery is . . . considered adequate provocation 'almost as a matter of law'" and the element may also be satisfied by "the presence of a gun or knife." Carrero, 229 N.J. at 129 (quoting Mauricio, 117 N.J. at 414 ). | 1 | 4 |
In Re Parole Application of Hawleygreen2 sentences1997Consistent with this generally accepted standard, the Supreme Court said in Hawley that: “We find no reason to exempt the Parole Board from the well-established principle that a court may review the actions of an administrative agency to determine if its power is being exercised arbitrarily or capriciously.” [In re Parole Application of Hawley, ] 98 N.J. 108, 112 [ 484 A.2d 684 ]. 1997Consistent with this generally accepted standard, the Supreme Court said in Hawley that: “We find no reason to exempt the Parole Board from the well-established principle that a court may review the actions of an administrative agency to determine if its power is being exercised arbitrarily or capriciously.” [In re Parole Application of Hawley, ] 98 N.J. 108, 112 [ 484 A.2d 684 ]. | 1 | 2 |
Mhb v. Htbgreen1 sentence2025It is a generally accepted principle that both financial and emotional support are "vital to the well-being of a child." See M.H.B. v. H.T.B., 100 N.J. 567, 574-75 (1985) (Handler, J., concurring). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Sugargreen1 sentence2019The doctrine comports with the generally accepted principle that "[i]f the evidence would have been obtained lawfully and properly without [police] A-2840-16T4 9 misconduct, exclusion of the evidence would put the prosecution in a worse position than if no illegality had transpired." State v. Sugar, 100 N.J. 214, 237 (1985) (Sugar II). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Darriangreen1 sentence2018"The generally accepted rule is that words alone, no matter how offensive or insulting, do not constitute adequate provocation to reduce murder to manslaughter." Funderburg, 225 N.J. at 80 (quoting State v. Crisantos, 102 N.J 265, 274 (1986)). "[M]utual combat under certain circumstances can constitute adequate provocation to reduce murder to manslaughter, [but] the provocation must be proportionate to the manner of retaliation . . . ." State v. Darrian, 255 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Verdicchio v. Riccagreen1 sentence2018As a general rule, "a plaintiff in a medical malpractice action must prove the applicable standard of care, that a deviation has occurred, and that the deviation proximately caused the injury." Verdicchio v. Ricca, 179 N.J. 1, 23 (2004) (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Matthews v. City of AtLantic Citygreen2 sentences2012See Matthews, supra, 84 N.J. at 167 , 417 A.2d 1011 (declaring unconstitutional state statute that differentiated among types of municipalities when imposing durational residency requirements). 2012See Matthews, supra, 84 N.J. at 167 , 417 A.2d 1011 (declaring unconstitutional state statute that differentiated among types of municipalities when imposing durational residency requirements). | 1 | 1 |
Hager v. American West Insurancegreen1 sentence2001Co., 732 F.Supp. 1072, 1074 (D.Mont.1989) (recognizing “the generally accepted principle that the uninsured motorist coverage of an insurance policy may not limit the class of persons covered under the endorsement to a group smaller than that covered under the liability provisions of the same policy”); King v. Nationwide Ins. | 1 | 1 |
Oaks v. Connorsgreen2 sentences2001We endorsed the generally accepted rule in that circumstance of no employer liability, but we also noted with approval that one of the recognized exceptions to that rule "is where an employer requires the employee to drive his or her vehicle to work so that the vehicle is available for use in fulfilling the employee's work-related responsibilities." Id. at 354 , 703 A. 2d 944 (citing Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24 , 660 A. 2d 423, 426-27 (1995)). 2001We endorsed the generally accepted rule in that circumstance of no employer liability, but we also noted with approval that one of the recognized exceptions to that rule "is where an employer requires the employee to drive his or her vehicle to work so that the vehicle is available for use in fulfilling the employee's work-related responsibilities." Id. at 354 , 703 A. 2d 944 (citing Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24 , 660 A. 2d 423, 426-27 (1995)). | 1 | 1 |
King v. Nationwide Insurancegreen2 sentences2001Co., 35 Ohio St.3d 208 , 519 N.E.2d 1380, 1384 (1988) (finding that UIM coverage applying to “relatives living in your household” in a business auto policy was ambiguous and worker was entitled to employer’s UIM coverage). 2001Co., 35 Ohio St.3d 208 , 519 N.E.2d 1380, 1384 (1988) (finding that UIM coverage applying to “relatives living in your household” in a business auto policy was ambiguous and worker was entitled to employer’s UIM coverage). | 1 | 1 |
| Johnson v. City of San Leandrogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Dorrian v. Davisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Williamsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Roth v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Krauth v. Israel Geller and Buckingham Homes, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Ferraro v. Demetrakisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Trust v. Arden Farms Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Hensongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Brandstein v. Ironbound Transportation Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Moss v. Cherdakgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Daily v. Somberggreen | 1 | 1 |
| Breen v. Peckgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bentley v. Whittemoregreen | 1 | 1 |
| STATE BY PARSONS v. Standard Oil Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Johnstongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Gambrell v. Zengel
green
2 sentences2007Thus, although "[i]t must be conceded that the force of the impact, when two automobiles collide, does not necessarily justify an inference that the occupants of the vehicles sustained serious physical injuries[,]" Gambrell v. Zengel, 110 N.J.Super. 377, 380 , 265 A. 2d 823 (App.Div.1970), [a]t the same time it is a generally accepted rule that evidence of the speed at which the colliding cars were traveling, the severity of the physical impact and the manner of the happening of the accident is admissible where there is an issue as to the seriousness of plaintiff's injuries. 2007Thus, although "[i]t must be conceded that the force of the impact, when two automobiles collide, does not necessarily justify an inference that the occupants of the vehicles sustained serious physical injuries[,]" Gambrell v. Zengel, 110 N.J.Super. 377, 380 , 265 A. 2d 823 (App.Div.1970), [a]t the same time it is a generally accepted rule that evidence of the speed at which the colliding cars were traveling, the severity of the physical impact and the manner of the happening of the accident is admissible where there is an issue as to the seriousness of plaintiff's injuries. | 2 | 2006–2007 |
Vailsburg Motor Corp. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York
neutral
2 sentences1953Vailsburg Motor Corp. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 110 N.J.L. 209 ( E. & A. 1933); Rockmiss v. N.J. 1953Vailsburg Motor Corp. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 110 N.J.L. 209 ( E. & A. 1933); Rockmiss v. N.J. | 2 | 1953–1953 |
State v. Robinson
green
1 sentence2022In contrast, "battery, except for a light blow, has traditionally been considered, almost as a matter of law, to be sufficiently provocative." Robinson, 136 N.J. at 492 (quoting Mauricio, 117 N.J. at 414 ). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Suanez v. Egeland
green
2 sentences2007And this, too, despite admitted liability. [ Ibid. ] But see Suanez v. Egeland, 353 N.J.Super. 191, 201-03 , 801 A. 2d 1186 (App.Div.2002) (holding that "defendant failed to establish a reliable scientific foundation for [the] purported expert opinion on the basis of [the expert]'s own research work, authoritative scientific literature or persuasive judicial decisions" and that "there is no reliable scientific foundation in bio-mechanical studies for an expert opinion that a low-impact automobile accident cannot cause a . . . serious injury"). 2007And this, too, despite admitted liability. [ Ibid. ] But see Suanez v. Egeland, 353 N.J.Super. 191, 201-03 , 801 A. 2d 1186 (App.Div.2002) (holding that "defendant failed to establish a reliable scientific foundation for [the] purported expert opinion on the basis of [the expert]'s own research work, authoritative scientific literature or persuasive judicial decisions" and that "there is no reliable scientific foundation in bio-mechanical studies for an expert opinion that a low-impact automobile accident cannot cause a . . . serious injury"). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Spedick v. Murphy
green
2 sentences2006Spedick, supra, 266 N.J.Super. at 590-91 , 630 A.2d 355 . 2006Spedick, supra, 266 N.J.Super. at 590-91 , 630 A.2d 355 . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Mannes v. Healey
green
2 sentences2001We endorsed the generally accepted rule in that circumstance of no employer liability, but we also noted with approval that one of the recognized exceptions to that rule "is where an employer requires the employee to drive his or her vehicle to work so that the vehicle is available for use in fulfilling the employee's work-related responsibilities." Id. at 354 , 703 A. 2d 944 (citing Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24 , 660 A. 2d 423, 426-27 (1995)). 2001We endorsed the generally accepted rule in that circumstance of no employer liability, but we also noted with approval that one of the recognized exceptions to that rule "is where an employer requires the employee to drive his or her vehicle to work so that the vehicle is available for use in fulfilling the employee's work-related responsibilities." Id. at 354 , 703 A. 2d 944 (citing Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24 , 660 A. 2d 423, 426-27 (1995)). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Almog v. Israel Travel Advisory Service, Inc.
green
2 sentences2000Almog v. Israel Travel Advisory Serv., Inc., 298 N.J.Super. 145, 159-60 , 689 A. 2d 158 (App.Div. 1997), appeal dismissed, 152 N.J. 361 , 704 A. 2d 1297 (1998). 2000Almog v. Israel Travel Advisory Serv., Inc., 298 N.J.Super. 145, 159-60 , 689 A. 2d 158 (App.Div. 1997), appeal dismissed, 152 N.J. 361 , 704 A. 2d 1297 (1998). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Almog v. Israel Travel Advisory Service, Inc.
green
2 sentences2000Almog v. Israel Travel Advisory Serv., Inc., 298 N.J.Super. 145, 159-60 , 689 A. 2d 158 (App.Div. 1997), appeal dismissed, 152 N.J. 361 , 704 A. 2d 1297 (1998). 2000Almog v. Israel Travel Advisory Serv., Inc., 298 N.J.Super. 145, 159-60 , 689 A. 2d 158 (App.Div. 1997), appeal dismissed, 152 N.J. 361 , 704 A. 2d 1297 (1998). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Tumarkin v. First National State Bank
neutral
2 sentences1995On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Appellate Division decision was affirmed on the opinion below by a three vote majority of a five justice quorum. 75 N.J. at 373 , 382 A.2d 1122 . 1995On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Appellate Division decision was affirmed on the opinion below by a three vote majority of a five justice quorum. 75 N.J. at 373 , 382 A.2d 1122 . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Tumarkin v. First National State Bank of NJ
green
2 sentences1995The court further explained that the Bankruptcy Act and Corporation Act did not create new rights, but merely recognized a generally accepted principle “ ‘that a person against whom a claim is asserted by another may use his own claim against that person in full or partial satisfaction of the asserted claim.’” 142 N.J.Super. at 308-309 , 361 A.2d 550 (quoting 9 Am.Jur.2d Bankruptcy § 509 at 394 (1963)). 1995The court further explained that the Bankruptcy Act and Corporation Act did not create new rights, but merely recognized a generally accepted principle “ ‘that a person against whom a claim is asserted by another may use his own claim against that person in full or partial satisfaction of the asserted claim.’” 142 N.J.Super. at 308-309 , 361 A.2d 550 (quoting 9 Am.Jur.2d Bankruptcy § 509 at 394 (1963)). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Tooker v. Lonky
neutral
2 sentences1992See Johnson v. San Leandro, 179 Cal. App. 2d 794 , 4 Cal. Rptr. 404 ; Tipton v. Clower, 67 N.M. 388 , 356 P. 2d 46 ; Garden of the Gods Village v. Hellman, 133 Colo. 286 , 294 P. 2d 597 ; Gordon Creek Tree Farms Inc. v. Layne, 230 Or. 204 , 358 P. 2d 1062 , 368 P. 2d 737 ; Leonard v. Abbott, Tex.Civ.App., 357 S.W. 2d 778 ; Tooker v Lonky, 106 N.J.L. 110 , 147 A. 445 ; Amann v. City of Tacoma, 170 Wash. 296 , 16 P. 2d 601 . 1992See Johnson v. San Leandro, 179 Cal. App. 2d 794 , 4 Cal. Rptr. 404 ; Tipton v. Clower, 67 N.M. 388 , 356 P. 2d 46 ; Garden of the Gods Village v. Hellman, 133 Colo. 286 , 294 P. 2d 597 ; Gordon Creek Tree Farms Inc. v. Layne, 230 Or. 204 , 358 P. 2d 1062 , 368 P. 2d 737 ; Leonard v. Abbott, Tex.Civ.App., 357 S.W. 2d 778 ; Tooker v Lonky, 106 N.J.L. 110 , 147 A. 445 ; Amann v. City of Tacoma, 170 Wash. 296 , 16 P. 2d 601 . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Leonard v. Abbott
green
1 sentence1992See Johnson v. San Leandro, 179 Cal. App. 2d 794 , 4 Cal. Rptr. 404 ; Tipton v. Clower, 67 N.M. 388 , 356 P. 2d 46 ; Garden of the Gods Village v. Hellman, 133 Colo. 286 , 294 P. 2d 597 ; Gordon Creek Tree Farms Inc. v. Layne, 230 Or. 204 , 358 P. 2d 1062 , 368 P. 2d 737 ; Leonard v. Abbott, Tex.Civ.App., 357 S.W. 2d 778 ; Tooker v Lonky, 106 N.J.L. 110 , 147 A. 445 ; Amann v. City of Tacoma, 170 Wash. 296 , 16 P. 2d 601 . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Garden of the Gods Village, Inc. v. Hellman
green
2 sentences1992See Johnson v. San Leandro, 179 Cal. App. 2d 794 , 4 Cal. Rptr. 404 ; Tipton v. Clower, 67 N.M. 388 , 356 P. 2d 46 ; Garden of the Gods Village v. Hellman, 133 Colo. 286 , 294 P. 2d 597 ; Gordon Creek Tree Farms Inc. v. Layne, 230 Or. 204 , 358 P. 2d 1062 , 368 P. 2d 737 ; Leonard v. Abbott, Tex.Civ.App., 357 S.W. 2d 778 ; Tooker v Lonky, 106 N.J.L. 110 , 147 A. 445 ; Amann v. City of Tacoma, 170 Wash. 296 , 16 P. 2d 601 . 1992See Johnson v. San Leandro, 179 Cal. App. 2d 794 , 4 Cal. Rptr. 404 ; Tipton v. Clower, 67 N.M. 388 , 356 P. 2d 46 ; Garden of the Gods Village v. Hellman, 133 Colo. 286 , 294 P. 2d 597 ; Gordon Creek Tree Farms Inc. v. Layne, 230 Or. 204 , 358 P. 2d 1062 , 368 P. 2d 737 ; Leonard v. Abbott, Tex.Civ.App., 357 S.W. 2d 778 ; Tooker v Lonky, 106 N.J.L. 110 , 147 A. 445 ; Amann v. City of Tacoma, 170 Wash. 296 , 16 P. 2d 601 . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Tipton v. Clower green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Gordon Creek Tree Farms, Inc. v. Layne
green
2 sentences1992See Johnson v. San Leandro, 179 Cal. App. 2d 794 , 4 Cal. Rptr. 404 ; Tipton v. Clower, 67 N.M. 388 , 356 P. 2d 46 ; Garden of the Gods Village v. Hellman, 133 Colo. 286 , 294 P. 2d 597 ; Gordon Creek Tree Farms Inc. v. Layne, 230 Or. 204 , 358 P. 2d 1062 , 368 P. 2d 737 ; Leonard v. Abbott, Tex.Civ.App., 357 S.W. 2d 778 ; Tooker v Lonky, 106 N.J.L. 110 , 147 A. 445 ; Amann v. City of Tacoma, 170 Wash. 296 , 16 P. 2d 601 . 1992See Johnson v. San Leandro, 179 Cal. App. 2d 794 , 4 Cal. Rptr. 404 ; Tipton v. Clower, 67 N.M. 388 , 356 P. 2d 46 ; Garden of the Gods Village v. Hellman, 133 Colo. 286 , 294 P. 2d 597 ; Gordon Creek Tree Farms Inc. v. Layne, 230 Or. 204 , 358 P. 2d 1062 , 368 P. 2d 737 ; Leonard v. Abbott, Tex.Civ.App., 357 S.W. 2d 778 ; Tooker v Lonky, 106 N.J.L. 110 , 147 A. 445 ; Amann v. City of Tacoma, 170 Wash. 296 , 16 P. 2d 601 . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Amann v. City of Tacoma
green
2 sentences1992See Johnson v. San Leandro, 179 Cal. App. 2d 794 , 4 Cal. Rptr. 404 ; Tipton v. Clower, 67 N.M. 388 , 356 P. 2d 46 ; Garden of the Gods Village v. Hellman, 133 Colo. 286 , 294 P. 2d 597 ; Gordon Creek Tree Farms Inc. v. Layne, 230 Or. 204 , 358 P. 2d 1062 , 368 P. 2d 737 ; Leonard v. Abbott, Tex.Civ.App., 357 S.W. 2d 778 ; Tooker v Lonky, 106 N.J.L. 110 , 147 A. 445 ; Amann v. City of Tacoma, 170 Wash. 296 , 16 P. 2d 601 . 1992See Johnson v. San Leandro, 179 Cal. App. 2d 794 , 4 Cal. Rptr. 404 ; Tipton v. Clower, 67 N.M. 388 , 356 P. 2d 46 ; Garden of the Gods Village v. Hellman, 133 Colo. 286 , 294 P. 2d 597 ; Gordon Creek Tree Farms Inc. v. Layne, 230 Or. 204 , 358 P. 2d 1062 , 368 P. 2d 737 ; Leonard v. Abbott, Tex.Civ.App., 357 S.W. 2d 778 ; Tooker v Lonky, 106 N.J.L. 110 , 147 A. 445 ; Amann v. City of Tacoma, 170 Wash. 296 , 16 P. 2d 601 . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Travis v. Rochester Bridge Co. green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| State v. Johnson green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Beauharnais v. Illinois green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| United States v. Morgan green | 1 | 1969–1969 |
| Matczak v. Byrne green | 1 | 1966–1966 |
| Morgenstern Chemical Co. v. G. D. Searle & Co. green | 1 | 1966–1966 |
| Horowitz v. United States green | 1 | 1964–1964 |
| Barusch v. Brainard green | 1 | 1964–1964 |
| Trappey v. McIlhenny Co. green | 1 | 1964–1964 |
| Toledo Society for Crippled Children v. Hickok green | 1 | 1959–1959 |
| Heinze v. State green | 1 | 1955–1955 |
| Davison v. London & Lancashire Fire Insurance green | 1 | 1955–1955 |
| Rickards v. Sun Oil Co. green | 1 | 1953–1953 |
| Cleveland v. Salwen green | 1 | 1953–1953 |
| Danner v. Kennedy neutral | 1 | 1952–1952 |
| Carver v. Harr green | 1 | 1952–1952 |
| Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson green | 1 | 1952–1952 |
| Moore v. State green | 1 | 1952–1952 |
| Gude v. Pennsylvania Railroad green | 1 | 1951–1951 |
| State v. Linarducci green | 1 | 1951–1951 |
| Simpson v. New Jersey Stone & Tile Co. green | 1 | 1951–1951 |
| New Jersey Orthopædic Hospital v. Wright neutral | 1 | 1951–1951 |
| People's State Bank v. Brown neutral | 1 | 1935–1935 |
| Brown v. Maryland green | 1 | 1934–1934 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.