generally accepted rule in Florida

2024Cf. OBS Co., Inc. v. Pace Const. Corp., 558 So. 2d 404, 406 (Fla. 1990) (“It is a generally accepted rule of contract law that, where a writing expressly refers to and sufficiently describes another document, that other document, or so much of it as is referred to, is to be interpreted as part of the writing.”); Comput.

2021See OBS Co., Inc. v. Pace Const. Corp., 558 So. 2d 404, 406 (Fla. 1990) (“It is a generally accepted rule of contract law that, where a writing expressly refers to and sufficiently describes another document, that other document, or so much of it as is referred to, is to be interpreted as part of the writing.”).

2005We acknowledge that orders granting the custodial parent exclusive use and possession of the marital home "are so frequently ordered that they have become a generally accepted principle of the law of divorce." Zeller v. Zeller, 396 So.2d 1177, 1179 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981), see also Dorsett v. Dorsett, 902 So.2d 947 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005).

1990In Zeller v. Zeller, 396 So.2d 1177, 1179 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981), the court correctly noted that although the failure to award exclusive possession of the marital home to the custodial parent until all of the children attain majority or become emancipated would not always constitute error, such awards are so frequently ordered that they have become a generally accepted principle of the law of divorce.

2022See Iglehart, 383 So. 2d at 615 (“It is the generally accepted rule that a fixed price repurchase option of unlimited duration, independent of the lease, is an unreasonable restraint. . . .

2022See Iglehart, 383 So. 2d at 615 (“It is the generally accepted rule that a fixed price repurchase option of unlimited duration, 7 independent of the lease, is an unreasonable restraint. . . .

2022An option for a fixed price clearly discourages any improvements of the land by the existing property owner because he could never recover the value of the improvements should the optionee exercise the option.”); Brine v. Fertitta, 537 So. 2d 113, 114 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988) (agreeing that option contract was void due to restraint on alienation where “the option was for an indefinite period and was, in effect, for a fixed price, i.e., a price which, while adjustable 8 for inflation, was not adjustable for changes in the market value of the property”).

2022An option for a fixed price clearly discourages any improvements of the land by the existing property owner because he could never recover the value of the improvements should the optionee exercise the option.”); Sunlink Corp., 642 So. 2d at 553 (affirming summary judgment based on unreasonableness of covenant restricting resale of property where covenant lasted indefinitely, rendered property effectively unmarketable, and removed beneficial uses); Brine v. Fertitta, 537 So. 2d 113, 114 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988) (agreeing that option contract was void due to restraint on alienation where “the option

2026Appellee, the State of Florida, confesses error in its brief, and agrees with Appellant that the “trial court lacked jurisdiction to hold the restitution hearing or enter an order of restitution” and that the “case should be remanded back to the trial court where another restitution hearing may be conducted.” It is a generally accepted principle that a “party’s filing of a notice of appeal divests the trial court of jurisdiction to enter a restitution order.” Jenkins v. State, 954 So. 2d 738, 738 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007).

2024Sales, 656 So. 2d at 1384 (“The rule is clear that when a writing expressly refers to and sufficiently describes another document— in this case, the Certificate of Acceptance—the other document is to be interpreted as part of the writing.”). 7 For USAA to prove up its contention that the assignment agreement is invalid and unenforceable under the statute, it must establish—through evidence—that these documents are not two parts of one agreement.

2022An option for a fixed price clearly discourages any improvements of the land by the existing property owner because he could never recover the value of the improvements should the optionee exercise the option.”); Sunlink Corp., 642 So. 2d at 553 (affirming summary judgment based on unreasonableness of covenant restricting resale of property where covenant lasted indefinitely, rendered property effectively unmarketable, and removed beneficial uses); Brine v. Fertitta, 537 So. 2d 113, 114 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988) (agreeing that option contract was void due to restraint on alienation where “the option

2018The [s]upreme [c]ourt set forth the second requirement for incorporation by reference in OBS Co. v. Pace Construction Corp., 558 So.2d 404, 406 (Fla. 1990): “It is a generally accepted rule of contract law that, where a writing expressly refers to and sufficiently describes another document, that other document, or so much of it as is referred to, is to'be interpreted as part of the writing.” BGT Grp., Inc. ,v. Tradewinds Engine Servs., LLC, 62 So.3d 1192, 1194 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (first alteration in original); cf. Jenkins v, Eckerd Corp,, 913 So.2d 43, 51 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (“The contract m

2018The [s]upreme [c]ourt set forth the second requirement for incorporation by reference in OBS Co. v. Pace Construction Corp., 558 So.2d 404, 406 (Fla. 1990): “It is a generally accepted rule of contract law that, where a writing expressly refers to and sufficiently describes another document, that other document, or so much of it as is referred to, is to'be interpreted as part of the writing.” BGT Grp., Inc. ,v. Tradewinds Engine Servs., LLC, 62 So.3d 1192, 1194 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (first alteration in original); cf. Jenkins v, Eckerd Corp,, 913 So.2d 43, 51 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (“The contract m

2016“It is a generally accepted rule of contract law that, where a writing expressly refers to and' sufficiently describes another document, that other document, or so much of it as is referred to, is to be interpreted as part of the writing.” Avatar Props., Inc. v. Greetham, 27 So.3d 764, 766 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (quoting OBS Co. v. Pace Constr.

2014Mayo v. Allen, 973 So.2d 1257, 1259 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (quoting Goodrich v. Malowney, 157 So.2d 829, 882 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963)).

2014Mayo v. Allen, 973 So.2d 1257, 1259 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (quoting Goodrich v. Malowney, 157 So.2d 829, 882 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963)).

2012Indus. v. Betterson, 648 So.2d 778, 779 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (quoting Dade Cnty. v. AT & T Info.

2006Courtesy Auto Group, Inc. v. Garcia, 778 So.2d 1000, 1002 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000).

2005Zeller v. Zeller, 396 So.2d 1177, 1179 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981) (reversing and remanding case to the trial court for the purpose of "entering a final judgment awarding the wife exclusive occupancy of the marital domicile until the youngest of the two children in her custody attains majority or otherwise becomes emancipated"); see also Robinson v. Robinson, 340 So.2d 935, 936 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976)("The trial court granted to appellee-wife the possession and occupancy of the marital home until the youngest child of the parties is eighteen years of age.

2003See Sens v. Slavia, Inc., 304 So.2d 438 (Fla.1974); 15 W.

2002Montgomery Roofing Co. v. Fred Howland, Inc., 98 So.2d 484 (Fla. 1957)); United States Rubber Prods. v. Clark, 145 Fla. 631 , 200 So. 385, 388 (1941) (stating that "where a writing expressly refers to and sufficiently describes another document, that other document, or so much of it as is referred to, is to be interpreted as part of the writing."); McGhee Interests, Inc. v. Alexander Nat'l Bank, 102 Fla. 140 , 135 So. 545 (1931).

2002Montgomery Roofing Co. v. Fred Howland, Inc., 98 So.2d 484 (Fla. 1957)); United States Rubber Prods. v. Clark, 145 Fla. 631 , 200 So. 385, 388 (1941) (stating that "where a writing expressly refers to and sufficiently describes another document, that other document, or so much of it as is referred to, is to be interpreted as part of the writing."); McGhee Interests, Inc. v. Alexander Nat'l Bank, 102 Fla. 140 , 135 So. 545 (1931).

2002Corp., 558 So.2d 404, 406 (Fla.1990)(“It is a generally accepted rule of contract law that, where a writing expressly refers to and sufficiently describes another document, that other document, or so much of it as is referred to, is to be interpreted as part of the writing.”); Quix Snaxx, Inc. v. Sorensen, 710 So.2d 152, 153 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)(same).

2002Co. v. Butler, 770 So.2d 1210, 1214 (Fla.2000) (citations omitted).