19 Idaho opinions name it 2 courts 1934–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Idaho courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Nial Ruth Cox v. A. M. Stanton, M.D.green2 sentences2006The generally accepted rule is that accrual begins when a “plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of their action.” Id. (quoting Cox v. Stanton, 529 F.2d 47, 50 (4th Cir.1975)). 1986The generally accepted rule for ascertaining the “last act” is provided in Cox v. Stanton, 529 F.2d 47, 50 (1975): Federal law holds that the time of accrual [of a civil rights claim] is when plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action. | 2 | 2 |
Eli v. Eligreen1 sentence2023Before that decision, the South Dakota Supreme Court followed the generally accepted standard that great prejudice would result when “the value of each cotenant’s share would be materially less than his share of the money equivalent that could probably be obtained for the whole.” Eli, 557 N.W.2d at 408 (internal quotations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Fike v. Sharergreen1 sentence2023Given the lack of any statutory definition or Idaho case law defining the phrase, we turn to case law from other jurisdictions. 7 The generally accepted test in other jurisdictions for whether a partition in kind would result in great prejudice to the owners is “whether the value of the share of each in case of a partition would be materially less than his share of the money equivalent that could probably be obtained for the whole.” Fike v. Sharer, 571 P.2d 1252, 1254 (Or. 1977) (internal quotations and citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Idema v. Comstockgreen1 sentence2023See also Rieger v. Ackerman, 939 N.W.2d 413, 416 (N.D. 2020) (“[G]reat prejudice exists when the value of the share of each in case of a partition would be materially less than his share of the money equivalent that could probably be obtained from the whole.”); Idema v. Comstock, 110 N.W. 786, 787 (Wis. 1907) (same); Williamson Inv. | 1 | 1 |
Rieger v. Ackermangreen1 sentence2023See also Rieger v. Ackerman, 939 N.W.2d 413, 416 (N.D. 2020) (“[G]reat prejudice exists when the value of the share of each in case of a partition would be materially less than his share of the money equivalent that could probably be obtained from the whole.”); Idema v. Comstock, 110 N.W. 786, 787 (Wis. 1907) (same); Williamson Inv. | 1 | 1 |
Gibson v. Ada Countygreen2 sentences2007According to Henderson [v. State, 110 Idaho 308 , 715 P.2d 978 (1986)], “federal law determines the ‘last act’ for purposes of tolling a state’s statute of limitations.” The generally accepted rule is that accrual begins when a “plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of their action.” Gibson v. Ada County, 142 Idaho 746, 754 , 133 P.3d 1211, 1219 (2006) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 2007According to Henderson [v. State, 110 Idaho 308 , 715 P.2d 978 (1986)], “federal law determines the ‘last act’ for purposes of tolling a state’s statute of limitations.” The generally accepted rule is that accrual begins when a “plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of their action.” Gibson v. Ada County, 142 Idaho 746, 754 , 133 P.3d 1211, 1219 (2006) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
Carman v. Carmangreen2 sentences2007Since I.C. § 6-911,4 the statute governing McCabe’s ITCA claim, was amended in 1985 with language similar to the federal discovery rule of accrual, see Carman v. Carman, 114 Idaho 551, 553 , 758 P.2d 710, 712 (Ct. App. 1988), our point of accrual analysis is the same for an ITCA claim as it is for a section 1983 claim. 2007Since I.C. § 6-911,4 the statute governing McCabe’s ITCA claim, was amended in 1985 with language similar to the federal discovery rule of accrual, see Carman v. Carman, 114 Idaho 551, 553 , 758 P.2d 710, 712 (Ct. App. 1988), our point of accrual analysis is the same for an ITCA claim as it is for a section 1983 claim. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Houghamgreen2 sentences1999The United States Supreme Court has reached the same conclusion: “It is a generally accepted rule of law that where a judgment is appealed on the ground that the damages awarded are inadequate, acceptance of payment of the amount of the unsatisfactory judgment does not, standing alone, amount to an accord and satisfaction of the entire claim.” United States v. Hougham, 364 U.S. 310, 312 , 81 S.Ct. 13, 16 , 5 L.Ed.2d 8, 12 (1960). 1999The United States Supreme Court has reached the same conclusion: “It is a generally accepted rule of law that where a judgment is appealed on the ground that the damages awarded are inadequate, acceptance of payment of the amount of the unsatisfactory judgment does not, standing alone, amount to an accord and satisfaction of the entire claim.” United States v. Hougham, 364 U.S. 310, 312 , 81 S.Ct. 13, 16 , 5 L.Ed.2d 8, 12 (1960). | 1 | 1 |
International Business MacHines Corp. v. Lawhorngreen2 sentences1998If the satisfaction was involuntary, the appeal remains viable.” International Business Machines Corp. v. Lawhorn, 106 Idaho 194, 196 , 677 P.2d 507, 509 (Ct.App.1984) (citation omitted). 1998If the satisfaction was involuntary, the appeal remains viable.” International Business Machines Corp. v. Lawhorn, 106 Idaho 194, 196 , 677 P.2d 507, 509 (Ct.App.1984) (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Georgia-Pacific Companygreen1 sentence1971See United States v. Georgia-Pacific Co., 421 F.2d 92 (9th Cir. 1970), and authorities cited therein. | 1 | 1 |
Hayhurst v. Boyd Hospitalgreen2 sentences1966“The generally accepted requirement is that a private hospital conducted for gain must, in the care of its patients, exercise such reasonable care and attention for their safety as their mental and physical condition, if known, may require.” Hayhurst v. Boyd Hospital, 43 Idaho 661, at 669 , 254 P. 528, at 529 (1927). 1966“The generally accepted requirement is that a private hospital conducted for gain must, in the care of its patients, exercise such reasonable care and attention for their safety as their mental and physical condition, if known, may require.” Hayhurst v. Boyd Hospital, 43 Idaho 661, at 669 , 254 P. 528, at 529 (1927). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Idaho. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Henderson v. State
green
2 sentences2007According to Henderson [v. State, 110 Idaho 308 , 715 P.2d 978 (1986)], “federal law determines the ‘last act’ for purposes of tolling a state’s statute of limitations.” The generally accepted rule is that accrual begins when a “plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of their action.” Gibson v. Ada County, 142 Idaho 746, 754 , 133 P.3d 1211, 1219 (2006) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 2007According to Henderson [v. State, 110 Idaho 308 , 715 P.2d 978 (1986)], “federal law determines the ‘last act’ for purposes of tolling a state’s statute of limitations.” The generally accepted rule is that accrual begins when a “plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of their action.” Gibson v. Ada County, 142 Idaho 746, 754 , 133 P.3d 1211, 1219 (2006) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Briley v. State Of California
green
1 sentence2006The generally accepted rule is that accrual begins when a “plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of their action.” Id. (quoting Cox v. Stanton, 529 F.2d 47, 50 (4th Cir.1975)). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Chardon v. Fernandez
green
2 sentences2006Accrual of the limitations period in the employment context has been most clearly discussed in Delaware State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250 , 101 S.Ct. 498 , 66 L.Ed.2d 431 (1980), and Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6 , 102 S.Ct. 28 , 70 L.Ed.2d 6 (1981). 2006Accrual of the limitations period in the employment context has been most clearly discussed in Delaware State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250 , 101 S.Ct. 498 , 66 L.Ed.2d 431 (1980), and Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6 , 102 S.Ct. 28 , 70 L.Ed.2d 6 (1981). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Delaware State College v. Ricks
green
2 sentences2006Accrual of the limitations period in the employment context has been most clearly discussed in Delaware State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250 , 101 S.Ct. 498 , 66 L.Ed.2d 431 (1980), and Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6 , 102 S.Ct. 28 , 70 L.Ed.2d 6 (1981). 2006Accrual of the limitations period in the employment context has been most clearly discussed in Delaware State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250 , 101 S.Ct. 498 , 66 L.Ed.2d 431 (1980), and Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6 , 102 S.Ct. 28 , 70 L.Ed.2d 6 (1981). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Laurino v. Board of Professional Discipline
green
2 sentences2004Laurino v. Board of Prof'l Discipline of the Idaho State Bd. of Med., 137 Idaho 596 , 51 P.3d 410 (2002); IDAHO CODE § 54-1814 (2003). 2004Laurino v. Board of Prof'l Discipline of the Idaho State Bd. of Med., 137 Idaho 596 , 51 P.3d 410 (2002); IDAHO CODE § 54-1814 (2003). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Matter of Clayton
green
2 sentences1990For that reason I would affirm the two judges who in fairness did not penalize Vogt for conduct which was thought to be commendable in State v. Clayton, 113 Idaho 817 , 748 P.2d 401 (1988) (Bistline, J., specially concurring). 1990For that reason I would affirm the two judges who in fairness did not penalize Vogt for conduct which was thought to be commendable in State v. Clayton, 113 Idaho 817 , 748 P.2d 401 (1988) (Bistline, J., specially concurring). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
State v. Bonefield
green
2 sentences1987State v. Pena, 15 Or.App. 582 , 516 P.2d 761 (1973); State v. Bonefield, 37 Wash.App. 878 , 683 P.2d 1129 (1984). 1987State v. Pena, 15 Or.App. 582 , 516 P.2d 761 (1973); State v. Bonefield, 37 Wash.App. 878 , 683 P.2d 1129 (1984). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
State v. Pena
green
2 sentences1987State v. Pena, 15 Or.App. 582 , 516 P.2d 761 (1973); State v. Bonefield, 37 Wash.App. 878 , 683 P.2d 1129 (1984). 1987State v. Pena, 15 Or.App. 582 , 516 P.2d 761 (1973); State v. Bonefield, 37 Wash.App. 878 , 683 P.2d 1129 (1984). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Joplin v. Kitchens
neutral
2 sentences1979Further, the trial judge interpreted the case of Joplin v. Kitchens, 87 Idaho 530 , 394 P.2d 313 (1964) to stand for the proposition that “[i]f there is no evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that the change in location of a river channel was not by avulsion.” The court concluded that since in this case there was no specific evidence that the river changed by avulsion, the presumption of accretion would apply. 1979Further, the trial judge interpreted the case of Joplin v. Kitchens, 87 Idaho 530 , 394 P.2d 313 (1964) to stand for the proposition that “[i]f there is no evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that the change in location of a river channel was not by avulsion.” The court concluded that since in this case there was no specific evidence that the river changed by avulsion, the presumption of accretion would apply. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
State v. Parish
green
2 sentences1965(See, also, G.S.1949, 19-1305) to the effect that clerks of district courts have authority to administer oaths where such are required.” In State v. Parish, 79 Idaho 75 , 310 P.2d 1082 , this court stated “[ujnder the generally accepted rule in criminal law a varianee is not regarded as material unless it is of such a substantive character as to mislead the accused in preparing his defense, or is likely to place him in second jeopardy for the same offense.” In the instant case the information fully advised the accused of the charge which he was required to meet and it was pleaded with such par 1965(See, also, G.S.1949, 19-1305) to the effect that clerks of district courts have authority to administer oaths where such are required.” In State v. Parish, 79 Idaho 75 , 310 P.2d 1082 , this court stated “[ujnder the generally accepted rule in criminal law a varianee is not regarded as material unless it is of such a substantive character as to mislead the accused in preparing his defense, or is likely to place him in second jeopardy for the same offense.” In the instant case the information fully advised the accused of the charge which he was required to meet and it was pleaded with such par | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Boise-Payette Lumber Co. v. McCornick
green
2 sentences1964I.C. § 55-308 authorizes removal of trade fixtures, “if the removal can be effected without injury to the premises, unless the thing has, by the manner in which it is affixed, become an integral part of the premises.” In Beebe v. Pioneer Bank & Trust Co., 34 Idaho 385, 391 , 201 P. 717 , this court quoted at length from the case of Boise Payette Lumber Co., v. McCornick, 32 Idaho 462 , 186 P. 252 , and aligned this jurisdiction with the generally accepted rule that in determining whether a particular article has become a trade fixture, three general tests are to be applied: (1) annexation to t 1964I.C. § 55-308 authorizes removal of trade fixtures, “if the removal can be effected without injury to the premises, unless the thing has, by the manner in which it is affixed, become an integral part of the premises.” In Beebe v. Pioneer Bank & Trust Co., 34 Idaho 385, 391 , 201 P. 717 , this court quoted at length from the case of Boise Payette Lumber Co., v. McCornick, 32 Idaho 462 , 186 P. 252 , and aligned this jurisdiction with the generally accepted rule that in determining whether a particular article has become a trade fixture, three general tests are to be applied: (1) annexation to t | 1 | 1964–1964 |
Beebe v. Pioneer Bank & Trust Co.
green
2 sentences1964I.C. § 55-308 authorizes removal of trade fixtures, “if the removal can be effected without injury to the premises, unless the thing has, by the manner in which it is affixed, become an integral part of the premises.” In Beebe v. Pioneer Bank & Trust Co., 34 Idaho 385, 391 , 201 P. 717 , this court quoted at length from the case of Boise Payette Lumber Co., v. McCornick, 32 Idaho 462 , 186 P. 252 , and aligned this jurisdiction with the generally accepted rule that in determining whether a particular article has become a trade fixture, three general tests are to be applied: (1) annexation to t 1964I.C. § 55-308 authorizes removal of trade fixtures, “if the removal can be effected without injury to the premises, unless the thing has, by the manner in which it is affixed, become an integral part of the premises.” In Beebe v. Pioneer Bank & Trust Co., 34 Idaho 385, 391 , 201 P. 717 , this court quoted at length from the case of Boise Payette Lumber Co., v. McCornick, 32 Idaho 462 , 186 P. 252 , and aligned this jurisdiction with the generally accepted rule that in determining whether a particular article has become a trade fixture, three general tests are to be applied: (1) annexation to t | 1 | 1964–1964 |
State v. Patterson
green
2 sentences1957Further, I.C. § 19-2132 charges the trial judge with the duty of instructing the jurors on what he believes to be "matters of law necessary for their information." His stock instructions, given on his own motion, are intended to state the fundamental principles of law applicable in all criminal cases, and additionally, "to advise the jury as to the nature and elements of the crime charged." State v. Patterson, 60 Idaho 67, 78 , 88 P.2d 493, 497 . 1957Further, I.C. § 19-2132 charges the trial judge with the duty of instructing the jurors on what he believes to be "matters of law necessary for their information." His stock instructions, given on his own motion, are intended to state the fundamental principles of law applicable in all criminal cases, and additionally, "to advise the jury as to the nature and elements of the crime charged." State v. Patterson, 60 Idaho 67, 78 , 88 P.2d 493, 497 . | 1 | 1957–1957 |
Flynn v. Flynn
green
2 sentences1952Flynn v. Flynn, 17 Idaho 147 , 104 P. 1030 ; In re McConkey’s Estate, 33 Cal.App.2d 554 , 92 P.2d 456 ; Dinneen v. Younger, 57 Cal.App.2d 200 , 134 P.2d 323 ; Huth v. Katz, 30 Cal.2d 605 , 184 P.2d 521 ; Szekeres v. Reed, 96 Cal.App.2d 348 , 215 P.2d 522 ; Seibert v. Seibert, 379 Ill. 470 , 41 N.E.2d 544 , 141 A.L.R. 299 , note 305; 56 A.L.R. note 746; 16 Am.Jur., Deeds, § 115. 1952Flynn v. Flynn, 17 Idaho 147 , 104 P. 1030 ; In re McConkey’s Estate, 33 Cal.App.2d 554 , 92 P.2d 456 ; Dinneen v. Younger, 57 Cal.App.2d 200 , 134 P.2d 323 ; Huth v. Katz, 30 Cal.2d 605 , 184 P.2d 521 ; Szekeres v. Reed, 96 Cal.App.2d 348 , 215 P.2d 522 ; Seibert v. Seibert, 379 Ill. 470 , 41 N.E.2d 544 , 141 A.L.R. 299 , note 305; 56 A.L.R. note 746; 16 Am.Jur., Deeds, § 115. | 1 | 1952–1952 |
| Seibert v. Seibert green | 1 | 1952–1952 |
Dinneen v. Younger
green
2 sentences1952Flynn v. Flynn, 17 Idaho 147 , 104 P. 1030 ; In re McConkey’s Estate, 33 Cal.App.2d 554 , 92 P.2d 456 ; Dinneen v. Younger, 57 Cal.App.2d 200 , 134 P.2d 323 ; Huth v. Katz, 30 Cal.2d 605 , 184 P.2d 521 ; Szekeres v. Reed, 96 Cal.App.2d 348 , 215 P.2d 522 ; Seibert v. Seibert, 379 Ill. 470 , 41 N.E.2d 544 , 141 A.L.R. 299 , note 305; 56 A.L.R. note 746; 16 Am.Jur., Deeds, § 115. 1952Flynn v. Flynn, 17 Idaho 147 , 104 P. 1030 ; In re McConkey’s Estate, 33 Cal.App.2d 554 , 92 P.2d 456 ; Dinneen v. Younger, 57 Cal.App.2d 200 , 134 P.2d 323 ; Huth v. Katz, 30 Cal.2d 605 , 184 P.2d 521 ; Szekeres v. Reed, 96 Cal.App.2d 348 , 215 P.2d 522 ; Seibert v. Seibert, 379 Ill. 470 , 41 N.E.2d 544 , 141 A.L.R. 299 , note 305; 56 A.L.R. note 746; 16 Am.Jur., Deeds, § 115. | 1 | 1952–1952 |
London v. McConkey
green
2 sentences1952Flynn v. Flynn, 17 Idaho 147 , 104 P. 1030 ; In re McConkey’s Estate, 33 Cal.App.2d 554 , 92 P.2d 456 ; Dinneen v. Younger, 57 Cal.App.2d 200 , 134 P.2d 323 ; Huth v. Katz, 30 Cal.2d 605 , 184 P.2d 521 ; Szekeres v. Reed, 96 Cal.App.2d 348 , 215 P.2d 522 ; Seibert v. Seibert, 379 Ill. 470 , 41 N.E.2d 544 , 141 A.L.R. 299 , note 305; 56 A.L.R. note 746; 16 Am.Jur., Deeds, § 115. 1952Flynn v. Flynn, 17 Idaho 147 , 104 P. 1030 ; In re McConkey’s Estate, 33 Cal.App.2d 554 , 92 P.2d 456 ; Dinneen v. Younger, 57 Cal.App.2d 200 , 134 P.2d 323 ; Huth v. Katz, 30 Cal.2d 605 , 184 P.2d 521 ; Szekeres v. Reed, 96 Cal.App.2d 348 , 215 P.2d 522 ; Seibert v. Seibert, 379 Ill. 470 , 41 N.E.2d 544 , 141 A.L.R. 299 , note 305; 56 A.L.R. note 746; 16 Am.Jur., Deeds, § 115. | 1 | 1952–1952 |
Imperial Irrigation District v. County of Riverside
neutral
1 sentence1952Flynn v. Flynn, 17 Idaho 147 , 104 P. 1030 ; In re McConkey’s Estate, 33 Cal.App.2d 554 , 92 P.2d 456 ; Dinneen v. Younger, 57 Cal.App.2d 200 , 134 P.2d 323 ; Huth v. Katz, 30 Cal.2d 605 , 184 P.2d 521 ; Szekeres v. Reed, 96 Cal.App.2d 348 , 215 P.2d 522 ; Seibert v. Seibert, 379 Ill. 470 , 41 N.E.2d 544 , 141 A.L.R. 299 , note 305; 56 A.L.R. note 746; 16 Am.Jur., Deeds, § 115. | 1 | 1952–1952 |
Huth v. Katz
green
2 sentences1952Flynn v. Flynn, 17 Idaho 147 , 104 P. 1030 ; In re McConkey’s Estate, 33 Cal.App.2d 554 , 92 P.2d 456 ; Dinneen v. Younger, 57 Cal.App.2d 200 , 134 P.2d 323 ; Huth v. Katz, 30 Cal.2d 605 , 184 P.2d 521 ; Szekeres v. Reed, 96 Cal.App.2d 348 , 215 P.2d 522 ; Seibert v. Seibert, 379 Ill. 470 , 41 N.E.2d 544 , 141 A.L.R. 299 , note 305; 56 A.L.R. note 746; 16 Am.Jur., Deeds, § 115. 1952Flynn v. Flynn, 17 Idaho 147 , 104 P. 1030 ; In re McConkey’s Estate, 33 Cal.App.2d 554 , 92 P.2d 456 ; Dinneen v. Younger, 57 Cal.App.2d 200 , 134 P.2d 323 ; Huth v. Katz, 30 Cal.2d 605 , 184 P.2d 521 ; Szekeres v. Reed, 96 Cal.App.2d 348 , 215 P.2d 522 ; Seibert v. Seibert, 379 Ill. 470 , 41 N.E.2d 544 , 141 A.L.R. 299 , note 305; 56 A.L.R. note 746; 16 Am.Jur., Deeds, § 115. | 1 | 1952–1952 |
Szekeres v. Reed
neutral
1 sentence1952Flynn v. Flynn, 17 Idaho 147 , 104 P. 1030 ; In re McConkey’s Estate, 33 Cal.App.2d 554 , 92 P.2d 456 ; Dinneen v. Younger, 57 Cal.App.2d 200 , 134 P.2d 323 ; Huth v. Katz, 30 Cal.2d 605 , 184 P.2d 521 ; Szekeres v. Reed, 96 Cal.App.2d 348 , 215 P.2d 522 ; Seibert v. Seibert, 379 Ill. 470 , 41 N.E.2d 544 , 141 A.L.R. 299 , note 305; 56 A.L.R. note 746; 16 Am.Jur., Deeds, § 115. | 1 | 1952–1952 |
| White v. Garrett neutral | 1 | 1938–1938 |
| Estate of Zimmer neutral | 1 | 1938–1938 |
| Koon v. Empey green | 1 | 1938–1938 |
| Kelley v. Smith green | 1 | 1938–1938 |
| Bower v. Kollmeyer green | 1 | 1938–1938 |
| Stevens v. Evening Courier green | 1 | 1938–1938 |
| Robison v. Floesch Construction Co. green | 1 | 1936–1936 |
| Stockley v. School District No. 1 of Portage Township. green | 1 | 1934–1934 |
| Mann v. Board of Education green | 1 | 1934–1934 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.