generally accepted rule in Virginia

2000When ruling that Virginia’s long arm statutes applied to a cause of action that accrued before the effective date of the long arm statutes, the Supreme Court of Virginia stated: We do not overlook or overrule the statement in Phipps, Adm 'r v. Sutherland, 201 Va. 448, 452 , 111 S.E.2d 422, 425 , that the generally accepted rule is that “statutes of limitation, or remedial statutes, are not retrospective in their application in the absence of clear legislative intent.” But the statutes here involved are not of the type to which that rule applies.

2000When ruling that Virginia’s long arm statutes applied to a cause of action that accrued before the effective date of the long arm statutes, the Supreme Court of Virginia stated: We do not overlook or overrule the statement in Phipps, Adm 'r v. Sutherland, 201 Va. 448, 452 , 111 S.E.2d 422, 425 , that the generally accepted rule is that “statutes of limitation, or remedial statutes, are not retrospective in their application in the absence of clear legislative intent.” But the statutes here involved are not of the type to which that rule applies.

1985The case of Florence Smith v. Combined Insurance Company of America, 202 Va. 758 (1961), sets forth the principle relied upon by the defendant when the Court defines accident as "the generally accepted rule is that death or injury does not result from accident or accidental means within the terms of an accident policy where it is the natural result of the insured’s voluntary act, unaccompanied by anything unforeseen except the death or injury." It sets forth the principle that even though the death in a sense is unforeseen or unexpected but results directly from the insured’s voluntary act and

1965In Smith v. Combined Insurance Company of America, 202 Va. 758, 761 , 120 S. E. 2d 267 , we approved the following definition: “ ‘Accident: An event that takes place without one’s foresight or *755 expectation; an undesigned, sudden, and unexpected event; chance; contingency, often; an undesigned and unforeseen occurrence of an afflicted or unfortunate character; casualty, mishap; as, to die by accident.’ ” “ ‘The generally accepted rule is that death or injury does not result from accident or accidental means within the terms of an accident policy where it is the natural result of the insured

1954IV, ch. 106, § 3), this common-law doctrine has been recognized and given effect in a substantial number of the American jurisdictions, usually, *975 however, in the modified form of a rule or precept of construction rather than as an absolute rule of law.” It was this rule that Mr. Justice Eggleston was referring to in Bottimore v. First-Merchants Bank, 170 Va. 221, 230 , 196 S. E. 593 , when he used the following language from Stephens v. Moore, 298 Mo. 215 , 249 S. W. 601 : “ ‘It is the generally accepted rule that, where there is a grant to one for fife, with remainder to the heirs of the

1954IV, ch. 106, § 3), this common-law doctrine has been recognized and given effect in a substantial number of the American jurisdictions, usually, *975 however, in the modified form of a rule or precept of construction rather than as an absolute rule of law.” It was this rule that Mr. Justice Eggleston was referring to in Bottimore v. First-Merchants Bank, 170 Va. 221, 230 , 196 S. E. 593 , when he used the following language from Stephens v. Moore, 298 Mo. 215 , 249 S. W. 601 : “ ‘It is the generally accepted rule that, where there is a grant to one for fife, with remainder to the heirs of the

1930In the case of Manss-Owens Co. v. Owens & Son. 129 Va. 183 , 105 S. E. 543, 547 , it is said: “On thissubject, Harrison, J., in Boisseau v. Fuller, 96 Va. 46 , 30 S. E. 457 , makes this clear and comprehensive statement of the generally accepted rule: “The whole'*, question is one of intention.

1921On this subject, Harrison, J., in Boisseau v. Fuller, 96 Va. 46 , 30 S. E. 457 , makes this clear and comprehensive statement of the generally accepted rule: “The whole question is one of intention.

2001Although the Supreme Court’s discussion of prisoners’ privacy and confidential relationships in Lanza was dicta, see id. (noting that Lanza did not claim violation of any special relationship), other courts have relied upon the language in Lanza to recognize exceptions to the generally accepted principle that no Fourth Amendment reasonable expectation of privacy exists in prisoners’ conversations with their visitors, see, e.g., North v. Super.

2001Although the Supreme Court's discussion of prisoners' privacy and confidential relationships in Lanza was dicta, see id. (noting that Lanza did not claim violation of any special relationship), other courts have relied upon the language in Lanza to recognize exceptions to the generally accepted principle that no Fourth Amendment reasonable expectation of privacy exists in prisoners' conversations with their visitors, see, e.g., North v. Super.

1995Board of Supervisors v. Sampson, 235 Va. 516 (1988).

1990Id.

1976Title Insurance Co. of Richmond, Inc. v. Clara A. Howell, 158 Va. 713 (1932).

1975Charles v. Commonwealth Motors, 195 Va. 576 (1954).

1961In Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp. v. Glover, 165 Va. 283, 285 , 182 S. E. 221, 222 , we adopted this definition: *761 “Accident: An event that takes place without one’s foresight or expectation; an undesigned, sudden, and unexpected event; chance; contingency, often; an undesigned and unforeseen occurrence of an afflicted or unfortunate character; casualty, mishap; as, to die by accident.” “The generally accepted rule is that death or injury does not result from accident or accidental means within the terms of an accident policy where it is the natural result of the insured’s voluntary act,

1961In Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp. v. Glover, 165 Va. 283, 285 , 182 S. E. 221, 222 , we adopted this definition: *761 “Accident: An event that takes place without one’s foresight or expectation; an undesigned, sudden, and unexpected event; chance; contingency, often; an undesigned and unforeseen occurrence of an afflicted or unfortunate character; casualty, mishap; as, to die by accident.” “The generally accepted rule is that death or injury does not result from accident or accidental means within the terms of an accident policy where it is the natural result of the insured’s voluntary act,

1956Cf. Hardiman v. Dyson, 194 Va. 116, 119 , 72 S. E. 2d 361, 363 .

1956Cf. Hardiman v. Dyson, 194 Va. 116, 119 , 72 S. E. 2d 361, 363 .

1954Va. 559 , 149 S. E. 611 ; Copenhaver v. Pendleton, supra. This rule against a remainder to the grantor’s heirs had its origin in feudal custom which preferred to have real property pass by the “worthier” channel of descent, rather than by the less worthy channel of purchase, and although the reason for the rule disappeared with the abolition of feudalism, the rule itself remained.

1954IV, ch. 106, § 3), this common-law doctrine has been recognized and given effect in a substantial number of the American jurisdictions, usually, *975 however, in the modified form of a rule or precept of construction rather than as an absolute rule of law.” It was this rule that Mr. Justice Eggleston was referring to in Bottimore v. First-Merchants Bank, 170 Va. 221, 230 , 196 S. E. 593 , when he used the following language from Stephens v. Moore, 298 Mo. 215 , 249 S. W. 601 : “ ‘It is the generally accepted rule that, where there is a grant to one for fife, with remainder to the heirs of the

1954IV, ch. 106, § 3), this common-law doctrine has been recognized and given effect in a substantial number of the American jurisdictions, usually, *975 however, in the modified form of a rule or precept of construction rather than as an absolute rule of law.” It was this rule that Mr. Justice Eggleston was referring to in Bottimore v. First-Merchants Bank, 170 Va. 221, 230 , 196 S. E. 593 , when he used the following language from Stephens v. Moore, 298 Mo. 215 , 249 S. W. 601 : “ ‘It is the generally accepted rule that, where there is a grant to one for fife, with remainder to the heirs of the

1954IV, ch. 106, § 3), this common-law doctrine has been recognized and given effect in a substantial number of the American jurisdictions, usually, *975 however, in the modified form of a rule or precept of construction rather than as an absolute rule of law.” It was this rule that Mr. Justice Eggleston was referring to in Bottimore v. First-Merchants Bank, 170 Va. 221, 230 , 196 S. E. 593 , when he used the following language from Stephens v. Moore, 298 Mo. 215 , 249 S. W. 601 : “ ‘It is the generally accepted rule that, where there is a grant to one for fife, with remainder to the heirs of the

1954IV, ch. 106, § 3), this common-law doctrine has been recognized and given effect in a substantial number of the American jurisdictions, usually, *975 however, in the modified form of a rule or precept of construction rather than as an absolute rule of law.” It was this rule that Mr. Justice Eggleston was referring to in Bottimore v. First-Merchants Bank, 170 Va. 221, 230 , 196 S. E. 593 , when he used the following language from Stephens v. Moore, 298 Mo. 215 , 249 S. W. 601 : “ ‘It is the generally accepted rule that, where there is a grant to one for fife, with remainder to the heirs of the

1954IV, ch. 106, § 3), this common-law doctrine has been recognized and given effect in a substantial number of the American jurisdictions, usually, *975 however, in the modified form of a rule or precept of construction rather than as an absolute rule of law.” It was this rule that Mr. Justice Eggleston was referring to in Bottimore v. First-Merchants Bank, 170 Va. 221, 230 , 196 S. E. 593 , when he used the following language from Stephens v. Moore, 298 Mo. 215 , 249 S. W. 601 : “ ‘It is the generally accepted rule that, where there is a grant to one for fife, with remainder to the heirs of the

1953If remote, *892 speculative, contingent or uncertain, they are not recoverable.” ( 191 Va., at page 573 , 62 S. E. 2d, at page 255 .) The Kentucky court follows this general rule.

1953If remote, *892 speculative, contingent or uncertain, they are not recoverable.” ( 191 Va., at page 573 , 62 S. E. 2d, at page 255 .) The Kentucky court follows this general rule.

1931The Virginia cases of Willard v. Worsham, 76 Va. 392 , and Osborne v. Cabell, 77 Va. 462 , as to this, are in accord with the generally accepted rule, that when the grantee in a conveyance of land covenants to assume and discharge a previously existing mortgage thereon as part of the purchase money, then such grantee thereby becomes the principal debtor for the payment of the incumbrance, and the grantor by necessary implication becomes the surety.

1931The Virginia cases of Willard v. Worsham, 76 Va. 392 , and Osborne v. Cabell, 77 Va. 462 , as to this, are in accord with the generally accepted rule, that when the grantee in a conveyance of land covenants to assume and discharge a previously existing mortgage thereon as part of the purchase money, then such grantee thereby becomes the principal debtor for the payment of the incumbrance, and the grantor by necessary implication becomes the surety.

1930In the case of Manss-Owens Co. v. Owens & Son. 129 Va. 183 , 105 S. E. 543, 547 , it is said: “On thissubject, Harrison, J., in Boisseau v. Fuller, 96 Va. 46 , 30 S. E. 457 , makes this clear and comprehensive statement of the generally accepted rule: “The whole'*, question is one of intention.

1930In the case of Manss-Owens Co. v. Owens & Son. 129 Va. 183 , 105 S. E. 543, 547 , it is said: “On thissubject, Harrison, J., in Boisseau v. Fuller, 96 Va. 46 , 30 S. E. 457 , makes this clear and comprehensive statement of the generally accepted rule: “The whole'*, question is one of intention.

1928Co. v. Bryant’s Admr., 95 Va. 215 , 28 S. E. 183 , thus clearly summarizes the rule: “It is consonant with reason and human experience that the positive testimony of a single witness, whose credibility is unimpeached, that he saw or heard a particular thing at a particular time and place, ought ordinarily to outweigh that of a number of equally credible witnesses, who, with the same opportunities, testify that they did not see nor hear it.

1926That this is the generally accepted rule is well indicated by the cases which, we have cited as well as by Rice v. Hammond, 19 Okl. 419 , 91 P. 698 , 14 Ann.

1926That this is the generally accepted rule is well indicated by the cases which, we have cited as well as by Rice v. Hammond, 19 Okl. 419 , 91 P. 698 , 14 Ann.

1926In Dodgson v. Henderson, 113 Ill. 360 , there was no collateral note involved, and the surety who was there released was the surety on a single promissory note whieh was extended without his knowledge or consent.

1922As was said by this court in Jones v. Commonwealth, 111 Va. 862 , 69 S. E. 953 , according to the generally accepted rule, “if two or more accomplices are produced as witnesses, they are not permitted to corroborate each other, but the same rule is applied and the same confirmation is required as if there were but one”; and it was therein held to be error (though not the principal one upon which the reversal was based) that the trial court refused to instruct the jury accordingly.

1922As was said by this court in Jones v. Commonwealth, 111 Va. 862 , 69 S. E. 953 , according to the generally accepted rule, “if two or more accomplices are produced as witnesses, they are not permitted to corroborate each other, but the same rule is applied and the same confirmation is required as if there were but one”; and it was therein held to be error (though not the principal one upon which the reversal was based) that the trial court refused to instruct the jury accordingly.

1920In the Matter of Davis, 149 N. Y. 539 , 44 N. E. 185 , it is held that the method of procedure in a proceeding for the ascertainment and determining of a transfer or inheritance tax is controlled by the statute which was in force on .the subject at the time of the institution of the proceeding, although the tax itself and the rights of the parties are controlled by an earlier statute.

1920In the Matter of Davis, 149 N. Y. 539 , 44 N. E. 185 , it is held that the method of procedure in a proceeding for the ascertainment and determining of a transfer or inheritance tax is controlled by the statute which was in force on .the subject at the time of the institution of the proceeding, although the tax itself and the rights of the parties are controlled by an earlier statute.