generally accepted rule in North Carolina

1988The Spiegel court relied on Winder v. Martin, 183 N.C. 410, 111 S.E. 708 (1922) from which we also derive direction: It is the generally accepted rule that if the landlord receive rent from his tenant, after full notice or knowledge of a breach of a covenant or condition in his lease, for which forfeiture might have been declared, such constitutes a waiver of the forfeiture which may not afterwards be asserted for that particular breach, or any other breach which occurred prior to the acceptance of the rent.

1988The Spiegel court relied on Winder v. Martin, 183 N.C. 410, 111 S.E. 708 (1922) from which we also derive direction: It is the generally accepted rule that if the landlord receive rent from his tenant, after full notice or knowledge of a breach of a covenant or condition in his lease, for which forfeiture might have been declared, such constitutes a waiver of the forfeiture which may not afterwards be asserted for that particular breach, or any other breach which occurred prior to the acceptance of the rent.

2004Moreover, "[i]t is a generally accepted principle that the courts of the state in which a minor child is physically present have jurisdiction consistent with due process to adjudicate a custody dispute involving that child." Lynch v. Lynch, 302 N.C. 189, 193 , 274 S.E.2d 212, 217 , modified and affirmed, 303 N.C. 367 , 279 S.E.2d 840 (1981).

2004Moreover, "[i]t is a generally accepted principle that the courts of the state in which a minor child is physically present have jurisdiction consistent with due process to adjudicate a custody dispute involving that child." Lynch v. Lynch, 302 N.C. 189, 193 , 274 S.E.2d 212, 217 , modified and affirmed, 303 N.C. 367 , 279 S.E.2d 840 (1981).

2004Moreover, “[i]t is a generally accepted principle that the courts of the state in which a minor child is physically present have jurisdiction consistent with due process to adjudicate a custody dispute involving that child.” Lynch v. Lynch, 302 N.C. 189, 193 , 274 S.E.2d 212, 217 , modified and affirmed, 303 N.C. 367 , 279 S.E.2d 840 (1981).

2004Moreover, "[i]t is a generally accepted principle that the courts of the state in which a minor child is physically present have jurisdiction consistent with due process to adjudicate a custody dispute involving that child." Lynch v. Lynch, 302 N.C. 189, 193 , 274 S.E.2d 212, 217 , modified and affirmed, 303 N.C. 367 , 279 S.E.2d 840 (1981).

2004Moreover, “[i]t is a generally accepted principle that the courts of the state in which a minor child is physically present have jurisdiction consistent with due process to adjudicate a custody dispute involving that child.” Lynch v. Lynch, 302 N.C. 189, 193 , 274 S.E.2d 212, 217 , modified and affirmed, 303 N.C. 367 , 279 S.E.2d 840 (1981).

2004Moreover, "[i]t is a generally accepted principle that the courts of the state in which a minor child is physically present have jurisdiction consistent with due process to adjudicate a custody dispute involving that child." Lynch v. Lynch, 302 N.C. 189, 193 , 274 S.E.2d 212, 217 , modified and affirmed, 303 N.C. 367 , 279 S.E.2d 840 (1981).

2014App. 250, 252 , 368 S.E.2d 199, 200 (1988) (citing Pike v. Wachovia Bank and Trust Co., 274 N.C. 1 , 161 S.E.2d 453 (1968)).

2014App. 250, 252 , 368 S.E.2d 199, 200 (1988) (citing Pike v. Wachovia Bank and Trust Co., 274 N.C. 1 , 161 S.E.2d 453 (1968)).

1967Here, we think the following excerpt from Hotels, Inc. v. Raleigh, 268 N.C. 535 , 151 S.E. 2d 35 , is applicable: “In Johnson v. City of Winston-Salem, 239 N.C. 697, at p. 707 , 81 S.E. 2d 153 , which is cited by the Present Chief Justice Parker, in Hormel & Company v. Winston-Salem, 263 N.C. 666, at p. 675 , 140 S.E. 2d 362 , it is said: ‘The general rule is that a municipality becomes responsible for maintenance, and liable for injuries resulting from a want of due care in respect to upkeep, of drains and culverts constructed by third persons when, and only when, they are adopted as a part o

1967Here, we think the following excerpt from Hotels, Inc. v. Raleigh, 268 N.C. 535 , 151 S.E. 2d 35 , is applicable: “In Johnson v. City of Winston-Salem, 239 N.C. 697, at p. 707 , 81 S.E. 2d 153 , which is cited by the Present Chief Justice Parker, in Hormel & Company v. Winston-Salem, 263 N.C. 666, at p. 675 , 140 S.E. 2d 362 , it is said: ‘The general rule is that a municipality becomes responsible for maintenance, and liable for injuries resulting from a want of due care in respect to upkeep, of drains and culverts constructed by third persons when, and only when, they are adopted as a part o

1967Here, we think the following excerpt from Hotels, Inc. v. Raleigh, 268 N.C. 535 , 151 S.E. 2d 35 , is applicable: “In Johnson v. City of Winston-Salem, 239 N.C. 697, at p. 707 , 81 S.E. 2d 153 , which is cited by the Present Chief Justice Parker, in Hormel & Company v. Winston-Salem, 263 N.C. 666, at p. 675 , 140 S.E. 2d 362 , it is said: ‘The general rule is that a municipality becomes responsible for maintenance, and liable for injuries resulting from a want of due care in respect to upkeep, of drains and culverts constructed by third persons when, and only when, they are adopted as a part o

1967Here, we think the following excerpt from Hotels, Inc. v. Raleigh, 268 N.C. 535 , 151 S.E. 2d 35 , is applicable: “In Johnson v. City of Winston-Salem, 239 N.C. 697, at p. 707 , 81 S.E. 2d 153 , which is cited by the Present Chief Justice Parker, in Hormel & Company v. Winston-Salem, 263 N.C. 666, at p. 675 , 140 S.E. 2d 362 , it is said: ‘The general rule is that a municipality becomes responsible for maintenance, and liable for injuries resulting from a want of due care in respect to upkeep, of drains and culverts constructed by third persons when, and only when, they are adopted as a part o

1934The law is thus stated where numerous authorities are cited, in S. v. Dalton, 178 N. C., 779 (781) : “In cases of this character, it is the generally accepted principle that, where one man, engaged in an affray or difficulty with another, unintentionally kills a bystander, his act shall be interpreted in reference to his intent and conduct towards his adversary, and criminal liability for the homicide, or otherwise, and the degree of it must be thereby determined.” On this aspect, the court below charged the jury, which was not excepted to, as follows: “I also charge you, gentlemen, that it is

1934The law is thus stated where numerous authorities are cited, in S. v. Dalton , 178 N.C. 779 (781): "In cases of this character, it is the generally accepted principle that, where one man, engaged in an affray or difficulty with another, unintentionally kills a bystander, his act shall be interpreted in reference to his intent and conduct towards his adversary, and criminal liability for the homicide, or otherwise, and the degree of it must be thereby determined." On this aspect, the court below charged the jury, which was not excepted to, as follows: "I also charge you, gentlemen, that it is t

1923This same doctrine has been sustained in Bradshaw v. Millikin, 173 N. C., 432 .

1923This same doctrine has been sustained in Bradshaw v. Millikin , 173 N.C. 432 . *Page 288 In two notable instances, Standard Oil Co. v. U.S. , 221 U.S. 1 ; and U.S. v. American Tobacco Co., ibid . 106, stipulations in partial restraint of trade were held not to be obnoxious to the law unless they were unreasonable and likely to become monopolies, which are obnoxious to our constitutional provisions, Const. of N.C.

1908Adams v. Wadhams , 40 Bar., 225; Comstock v. Hitt , 37 Ill. 542 .

1908Adams v. Wadhams, 40 Bar., 225; Comstock v. Hitt, 37 Ill., 542 .

2011App. 203 , 281 S.E.2d 664 (1981). [I]t is a generally accepted principle that the test of the place of a contract is as to the place at which the last act was done by either of the parties essential to a meeting of minds.

2000App. 247, 254 , 328 S.E.2d 446, 450 , aff'd 314 N.C. 660 , 335 S.E.2d 897 (1985) (“In paternity cases, where the defendant has not been previously excluded as the father, and where 50% is used as the prior probability, the Bayes Theorem ensures that every alleged father is ‘probably’ the father, i.e., the blood test results only improve upon the 50% prior probability of paternity”); Griffith v. State, 976 S.W.2d 241, 245 (Ct. App. Texas 1998) (In genetic testing, “courts in the United States typically use a .5 or 50% prior probability because it is a neutral probability ...[;] this calculation

2000App. 247, 254 , 328 S.E.2d 446, 450 , aff'd 314 N.C. 660 , 335 S.E.2d 897 (1985) (“In paternity cases, where the defendant has not been previously excluded as the father, and where 50% is used as the prior probability, the Bayes Theorem ensures that every alleged father is ‘probably’ the father, i.e., the blood test results only improve upon the 50% prior probability of paternity”); Griffith v. State, 976 S.W.2d 241, 245 (Ct. App. Texas 1998) (In genetic testing, “courts in the United States typically use a .5 or 50% prior probability because it is a neutral probability ...[;] this calculation

2000App. 247, 254 , 328 S.E.2d 446, 450 , aff'd 314 N.C. 660 , 335 S.E.2d 897 (1985) (“In paternity cases, where the defendant has not been previously excluded as the father, and where 50% is used as the prior probability, the Bayes Theorem ensures that every alleged father is ‘probably’ the father, i.e., the blood test results only improve upon the 50% prior probability of paternity”); Griffith v. State, 976 S.W.2d 241, 245 (Ct. App. Texas 1998) (In genetic testing, “courts in the United States typically use a .5 or 50% prior probability because it is a neutral probability ...[;] this calculation

1998Jur. 2d, Attachment and Garnishment § 100 (1963) (citing Tillinghast v. Johnson, 82 A. 788 (R.I. 1912); West Cache Sugar Co. v. Hendrickson, 190 P. 946 (Utah 1920)); see also National Safe Deposit Co. v. Stead, 95 N.E. 973 (Ill. 1911), aff’d, 232 U.S. 58 , 58 L.

1998Jur. 2d, Attachment and Garnishment § 100 (1963) (citing Tillinghast v. Johnson, 82 A. 788 (R.I. 1912); West Cache Sugar Co. v. Hendrickson, 190 P. 946 (Utah 1920)); see also National Safe Deposit Co. v. Stead, 95 N.E. 973 (Ill. 1911), aff’d, 232 U.S. 58 , 58 L.