generally accepted rule in Kentucky

1931Co., supra, the court said: “It is nevertheless true that in practice a corporation may, and often does, bind itself by the actions of its executive officers and agents *785 ■without formal grant of power so to do, and this court uniformly has recognized this generally accepted principle of law.” Bell & Coggleshall Co. v. Ky. Glass-Works Co., 106 Ky. 7 , 50 S. W. 2, 1092 , 51 S. W. 180 , 20 Ky. Law.

1931Co., supra, the court said: “It is nevertheless true that in practice a corporation may, and often does, bind itself by the actions of its executive officers and agents *785 ■without formal grant of power so to do, and this court uniformly has recognized this generally accepted principle of law.” Bell & Coggleshall Co. v. Ky. Glass-Works Co., 106 Ky. 7 , 50 S. W. 2, 1092 , 51 S. W. 180 , 20 Ky. Law.

1950The correct and generally accepted rule seems to be that laid down in the Sutherland case, above cited by appellant: "We believe the law to be that admissions fatal to his cause given in the testimony of a party to an action on the trial of the case should be viewed in the light of all the conditions and circumstances *281 proven in the case; and unless all such circumstances and conditions give rise to the probability of error in the party's own testimony, he should not be permitted to avert the consequences of his testimony by the introduction of, or reliance on, other evidence in the case."

1950The correct and generally accepted rule seems to be that laid down in the Sutherland case, above cited by appellant: “We believe the law to be that admissions fatal to his cause given in the testimony of a party to an action on the trial of the case should be viewed in. the light of all the conditions and circumstances proven in the case; and unless all such circumstances and conditions give rise to the probability of error in the party’s own testimony, he should not be permitted to avert the consequences of his testimony by the introduction of, or reliance on, other evidence in the case.” ( 2

1950The correct and generally accepted rule seems to be that laid down in the Sutherland case, above cited by appellant: "We believe the law to be that admissions fatal to his cause given in the testimony of a party to an action on the trial of the case should be viewed in the light of all the conditions and circumstances *281 proven in the case; and unless all such circumstances and conditions give rise to the probability of error in the party's own testimony, he should not be permitted to avert the consequences of his testimony by the introduction of, or reliance on, other evidence in the case."

1950The correct and generally accepted rule seems to be that laid down in the Sutherland case, above cited by appellant: “We believe the law to be that admissions fatal to his cause given in the testimony of a party to an action on the trial of the case should be viewed in. the light of all the conditions and circumstances proven in the case; and unless all such circumstances and conditions give rise to the probability of error in the party’s own testimony, he should not be permitted to avert the consequences of his testimony by the introduction of, or reliance on, other evidence in the case.” ( 2

1937As said in Thornton on Attorneys At Law, vol. 2, sec. 894: “ ‘The solution of this question frequently involves so many considerations of public policy and concrete justice * * * that no fixed or arbitrary rules have been, or properly can be, adopted by the courts. * * * It is a generally accepted principle, however, that since the' primary purpose of disbarment proceedings is the protection of the courts *518 and the public disbarment should never be decreed, if any discipline less severe would accomplish the: desired result, as when there are prospects that the: attorney’s conduct and charac

1915As said in Thornton on Attorneys-at-Law, Vol. 2, Sec. 894: “The solution of this question frequently involves so many considerations of public policy and concrete justice, dependent upon the gravity and consequences of the misconduct, the age, character and reputation of the attorney, the probability of his reformation, the circumstances atténding the commission of the offense, and the like, that no fixed or arbitrary rules have been, or properly can be, adopted by the courts. * * * It is a generally accepted principle, however, that since the primary purpose of disbarment proceedings is the p

1937As said in Thornton on Attorneys At Law, vol. 2, sec. 894: “ ‘The solution of this question frequently involves so many considerations of public policy and concrete justice * * * that no fixed or arbitrary rules have been, or properly can be, adopted by the courts. * * * It is a generally accepted principle, however, that since the' primary purpose of disbarment proceedings is the protection of the courts *518 and the public disbarment should never be decreed, if any discipline less severe would accomplish the: desired result, as when there are prospects that the: attorney’s conduct and charac

1915As said in Thornton on Attorneys-at-Law, Vol. 2, Sec. 894: “The solution of this question frequently involves so many considerations of public policy and concrete justice, dependent upon the gravity and consequences of the misconduct, the age, character and reputation of the attorney, the probability of his reformation, the circumstances atténding the commission of the offense, and the like, that no fixed or arbitrary rules have been, or properly can be, adopted by the courts. * * * It is a generally accepted principle, however, that since the primary purpose of disbarment proceedings is the p

1926Bell & Coggeshall Co. v. Kentucky Glass Works Co., 106 Ky. 7 , 50 S. W. 2 ; Star Mills Company v. Bailey, 140 Ky. 197 ; Nelson-Bethel Co. v. Pitts, 141 Ky. 242 ; Elk Valley Coal Company v. Thompson, 150 Ky. 614 ; Caddy Oil Co. v. Sommer, 186 Ky. 843 ; Commonwealth v. Mehler, 183 Ky. 11 .’ ’ Nothing is better settled than that a corporation may be bound by its officers or agents acting in the regular course of business, even though no specific authority be granted by the board of directors, if by subsequent action the board ratifies the acts of the officer or agent, or acquiesces therein by rec

1924Bell & Coggeshall Co. v. Ky. Glass Works Co., 106 Ky. 7 , 50 S. W. 2 ; Star Mills Co. v. Bell, 140 Ky. 197 ; Nelson-Bethel Co. v. Pitts, 141 Ky. 242 , 132 S. W. 430 ; Elk Valley Coal Co. v. Thompson, 106 Ky. 614 , 150 S. W. 817 ; Caddy Oil Co. v. Sommer, 186 Ky. 843 , 218 S. W. 288 ; Commonwealth v. Mehler, 183 Ky. 11 , 208 S. W. 13 .

1926Bell & Coggeshall Co. v. Kentucky Glass Works Co., 106 Ky. 7 , 50 S. W. 2 ; Star Mills Company v. Bailey, 140 Ky. 197 ; Nelson-Bethel Co. v. Pitts, 141 Ky. 242 ; Elk Valley Coal Company v. Thompson, 150 Ky. 614 ; Caddy Oil Co. v. Sommer, 186 Ky. 843 ; Commonwealth v. Mehler, 183 Ky. 11 .’ ’ Nothing is better settled than that a corporation may be bound by its officers or agents acting in the regular course of business, even though no specific authority be granted by the board of directors, if by subsequent action the board ratifies the acts of the officer or agent, or acquiesces therein by rec

1924Bell & Coggeshall Co. v. Ky. Glass Works Co., 106 Ky. 7 , 50 S. W. 2 ; Star Mills Co. v. Bell, 140 Ky. 197 ; Nelson-Bethel Co. v. Pitts, 141 Ky. 242 , 132 S. W. 430 ; Elk Valley Coal Co. v. Thompson, 106 Ky. 614 , 150 S. W. 817 ; Caddy Oil Co. v. Sommer, 186 Ky. 843 , 218 S. W. 288 ; Commonwealth v. Mehler, 183 Ky. 11 , 208 S. W. 13 .

1926Bell & Coggeshall Co. v. Kentucky Glass Works Co., 106 Ky. 7 , 50 S. W. 2 ; Star Mills Company v. Bailey, 140 Ky. 197 ; Nelson-Bethel Co. v. Pitts, 141 Ky. 242 ; Elk Valley Coal Company v. Thompson, 150 Ky. 614 ; Caddy Oil Co. v. Sommer, 186 Ky. 843 ; Commonwealth v. Mehler, 183 Ky. 11 .’ ’ Nothing is better settled than that a corporation may be bound by its officers or agents acting in the regular course of business, even though no specific authority be granted by the board of directors, if by subsequent action the board ratifies the acts of the officer or agent, or acquiesces therein by rec

1924Bell & Coggeshall Co. v. Ky. Glass Works Co., 106 Ky. 7 , 50 S. W. 2 ; Star Mills Co. v. Bell, 140 Ky. 197 ; Nelson-Bethel Co. v. Pitts, 141 Ky. 242 , 132 S. W. 430 ; Elk Valley Coal Co. v. Thompson, 106 Ky. 614 , 150 S. W. 817 ; Caddy Oil Co. v. Sommer, 186 Ky. 843 , 218 S. W. 288 ; Commonwealth v. Mehler, 183 Ky. 11 , 208 S. W. 13 .

1926Bell & Coggeshall Co. v. Kentucky Glass Works Co., 106 Ky. 7 , 50 S. W. 2 ; Star Mills Company v. Bailey, 140 Ky. 197 ; Nelson-Bethel Co. v. Pitts, 141 Ky. 242 ; Elk Valley Coal Company v. Thompson, 150 Ky. 614 ; Caddy Oil Co. v. Sommer, 186 Ky. 843 ; Commonwealth v. Mehler, 183 Ky. 11 .’ ’ Nothing is better settled than that a corporation may be bound by its officers or agents acting in the regular course of business, even though no specific authority be granted by the board of directors, if by subsequent action the board ratifies the acts of the officer or agent, or acquiesces therein by rec

1924Bell & Coggeshall Co. v. Ky. Glass Works Co., 106 Ky. 7 , 50 S. W. 2 ; Star Mills Co. v. Bell, 140 Ky. 197 ; Nelson-Bethel Co. v. Pitts, 141 Ky. 242 , 132 S. W. 430 ; Elk Valley Coal Co. v. Thompson, 106 Ky. 614 , 150 S. W. 817 ; Caddy Oil Co. v. Sommer, 186 Ky. 843 , 218 S. W. 288 ; Commonwealth v. Mehler, 183 Ky. 11 , 208 S. W. 13 .

1998The Court then stated: “Moreover, we find the generally accepted rule to be that a certified copy of a public record is admissible in evidence as proof of its contents.” Id.

1993The deed still clearly excepts from the covenant of general warranty encumbrances consisting of "easements and restrictions of record and Zoning Regulations of Spencer County." The Seigles next argue that even if the exceptions are applicable to the covenant of general warranty that "their applicability would be limited to the covenant against encumbrances." This argument is based on the generally accepted principle that the covenant of "general warranty includes all common law covenants under section 493 of the Kentucky Statutes." (Section 493 is now KRS 382.030.) Eli v. Trent, 195 Ky. 26, 27

1993The deed still clearly excepts from the covenant of general warranty encumbrances consisting of “easements and restrictions of record and Zoning Regulations of Spencer County.” The Seigles next argue that even if the exceptions are applicable to the covenant of general warranty that “their applicability would be limited to the covenant against encumbrances.” This argument is based on the generally accepted principle that the covenant of “general warranty includes all common law covenants under section 493 of the Kentucky Statutes.” (Section 493 is now KRS 382.030.) Eli v. Trent, 195 Ky. 26, 27

1993The deed still clearly excepts from the covenant of general warranty encumbrances consisting of "easements and restrictions of record and Zoning Regulations of Spencer County." The Seigles next argue that even if the exceptions are applicable to the covenant of general warranty that "their applicability would be limited to the covenant against encumbrances." This argument is based on the generally accepted principle that the covenant of "general warranty includes all common law covenants under section 493 of the Kentucky Statutes." (Section 493 is now KRS 382.030.) Eli v. Trent, 195 Ky. 26, 27

1993The deed still clearly excepts from the covenant of general warranty encumbrances consisting of "easements and restrictions of record and Zoning Regulations of Spencer County." The Seigles next argue that even if the exceptions are applicable to the covenant of general warranty that "their applicability would be limited to the covenant against encumbrances." This argument is based on the generally accepted principle that the covenant of "general warranty includes all common law covenants under section 493 of the Kentucky Statutes." (Section 493 is now KRS 382.030.) Eli v. Trent, 195 Ky. 26, 27

1993The deed still clearly excepts from the covenant of general warranty encumbrances consisting of "easements and restrictions of record and Zoning Regulations of Spencer County." The Seigles next argue that even if the exceptions are applicable to the covenant of general warranty that "their applicability would be limited to the covenant against encumbrances." This argument is based on the generally accepted principle that the covenant of "general warranty includes all common law covenants under section 493 of the Kentucky Statutes." (Section 493 is now KRS 382.030.) Eli v. Trent, 195 Ky. 26, 27

1993The deed still clearly excepts from the covenant of general warranty encumbrances consisting of "easements and restrictions of record and Zoning Regulations of Spencer County." The Seigles next argue that even if the exceptions are applicable to the covenant of general warranty that "their applicability would be limited to the covenant against encumbrances." This argument is based on the generally accepted principle that the covenant of "general warranty includes all common law covenants under section 493 of the Kentucky Statutes." (Section 493 is now KRS 382.030.) Eli v. Trent, 195 Ky. 26, 27

1993The deed still clearly excepts from the covenant of general warranty encumbrances consisting of "easements and restrictions of record and Zoning Regulations of Spencer County." The Seigles next argue that even if the exceptions are applicable to the covenant of general warranty that "their applicability would be limited to the covenant against encumbrances." This argument is based on the generally accepted principle that the covenant of "general warranty includes all common law covenants under section 493 of the Kentucky Statutes." (Section 493 is now KRS 382.030.) Eli v. Trent, 195 Ky. 26, 27

1993The deed still clearly excepts from the covenant of general warranty encumbrances consisting of "easements and restrictions of record and Zoning Regulations of Spencer County." The Seigles next argue that even if the exceptions are applicable to the covenant of general warranty that "their applicability would be limited to the covenant against encumbrances." This argument is based on the generally accepted principle that the covenant of "general warranty includes all common law covenants under section 493 of the Kentucky Statutes." (Section 493 is now KRS 382.030.) Eli v. Trent, 195 Ky. 26, 27

1989We disagree with appellant’s interpretation of Huff Our supreme court in Huff simply recognized the generally accepted rule that in this jurisdiction a “company may be liable for damages resulting from the disconnection of the current if the bill rendered is not just and correct.” Id. at 818 .

1967A man can be no more than totally disabled, and if he is allowed to draw weekly benefits simultaneously from a permanent total and a permanent partial award, it will probably become more profitable for him to be disabled than to be well * * This general rule was stated under different facts in Dunn v. Eaton, 233 Ky. 699 , 26 S.W.2d 513, 514 , 1 “However, payments for separate injuries cannot be added together and made to run concurrently, where the weekly payments will exceed the highest payment allowed under the statute.” *886 On the second question we are of the opinion that there was suffic

1967A man can be no more than totally disabled, and if he is allowed to draw weekly benefits simultaneously from a permanent total and a permanent partial award, it will probably become more profitable for him to be disabled than to be well * * This general rule was stated under different facts in Dunn v. Eaton, 233 Ky. 699 , 26 S.W.2d 513, 514 , 1 “However, payments for separate injuries cannot be added together and made to run concurrently, where the weekly payments will exceed the highest payment allowed under the statute.” *886 On the second question we are of the opinion that there was suffic

1965See Gatewood v. Pickett, 314 Ky. 125 , 234 S.W. 2d 489 ; Montgomery’s Ex’r v. Northcutt, 292 Ky. 622 , 167 S.W.2d 317 ; Fugazzi v. Fugazzi’s Com, 275 Ky. 62 , 120 S.W.2d 779 ; Stallard v. Lambert, 236 Ky. 651 , 33 S.W.2d 682 ; Sherley v. Sherley, 192 Ky. 122 , 232 S.W. 53 and cases therein cited and discussed as to the prevailing general rule that the date of the testator’s death is generally held to be the date of vesting of a remainder interest.

1965See Gatewood v. Pickett, 314 Ky. 125 , 234 S.W. 2d 489 ; Montgomery’s Ex’r v. Northcutt, 292 Ky. 622 , 167 S.W.2d 317 ; Fugazzi v. Fugazzi’s Com, 275 Ky. 62 , 120 S.W.2d 779 ; Stallard v. Lambert, 236 Ky. 651 , 33 S.W.2d 682 ; Sherley v. Sherley, 192 Ky. 122 , 232 S.W. 53 and cases therein cited and discussed as to the prevailing general rule that the date of the testator’s death is generally held to be the date of vesting of a remainder interest.

1965See Gatewood v. Pickett, 314 Ky. 125 , 234 S.W. 2d 489 ; Montgomery’s Ex’r v. Northcutt, 292 Ky. 622 , 167 S.W.2d 317 ; Fugazzi v. Fugazzi’s Com, 275 Ky. 62 , 120 S.W.2d 779 ; Stallard v. Lambert, 236 Ky. 651 , 33 S.W.2d 682 ; Sherley v. Sherley, 192 Ky. 122 , 232 S.W. 53 and cases therein cited and discussed as to the prevailing general rule that the date of the testator’s death is generally held to be the date of vesting of a remainder interest.

1965See Gatewood v. Pickett, 314 Ky. 125 , 234 S.W. 2d 489 ; Montgomery’s Ex’r v. Northcutt, 292 Ky. 622 , 167 S.W.2d 317 ; Fugazzi v. Fugazzi’s Com, 275 Ky. 62 , 120 S.W.2d 779 ; Stallard v. Lambert, 236 Ky. 651 , 33 S.W.2d 682 ; Sherley v. Sherley, 192 Ky. 122 , 232 S.W. 53 and cases therein cited and discussed as to the prevailing general rule that the date of the testator’s death is generally held to be the date of vesting of a remainder interest.

1965See Gatewood v. Pickett, 314 Ky. 125 , 234 S.W. 2d 489 ; Montgomery’s Ex’r v. Northcutt, 292 Ky. 622 , 167 S.W.2d 317 ; Fugazzi v. Fugazzi’s Com, 275 Ky. 62 , 120 S.W.2d 779 ; Stallard v. Lambert, 236 Ky. 651 , 33 S.W.2d 682 ; Sherley v. Sherley, 192 Ky. 122 , 232 S.W. 53 and cases therein cited and discussed as to the prevailing general rule that the date of the testator’s death is generally held to be the date of vesting of a remainder interest.

1965See Gatewood v. Pickett, 314 Ky. 125 , 234 S.W. 2d 489 ; Montgomery’s Ex’r v. Northcutt, 292 Ky. 622 , 167 S.W.2d 317 ; Fugazzi v. Fugazzi’s Com, 275 Ky. 62 , 120 S.W.2d 779 ; Stallard v. Lambert, 236 Ky. 651 , 33 S.W.2d 682 ; Sherley v. Sherley, 192 Ky. 122 , 232 S.W. 53 and cases therein cited and discussed as to the prevailing general rule that the date of the testator’s death is generally held to be the date of vesting of a remainder interest.

1965Com. by Breckinridge v. Woods, Ky., 342 S.W.2d 534, 535 ; see also, Civil Service Commission v. Tankersley, Ky., 330 S.W.2d 392 , where we said: “ * * * In order for a party to maintain an appeal from a judgment it is essential that he shall be aggrieved or prejudiced by the judgment, for appeals are not allowed for the purpose of settling academic or moot questions however interesting or desirable such disposition may be.

1965See Gatewood v. Pickett, 314 Ky. 125 , 234 S.W. 2d 489 ; Montgomery’s Ex’r v. Northcutt, 292 Ky. 622 , 167 S.W.2d 317 ; Fugazzi v. Fugazzi’s Com, 275 Ky. 62 , 120 S.W.2d 779 ; Stallard v. Lambert, 236 Ky. 651 , 33 S.W.2d 682 ; Sherley v. Sherley, 192 Ky. 122 , 232 S.W. 53 and cases therein cited and discussed as to the prevailing general rule that the date of the testator’s death is generally held to be the date of vesting of a remainder interest.

1965See Gatewood v. Pickett, 314 Ky. 125 , 234 S.W. 2d 489 ; Montgomery’s Ex’r v. Northcutt, 292 Ky. 622 , 167 S.W.2d 317 ; Fugazzi v. Fugazzi’s Com, 275 Ky. 62 , 120 S.W.2d 779 ; Stallard v. Lambert, 236 Ky. 651 , 33 S.W.2d 682 ; Sherley v. Sherley, 192 Ky. 122 , 232 S.W. 53 and cases therein cited and discussed as to the prevailing general rule that the date of the testator’s death is generally held to be the date of vesting of a remainder interest.

1962But all essential elements of estoppel must be present. 6 McQuillin, Section 20.12; Palmer v. Elizaville Graded Common School District, 235 Ky. 75 , 29 S.W.2d 648 ; O’Hara v. City of South Ft.

1962But all essential elements of estoppel must be present. 6 McQuillin, Section 20.12; Palmer v. Elizaville Graded Common School District, 235 Ky. 75 , 29 S.W.2d 648 ; O’Hara v. City of South Ft.

1960We are of the conclusion that the Rives case is unsound in that it did not follow the recognized rule, and we hereby overrule it (and City of Maysville v. Kenton, Ky., 252 S.W.2d 39 to the extent that it followed the Rives case). .