generally accepted rule in Hawaii

2011Implicit in the waiver is the well-settled maxim that “the failure to properly raise an issue at the trial level precludes a party from raising that issue on appeal.” State v. Hoglund, 71 Haw. 147, 150 , 785 P.2d 1311, 1313 (1990); see also State v. Ildefonso, 72 Haw. 573, 584 , 827 P.2d 648, 655 (1992) (“Our review of the record reveals that [the defendant] did not raise this argu ment at trial, and thus it is deemed to have been waived.” (Citing State v. Cummings, 49 Haw. 522 , 423 P.2d 438 (1967).)); Rodrigues, 67 Haw. at 498 , 692 P.2d at 1158 (holding that the State, “propounding] only th

2011Implicit in the waiver is the well-settled maxim that “the failure to properly raise an issue at the trial level precludes a party from raising that issue on appeal.” State v. Hoglund, 71 Haw. 147, 150 , 785 P.2d 1311, 1313 (1990); see also State v. Ildefonso, 72 Haw. 573, 584 , 827 P.2d 648, 655 (1992) (“Our review of the record reveals that [the defendant] did not raise this argu ment at trial, and thus it is deemed to have been waived.” (Citing State v. Cummings, 49 Haw. 522 , 423 P.2d 438 (1967).)); Rodrigues, 67 Haw. at 498 , 692 P.2d at 1158 (holding that the State, “propounding] only th

2011Implicit in the waiver is the well-settled maxim that “the failure to properly raise an issue at the trial level precludes a party from raising that issue on appeal.” State v. Hoglund, 71 Haw. 147, 150 , 785 P.2d 1311, 1313 (1990); see also State v. Ildefonso, 72 Haw. 573, 584 , 827 P.2d 648, 655 (1992) (“Our review of the record reveals that [the defendant] did not raise this argu ment at trial, and thus it is deemed to have been waived.” (Citing State v. Cummings, 49 Haw. 522 , 423 P.2d 438 (1967).)); Rodrigues, 67 Haw. at 498 , 692 P.2d at 1158 (holding that the State, “propounding] only th

2011Implicit in the waiver is the well-settled maxim that “the failure to properly raise an issue at the trial level precludes a party from raising that issue on appeal.” State v. Hoglund, 71 Haw. 147, 150 , 785 P.2d 1311, 1313 (1990); see also State v. Ildefonso, 72 Haw. 573, 584 , 827 P.2d 648, 655 (1992) (“Our review of the record reveals that [the defendant] did not raise this argu ment at trial, and thus it is deemed to have been waived.” (Citing State v. Cummings, 49 Haw. 522 , 423 P.2d 438 (1967).)); Rodrigues, 67 Haw. at 498 , 692 P.2d at 1158 (holding that the State, “propounding] only th

2011State v. Moses, 102 Hawai'i 449, 456 , 77 P.3d 940, 947 (2003) (“As a general rule, if a party does not raise an argument at trial, that argument will be deemed to have been waived on appeal[.]”) (Citations omitted.); State v. Hoglund, 71 Haw. 147, 150 , 785 P.2d 1311, 1313 (1990) (“Generally, the failure to properly raise an issue at the trial level precludes a party from raising that issue on appeal.” (Citing State v. Cummings, 49 Haw. 522 , 423 P.2d 438 (1967).)); State v. Rodrigues, 67 Haw. 496, 498 , 692 P.2d 1156, 1158 (1985) (holding that the State, “propound[ing] only the theory of con

2011State v. Moses, 102 Hawai'i 449, 456 , 77 P.3d 940, 947 (2003) (“As a general rule, if a party does not raise an argument at trial, that argument will be deemed to have been waived on appeal[.]”) (Citations omitted.); State v. Hoglund, 71 Haw. 147, 150 , 785 P.2d 1311, 1313 (1990) (“Generally, the failure to properly raise an issue at the trial level precludes a party from raising that issue on appeal.” (Citing State v. Cummings, 49 Haw. 522 , 423 P.2d 438 (1967).)); State v. Rodrigues, 67 Haw. 496, 498 , 692 P.2d 1156, 1158 (1985) (holding that the State, “propound[ing] only the theory of con

2004Cf. Helbush v. Mitchell, 34 Haw. 639, 648 (1938) (“It is a generally accepted rule of statutory construction that where the legislative body adopts a law of another State all changes in words and phraseology will be presumed to have been made deliberately and with a purpose to limit, qualify or enlarge the adopted law to the extent that the changes in words and phrases imply.”) The lack of a minority tolling provision in the FTCA and the STLA is justified by sovereign immunity.

2004Cf. Helbush v. Mitchell, 34 Haw. 639, 648 (1938) ("It is a generally accepted rule of statutory construction that where the legislative body adopts a law of another State all changes in words and phraseology will be presumed to have been made deliberately and with a purpose to limit, qualify or enlarge the adopted law to the extent that the changes in words and phrases imply.") The lack of a minority tolling provision in the FTCA and the STLA is justified by sovereign immunity.

2011Implicit in the waiver is the well-settled maxim that “the failure to properly raise an issue at the trial level precludes a party from raising that issue on appeal.” State v. Hoglund, 71 Haw. 147, 150 , 785 P.2d 1311, 1313 (1990); see also State v. Ildefonso, 72 Haw. 573, 584 , 827 P.2d 648, 655 (1992) (“Our review of the record reveals that [the defendant] did not raise this argu ment at trial, and thus it is deemed to have been waived.” (Citing State v. Cummings, 49 Haw. 522 , 423 P.2d 438 (1967).)); Rodrigues, 67 Haw. at 498 , 692 P.2d at 1158 (holding that the State, “propounding] only th

2011Implicit in the waiver is the well-settled maxim that “the failure to properly raise an issue at the trial level precludes a party from raising that issue on appeal.” State v. Hoglund, 71 Haw. 147, 150 , 785 P.2d 1311, 1313 (1990); see also State v. Ildefonso, 72 Haw. 573, 584 , 827 P.2d 648, 655 (1992) (“Our review of the record reveals that [the defendant] did not raise this argu ment at trial, and thus it is deemed to have been waived.” (Citing State v. Cummings, 49 Haw. 522 , 423 P.2d 438 (1967).)); Rodrigues, 67 Haw. at 498 , 692 P.2d at 1158 (holding that the State, “propounding] only th

1961Ry. v. Borthwick, 34 Haw. 269 , this court reviewed the several decisions and summarized them at p. 272 as follows: “It is a generally accepted rule of statutory construction that unless it appears by the context or otherwise in the statute a different sense was intended, words are to be given their ordinarily accepted meaning.

1961Ry. v. Borthwick, 34 Haw. 269 , this court reviewed the several decisions and summarized them at p. 272 as follows: "It is a generally accepted rule of statutory construction that unless it appears by the context or otherwise in the statute a different sense was intended, words are to be given their ordinarily accepted meaning.

2014“It is a generally accepted rule of statutory construction that unless it appears by the context or otherwise in the statute a different sense was intended, words are to be given their ordinarily accepted meaning.” State v. Kwak, 80 Hawai'i 297, 301 , 909 P.2d 1112, 1116 (1995) (citation, internal quotation marks, and brackets omitted).

2014“It is a generally accepted rule of statutory construction that unless it appears by the context or otherwise in the statute a different sense was intended, words are to be given their ordinarily accepted meaning.” State v. Kwak, 80 Hawai'i 297, 301 , 909 P.2d 1112, 1116 (1995) (citation, internal quotation marks, and brackets omitted).

2011Implicit in the waiver is the well-settled maxim that “the failure to properly raise an issue at the trial level precludes a party from raising that issue on appeal.” State v. Hoglund, 71 Haw. 147, 150 , 785 P.2d 1311, 1313 (1990); see also State v. Ildefonso, 72 Haw. 573, 584 , 827 P.2d 648, 655 (1992) (“Our review of the record reveals that [the defendant] did not raise this argu ment at trial, and thus it is deemed to have been waived.” (Citing State v. Cummings, 49 Haw. 522 , 423 P.2d 438 (1967).)); Rodrigues, 67 Haw. at 498 , 692 P.2d at 1158 (holding that the State, “propounding] only th

2011Implicit in the waiver is the well-settled maxim that “the failure to properly raise an issue at the trial level precludes a party from raising that issue on appeal.” State v. Hoglund, 71 Haw. 147, 150 , 785 P.2d 1311, 1313 (1990); see also State v. Ildefonso, 72 Haw. 573, 584 , 827 P.2d 648, 655 (1992) (“Our review of the record reveals that [the defendant] did not raise this argu ment at trial, and thus it is deemed to have been waived.” (Citing State v. Cummings, 49 Haw. 522 , 423 P.2d 438 (1967).)); Rodrigues, 67 Haw. at 498 , 692 P.2d at 1158 (holding that the State, “propounding] only th

2010See State v. Sunderland, 115 Hawai'i 396, 399-400 , 168 P.3d 526, 529-30 (2007) (concluding that Petitioner made an argument at trial that “differed] from the argument [he sought] to assert on appeal” and, therefore, the court would not address it (citing HRS § 641-2 (Supp.2004) (“The appellate court ... need not consider a point that was not presented in the trial court in an appropriate manner.”))); State v. Rodrigues, 67 Haw. 496, 498 , 692 P.2d 1156, 1158 (1985) (holding that, on appeal, when seeking a reversal on a motion to suppress, the State was precluded from raising the issue of a “g

2010See State v. Sunderland, 115 Hawai'i 396, 399-400 , 168 P.3d 526, 529-30 (2007) (concluding that Petitioner made an argument at trial that “differed] from the argument [he sought] to assert on appeal” and, therefore, the court would not address it (citing HRS § 641-2 (Supp.2004) (“The appellate court ... need not consider a point that was not presented in the trial court in an appropriate manner.”))); State v. Rodrigues, 67 Haw. 496, 498 , 692 P.2d 1156, 1158 (1985) (holding that, on appeal, when seeking a reversal on a motion to suppress, the State was precluded from raising the issue of a “g

2010Moreover, “[t]he doctrine of judicial estoppel ‘prevents parties from playing fast and loose with the court or blowing hot and cold during the course of litigation.’ ” State v. Fields, 115 Hawai'i 503, 534 , 168 P.3d 955, 986 (2007) (quoting Roxas v. Marcos, 89 Hawai'i 91, 124 , 969 P.2d 1209, 1242 (1998) (citations and some internal quotation marks omitted)).

2010Moreover, “[t]he doctrine of judicial estoppel ‘prevents parties from playing fast and loose with the court or blowing hot and cold during the course of litigation.’ ” State v. Fields, 115 Hawai'i 503, 534 , 168 P.3d 955, 986 (2007) (quoting Roxas v. Marcos, 89 Hawai'i 91, 124 , 969 P.2d 1209, 1242 (1998) (citations and some internal quotation marks omitted)).

2010Moreover, “[t]he doctrine of judicial estoppel ‘prevents parties from playing fast and loose with the court or blowing hot and cold during the course of litigation.’ ” State v. Fields, 115 Hawai'i 503, 534 , 168 P.3d 955, 986 (2007) (quoting Roxas v. Marcos, 89 Hawai'i 91, 124 , 969 P.2d 1209, 1242 (1998) (citations and some internal quotation marks omitted)).

2010Moreover, “[t]he doctrine of judicial estoppel ‘prevents parties from playing fast and loose with the court or blowing hot and cold during the course of litigation.’ ” State v. Fields, 115 Hawai'i 503, 534 , 168 P.3d 955, 986 (2007) (quoting Roxas v. Marcos, 89 Hawai'i 91, 124 , 969 P.2d 1209, 1242 (1998) (citations and some internal quotation marks omitted)).

2005See also Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 272 , 114 S.Ct. 1483 (1994) (reaffirming the generally accepted principle that “congressional enactments and administrative rules will not be construed to have retroactive effect unless their language requires this result”); Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 851 , 110 S.Ct. 1570 , 108 L.Ed.2d 842 (1990) (reaffirming the presumption against retroactivity set forth in Bowen).

2005See also Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 272 , 114 S.Ct. 1483 (1994) (reaffirming the generally accepted principle that “congressional enactments and administrative rules will not be construed to have retroactive effect unless their language requires this result”); Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 851 , 110 S.Ct. 1570 , 108 L.Ed.2d 842 (1990) (reaffirming the presumption against retroactivity set forth in Bowen).

2005Furthermore, this court, in Gap v. Puna Geothermal Venture, 106 Hawai'i 325, 333 , 104 P.3d 912, 920 (2004), stated that “Hawaii statutory and case law discourage retroactive application of laws and rules in the absence of language showing that such operation was intended.” Accordingly, in the present case, the insurance commissioner could not retroactively apply a medical-rehabilitative limit unless “such operation was intended.” The relevant question, then, is whether an intent to permit the retroactive application of the medical-rehabilitative limit is ascertainable from the language of the

2005Furthermore, this court, in Gap v. Puna Geothermal Venture, 106 Hawai'i 325, 333 , 104 P.3d 912, 920 (2004), stated that “Hawaii statutory and case law discourage retroactive application of laws and rules in the absence of language showing that such operation was intended.” Accordingly, in the present case, the insurance commissioner could not retroactively apply a medical-rehabilitative limit unless “such operation was intended.” The relevant question, then, is whether an intent to permit the retroactive application of the medical-rehabilitative limit is ascertainable from the language of the

2002See State v. Rodrigues, 67 Haw. 496, 498 , 692 P.2d 1156, 1158 (1985) (holding that, on appeal, when seeking reversal of a court's granting of a motion to suppress, the State waived the argument that the exigent circumstances and good faith exceptions to the warrant requirement applied because "the State had never presented the issue[s] . . . to the trial court" and that "[i]t is a generally accepted rule that issues not raised at the trial level will not be considered on appeal" (citations omitted)). *155 The majority claims that "the record is replete with indications that all of the parties

2001See, e.g., Amorin, 61 Haw. at 359 n. 4, 604 P.2d at 48 n. 4 ("Additional exceptions to the Miranda rule, not relevant here, have been recognized by courts in other jurisdictions.

2001See, e.g., Amorin, 61 Haw. at 359 n. 4, 604 P.2d at 48 n. 4 ("Additional exceptions to the Miranda rule, not relevant here, have been recognized by courts in other jurisdictions.

1995Accordingly, “[i]t is a generally accepted rule of statutory eonstruction that unless it appears by the context or otherwise in the statute a different sense was intended, words are to be given their ordinarily accepted meaning.” Hirasa v. Burtner, 68 Haw. 22, 25 , 702 P.2d 772, 775 (1985) (citations omitted).

1995Accordingly, “[i]t is a generally accepted rule of statutory eonstruction that unless it appears by the context or otherwise in the statute a different sense was intended, words are to be given their ordinarily accepted meaning.” Hirasa v. Burtner, 68 Haw. 22, 25 , 702 P.2d 772, 775 (1985) (citations omitted).

1985State v. DeSilva, 64 Haw. 40, 41 , 636 P.2d 728, 729 (1981); State v. Hook, 60 Haw. 197, 204 , 587 P.2d 1224, 1229 (1978).

1985State v. DeSilva, 64 Haw. 40, 41 , 636 P.2d 728, 729 (1981); State v. Hook, 60 Haw. 197, 204 , 587 P.2d 1224, 1229 (1978).

1985State v. DeSilva, 64 Haw. 40, 41 , 636 P.2d 728, 729 (1981); State v. Hook, 60 Haw. 197, 204 , 587 P.2d 1224, 1229 (1978).

1985State v. DeSilva, 64 Haw. 40, 41 , 636 P.2d 728, 729 (1981); State v. Hook, 60 Haw. 197, 204 , 587 P.2d 1224, 1229 (1978).

1985Hawaii Consolidated Railway v. Borthwick, 34 Haw. 269, 272 (1937); see also Hawaiian Beaches v. Kondo, 52 Haw. 279 , 474 P.2d 538 (1970); Advertiser Publishing Co. v. Fase, 43 Haw. 154 (1959).

1985Hawaii Consolidated Railway v. Borthwick, 34 Haw. 269, 272 (1937); see also Hawaiian Beaches v. Kondo, 52 Haw. 279 , 474 P.2d 538 (1970); Advertiser Publishing Co. v. Fase, 43 Haw. 154 (1959).

1974See United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 , 68 S.Ct. 222 , 92 L.Ed. 210 (1948); but see Brown v. State, 498 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. Crim.

1974See United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 , 68 S.Ct. 222 , 92 L.Ed. 210 (1948); but see Brown v. State, 498 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. Crim.