15 Rhode Island opinions name it 2 courts 1904–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Rhode Island courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Latham v. STATE, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATIONgreen2 sentences2021We follow the generally accepted rule that, in the absence of any limitation fixed -9- by statute, an appeal must be filed within a reasonable time[,] otherwise the appeal will be denied because of laches.” Latham v. State Department of Education, 116 R.I. 245, 249-50 , 355 A.2d 400, 403 (1976). 2021We follow the generally accepted rule that, in the absence of any limitation fixed -9- by statute, an appeal must be filed within a reasonable time[,] otherwise the appeal will be denied because of laches.” Latham v. State Department of Education, 116 R.I. 245, 249-50 , 355 A.2d 400, 403 (1976). | 1 | 1 |
Capital Properties, Inc. v. Stategreen1 sentence2007See Capital Properties, Inc. v. State , 749 A.2d 1069 , 1081 (R.I. 1999). | 1 | 1 |
Steinmetz v. Stockton City Chamber of Commercegreen1 sentence1994See Steinmetz v. Stockton City Chamber of Commerce, 169 Cal.App.3d 1142, 1147 , 214 Cal.Rptr. 405 , 408 (1985) (no duty to protect plaintiff from injury by third party on land not owned, possessed, or controlled by landowner); Buck v. Acme Markets, Inc., 53 Md.App. 151, 157 , 456 A.2d 47, 51 (1982) (no duty on private landowner to protect one on public way); Jones v. Williams, 160 Mich.App. 681, 684 , 408 N.W.2d 426, 428 (1987) (no duty to patron attacked off premises in adjacent parking lot); Wofford v. Kennedy’s 2nd St. | 1 | 1 |
Buck v. Acme Markets, Inc.green2 sentences1994See Steinmetz v. Stockton City Chamber of Commerce, 169 Cal.App.3d 1142, 1147 , 214 Cal.Rptr. 405 , 408 (1985) (no duty to protect plaintiff from injury by third party on land not owned, possessed, or controlled by landowner); Buck v. Acme Markets, Inc., 53 Md.App. 151, 157 , 456 A.2d 47, 51 (1982) (no duty on private landowner to protect one on public way); Jones v. Williams, 160 Mich.App. 681, 684 , 408 N.W.2d 426, 428 (1987) (no duty to patron attacked off premises in adjacent parking lot); Wofford v. Kennedy’s 2nd St. 1994See Steinmetz v. Stockton City Chamber of Commerce, 169 Cal.App.3d 1142, 1147 , 214 Cal.Rptr. 405 , 408 (1985) (no duty to protect plaintiff from injury by third party on land not owned, possessed, or controlled by landowner); Buck v. Acme Markets, Inc., 53 Md.App. 151, 157 , 456 A.2d 47, 51 (1982) (no duty on private landowner to protect one on public way); Jones v. Williams, 160 Mich.App. 681, 684 , 408 N.W.2d 426, 428 (1987) (no duty to patron attacked off premises in adjacent parking lot); Wofford v. Kennedy’s 2nd St. | 1 | 1 |
Jones v. Williamsgreen2 sentences1994See Steinmetz v. Stockton City Chamber of Commerce, 169 Cal.App.3d 1142, 1147 , 214 Cal.Rptr. 405 , 408 (1985) (no duty to protect plaintiff from injury by third party on land not owned, possessed, or controlled by landowner); Buck v. Acme Markets, Inc., 53 Md.App. 151, 157 , 456 A.2d 47, 51 (1982) (no duty on private landowner to protect one on public way); Jones v. Williams, 160 Mich.App. 681, 684 , 408 N.W.2d 426, 428 (1987) (no duty to patron attacked off premises in adjacent parking lot); Wofford v. Kennedy’s 2nd St. 1994See Steinmetz v. Stockton City Chamber of Commerce, 169 Cal.App.3d 1142, 1147 , 214 Cal.Rptr. 405 , 408 (1985) (no duty to protect plaintiff from injury by third party on land not owned, possessed, or controlled by landowner); Buck v. Acme Markets, Inc., 53 Md.App. 151, 157 , 456 A.2d 47, 51 (1982) (no duty on private landowner to protect one on public way); Jones v. Williams, 160 Mich.App. 681, 684 , 408 N.W.2d 426, 428 (1987) (no duty to patron attacked off premises in adjacent parking lot); Wofford v. Kennedy’s 2nd St. | 1 | 1 |
Bridges v. Donalsongreen2 sentences1985It is a generally accepted principle that “[w]hen a suit for divorce and alimony is pending or is prospective, the husband can not [sic ] dispose of his property to another for the purpose of defeating the recovery by his wife of alimony, if such purpose is known to the party taking, or he has reasonable grounds to suspect that the husband intends to accomplish this purpose by his conveyance.” Harrison v. Harrison, 228 Ga. 126, 126 , 184 S.E.2d 147, 148 (1971) (quoting Bridges v. Donalson, 165 Ga. 228, 233 , 140 S.E. 497, 499 (1927)). 1985It is a generally accepted principle that “[w]hen a suit for divorce and alimony is pending or is prospective, the husband can not [sic ] dispose of his property to another for the purpose of defeating the recovery by his wife of alimony, if such purpose is known to the party taking, or he has reasonable grounds to suspect that the husband intends to accomplish this purpose by his conveyance.” Harrison v. Harrison, 228 Ga. 126, 126 , 184 S.E.2d 147, 148 (1971) (quoting Bridges v. Donalson, 165 Ga. 228, 233 , 140 S.E. 497, 499 (1927)). | 1 | 1 |
McCallie v. McCalliegreen2 sentences1985“This is true even though the deed was made in payment of a valid pre-existing debt due by the husband to the grantee.” Harrison, 228 Ga. at 126-27 , 184 S.E.2d at 148 (citing McCallie v. McCallie, 192 Ga. 699, 700 , 16 S.E.2d 562, 563 (1941)). 1985“This is true even though the deed was made in payment of a valid pre-existing debt due by the husband to the grantee.” Harrison, 228 Ga. at 126-27 , 184 S.E.2d at 148 (citing McCallie v. McCallie, 192 Ga. 699, 700 , 16 S.E.2d 562, 563 (1941)). | 1 | 1 |
Harrison v. Harrisongreen2 sentences1985It is a generally accepted principle that “[w]hen a suit for divorce and alimony is pending or is prospective, the husband can not [sic ] dispose of his property to another for the purpose of defeating the recovery by his wife of alimony, if such purpose is known to the party taking, or he has reasonable grounds to suspect that the husband intends to accomplish this purpose by his conveyance.” Harrison v. Harrison, 228 Ga. 126, 126 , 184 S.E.2d 147, 148 (1971) (quoting Bridges v. Donalson, 165 Ga. 228, 233 , 140 S.E. 497, 499 (1927)). 1985It is a generally accepted principle that “[w]hen a suit for divorce and alimony is pending or is prospective, the husband can not [sic ] dispose of his property to another for the purpose of defeating the recovery by his wife of alimony, if such purpose is known to the party taking, or he has reasonable grounds to suspect that the husband intends to accomplish this purpose by his conveyance.” Harrison v. Harrison, 228 Ga. 126, 126 , 184 S.E.2d 147, 148 (1971) (quoting Bridges v. Donalson, 165 Ga. 228, 233 , 140 S.E. 497, 499 (1927)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Naglegreen2 sentences1972It is a generally-accepted rule of law that “* * * a wrongful refusal .to license is not a bar to a prosecution for acting without a license.” State v. Poulos, 97 N. H. 352, 354, 88 A.2d 860, 861 (1952); accord State v. Nagle, 148 Me. 197 , 91 A.2d 397 (1952); Lipkin v. Duffy, 118 N.J.L. 84 , 191 A. 288 (1937); Waller v. Birmingham, 37 Ala. App. 325 , 67 So.2d 421 (1953). 2 The record in this case clearly indicates that a Board of Examiners of Hoisting Engineers has been established as required by law. 1972It is a generally-accepted rule of law that “* * * a wrongful refusal .to license is not a bar to a prosecution for acting without a license.” State v. Poulos, 97 N. H. 352, 354, 88 A.2d 860, 861 (1952); accord State v. Nagle, 148 Me. 197 , 91 A.2d 397 (1952); Lipkin v. Duffy, 118 N.J.L. 84 , 191 A. 288 (1937); Waller v. Birmingham, 37 Ala. App. 325 , 67 So.2d 421 (1953). 2 The record in this case clearly indicates that a Board of Examiners of Hoisting Engineers has been established as required by law. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Poulosgreen1 sentence1972It is a generally-accepted rule of law that “* * * a wrongful refusal .to license is not a bar to a prosecution for acting without a license.” State v. Poulos, 97 N. H. 352, 354, 88 A.2d 860, 861 (1952); accord State v. Nagle, 148 Me. 197 , 91 A.2d 397 (1952); Lipkin v. Duffy, 118 N.J.L. 84 , 191 A. 288 (1937); Waller v. Birmingham, 37 Ala. App. 325 , 67 So.2d 421 (1953). 2 The record in this case clearly indicates that a Board of Examiners of Hoisting Engineers has been established as required by law. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Rhode Island. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Matter of Almeida
green
1 sentence2011During the late eighteenth century, the generally accepted rule was that a pension *Page 13 was "a gratuity of the state, `a bounty springing from the appreciation and graciousness of the sovereign. . . .'" In re Almeida , 611 A.2d 1375 , 1385 (R.I. 1992) (quoting Ballurio v. Castellini , 102 A.2d 662 , 666 (N.J. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Ballurio v. Castellini
green
1 sentence2011During the late eighteenth century, the generally accepted rule was that a pension *Page 13 was "a gratuity of the state, `a bounty springing from the appreciation and graciousness of the sovereign. . . .'" In re Almeida , 611 A.2d 1375 , 1385 (R.I. 1992) (quoting Ballurio v. Castellini , 102 A.2d 662 , 666 (N.J. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Sherman v. Goloskie
green
1 sentence1995The generally accepted rule is that possession required to acquire title pursuant to 34-7-1 must be actual, open, notorious hostile, under claim of right, continuous and exclusive. ( Sherman v. Goloskie , 95 R.I. 457 (1963). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Curvin for an Opinion
neutral
2 sentences1986Referring specifically to the request by the Speaker and the Senate Majority Leader, the following language from the Reply of The Supreme Court To A Communication From Certain Members of The House of Representatives in The General Assembly, 58 R.I. 51, 54 , 191 A. 259 , 271 (1937) is instructive: "We are not unmindful of the generally accepted principle of the law of legislative assemblies that the house means a majority of the house. 1986Referring specifically to the request by the Speaker and the Senate Majority Leader, the following language from the Reply of The Supreme Court To A Communication From Certain Members of The House of Representatives in The General Assembly, 58 R.I. 51, 54 , 191 A. 259 , 271 (1937) is instructive: “We are not unmindful of the generally accepted principle of the law of legislative assemblies that the house means a majority of the house. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Davis v. United States
green
2 sentences1980Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469 , 16 S. Ct. 353 , 40 L. 1980Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469 , 16 S. Ct. 353 , 40 L. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
State v. Mazzarella
green
2 sentences1980State v. Mazzarella, 103 R.I. 253 , 236 A.2d 446 (1967); State v. Colangelo, 55 R.I. 170 , 179 A. 147 (1935); McCormick’s Handbook of the Law of Evidence §190 at 447 (2d ed. Cleary 1972). 1980State v. Mazzarella, 103 R.I. 253 , 236 A.2d 446 (1967); State v. Colangelo, 55 R.I. 170 , 179 A. 147 (1935); McCormick’s Handbook of the Law of Evidence §190 at 447 (2d ed. Cleary 1972). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
State v. Colangelo
green
2 sentences1980State v. Mazzarella, 103 R.I. 253 , 236 A.2d 446 (1967); State v. Colangelo, 55 R.I. 170 , 179 A. 147 (1935); McCormick’s Handbook of the Law of Evidence §190 at 447 (2d ed. Cleary 1972). 1980State v. Mazzarella, 103 R.I. 253 , 236 A.2d 446 (1967); State v. Colangelo, 55 R.I. 170 , 179 A. 147 (1935); McCormick’s Handbook of the Law of Evidence §190 at 447 (2d ed. Cleary 1972). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Norman Apartments, Inc. v. International Trust Co.
green
1 sentence1975McCleary v. Hudspeth, 124 F.2d 455 (10th Cir. 1941). | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Lipkin v. Duffy
neutral
2 sentences1972It is a generally-accepted rule of law that “* * * a wrongful refusal .to license is not a bar to a prosecution for acting without a license.” State v. Poulos, 97 N. H. 352, 354, 88 A.2d 860, 861 (1952); accord State v. Nagle, 148 Me. 197 , 91 A.2d 397 (1952); Lipkin v. Duffy, 118 N.J.L. 84 , 191 A. 288 (1937); Waller v. Birmingham, 37 Ala. App. 325 , 67 So.2d 421 (1953). 2 The record in this case clearly indicates that a Board of Examiners of Hoisting Engineers has been established as required by law. 1972It is a generally-accepted rule of law that “* * * a wrongful refusal .to license is not a bar to a prosecution for acting without a license.” State v. Poulos, 97 N. H. 352, 354, 88 A.2d 860, 861 (1952); accord State v. Nagle, 148 Me. 197 , 91 A.2d 397 (1952); Lipkin v. Duffy, 118 N.J.L. 84 , 191 A. 288 (1937); Waller v. Birmingham, 37 Ala. App. 325 , 67 So.2d 421 (1953). 2 The record in this case clearly indicates that a Board of Examiners of Hoisting Engineers has been established as required by law. | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Waller v. City of Birmingham
neutral
2 sentences1972It is a generally-accepted rule of law that “* * * a wrongful refusal .to license is not a bar to a prosecution for acting without a license.” State v. Poulos, 97 N. H. 352, 354, 88 A.2d 860, 861 (1952); accord State v. Nagle, 148 Me. 197 , 91 A.2d 397 (1952); Lipkin v. Duffy, 118 N.J.L. 84 , 191 A. 288 (1937); Waller v. Birmingham, 37 Ala. App. 325 , 67 So.2d 421 (1953). 2 The record in this case clearly indicates that a Board of Examiners of Hoisting Engineers has been established as required by law. 1972It is a generally-accepted rule of law that “* * * a wrongful refusal .to license is not a bar to a prosecution for acting without a license.” State v. Poulos, 97 N. H. 352, 354, 88 A.2d 860, 861 (1952); accord State v. Nagle, 148 Me. 197 , 91 A.2d 397 (1952); Lipkin v. Duffy, 118 N.J.L. 84 , 191 A. 288 (1937); Waller v. Birmingham, 37 Ala. App. 325 , 67 So.2d 421 (1953). 2 The record in this case clearly indicates that a Board of Examiners of Hoisting Engineers has been established as required by law. | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Lindsay v. State
green
2 sentences1972The rule is aptly stated in Lindsay v. State, 2 Md.App. 330 , 234 A.2d 479 (1967). 1972The rule is aptly stated in Lindsay v. State, 2 Md.App. 330 , 234 A.2d 479 (1967). | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Robinson v. Air Draulics Engineering Company
green
2 sentences1967In our opinion, the generally accepted rule is aptly stated in Robinson v. Air Draulics Engineering Co., 214 Tenn. 30, 39 , 377 S.W.2d 908, 913 , as follows: “The nature of the inquiry in a contempt proceeding should admit of no strict or technical rulings against the accused, but the freest opportunity should always be given him to produce his defense.” We are of the opinion that where a direct contempt is not involved and evidence is offered that, if believed by the court, tends to mitigate the willfulness of the conduct constituting the contempt or would tend to establish that the contumaci 1967In our opinion, the generally accepted rule is aptly stated in Robinson v. Air Draulics Engineering Co., 214 Tenn. 30, 39 , 377 S.W.2d 908, 913 , as follows: “The nature of the inquiry in a contempt proceeding should admit of no strict or technical rulings against the accused, but the freest opportunity should always be given him to produce his defense.” We are of the opinion that where a direct contempt is not involved and evidence is offered that, if believed by the court, tends to mitigate the willfulness of the conduct constituting the contempt or would tend to establish that the contumaci | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Norton v. Shelby County
green
2 sentences1964It was said in Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U. S. 425, 441 , that “For the good order and peace of society their authority is to be respected and obeyed until in some regular mode prescribed by law their title is investigated and determined.” In the case at bax*, therefore, I think it would have been more consistent with this generally accepted principle of law “established from the earliest period, and repeatedly confirmed, by an unbroken current of decisions * * *,” 43 Am. 1964It was said in Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 441 , 6 S.Ct. 1121 , 30 L.Ed. 178 , that "For the good order and peace of society their authority is to be respected and obeyed until in some regular mode prescribed by law their title is investigated and determined." In the case at bar, therefore, I think it would have been more consistent with this generally accepted principle of law "established from the earliest period, and repeatedly confirmed, by an unbroken current of decisions * * *," 43 Am. | 1 | 1964–1964 |
Sweeney v. Perney
neutral
1 sentence1904See Stone v. Crocker, 24 Pick. 81 ; Israel v. Brooks, 23 Ill. 575 ; Sweeney v. Perney, 40 Kan. 102 . | 1 | 1904–1904 |
Israel v. Brooks
green
1 sentence1904See Stone v. Crocker, 24 Pick. 81 ; Israel v. Brooks, 23 Ill. 575 ; Sweeney v. Perney, 40 Kan. 102 . | 1 | 1904–1904 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.