generally accepted rule in Louisiana

1959See 12 A.L.R. 1435 -1455; 72 A.L.R. 229 -232, Vol. 1 McQuillin on Municipal Corporations, 2d Ed., 1102, Sections 395 through 399; City of Shreveport v. Herndon, 159 La. 113 , 105 So. 244 ; State v. Maitrejean, 193 La. 824 , 192 So. 361 , and the authorities cited in these various sources.

1959See 12 A.L.R. 1435 -1455; 72 A.L.R. 229 -232, Vol. 1 McQuillin on Municipal Corporations, 2d Ed., 1102, Sections 395 through 399; City of Shreveport v. Herndon, 159 La. 113 , 105 So. 244 ; State v. Maitrejean, 193 La. 824 , 192 So. 361 , and the authorities cited in these various sources.

1959See 12 A.L.R. 1435 -1455; 72 A.L.R. 229 -232, Vol. 1 McQuillin on Municipal Corporations, 2d Ed., 1102, Sections 395 through 399; City of Shreveport v. Herndon, 159 La. 113 , 105 So. 244 ; State v. Maitrejean, 193 La. 824 , 192 So. 361 , and the authorities cited in these various sources.

1959See 12 A.L.R. 1435 -1455; 72 A.L.R. 229 -232, Vol. 1 McQuillin on Municipal Corporations, 2d Ed., 1102, Sections 395 through 399; City of Shreveport v. Herndon, 159 La. 113 , 105 So. 244 ; State v. Maitrejean, 193 La. 824 , 192 So. 361 , and the authorities cited in these various sources.

1965As pointed out in Thornton’s work on Attorneys at Law, quoted with approval by this court in In re Novo, 200 La. 833 , 9 So.2d 201 , and In re Weber, 202 La. 1037 , 13 So.2d 341 , “The solution of this question (of the discipline to be meted out in such cases) frequently involves too many considerations of public policy and concrete justice, dependent upon the gravity and consequences of the misconduct, the age, character., and reputation of the attorney, the probability of his reformation, the circumstances attending the commission of the offense, and the like that no fixed or arbitrary rules

1965As pointed out in Thornton’s work on Attorneys at Law, quoted with approval by this court in In re Novo, 200 La. 833 , 9 So.2d 201 , and In re Weber, 202 La. 1037 , 13 So.2d 341 , “The solution of this question (of the discipline to be meted out in such cases) frequently involves too many considerations of public policy and concrete justice, dependent upon the gravity and consequences of the misconduct, the age, character., and reputation of the attorney, the probability of his reformation, the circumstances attending the commission of the offense, and the like that no fixed or arbitrary rules

1959Co. v. Bush, La.App., 68 So.2d 254, 256 , this court, concerned with the question of the vigilance of a driver of a motor vehicle on a superior right of way street, observed that the appellant’s defense rested upon the generally accepted rule that where a motorist enters an intersection under the protection of being on a favored street or facing a favorable light, it is negligence to fail to notice another vehicle moving in violation of the traffic right of way, and stated: “In recognition of this principle our courts on several occasions have held that even the protection of a favorable light

1957Co. v. Bush, La.App., 68 So.2d 254, 256 , as follows: “Appellants’ defense rests upon the generally accepted rule that where a motorist enters an intersection under the protection of being on a favored street or facing a favorable light, it is negligence to fail to notice another vehicle, moving in violation of the traffic right of way.

1944In this country * * * according to the generally accepted doctrine, the boundries of owners of land abutting upon the navigable lakes extend only to the low watermark (under the jurisprudence of Louisiana it is the high watermark, see Sapp v. Frazier, 51 La.Ann. 1718 , 26 So. 378 [ 72 Am.St.Rep. 493 ]; State v. Bayou Johnson Oyster Co., 130 La. 604 , 58 So. 405 ; State v. Capdeville, 146 La. 94 , 83 So. 421 ; State v. Bozeman, 156 La. 635 , 101 So. 4 ; State v. Jefferson Island Salt Mining Co., 183 La. 304 , 163 So. 145 ; and Miami Corporation v. State, 186 La. 784 , 173 So. 315 ), the title t

1944In this country * * * according to the generally accepted doctrine, the boundries of owners of land abutting upon the navigable lakes extend only to the low watermark (under the jurisprudence of Louisiana it is the high watermark, see Sapp v. Frazier, 51 La.Ann. 1718 , 26 So. 378 [ 72 Am.St.Rep. 493 ]; State v. Bayou Johnson Oyster Co., 130 La. 604 , 58 So. 405 ; State v. Capdeville, 146 La. 94 , 83 So. 421 ; State v. Bozeman, 156 La. 635 , 101 So. 4 ; State v. Jefferson Island Salt Mining Co., 183 La. 304 , 163 So. 145 ; and Miami Corporation v. State, 186 La. 784 , 173 So. 315 ), the title t

1944In this country * * * according to the generally accepted doctrine, the boundries of owners of land abutting upon the navigable lakes extend only to the low watermark (under the jurisprudence of Louisiana it is the high watermark, see Sapp v. Frazier, 51 La.Ann. 1718 , 26 So. 378 [ 72 Am.St.Rep. 493 ]; State v. Bayou Johnson Oyster Co., 130 La. 604 , 58 So. 405 ; State v. Capdeville, 146 La. 94 , 83 So. 421 ; State v. Bozeman, 156 La. 635 , 101 So. 4 ; State v. Jefferson Island Salt Mining Co., 183 La. 304 , 163 So. 145 ; and Miami Corporation v. State, 186 La. 784 , 173 So. 315 ), the title t

1944In this country * * * according to the generally accepted doctrine, the boundries of owners of land abutting upon the navigable lakes extend only to the low watermark (under the jurisprudence of Louisiana it is the high watermark, see Sapp v. Frazier, 51 La.Ann. 1718 , 26 So. 378 [ 72 Am.St.Rep. 493 ]; State v. Bayou Johnson Oyster Co., 130 La. 604 , 58 So. 405 ; State v. Capdeville, 146 La. 94 , 83 So. 421 ; State v. Bozeman, 156 La. 635 , 101 So. 4 ; State v. Jefferson Island Salt Mining Co., 183 La. 304 , 163 So. 145 ; and Miami Corporation v. State, 186 La. 784 , 173 So. 315 ), the title t

1944In this country * * * according to the generally accepted doctrine, the boundries of owners of land abutting upon the navigable lakes extend only to the low watermark (under the jurisprudence of Louisiana it is the high watermark, see Sapp v. Frazier, 51 La.Ann. 1718 , 26 So. 378 [ 72 Am.St.Rep. 493 ]; State v. Bayou Johnson Oyster Co., 130 La. 604 , 58 So. 405 ; State v. Capdeville, 146 La. 94 , 83 So. 421 ; State v. Bozeman, 156 La. 635 , 101 So. 4 ; State v. Jefferson Island Salt Mining Co., 183 La. 304 , 163 So. 145 ; and Miami Corporation v. State, 186 La. 784 , 173 So. 315 ), the title t

1944In this country * * * according to the generally accepted doctrine, the boundries of owners of land abutting upon the navigable lakes extend only to the low watermark (under the jurisprudence of Louisiana it is the high watermark, see Sapp v. Frazier, 51 La.Ann. 1718 , 26 So. 378 [ 72 Am.St.Rep. 493 ]; State v. Bayou Johnson Oyster Co., 130 La. 604 , 58 So. 405 ; State v. Capdeville, 146 La. 94 , 83 So. 421 ; State v. Bozeman, 156 La. 635 , 101 So. 4 ; State v. Jefferson Island Salt Mining Co., 183 La. 304 , 163 So. 145 ; and Miami Corporation v. State, 186 La. 784 , 173 So. 315 ), the title t

1944In this country * * * according to the generally accepted doctrine, the boundries of owners of land abutting upon the navigable lakes extend only to the low watermark (under the jurisprudence of Louisiana it is the high watermark, see Sapp v. Frazier, 51 La.Ann. 1718 , 26 So. 378 [ 72 Am.St.Rep. 493 ]; State v. Bayou Johnson Oyster Co., 130 La. 604 , 58 So. 405 ; State v. Capdeville, 146 La. 94 , 83 So. 421 ; State v. Bozeman, 156 La. 635 , 101 So. 4 ; State v. Jefferson Island Salt Mining Co., 183 La. 304 , 163 So. 145 ; and Miami Corporation v. State, 186 La. 784 , 173 So. 315 ), the title t

1944In this country * * * according to the generally accepted doctrine, the boundries of owners of land abutting upon the navigable lakes extend only to the low watermark (under the jurisprudence of Louisiana it is the high watermark, see Sapp v. Frazier, 51 La.Ann. 1718 , 26 So. 378 [ 72 Am.St.Rep. 493 ]; State v. Bayou Johnson Oyster Co., 130 La. 604 , 58 So. 405 ; State v. Capdeville, 146 La. 94 , 83 So. 421 ; State v. Bozeman, 156 La. 635 , 101 So. 4 ; State v. Jefferson Island Salt Mining Co., 183 La. 304 , 163 So. 145 ; and Miami Corporation v. State, 186 La. 784 , 173 So. 315 ), the title t

1944In this country * * * according to the generally accepted doctrine, the boundries of owners of land abutting upon the navigable lakes extend only to the low watermark (under the jurisprudence of Louisiana it is the high watermark, see Sapp v. Frazier, 51 La.Ann. 1718 , 26 So. 378 [ 72 Am.St.Rep. 493 ]; State v. Bayou Johnson Oyster Co., 130 La. 604 , 58 So. 405 ; State v. Capdeville, 146 La. 94 , 83 So. 421 ; State v. Bozeman, 156 La. 635 , 101 So. 4 ; State v. Jefferson Island Salt Mining Co., 183 La. 304 , 163 So. 145 ; and Miami Corporation v. State, 186 La. 784 , 173 So. 315 ), the title t

1944In this country * * * according to the generally accepted doctrine, the boundries of owners of land abutting upon the navigable lakes extend only to the low watermark (under the jurisprudence of Louisiana it is the high watermark, see Sapp v. Frazier, 51 La.Ann. 1718 , 26 So. 378 [ 72 Am.St.Rep. 493 ]; State v. Bayou Johnson Oyster Co., 130 La. 604 , 58 So. 405 ; State v. Capdeville, 146 La. 94 , 83 So. 421 ; State v. Bozeman, 156 La. 635 , 101 So. 4 ; State v. Jefferson Island Salt Mining Co., 183 La. 304 , 163 So. 145 ; and Miami Corporation v. State, 186 La. 784 , 173 So. 315 ), the title t

1944In this country * * * according to the generally accepted doctrine, the boundries of owners of land abutting upon the navigable lakes extend only to the low watermark (under the jurisprudence of Louisiana it is the high watermark, see Sapp v. Frazier, 51 La.Ann. 1718 , 26 So. 378 [ 72 Am.St.Rep. 493 ]; State v. Bayou Johnson Oyster Co., 130 La. 604 , 58 So. 405 ; State v. Capdeville, 146 La. 94 , 83 So. 421 ; State v. Bozeman, 156 La. 635 , 101 So. 4 ; State v. Jefferson Island Salt Mining Co., 183 La. 304 , 163 So. 145 ; and Miami Corporation v. State, 186 La. 784 , 173 So. 315 ), the title t

1944In this country * * * according to the generally accepted doctrine, the boundries of owners of land abutting upon the navigable lakes extend only to the low watermark (under the jurisprudence of Louisiana it is the high watermark, see Sapp v. Frazier, 51 La.Ann. 1718 , 26 So. 378 [ 72 Am.St.Rep. 493 ]; State v. Bayou Johnson Oyster Co., 130 La. 604 , 58 So. 405 ; State v. Capdeville, 146 La. 94 , 83 So. 421 ; State v. Bozeman, 156 La. 635 , 101 So. 4 ; State v. Jefferson Island Salt Mining Co., 183 La. 304 , 163 So. 145 ; and Miami Corporation v. State, 186 La. 784 , 173 So. 315 ), the title t

1943See, also, Lenihan v. Commonwealth, 165 Ky. 93 , 176 S.W. 948 , L.R.A. 1917B, 1132 ; Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265 , 2 S.Ct. 569, 614 , 27 L.Ed. 552 ; and Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 355 , 20 L.Ed. 646 .

1942I am not contending that both of these defendants should be disbarred, for, as was pointed out in the Novo case, 9 So.2d 201 , handed down May 25, 1942, where we quoted with approval the opinion of Justice Field of the United States Supreme Court in the case of Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335 , 10 L.Ed. 646 , to the effect that “A removal from the bar should * * * never be decreed where any punishment less severe — such as reprimand, temporary suspension, or fine — would accomplish the end desired,” and Thornton on Attorneys at Law to the effect that “It is a generally accepted principle * * *

1931Co., 143 La. 178 , 78 So. 438 , where the court, after stating the generally accepted rule hereinabove cited, added the following: “If defendant did not see the danger, it must appear that plaintiff has clearly shown that defendant might by the exercise of ordinary care have seen the danger in time to avoid the injury.” The Norwood v. Bahm Case is referred to, not because the facts are similar to those here presented, but because the doctrine there recognized is equally applicable, and must be applied in the instant case.

1930Co., 143 La. 178 , 78 So. 438 , where the court, after stating the generally accepted rule herein-above cited, added the following: “If defendant did not see the danger, it must appear that plaintiff has clearly shown that defendant might by the exercise of ordinary care have seen the danger in time to avoid the injury.” In our original opinion, we said that the rule of the last clear chance had been stat-ted with more amplitude in Tyer v. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry.

1921Hodges v. Joyce, 128 La. 434 , 54 South. 932 , it was held that a person living at Ferriday (in this state) in a stationary box car (with an older brother who was a car inspector), but who had gone to Mississippi under employment there, who ‘frankly testified that he expected to remain in Mississippi as long as he could hold his present job, but would return to his home at Ferriday if he lost his job, or got sick, or could obtain a better job in Louisiana,’ who had left his trunk and part of his clothing in Ferriday, and who had no other abode in this state, was ‘an actual bona fide resident o

1921Hodges v. Joyce, 128 La. 434 , 54 South. 932 , it was held that a person living at Ferriday (in this state) in a stationary box car (with an older brother who was a car inspector), but who had gone to Mississippi under employment there, who ‘frankly testified that he expected to remain in Mississippi as long as he could hold his present job, but would return to his home at Ferriday if he lost his job, or got sick, or could obtain a better job in Louisiana,’ who had left his trunk and part of his clothing in Ferriday, and who had no other abode in this state, was ‘an actual bona fide resident o

2018State v. U-Drive It Car Co ., 79 So.2d 590 , 594 (La.

2004The Ray court noted that "Rule 15(c) alters the generally accepted rule that a new defendant may not be added after prescription has run, and the facts of each case must be viewed carefully subject to the following caveat: this rule does not apply where the amendment seeks to add new and unrelated defendants, since this would be tantamount to assertion of a new cause of action." Ray, 434 So.2d at 1086 . {Emphasis added} Under Ray , the an amendment to the petition relates back to the original petition when: (1) The amended claim must arise out of the same transaction or occurrence set forth in

2004Ray, 434 So.2d at 1087 .

2000State v. Howard, 448 So.2d 150 (La.App. 1 Cir.1984), writ denied, 449 So.2d 1355 (La.1984).

2000State v. Howard, 448 So.2d 150 (La.App. 1 Cir.1984), writ denied, 449 So.2d 1355 (La.1984).

1988"The rule is not without exception or modification, ... because some situations, and some statutes or ordinances, in the very nature of things, require the vesting of discretion in a subordinate commission or in the officer charged with the duty of enforcing the statute or ordinance; e.g., where it is impracticable to lay down a definite or comprehensive rule, or where the discretion relates to the enforcement of a police regulation *463 requiring prompt exercise of judgment." (citations omitted). 116 So.2d at 687 .

1985Co., 248 N.Y. 339 , 162 N.E. 99 (1928).

1985Co., 248 N.Y. 339 , 162 N.E. 99 (1928).

1983See Williams v. U.S., 405 F.2d 234 (5th Cir.1968); Ingenito v. Bermec Corp., 441 F.Supp. 525 (D.N.Y. 1977); cf. Naxon Telesign Corp. v. GTE Information Systems, Inc., 89 F.R.D. 333 (D.Ill.1980).

1983See Williams v. U.S., 405 F.2d 234 (5th Cir.1968); Ingenito v. Bermec Corp., 441 F.Supp. 525 (D.N.Y. 1977); cf. Naxon Telesign Corp. v. GTE Information Systems, Inc., 89 F.R.D. 333 (D.Ill.1980).