generally accepted rule in Maryland

2006We have adopted the generally accepted rule that where a valid common-law marriage has been entered into in a jurisdiction which recognizes the validity of such a marriage, it will be recognized as valid in another jurisdiction, regardless of the rule which prevails in the latter jurisdiction in respect to the validity of common-law marriages. 199 Md. at 459, 87 A.2d 403 (emphasis supplied).

1974Ill It is the law of this State, and Annie and Joshua so concede, that, although a common-law marriage may not be contracted in Maryland, 5 “[w]e have adopted the generally accepted rule that where a valid common-law marriage has been entered into in a jurisdiction which recognizes the *373 validity of such a marriage, it will be recognized as valid in another jurisdiction, regardless of the rule which prevails in the latter jurisdiction in respect to the validity of common-law marriages.” Henderson v. Henderson, 199 Md. 449, 459 .

1974While the generally accepted test as to whether a witness is an accomplice is whether he himself could be convicted for the offense, either as a principal or accessory before the fact, Sutton v. State, 10 Md.

1971While the generally accepted test as to whether a witness is an accomplice is whether he himself could be convicted for the offense, either as a principal or accessory before the fact, Sutton v. State, 10 Md.

2003Id. at 240 , 72 A.2d at 722 .

2003Id. at 240 , 72 A.2d at 722 .

2002“It is generally recognized that it is inappropriate to instruct on the law at this stage of the case, or to question the jury as to whether or not they would be disposed to follow or apply stated rules of law.” Twining v. State, 234 Md. 97, 100 , 198 A.2d 291 (1964), quoted in Davis v. State, 93 Md.App. 89, 112 , 611 A.2d 1008 (1992)(“It is our view that the question which appellant sought to have propounded to the jury did not relate to a cause for disqualification under the circumstances.”); Carter v. State, 66 Md.App. 567, 577 , 505 A.2d 545 (1986)(“The Court of Appeals held that the lower

2002“It is generally recognized that it is inappropriate to instruct on the law at this stage of the case, or to question the jury as to whether or not they would be disposed to follow or apply stated rules of law.” Twining v. State, 234 Md. 97, 100 , 198 A.2d 291 (1964), quoted in Davis v. State, 93 Md.App. 89, 112 , 611 A.2d 1008 (1992)(“It is our view that the question which appellant sought to have propounded to the jury did not relate to a cause for disqualification under the circumstances.”); Carter v. State, 66 Md.App. 567, 577 , 505 A.2d 545 (1986)(“The Court of Appeals held that the lower

1992According to Burroughs, 88 Md.App. at 238 , 594 A.2d 625 , quoting Foster v. State, 11 Md.App. 40, 46 , 272 A.2d 810 , rev’d on other grounds, 263 Md. 388 , 283 A.2d 411 (1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 908 , 92 S.Ct. 1616 , 31 L.Ed.2d 818 (1972), the generally accepted test to determine if a witness is an accomplice is whether the witness could be convicted for the offense, either as a principal or accessory before the fact.

1992According to Burroughs, 88 Md.App. at 238 , 594 A.2d 625 , quoting Foster v. State, 11 Md.App. 40, 46 , 272 A.2d 810 , rev’d on other grounds, 263 Md. 388 , 283 A.2d 411 (1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 908 , 92 S.Ct. 1616 , 31 L.Ed.2d 818 (1972), the generally accepted test to determine if a witness is an accomplice is whether the witness could be convicted for the offense, either as a principal or accessory before the fact.

1968Jackson v. State, supra, p. 596; Lank v. State, 219 Md. 433, 436 .

1963Lank v. State, 219 Md. 433, 436 , 149 A. 2d 367 (1959).

2011In section 9-408(d), which deals with the unit of prosecution, the legislature merely codified what the Court of Appeals said in Purnell v. State, 375 Md. 678, 698 , 827 A.2d 68 (2003), which was decided approximately one year prior to the effective date of section 9-408. *527 In Robinson v. State, 353 Md. 683 , 728 A.2d 698 (1999), we held it to be “a generally accepted rule of law that statutes are not presumed to repeal the common law ‘further than is expressly declared, and that a statute, made in the affirmative without any negative expressed or implied, does not take away the common law,

2011In section 9-408(d), which deals with the unit of prosecution, the legislature merely codified what the Court of Appeals said in Purnell v. State, 375 Md. 678, 698 , 827 A.2d 68 (2003), which was decided approximately one year prior to the effective date of section 9-408. *527 In Robinson v. State, 353 Md. 683 , 728 A.2d 698 (1999), we held it to be “a generally accepted rule of law that statutes are not presumed to repeal the common law ‘further than is expressly declared, and that a statute, made in the affirmative without any negative expressed or implied, does not take away the common law,

2006We have adopted the generally accepted rule that where a valid common-law marriage has been entered into in a jurisdiction which recognizes the validity of such a marriage, it will be recognized as valid in another jurisdiction.”); Bannister v. Bannister, 181 Md. 177, 180 , 29 A.2d 287 (1942); Marshall v. Stefanides, 17 Md.App. 364, 371 , 302 A.2d 682 (1973).

2006We have adopted the generally accepted rule that where a valid common-law marriage has been entered into in a jurisdiction which recognizes the validity of such a marriage, it will be recognized as valid in another jurisdiction.”); Bannister v. Bannister, 181 Md. 177, 180 , 29 A.2d 287 (1942); Marshall v. Stefanides, 17 Md.App. 364, 371 , 302 A.2d 682 (1973).

2006We have adopted the generally accepted rule that where a valid common-law marriage has been entered into in a jurisdiction which recognizes the validity of such a marriage, it will be recognized as valid in another jurisdiction.”); Bannister v. Bannister, 181 Md. 177, 180 , 29 A.2d 287 (1942); Marshall v. Stefanides, 17 Md.App. 364, 371 , 302 A.2d 682 (1973).

2006We have adopted the generally accepted rule that where a valid common-law marriage has been entered into in a jurisdiction which recognizes the validity of such a marriage, it will be recognized as valid in another jurisdiction.”); Bannister v. Bannister, 181 Md. 177, 180 , 29 A.2d 287 (1942); Marshall v. Stefanides, 17 Md.App. 364, 371 , 302 A.2d 682 (1973).

2006The generally accepted rule for an express easement is ‘that [because] an easement is a restriction upon the rights of the servient property owner, no alteration can be made by the owner of the dominant estate which would increase such restriction except by mutual consent of both parties.’ Reid v. Washington Gas Light Co., 232 Md. 545, 548-49 , 194 A.2d 636, 638 (1963) (citation omitted).” Miller, 377 Md. at 349 , 833 A.2d at 544 .

2006The generally accepted rule for an express easement is ‘that [because] an easement is a restriction upon the rights of the servient property owner, no alteration can be made by the owner of the dominant estate which would increase such restriction except by mutual consent of both parties.’ Reid v. Washington Gas Light Co., 232 Md. 545, 548-49 , 194 A.2d 636, 638 (1963) (citation omitted).” Miller, 377 Md. at 349 , 833 A.2d at 544 .

2005And this, too, despite admitted liability.” See Martin v. Miqueu, 37 Cal.App.2d 133 , 98 P.2d 816 (1940); Johnson v. McRee, 66 Cal.App.2d 524 , 152 P.2d 526 (1944); Phillips v. Lawrence, 87 Ill.App.2d 60 , 230 N.E.2d 505 (1967); Hall v. Burkert, 117 Ohio App. 527 , 193 N.E.2d 167 (1962); Hayes v. Sutton, 190 A.2d 655, 656 (D.C.App.1963); Annotation, 80 A.L.R.2d, at 1224-1231 (1961) and 1968 supplement thereto, citing additional cases in accord.

2005And this, too, despite admitted liability.” See Martin v. Miqueu, 37 Cal.App.2d 133 , 98 P.2d 816 (1940); Johnson v. McRee, 66 Cal.App.2d 524 , 152 P.2d 526 (1944); Phillips v. Lawrence, 87 Ill.App.2d 60 , 230 N.E.2d 505 (1967); Hall v. Burkert, 117 Ohio App. 527 , 193 N.E.2d 167 (1962); Hayes v. Sutton, 190 A.2d 655, 656 (D.C.App.1963); Annotation, 80 A.L.R.2d, at 1224-1231 (1961) and 1968 supplement thereto, citing additional cases in accord.

2005And this, too, despite admitted liability.” See Martin v. Miqueu, 37 Cal.App.2d 133 , 98 P.2d 816 (1940); Johnson v. McRee, 66 Cal.App.2d 524 , 152 P.2d 526 (1944); Phillips v. Lawrence, 87 Ill.App.2d 60 , 230 N.E.2d 505 (1967); Hall v. Burkert, 117 Ohio App. 527 , 193 N.E.2d 167 (1962); Hayes v. Sutton, 190 A.2d 655, 656 (D.C.App.1963); Annotation, 80 A.L.R.2d, at 1224-1231 (1961) and 1968 supplement thereto, citing additional cases in accord.

2005And this, too, despite admitted liability.” See Martin v. Miqueu, 37 Cal.App.2d 133 , 98 P.2d 816 (1940); Johnson v. McRee, 66 Cal.App.2d 524 , 152 P.2d 526 (1944); Phillips v. Lawrence, 87 Ill.App.2d 60 , 230 N.E.2d 505 (1967); Hall v. Burkert, 117 Ohio App. 527 , 193 N.E.2d 167 (1962); Hayes v. Sutton, 190 A.2d 655, 656 (D.C.App.1963); Annotation, 80 A.L.R.2d, at 1224-1231 (1961) and 1968 supplement thereto, citing additional cases in accord.

2005And this, too, despite admitted liability.” See Martin v. Miqueu, 37 Cal.App.2d 133 , 98 P.2d 816 (1940); Johnson v. McRee, 66 Cal.App.2d 524 , 152 P.2d 526 (1944); Phillips v. Lawrence, 87 Ill.App.2d 60 , 230 N.E.2d 505 (1967); Hall v. Burkert, 117 Ohio App. 527 , 193 N.E.2d 167 (1962); Hayes v. Sutton, 190 A.2d 655, 656 (D.C.App.1963); Annotation, 80 A.L.R.2d, at 1224-1231 (1961) and 1968 supplement thereto, citing additional cases in accord.

2005And this, too, despite admitted liability.” See Martin v. Miqueu, 37 Cal.App.2d 133 , 98 P.2d 816 (1940); Johnson v. McRee, 66 Cal.App.2d 524 , 152 P.2d 526 (1944); Phillips v. Lawrence, 87 Ill.App.2d 60 , 230 N.E.2d 505 (1967); Hall v. Burkert, 117 Ohio App. 527 , 193 N.E.2d 167 (1962); Hayes v. Sutton, 190 A.2d 655, 656 (D.C.App.1963); Annotation, 80 A.L.R.2d, at 1224-1231 (1961) and 1968 supplement thereto, citing additional cases in accord.

2005And this, too, despite admitted liability.” See Martin v. Miqueu, 37 Cal.App.2d 133 , 98 P.2d 816 (1940); Johnson v. McRee, 66 Cal.App.2d 524 , 152 P.2d 526 (1944); Phillips v. Lawrence, 87 Ill.App.2d 60 , 230 N.E.2d 505 (1967); Hall v. Burkert, 117 Ohio App. 527 , 193 N.E.2d 167 (1962); Hayes v. Sutton, 190 A.2d 655, 656 (D.C.App.1963); Annotation, 80 A.L.R.2d, at 1224-1231 (1961) and 1968 supplement thereto, citing additional cases in accord.

2005And this, too, despite admitted liability.” See Martin v. Miqueu, 37 Cal.App.2d 133 , 98 P.2d 816 (1940); Johnson v. McRee, 66 Cal.App.2d 524 , 152 P.2d 526 (1944); Phillips v. Lawrence, 87 Ill.App.2d 60 , 230 N.E.2d 505 (1967); Hall v. Burkert, 117 Ohio App. 527 , 193 N.E.2d 167 (1962); Hayes v. Sutton, 190 A.2d 655, 656 (D.C.App.1963); Annotation, 80 A.L.R.2d, at 1224-1231 (1961) and 1968 supplement thereto, citing additional cases in accord.

2004Having enunciated the generally accepted principle that the “First Amendment affords the broadest protection to political expression in order to ‘assure [the] unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people,’ id. at 14 , 96 S.Ct. at 633 , 46 L.Ed.2d at 685 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 , 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1308 , 1 L.Ed.2d 1498, 1506 (1957)), and that its purpose ‘was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs, ... of course including] discussions of candidates ...,’ id., (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S

2004Having enunciated the generally accepted principle that the “First Amendment affords the broadest protection to political expression in order to ‘assure [the] unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people,’ id. at 14 , 96 S.Ct. at 633 , 46 L.Ed.2d at 685 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 , 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1308 , 1 L.Ed.2d 1498, 1506 (1957)), and that its purpose ‘was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs, ... of course including] discussions of candidates ...,’ id., (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S

2003Appellee relies upon Fraidin v. Weitzman, 93 Md.App. 168, 195 , 611 A.2d 1046 (1992), in which we said: ■ The admission of background evidence is a generally accepted exception to the relevancy requirement.

2003Appellee relies upon Fraidin v. Weitzman, 93 Md.App. 168, 195 , 611 A.2d 1046 (1992), in which we said: ■ The admission of background evidence is a generally accepted exception to the relevancy requirement.