26 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1888–2014 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Faught v. Stategreen2 sentences1990It has been held, however, that a stipulation of facts will not be construed to admit facts which were obviously intended to be controverted." Lewis v. State (1985), Ind.App., 482 N.E.2d 487, 492 (quoting Fought v. State (1974), 162 Ind.App. 436, 441 , 319 N.E.2d 843, 847 (citations omitted)). 1990It has been held, however, that a stipulation of facts will not be construed to admit facts which were obviously intended to be controverted." Lewis v. State (1985), Ind.App., 482 N.E.2d 487, 492 (quoting Fought v. State (1974), 162 Ind.App. 436, 441 , 319 N.E.2d 843, 847 (citations omitted)). | 1 | 2 |
N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. CITIZENS ACT. COAL. OF IND.green1 sentence2007“However, we have also held that in addition to the generally accepted principle that an administrative agency may not exercise power which is not granted to it by statute, ‘it is equally well settled that an administrative agency has such implicit power and authority as is inherent in its broad grant of power from the legislature to regulate [that] which is necessary to effectuate the regulatory scheme outlined by the statute.’” Id. (quoting NIPSCO v. Citizens Action Coalition of Indiana, Inc., 548 N.E.2d 153, 158 (Ind.1989)). | 1 | 1 |
Johnson County Plan Commission v. Tinklegreen1 sentence2003See Tinkle, 748 N.E.2d at 420 . | 1 | 1 |
SOUTH END IMP. GROUP, INC. EX REL. BANK OF NY v. Mullikengreen1 sentence2002See, e.g., South End Improvement Group, Inc. v. Mulliken, 602 So.2d 1327 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1992). | 1 | 1 |
Stump v. Commercial Uniongreen2 sentences2001In discerning public policy, we look to federal and state constitutions, the legislature, and the judiciary. [9] See Trotter v. Nelson, 684 N.E.2d 1150, 1152-53 (Ind. 1997); Creasy v. Rusk, 730 N.E.2d 659, 664 (Ind.2000) ("To assist in deciding whether Indiana should adopt the generally accepted rule, we turn to an examination of contemporary public policy in Indiana as embodied in enactments of our state legislature."); see also Stump v. Commercial Union, 601 N.E.2d 327, 332 (Ind.1992) (stating "public policy considerations further augment the relationship and foreseeability factors, particul 2001In discerning public policy, we look to federal and state constitutions, the legislature, and the judiciary. 9 See Trotter v. Nelson, 684 N.E.2d 1150, 1152-53 (Ind.1997); Creasy v. Rusk, 730 N.E.2d 659, 664 (Ind.2000) ("To assist in deciding whether Indiana should adopt the generally accepted rule, we turn to an examination of contemporary public policy in Indiana as embodied in enactments of our state legislature."); see also Stump v. Commercial Union, 601 N.E.2d 327, 332 (Ind.1992) (stating "public policy considerations further augment the relationship and foreseeability factors, particularl | 1 | 1 |
Trotter v. Nelsongreen2 sentences2001In discerning public policy, we look to federal and state constitutions, the legislature, and the judiciary. [9] See Trotter v. Nelson, 684 N.E.2d 1150, 1152-53 (Ind. 1997); Creasy v. Rusk, 730 N.E.2d 659, 664 (Ind.2000) ("To assist in deciding whether Indiana should adopt the generally accepted rule, we turn to an examination of contemporary public policy in Indiana as embodied in enactments of our state legislature."); see also Stump v. Commercial Union, 601 N.E.2d 327, 332 (Ind.1992) (stating "public policy considerations further augment the relationship and foreseeability factors, particul 2001In discerning public policy, we look to federal and state constitutions, the legislature, and the judiciary. 9 See Trotter v. Nelson, 684 N.E.2d 1150, 1152-53 (Ind.1997); Creasy v. Rusk, 730 N.E.2d 659, 664 (Ind.2000) ("To assist in deciding whether Indiana should adopt the generally accepted rule, we turn to an examination of contemporary public policy in Indiana as embodied in enactments of our state legislature."); see also Stump v. Commercial Union, 601 N.E.2d 327, 332 (Ind.1992) (stating "public policy considerations further augment the relationship and foreseeability factors, particularl | 1 | 1 |
Creasy v. Ruskgreen2 sentences2001In discerning public policy, we look to federal and state constitutions, the legislature, and the judiciary. [9] See Trotter v. Nelson, 684 N.E.2d 1150, 1152-53 (Ind. 1997); Creasy v. Rusk, 730 N.E.2d 659, 664 (Ind.2000) ("To assist in deciding whether Indiana should adopt the generally accepted rule, we turn to an examination of contemporary public policy in Indiana as embodied in enactments of our state legislature."); see also Stump v. Commercial Union, 601 N.E.2d 327, 332 (Ind.1992) (stating "public policy considerations further augment the relationship and foreseeability factors, particul 2001In discerning public policy, we look to federal and state constitutions, the legislature, and the judiciary. 9 See Trotter v. Nelson, 684 N.E.2d 1150, 1152-53 (Ind.1997); Creasy v. Rusk, 730 N.E.2d 659, 664 (Ind.2000) ("To assist in deciding whether Indiana should adopt the generally accepted rule, we turn to an examination of contemporary public policy in Indiana as embodied in enactments of our state legislature."); see also Stump v. Commercial Union, 601 N.E.2d 327, 332 (Ind.1992) (stating "public policy considerations further augment the relationship and foreseeability factors, particularl | 1 | 1 |
Shornick, Rec. v. Butlergreen2 sentences2000See Schornick, v. Butler, 205 Ind. 304, 304 , 185 N.E. 111, 112 (1933) (stating that the public policy of Indiana is derived from, inter alia, statutory enactments), reh’g denied. 2000See Schornick, v. Butler, 205 Ind. 304, 304 , 185 N.E. 111, 112 (1933) (stating that the public policy of Indiana is derived from, inter alia, statutory enactments), reh’g denied. | 1 | 1 |
Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission v. Gary Joint Venturegreen1 sentence1996However, we have also held that in addition to the generally accepted principle that an administrative agency may not exercise power which is not granted to it by statute, "it is equally well settled that an administrative agency has such implicit power and authority as is inherent in its broad grant of power from the legislature to regulate [that] which is necessary to effectuate the regulatory scheme outlined by the statute." NIPSCO v. Citizens Action Coalition, 548 N.E.2d 1583 , 158 (Ind.1989); see also Indiana Util Regulatory Comm'n v. Gary Joint Venture, 609 N.E.2d 7, 10 (Ind.Ct.App.1998) | 1 | 1 |
Austin Lakes Joint Venture v. Avon Utilities, Inc.green1 sentence1996However, we have also held that in addition to the generally accepted principle that an administrative agency may not exercise power which is not granted to it by statute, "it is equally well settled that an administrative agency has such implicit power and authority as is inherent in its broad grant of power from the legislature to regulate [that] which is necessary to effectuate the regulatory scheme outlined by the statute." NIPSCO v. Citizens Action Coalition, 548 N.E.2d 1583 , 158 (Ind.1989); see also Indiana Util Regulatory Comm'n v. Gary Joint Venture, 609 N.E.2d 7, 10 (Ind.Ct.App.1998) | 1 | 1 |
Lewis v. Stategreen1 sentence1990It has been held, however, that a stipulation of facts will not be construed to admit facts which were obviously intended to be controverted." Lewis v. State (1985), Ind.App., 482 N.E.2d 487, 492 (quoting Fought v. State (1974), 162 Ind.App. 436, 441 , 319 N.E.2d 843, 847 (citations omitted)). | 1 | 1 |
Coonan v. Stategreen2 sentences1985It has been held, however, that a stipulation of facts will not be construed to admit facts which were obviously intended to be controverted." Faught v. State (1974), 162 Ind.App. 436, 441 , 319 N.E.2d 843, 847 ; (citations omitted); see also Coonan v. State (1978), 269 Ind. 578 , 382 N.E.2d 157 , cert. denied, 440 U.S. 984 , 99 S.Ct. 1798 , 60 LEd.2d 246. 1985It has been held, however, that a stipulation of facts will not be construed to admit facts which were obviously intended to be controverted." Faught v. State (1974), 162 Ind.App. 436, 441 , 319 N.E.2d 843, 847 ; (citations omitted); see also Coonan v. State (1978), 269 Ind. 578 , 382 N.E.2d 157 , cert. denied, 440 U.S. 984 , 99 S.Ct. 1798 , 60 LEd.2d 246. | 1 | 1 |
Givens v. Marylandgreen1 sentence1985It has been held, however, that a stipulation of facts will not be construed to admit facts which were obviously intended to be controverted." Faught v. State (1974), 162 Ind.App. 436, 441 , 319 N.E.2d 843, 847 ; (citations omitted); see also Coonan v. State (1978), 269 Ind. 578 , 382 N.E.2d 157 , cert. denied, 440 U.S. 984 , 99 S.Ct. 1798 , 60 LEd.2d 246. | 1 | 1 |
Cudjo v. Oklahomagreen1 sentence1985It has been held, however, that a stipulation of facts will not be construed to admit facts which were obviously intended to be controverted." Faught v. State (1974), 162 Ind.App. 436, 441 , 319 N.E.2d 843, 847 ; (citations omitted); see also Coonan v. State (1978), 269 Ind. 578 , 382 N.E.2d 157 , cert. denied, 440 U.S. 984 , 99 S.Ct. 1798 , 60 LEd.2d 246. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Lowery v. State Life Insurance
green
2 sentences1970Co., 1899, 153 Ind. 100, 102 , 54 N. E. 442 .” We must conclude from the facts as they appear in the record and the argument and citation presented by appellant that the Madison Circuit Court was totally lacking in jurisdiction of either the person or the .cause in the pending case and that the judgment of conviction obtained therein is a nullity. 1970Co., 1899, 153 Ind. 100, 102 , 54 N. E. 442 .” We must conclude from the facts as they appear in the record and the argument and citation presented by appellant that the Madison Circuit Court was totally lacking in jurisdiction of either the person or the .cause in the pending case and that the judgment of conviction obtained therein is a nullity. | 3 | 1954–1970 |
Davis v. Lennen
neutral
2 sentences1968Jur. 80 , Quieting Title §95, note 6; Davis v. Lennen (1890), 125 Ind. 185, 188 , 24 N. E. 885 , supra. “To the generally accepted rule there exists an exception born of the justice and necessity of settling the rights of parties in being and the adjudication of property titles with dispatch. 1968Jur. 80 , Quieting Title §95, note 6; Davis v. Lennen (1890), 125 Ind. 185, 188 , 24 N. E. 885 , supra. “To the generally accepted rule there exists an exception born of the justice and necessity of settling the rights of parties in being and the adjudication of property titles with dispatch. | 2 | 1954–1968 |
Malley v. Briggs
green
1 sentence2014In particular, at common law, “the generally accepted rule was that one who procured the issuance of an arrest warrant by submitting a complaint could be held liable if the complaint was made maliciously and without probable cause.” Id. at 340-41, 106 S.Ct. 1092 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Knox County Rural Electric Membership Corp. v. PSI Energy, Inc.
green
1 sentence2007“However, we have also held that in addition to the generally accepted principle that an administrative agency may not exercise power which is not granted to it by statute, ‘it is equally well settled that an administrative agency has such implicit power and authority as is inherent in its broad grant of power from the legislature to regulate [that] which is necessary to effectuate the regulatory scheme outlined by the statute.’” Id. (quoting NIPSCO v. Citizens Action Coalition of Indiana, Inc., 548 N.E.2d 153, 158 (Ind.1989)). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
City of Gary v. Pontarelli
neutral
2 sentences1997City of Gary v. Pontarelli, 212 Ind. 319 , 9 N.E.2d 86 (1937). 1997City of Gary v. Pontarelli, 212 Ind. 319 , 9 N.E.2d 86 (1937). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
RL v. State
green
1 sentence1992R.L. v. State (1982), Ind.App., 437 N.E.2d 482, 485 . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Joseph K. Majko v. United States
green
1 sentence1982E.g., Majko v. United States, (7th Cir. 1972) 457 F.2d 790 (failure to comply with Fed.R.Crim.P. 11, the federal counterpart to IC 35-4.1-1-3, is fundamental error.) In view of our disposition on this issue, we need not address the other grounds asserted in Brown’s petition. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Lynch v. State
neutral
2 sentences1980Robinson v. State (1973), 260 Ind. 517 , 297 N.E.2d 409 ; Lynch v. State (1975), 163 Ind. App. 360 , 323 N.E.2d 661 ; Sankey v. State (1973), 157 Ind.App. 627 , 301 N.E.2d 235 . . 1980Robinson v. State (1973), 260 Ind. 517 , 297 N.E.2d 409 ; Lynch v. State (1975), 163 Ind. App. 360 , 323 N.E.2d 661 ; Sankey v. State (1973), 157 Ind.App. 627 , 301 N.E.2d 235 . . | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Robinson v. State
green
2 sentences1980Robinson v. State (1973), 260 Ind. 517 , 297 N.E.2d 409 ; Lynch v. State (1975), 163 Ind. App. 360 , 323 N.E.2d 661 ; Sankey v. State (1973), 157 Ind.App. 627 , 301 N.E.2d 235 . . 1980Robinson v. State (1973), 260 Ind. 517 , 297 N.E.2d 409 ; Lynch v. State (1975), 163 Ind. App. 360 , 323 N.E.2d 661 ; Sankey v. State (1973), 157 Ind.App. 627 , 301 N.E.2d 235 . . | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Sankey v. State
green
2 sentences1980Robinson v. State (1973), 260 Ind. 517 , 297 N.E.2d 409 ; Lynch v. State (1975), 163 Ind. App. 360 , 323 N.E.2d 661 ; Sankey v. State (1973), 157 Ind.App. 627 , 301 N.E.2d 235 . . 1980Robinson v. State (1973), 260 Ind. 517 , 297 N.E.2d 409 ; Lynch v. State (1975), 163 Ind. App. 360 , 323 N.E.2d 661 ; Sankey v. State (1973), 157 Ind.App. 627 , 301 N.E.2d 235 . . | 1 | 1980–1980 |
BRUGGNER v. Shaffer
green
2 sentences1974Bruggner et al. v. Shaffer (1965), 138 Ind. App. 183 , 210 N.E.2d 439 ; Tahash., Supt., etc. v. Clements (1955), 234 Ind. 197 , 125 N.E.2d 439 ; Bd. of Trustees, etc. et al. v. State ex rel. 1974Bruggner et al. v. Shaffer (1965), 138 Ind. App. 183 , 210 N.E.2d 439 ; Tahash., Supt., etc. v. Clements (1955), 234 Ind. 197 , 125 N.E.2d 439 ; Bd. of Trustees, etc. et al. v. State ex rel. | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Tahash v. Clements
neutral
2 sentences1974Bruggner et al. v. Shaffer (1965), 138 Ind. App. 183 , 210 N.E.2d 439 ; Tahash., Supt., etc. v. Clements (1955), 234 Ind. 197 , 125 N.E.2d 439 ; Bd. of Trustees, etc. et al. v. State ex rel. 1974Bruggner et al. v. Shaffer (1965), 138 Ind. App. 183 , 210 N.E.2d 439 ; Tahash., Supt., etc. v. Clements (1955), 234 Ind. 197 , 125 N.E.2d 439 ; Bd. of Trustees, etc. et al. v. State ex rel. | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Pokraka v. Lummus Co.
green
1 sentence1972The generally accepted standard for such a specification is found in Pokraka v. Lummus Co. (1952), 230 Ind. 530, 532 , 104 N. E. 2d 669 , where the Supreme Court stated: *476 “It is only where the evidence is without conflict and can lead to only one conclusion, and the trial court has reached an opposite conclusion, that the decision of the trial court will be set aside on the ground that it is contrary to law.” Appellants, however, in their brief, are not arguing that the decision of the trial court is contrary to law as not being supported by the unconflicting evidence, rather, they are att | 1 | 1972–1972 |
GILKISON v. Darlington
green
2 sentences1972Appellant argues that there was prima facie error committed when the trial court adopted as binding upon the parties and the court, certain findings of fact of the Porter Circuit Court in Gilkison, et al. v. Darlington (1952), 123 Ind. App. 28 , 106 N. E. 2d 473 . 1972Appellant argues that there was prima facie error committed when the trial court adopted as binding upon the parties and the court, certain findings of fact of the Porter Circuit Court in Gilkison, et al. v. Darlington (1952), 123 Ind. App. 28 , 106 N. E. 2d 473 . | 1 | 1972–1972 |
State ex rel. Blake v. Madison Circuit Court
green
2 sentences1964Dist. (1963), 244 Ind. 612 , 193 N. E. 2d 251 , 195 N. E. 2d 354 . 1964Dist. (1963), 244 Ind. 612 , 193 N. E. 2d 251 , 195 N. E. 2d 354 . | 1 | 1964–1964 |
Stone v. Stone
green
2 sentences1949“The court granting the divorce must be deemed to have full and continuing jurisdiction, during the minority of such children, to make from time to time such orders and modifications thereof, with respect to their care, custody, and control, as are deemed expedient; the interests of society and welfare of the children, in all ■ such in *545 quiries, being the paramount and controlling consideration.” Stone v. Stone (1902), 158 Ind. 628 , 64 N. E. 86 . 1949“The court granting the divorce must be deemed to have full and continuing jurisdiction, during the minority of such children, to make from time to time such orders and modifications thereof, with respect to their care, custody, and control, as are deemed expedient; the interests of society and welfare of the children, in all ■ such in *545 quiries, being the paramount and controlling consideration.” Stone v. Stone (1902), 158 Ind. 628 , 64 N. E. 86 . | 1 | 1949–1949 |
| Stockley v. School District No. 1 of Portage Township. green | 1 | 1937–1937 |
| Bigbee Fertilizer Co. v. Scott green | 1 | 1936–1936 |
| United States v. Borkowski green | 1 | 1927–1927 |
| Barton v. Anderson green | 1 | 1888–1888 |
| McFadden v. Ross green | 1 | 1888–1888 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.