generally accepted rule in Massachusetts

2019C ., 448 Mass. 199 (2007).

2016Perroncello v. Donahue, 64 Mass. App. Ct. 564, 570 (2005), S.C., 448 Mass. 199 (2007), quoting from Apparel Art Intl., Inc. v. Amertex Enterprises Ltd., 48 F.3d 576, 586 (1st Cir. 1995), and citing Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 26(1)(b) (1982).

2019"Under a generally accepted exception to the res judicata doctrine, a litigant's claims are not precluded if the court in an earlier action expressly reserves the litigant's right to bring those claims in a later action." Santos , 89 Mass. App. Ct. at 693 , quoting Perroncello v. Donahue , 64 Mass. App. Ct. 564 , 570 (2005), S .

2005Cf. Commonwealth v. Ghee, 414 Mass. 313 (1993) (challenge to a search in Connecticut was based on art. 14 of the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution).

2005“In cases where motive, intent, or other state of mind questions are at issue, summary judgment is often inappropriate.” Flesner, 410 Mass. at 809 , citing Pederson v. Time, Inc., 404 Mass. 14, 17 (1989) (“the generally accepted rule is that the ‘granting of summary judgment in a case where a party’s state of mind . . . constitutes an essential element of the cause of action is disfavored’ ”), quoting Quincy Mut.

1997Apparel Art Intern. v. Amertex Enterprises, 48 F.3d 576, 586 (1st Cir. 1995); D&K Properties Crystal Lake v. Mutual Life Ins., 112 F.3d 257 , 260 (7th Cir. 1997).

1996Commonwealth v. White, 358 Mass. 488 (1970).

1982E.g., IBM Corp. v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271 (3d Cir. 1978); Chateau de Ville Productions v. Tams-Whitmark Music Library, 474 F. Supp. 223 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Grievance Comm. v. Rottner, 203 A.2d 82 (Conn. 1964); In re Gillard, 271 N.W.2d 785 (Minn. 1978); In re Cohn, 216 A.2d 1 (N.J, 1966); In re Hansen, 586 P.2d 413 (Utah 1978).” Rule 1.7 (reporter’s notes), supra at 54. 6 “It seems to be a generally accepted standard of ethical conduct that a lawyer should not take a case against a present client of himself or his *151 firm, unless the client consents, at least where the client is an individual pers

1982“However, we are concerned with the implications of the [Grievance Comm. v.] Rottner [ 152 Conn. 59 (1964) ] rationale [i.e., that a client is entitled to the undivided loyalty of his lawyer] if it is extended to large commercial clients.

1982E.g., IBM Corp. v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271 (3d Cir. 1978); Chateau de Ville Productions v. Tams-Whitmark Music Library, 474 F. Supp. 223 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Grievance Comm. v. Rottner, 203 A.2d 82 (Conn. 1964); In re Gillard, 271 N.W.2d 785 (Minn. 1978); In re Cohn, 216 A.2d 1 (N.J, 1966); In re Hansen, 586 P.2d 413 (Utah 1978).” Rule 1.7 (reporter’s notes), supra at 54. 6 “It seems to be a generally accepted standard of ethical conduct that a lawyer should not take a case against a present client of himself or his *151 firm, unless the client consents, at least where the client is an individual pers

1982E.g., IBM Corp. v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271 (3d Cir. 1978); Chateau de Ville Productions v. Tams-Whitmark Music Library, 474 F. Supp. 223 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Grievance Comm. v. Rottner, 203 A.2d 82 (Conn. 1964); In re Gillard, 271 N.W.2d 785 (Minn. 1978); In re Cohn, 216 A.2d 1 (N.J, 1966); In re Hansen, 586 P.2d 413 (Utah 1978).” Rule 1.7 (reporter’s notes), supra at 54. 6 “It seems to be a generally accepted standard of ethical conduct that a lawyer should not take a case against a present client of himself or his *151 firm, unless the client consents, at least where the client is an individual pers

1982E.g., IBM Corp. v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271 (3d Cir. 1978); Chateau de Ville Productions v. Tams-Whitmark Music Library, 474 F. Supp. 223 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Grievance Comm. v. Rottner, 203 A.2d 82 (Conn. 1964); In re Gillard, 271 N.W.2d 785 (Minn. 1978); In re Cohn, 216 A.2d 1 (N.J, 1966); In re Hansen, 586 P.2d 413 (Utah 1978).” Rule 1.7 (reporter’s notes), supra at 54. 6 “It seems to be a generally accepted standard of ethical conduct that a lawyer should not take a case against a present client of himself or his *151 firm, unless the client consents, at least where the client is an individual pers

1982E.g., IBM Corp. v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271 (3d Cir. 1978); Chateau de Ville Productions v. Tams-Whitmark Music Library, 474 F. Supp. 223 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Grievance Comm. v. Rottner, 203 A.2d 82 (Conn. 1964); In re Gillard, 271 N.W.2d 785 (Minn. 1978); In re Cohn, 216 A.2d 1 (N.J, 1966); In re Hansen, 586 P.2d 413 (Utah 1978).” Rule 1.7 (reporter’s notes), supra at 54. 6 “It seems to be a generally accepted standard of ethical conduct that a lawyer should not take a case against a present client of himself or his *151 firm, unless the client consents, at least where the client is an individual pers

1982E.g., IBM Corp. v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271 (3d Cir. 1978); Chateau de Ville Productions v. Tams-Whitmark Music Library, 474 F. Supp. 223 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Grievance Comm. v. Rottner, 203 A.2d 82 (Conn. 1964); In re Gillard, 271 N.W.2d 785 (Minn. 1978); In re Cohn, 216 A.2d 1 (N.J, 1966); In re Hansen, 586 P.2d 413 (Utah 1978).” Rule 1.7 (reporter’s notes), supra at 54. 6 “It seems to be a generally accepted standard of ethical conduct that a lawyer should not take a case against a present client of himself or his *151 firm, unless the client consents, at least where the client is an individual pers

1956In the case of Maynard v. Royal Worcester Corset Co., 200 Mass. 1 involving a contract for personal services it was said "It seems to be the generally accepted rule that the burden of proof is upon the defendant to show that the plaintiff either found, or by the exercise of proper industry in the search, could have procured other employment of some kind reasonably adapted to his abilities, and that in the absence of such proof the plaintiff is entitled to recover the salary fixed by the contract.” Levine v. Lawrence & Co., 305 Mass. 210 ; McNally v. Schell, 293 Mass. 356 .

1956In the case of Maynard v. Royal Worcester Corset Co., 200 Mass. 1 involving a contract for personal services it was said "It seems to be the generally accepted rule that the burden of proof is upon the defendant to show that the plaintiff either found, or by the exercise of proper industry in the search, could have procured other employment of some kind reasonably adapted to his abilities, and that in the absence of such proof the plaintiff is entitled to recover the salary fixed by the contract.” Levine v. Lawrence & Co., 305 Mass. 210 ; McNally v. Schell, 293 Mass. 356 .