generally accepted principle in Maine

2015See Barrett v. McDonald Investments, Inc., 2005 ME 43 , ~17, 870 A.2d 146, 150 , citing 11 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS§ 32:12 at 471-72 (4th ed. 1999) ("Since the language is presumptively within the control ofthe party drafting the agreement, it is a generally accepted principle that any ambiguity in that language will be interpreted against the drafter."). 8.

2015See Barrett v. McDonald Investments, Inc., 2005 ME 43 , ~17, 870 A.2d 146, 150 , citing 11 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS§ 32:12 at 471-72 (4th ed. 1999) ("Since the language is presumptively within the control ofthe party drafting the agreement, it is a generally accepted principle that any ambiguity in that language will be interpreted against the drafter."). 8.

2017Stewart v. Durham, 451 A.2d 308,310 (Me. 1982).

2014Weeks v. Krysa, 2008 ME 120, ¶¶ 12, 21 , 955 A.2d 234 (holding that evidence of occasional, seasonal use of an undeveloped lot was insufficient to support an adverse possession claim). [¶ 29] Relying on the doctrine of constructive adverse possession, however, the Court holds that a person can obtain equitable title to an entire parcel if the parcel is described in the person’s deed and the person has occupied “a portion of that parcel in a manner sufficient to establish title by adverse possession.” Court’s Opinion ¶ 7 (citing Campbell v. Whitehouse, 122 Me. 409, 417 , 120 A. 529 (1923); Bant

2014Weeks v. Krysa, 2008 ME 120, ¶¶ 12, 21 , 955 A.2d 234 (holding that evidence of occasional, seasonal use of an undeveloped lot was insufficient to support an adverse possession claim). [¶ 29] Relying on the doctrine of constructive adverse possession, however, the Court holds that a person can obtain equitable title to an entire parcel if the parcel is described in the person’s deed and the person has occupied “a portion of that parcel in a manner sufficient to establish title by adverse possession.” Court’s Opinion ¶ 7 (citing Campbell v. Whitehouse, 122 Me. 409, 417 , 120 A. 529 (1923); Bant

2014Weeks v. Krysa, 2008 ME 120, ¶¶ 12, 21 , 955 A.2d 234 (holding that evidence of occasional, seasonal use of an undeveloped lot was insufficient to support an adverse possession claim). [¶ 29] Relying on the doctrine of constructive adverse possession, however, the Court holds that a person can obtain equitable title to an entire parcel if the parcel is described in the person’s deed and the person has occupied “a portion of that parcel in a manner sufficient to establish title by adverse possession.” Court’s Opinion ¶ 7 (citing Campbell v. Whitehouse, 122 Me. 409, 417 , 120 A. 529 (1923); Bant

2014Weeks v. Krysa, 2008 ME 120, ¶¶ 12, 21 , 955 A.2d 234 (holding that evidence of occasional, seasonal use of an undeveloped lot was insufficient to support an adverse possession claim). [¶29] Relying on the doctrine of constructive adverse possession, however, the Court holds that a person can obtain equitable title to an entire parcel if the parcel is described in the person’s deed and the person has occupied “a portion of that parcel in a manner sufficient to establish title by adverse possession.” Court’s Opinion ¶ 7 (citing Campbell v. Whitehouse, 122 Me. 409, 417 , 120 A. 529 (1923); Banto

2002See In re Maine Clean Fuels, Inc., 310 A.2d 736, 744 (Me. 1973) (“It is a generally accepted principle of administrative law that administrative agencies, at least in the absence of specific legislative direction, should be free to fashion their own rules of procedure.”).

1998App. 376 , 838 P.2d 640, 641 (1992) (theft by deception statute requires that the deceptive act have induced or caused the victims to transfer property to defendant); Commonwealth v. Imes, 424 Pa.Super. 633 , 623 A.2d 859, 862 (1993) (statute requires that state establish reliance by victim upon defendant’s false impression); State v. Casey, 81 Wash.App. 524 , 915 P.2d 587, 589 (1996) (evolution of crime of larceny by false pretenses into theft by deception did not change its essential elements and did not eliminate element of reliance). 8 .

1998App. 376 , 838 P.2d 640, 641 (1992) (theft by deception statute requires that the deceptive act have induced or caused the victims to transfer property to defendant); Commonwealth v. Imes, 424 Pa.Super. 633 , 623 A.2d 859, 862 (1993) (statute requires that state establish reliance by victim upon defendant’s false impression); State v. Casey, 81 Wash.App. 524 , 915 P.2d 587, 589 (1996) (evolution of crime of larceny by false pretenses into theft by deception did not change its essential elements and did not eliminate element of reliance). 8 .

1998See, e.g., King v. State, 214 Ga.App. 311 , 447 S.E.2d 645, 648 (1994) (statute requires that defendant's deceptive act or false representation have induced victim to part with his properly); State v. Saylor, 228 Kan. 498 , 618 P.2d 1166, 1168 (1980) (noting that the generally accepted rule throughout the United States is that the crime of theft by deception requires the state to prove that "the victim was actually deceived and relied in whole or in part upon the false representation”); State v. Worden, 115 Or.

1998See, e.g., King v. State, 214 Ga.App. 311 , 447 S.E.2d 645, 648 (1994) (statute requires that defendant's deceptive act or false representation have induced victim to part with his properly); State v. Saylor, 228 Kan. 498 , 618 P.2d 1166, 1168 (1980) (noting that the generally accepted rule throughout the United States is that the crime of theft by deception requires the state to prove that "the victim was actually deceived and relied in whole or in part upon the false representation”); State v. Worden, 115 Or.

1998See, e.g., King v. State, 214 Ga.App. 311 , 447 S.E.2d 645, 648 (1994) (statute requires that defendant's deceptive act or false representation have induced victim to part with his properly); State v. Saylor, 228 Kan. 498 , 618 P.2d 1166, 1168 (1980) (noting that the generally accepted rule throughout the United States is that the crime of theft by deception requires the state to prove that "the victim was actually deceived and relied in whole or in part upon the false representation”); State v. Worden, 115 Or.

1998App. 376 , 838 P.2d 640, 641 (1992) (theft by deception statute requires that the deceptive act have induced or caused the victims to transfer property to defendant); Commonwealth v. Imes, 424 Pa.Super. 633 , 623 A.2d 859, 862 (1993) (statute requires that state establish reliance by victim upon defendant’s false impression); State v. Casey, 81 Wash.App. 524 , 915 P.2d 587, 589 (1996) (evolution of crime of larceny by false pretenses into theft by deception did not change its essential elements and did not eliminate element of reliance). 8 .

1998App. 376 , 838 P.2d 640, 641 (1992) (theft by deception statute requires that the deceptive act have induced or caused the victims to transfer property to defendant); Commonwealth v. Imes, 424 Pa.Super. 633 , 623 A.2d 859, 862 (1993) (statute requires that state establish reliance by victim upon defendant’s false impression); State v. Casey, 81 Wash.App. 524 , 915 P.2d 587, 589 (1996) (evolution of crime of larceny by false pretenses into theft by deception did not change its essential elements and did not eliminate element of reliance). 8 .

1998App. 376 , 838 P.2d 640, 641 (1992) (theft by deception statute requires that the deceptive act have induced or caused the victims to transfer property to defendant); Commonwealth v. Imes, 424 Pa.Super. 633 , 623 A.2d 859, 862 (1993) (statute requires that state establish reliance by victim upon defendant’s false impression); State v. Casey, 81 Wash.App. 524 , 915 P.2d 587, 589 (1996) (evolution of crime of larceny by false pretenses into theft by deception did not change its essential elements and did not eliminate element of reliance). 8 .

1998See, e.g., King v. State, 214 Ga.App. 311 , 447 S.E.2d 645, 648 (1994) (statute requires that defendant's deceptive act or false representation have induced victim to part with his properly); State v. Saylor, 228 Kan. 498 , 618 P.2d 1166, 1168 (1980) (noting that the generally accepted rule throughout the United States is that the crime of theft by deception requires the state to prove that "the victim was actually deceived and relied in whole or in part upon the false representation”); State v. Worden, 115 Or.

1998See, e.g., King v. State, 214 Ga.App. 311 , 447 S.E.2d 645, 648 (1994) (statute requires that defendant's deceptive act or false representation have induced victim to part with his properly); State v. Saylor, 228 Kan. 498 , 618 P.2d 1166, 1168 (1980) (noting that the generally accepted rule throughout the United States is that the crime of theft by deception requires the state to prove that "the victim was actually deceived and relied in whole or in part upon the false representation”); State v. Worden, 115 Or.

1997See Breda v. Scott, 1 F.3d 908 (9th Cir.1993); Montplaisir v. Leighton, 875 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.1989); see generally Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U.S. 238, 247-49 , 82 S.Ct. 1318, 1324-25 , 8 L.Ed.2d 462 (1962) (immunity generally for union agents). 2 .

1997See Breda v. Scott, 1 F.3d 908 (9th Cir.1993); Montplaisir v. Leighton, 875 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.1989); see generally Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U.S. 238, 247-49 , 82 S.Ct. 1318, 1324-25 , 8 L.Ed.2d 462 (1962) (immunity generally for union agents). 2 .

1997See Breda v. Scott, 1 F.3d 908 (9th Cir.1993); Montplaisir v. Leighton, 875 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.1989); see generally Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U.S. 238, 247-49 , 82 S.Ct. 1318, 1324-25 , 8 L.Ed.2d 462 (1962) (immunity generally for union agents). 2 .

1973It is a generally accepted principle of administrative law that administrative agencies, at least in the absence of “specific legislative direction,” Laba v. Newark Board of Education, 23 N.J. 364 , 129 A.2d 273 (1957), “should be free to fashion their own rules of procedure.” Federal Comm’n v. Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 143 , 60 S.Ct. 437, 441 , 84 L.Ed. 656 (1940); In Re Shelton College, 109 N.J.Super. 488 , 263 A.2d 810, 812 (1970).

1973It is a generally accepted principle of administrative law that administrative agencies, at least in the absence of “specific legislative direction,” Laba v. Newark Board of Education, 23 N.J. 364 , 129 A.2d 273 (1957), “should be free to fashion their own rules of procedure.” Federal Comm’n v. Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 143 , 60 S.Ct. 437, 441 , 84 L.Ed. 656 (1940); In Re Shelton College, 109 N.J.Super. 488 , 263 A.2d 810, 812 (1970).

1973Within the bounds of “fair play,” administrative agencies have the power, either impliedly, In Re 17 Club, 26 N.J.Super. 43 , 97 A.2d 171, 173 (1953), or, as in the present case, statutorily conferred, Pub.L.1969, ch. 571, § 2, to adopt rules of practice and procedure relative to the conduct of agency proceedings.

1973Within the bounds of “fair play,” administrative agencies have the power, either impliedly, In Re 17 Club, 26 N.J.Super. 43 , 97 A.2d 171, 173 (1953), or, as in the present case, statutorily conferred, Pub.L.1969, ch. 571, § 2, to adopt rules of practice and procedure relative to the conduct of agency proceedings.