generally accepted principle in California

2024(See People v. Fryhaat (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 969, 976 [discussing legislative purpose of section 1473.7].) It has long been the law that a defendant who “successfully challenges a guilty plea on appeal ordinarily has the choice on remand of standing on that plea and obtaining the benefits of the original bargain, or of withdrawing the plea and proceeding as though no bargain had ever been made.” (People v. Aragon (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 749, 760 (Aragon).) “[W]hen a defendant successfully withdraws a plea, the case is generally restored to the position it was in before the parties entered into t

2024(Viking Pools, Inc. v. Maloney (1989) 48 Cal.3d 602, 609 ; see also Estate of McDill (1975) 14 Cal.3d 831, 839 [“ ‘It is a generally accepted principle that in adopting legislation the Legislature is presumed to have had knowledge of existing domestic judicial decisions and to have enacted and amended statutes in the light of such decisions as have a direct bearing upon them’ ”].) We thus presume the Legislature was aware of Kennedy’s interpretation of sections 17, 290, and 288.2 and the relationship between them when it enacted the recent amendments to section 290.

1993As we said in Larson v. Duca (1989) 213 Cal. App.3d 324, 329 [ 261 Cal. Rptr. 559 ], "`The adopting body is presumed to be aware of existing laws and judicial construction thereof....'" (Quoting In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 890, fn. 11 [ 694 P.2d 744 ].) "It is a generally accepted principle that in adopting legislation the Legislature is presumed to have had knowledge of existing domestic judicial decisions and to have enacted and amended statutes in the light of such decisions...." ( Buckley v. Chadwick (1955) 45 Cal.2d 183, 200 [ 288 P.2d 12 ], fn. omitted; accord, Estate of McDill

1993As we said in Larson v. Duca (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 324, 329 [ 261 Cal.Rptr. 559 ], “ ‘The adopting body is presumed to be aware of existing laws and judicial construction thereof . . . .’” (Quoting In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 890, fn. 11 [ 694 P.2d 744 ].) “It is a generally accepted principle that in adopting legislation the Legislature is presumed to have had knowledge of existing domestic judicial decisions and to have enacted and amended statutes in the light of such decisions . . . .” (Buckley v. Chadwick (1955) 45 Cal.2d 183, 200 [ 288 P.2d 12 ], fn. omitted; accord, Estate of M

2022Where . . . the particulars are not shown by the preliminary hearing transcript, the defendant is not on notice in such a way that he has the opportunity to prepare a meaningful defense.’ (People v. Pitts (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 606, 904-905 [].)” (People v. Peyton, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at pp. 657- 658.) Despite the role the preliminary hearing transcript plays in notifying the defendant of the particulars of the charged offenses, “it does not constitute a denial of due process to permit amendment of an information during trial if the amendment does not change the nature of the offense charged

2018Under the generally accepted rule in criminal law a variance is not regarded as material unless it is of such a substantial character as to mislead the accused in preparing his defense, or is likely to place him in second jeopardy for the same offense. [Citations.]” (People v. Williams (1945) 27 Cal.2d 220, 225-226 .) The variance here was immaterial.

1983Finally, we are aware of no California case holding that outsiders served by a municipality or district are entitled to a preference over inhabitants in the event of a shortage of utility service. 16 Thus, in upholding a contractual duty of a city to supply outsiders with water, the court in Sawyer v. City of San Diego, supra, 138 Cal.App.2d at page 658 , was careful to note: “The record does not indicate that at the time of trial the city was without sufficient water to supply its inhabitants.” *349 E Since our survey of California municipal corporation law has produced no ready answer to our

1983Finally, we are aware of no California case holding that outsiders served by a municipality or district are entitled to a preference over inhabitants in the event of a shortage of utility service. 16 Thus, in upholding a contractual duty of a city to supply outsiders with water, the court in Sawyer v. City of San Diego, supra, 138 Cal.App.2d at page 658 , was careful to note: “The record does not indicate that at the time of trial the city was without sufficient water to supply its inhabitants.” *349 E Since our survey of California municipal corporation law has produced no ready answer to our

1983Finally, we are aware of no California case holding that outsiders served by a municipality or district are entitled to a preference over inhabitants in the event of a shortage of utility service. 16 Thus, in upholding a contractual duty of a city to supply outsiders with water, the court in Sawyer v. City of San Diego, supra, 138 Cal.App.2d at page 658 , was careful to note: “The record does not indicate that at the time of trial the city was without sufficient water to supply its inhabitants.” *349 E Since our survey of California municipal corporation law has produced no ready answer to our

1983Finally, we are aware of no California case holding that outsiders served by a municipality or district are entitled to a preference over inhabitants in the event of a shortage of utility service. 16 Thus, in upholding a contractual duty of a city to supply outsiders with water, the court in Sawyer v. City of San Diego, supra, 138 Cal.App.2d at page 658 , was careful to note: “The record does not indicate that at the time of trial the city was without sufficient water to supply its inhabitants.” *349 E Since our survey of California municipal corporation law has produced no ready answer to our

1978Twenty-five years ago Justice Carter speaking in People v. Daugherty (1953) 40 Cal.2d 876, 894 [ 256 P.2d 911 ], said of a defendant's effort to change the evolving California M'Naghten test that it "has been the rule since the first decision in this state ... has been followed consistently ... is the generally accepted rule ... and if it is to be changed his argument should be addressed to the Legislature." Justice Spence, speaking for a unanimous court in People v. Berry (1955) 44 Cal.2d 426, 433 [ 282 P.2d 861 ], and referring to a defendant's challenge to the M'Naghten test, observed "Howe

1978Twenty-five years ago Justice Carter speaking in People v. Daugherty (1953) 40 Cal.2d 876, 894 [ 256 P.2d 911 ], said of a defendant's effort to change the evolving California M'Naghten test that it "has been the rule since the first decision in this state ... has been followed consistently ... is the generally accepted rule ... and if it is to be changed his argument should be addressed to the Legislature." Justice Spence, speaking for a unanimous court in People v. Berry (1955) 44 Cal.2d 426, 433 [ 282 P.2d 861 ], and referring to a defendant's challenge to the M'Naghten test, observed "Howe

1970As the Supreme Court said many years ago, in Golceff v. Sugarman (1950) 36 Cal.2d 152, at p. 154 [ 222 P.2d 665 ]: “It is a generally accepted rule, however, that, ‘In order to state a cause of action against defendant for a wrong committed by his servant, the ultimate fact necessary to be alleged is that the wrongful act was in legal effect committed by defendant.

1970As the Supreme Court said many years ago, in Golceff v. Sugarman (1950) 36 Cal.2d 152, at p. 154 [ 222 P.2d 665 ]: “It is a generally accepted rule, however, that, ‘In order to state a cause of action against defendant for a wrong committed by his servant, the ultimate fact necessary to be alleged is that the wrongful act was in legal effect committed by defendant.

2022We do, as well. 8 Bill 775; it would violate petitioners’ right to equal protection not to grant them the same constitutional rights as provided when adjudicating criminal misconduct in the first instance; or those rights are directly guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.7 Torrez’s implied legislative intent argument is premised on the generally accepted principle that, when adopting legislation, “‘the Legislature is presumed to have had knowledge of existing domestic judicial decisions and to have enacted and amended statutes in the light of such decisions as have a direct bearin

2016(See Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 [ 20 Cal.Rptr. 321 , 369 P.2d 937 ].) “When a statute has been construed by the courts, and the Legislature thereafter reenacts that statute without changing the interpretation put on that statute by the courts, the Legislature is presumed to have been aware of, and acquiesced in, the courts’ construction of that statute. [Citation.]” (People v. Bouzas (1991) 53 Cal.3d 467, 475 [ 279 Cal.Rptr. 847 , 807 P.2d 1076 ] (Bouzas).) “ ‘It is a generally accepted principle that in adopting legislation the Legislature is presumed

2022Where . . . the particulars are not shown by the preliminary hearing transcript, the defendant is not on notice in such a way that he has the opportunity to prepare a meaningful defense.’ (People v. Pitts (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 606, 904-905 [].)” (People v. Peyton, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at pp. 657- 658.) Despite the role the preliminary hearing transcript plays in notifying the defendant of the particulars of the charged offenses, “it does not constitute a denial of due process to permit amendment of an information during trial if the amendment does not change the nature of the offense charged

2022Where . . . the particulars are not shown by the preliminary hearing transcript, the defendant is not on notice in such a way that he has the opportunity to prepare a meaningful defense.’ (People v. Pitts (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 606, 904-905 [].)” (People v. Peyton, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at pp. 657- 658.) Despite the role the preliminary hearing transcript plays in notifying the defendant of the particulars of the charged offenses, “it does not constitute a denial of due process to permit amendment of an information during trial if the amendment does not change the nature of the offense charged

2016(See Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 [ 20 Cal.Rptr. 321 , 369 P.2d 937 ].) “When a statute has been construed by the courts, and the Legislature thereafter reenacts that statute without changing the interpretation put on that statute by the courts, the Legislature is presumed to have been aware of, and acquiesced in, the courts’ construction of that statute. [Citation.]” (People v. Bouzas (1991) 53 Cal.3d 467, 475 [ 279 Cal.Rptr. 847 , 807 P.2d 1076 ] (Bouzas).) “ ‘It is a generally accepted principle that in adopting legislation the Legislature is presumed

2016(See Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 [ 20 Cal.Rptr. 321 , 369 P.2d 937 ].) “When a statute has been construed by the courts, and the Legislature thereafter reenacts that statute without changing the interpretation put on that statute by the courts, the Legislature is presumed to have been aware of, and acquiesced in, the courts’ construction of that statute. [Citation.]” (People v. Bouzas (1991) 53 Cal.3d 467, 475 [ 279 Cal.Rptr. 847 , 807 P.2d 1076 ] (Bouzas).) “ ‘It is a generally accepted principle that in adopting legislation the Legislature is presumed

2016(See People v. Osuna (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1020, 1040 .) Relying on a concurring opinion in People v. Bradford (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1322, 1344 (by the author of the court’s opinion in that case), the Arevalo court concludes that the standard must be greater than preponderance.

2016(See People v. Osuna (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1020, 1040 [ 171 Cal.Rptr.3d 55 ].) Relying on a concurring opinion in People v. Bradford (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1322, 1344 [ 174 Cal.Rptr.3d 499 ] (by the author of the court’s opinion in that case), the Arevalo court concludes that the standard must be greater than preponderance.

2014Co. (1975) 14 Cal.3d 45, 61 ; Old Line, supra, 229 Cal.App.3d at p. 1604 ["'The most generally accepted test of materiality is whether or not the matter misstated could reasonably be considered material in affecting the insurer's decision as to whether or not to enter into the contract, in estimating the degree or character of the risk, or in fixing the premium rate thereon.'"]; Bennett v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins.

2005Co. v. Superior Court (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1600, 1604 [ 281 Cal.Rptr. 15 ] [“ ‘The most generally accepted test of materiality is whether or not the matter misstated could reasonably be considered material in affecting the insurer’s decision as to whether or not to enter into the contract, in estimating the degree or character of the risk, or infixing the premium rate thereon1 [Citations.]”]; Holz Rubber Co., Inc. v. American Star Ins.

1988Properly interpreted, this would seem to mean thirty days after the publication, which necessarily excludes the day of publication.” (Ibid., italics in original.) As stated in Ziganto v. Taylor (1961) 198 Cal.App.2d 603, 607 [ 18 Cal.Rptr. 229 ]: “It is a generally accepted rule that in the computation of a period of time ‘from and after’ a day, date, act or event, such day or the date of such act or event is excluded and the computation of time is commenced on the following day.” From a broader perspective, however, respondent’s argument concerning the calculation of time would impinge upon t

1988Properly interpreted, this would seem to mean thirty days after the publication, which necessarily excludes the day of publication.” (Ibid., italics in original.) As stated in Ziganto v. Taylor (1961) 198 Cal.App.2d 603, 607 [ 18 Cal.Rptr. 229 ]: “It is a generally accepted rule that in the computation of a period of time ‘from and after’ a day, date, act or event, such day or the date of such act or event is excluded and the computation of time is commenced on the following day.” From a broader perspective, however, respondent’s argument concerning the calculation of time would impinge upon t

2014(See, e.g., In re Marinna J. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 731, 739 .) “As this court has held, ‘[t]he notice requirements serve the interests of the Indian tribes “irrespective of the positions of the parents” and cannot be waived by the parent.’ [Citation.] A parent in a dependency proceeding is permitted to raise ICWA issues not only in the juvenile court, but also on appeal even where, as here, no mention was made of the issue in the juvenile court.” (In re Justin S. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1435 .) 17 requirement. [Citation.]” (In re Desiree F., supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at p. 471 ; In re Kahlen

2008(See, e.g., In re Marinna J. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 731, 739 [ 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 267 ] (Marinna J.).) “As this court has held, ‘[t]he notice requirements serve the interests of the Indian tribes “irrespective of the position of the parents” and cannot be waived by the parent.’ [Citation.] A parent in a dependency proceeding is permitted to raise ICWA notice issues not only in the juvenile court, but also on appeal even where, as here, no mention was made of the issue in the juvenile court.” (In re Justin S. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1426 , 1435 [ 59 Cal.Rptr.3d 376 ].) The Department argues, however

2016(See Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 [ 20 Cal.Rptr. 321 , 369 P.2d 937 ].) “When a statute has been construed by the courts, and the Legislature thereafter reenacts that statute without changing the interpretation put on that statute by the courts, the Legislature is presumed to have been aware of, and acquiesced in, the courts’ construction of that statute. [Citation.]” (People v. Bouzas (1991) 53 Cal.3d 467, 475 [ 279 Cal.Rptr. 847 , 807 P.2d 1076 ] (Bouzas).) “ ‘It is a generally accepted principle that in adopting legislation the Legislature is presumed

2016(See Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 [ 20 Cal.Rptr. 321 , 369 P.2d 937 ].) “When a statute has been construed by the courts, and the Legislature thereafter reenacts that statute without changing the interpretation put on that statute by the courts, the Legislature is presumed to have been aware of, and acquiesced in, the courts’ construction of that statute. [Citation.]” (People v. Bouzas (1991) 53 Cal.3d 467, 475 [ 279 Cal.Rptr. 847 , 807 P.2d 1076 ] (Bouzas).) “ ‘It is a generally accepted principle that in adopting legislation the Legislature is presumed

2016(See People v. Osuna (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1020, 1040 .) Relying on a concurring opinion in People v. Bradford (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1322, 1344 (by the author of the court’s opinion in that case), the Arevalo court concludes that the standard must be greater than preponderance.

2016(See People v. Osuna (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1020, 1040 [ 171 Cal.Rptr.3d 55 ].) Relying on a concurring opinion in People v. Bradford (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1322, 1344 [ 174 Cal.Rptr.3d 499 ] (by the author of the court’s opinion in that case), the Arevalo court concludes that the standard must be greater than preponderance.

2015Nothing we do in this appeal will make him a non- offending parent.3 3 We note that there is some tension between the terms “offending” and “non- offending” parent and the generally accepted principle in dependency law that “the juvenile court intervenes to protect a child, not to punish the parent. [Citation.]” (In re Nolan W. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1217, 1233 .) Because the system is designed to protect 14 Father argues that we should address the merits of his claim because “the finding . . . serves as the basis for dispositional orders that are also challenged on appeal.” (Drake M., supra, 211 C

2015Ashmann-Gerst, Acting P. J., and Hoffstadt, J., concurred. 1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. 2 Vincent is not a subject of this appeal. 3 We note that there is some tension between the terms “offending” and “non-offending” parent and the generally accepted principle in dependency law that “the juvenile court intervenes to protect a child, not to punish the parent. [Citation.]” (In re Nolan W. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1217, 1233 [ 91 Cal.Rptr.3d 140 , 203 P.3d 454 ].) Because the system is designed to protect children, not vilify parents, dependency jurisdict

2014Co. (1975) 14 Cal.3d 45, 61 ; Old Line, supra, 229 Cal.App.3d at p. 1604 ["'The most generally accepted test of materiality is whether or not the matter misstated could reasonably be considered material in affecting the insurer's decision as to whether or not to enter into the contract, in estimating the degree or character of the risk, or in fixing the premium rate thereon.'"]; Bennett v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins.

2005Co. (1975) 14 Cal.3d 45, 61 [ 120 Cal.Rptr. 415 , 533 P.2d 1055 ] [“Materiality is determined by the probable and reasonable effect that truthful disclosure would have had upon the insurer in determining the advantages of the proposed contract. [Citations.] Essentially, we must decide whether the insurer was misled into accepting the risk or fixing the premium of insurance. [Citations.]”].) “This is a subjective test; the critical question is the effect truthful answers would have had on [the insurer], not on some ‘average reasonable’ insurer.” (Imperial, supra, 198 Cal.App.3d at p. 181 ; see

1999(Taylor v. Centennial Bowl, Inc. [(1966)] 65 Cal.2d 114, 124-125 [ 52 Cal.Rptr. 561 , 416 P.2d 793 ].) “The Restatement rule continues to be the generally accepted test of liability of a business owner for injuries on the business premises caused by third party criminal conduct.

1999(Taylor v. Centennial Bowl, Inc. [(1966)] 65 Cal.2d 114, 124-125 [ 52 Cal.Rptr. 561 , 416 P.2d 793 ].) “The Restatement rule continues to be the generally accepted test of liability of a business owner for injuries on the business premises caused by third party criminal conduct.