generally accepted rule in Michigan

2025We therefore consider David Sr.’s application for insurance, despite Auto Club’s failure to timely provide it. -8- The generally accepted test for determining the materiality of a fact or matter as to which a representation is made to the insurer by an applicant for insurance is to be found in the answer to the question whether reasonably careful and intelligent underwriters would have regarded the fact or matter, communicated at the time of effecting the insurance, as substantially increasing the chances of loss insured against so as to bring about a rejection of the risk or the charging of a

2025We therefore consider David Sr.’s application for insurance, despite Auto Club’s failure to timely provide it. -8- The generally accepted test for determining the materiality of a fact or matter as to which a representation is made to the insurer by an applicant for insurance is to be found in the answer to the question whether reasonably careful and intelligent underwriters would have regarded the fact or matter, communicated at the time of effecting the insurance, as substantially increasing the chances of loss insured against so as to bring about a rejection of the risk or the charging of a

1970Co. (1909), 157 Mich 172, 180 , where the Court declared: “It is the generally accepted rule that to entitle a plaintiff to recover damages presently for apprehended future consequences of an injury, there must be such a degree of probability of such consequences as to amount to reasonable certainty that they will result from the original injury.” *232 Brimnstool, thus, dealt with the possible consequences of a known injury.

1951“It is the generally accepted rule that to entitle a plaintiff to recover damages presently for apprehended future consequences of an injury, there must be such a degree of probability of such consequences as to amount to reasonable certainty that they will result from the original injury.” Brininstool v. Michigan United Railways Co., 157 Mich 172, 180 .

1975Further, it must, ordinarily, relate to a past or existing fact, or an alleged past or existing fact, and not to the future or future events or occurrences’. 37 CJS, p 222. *373 " ’An actionable representation must relate to past or existing facts and cannot consist of mere broken promises, unfulfilled predictions, or erroneous conjectures as to future events. ’ 26 CJ, p 1087, as quoted with approval in Mieske v Harmony Electric Co, 278 Mich 61, 66 .” 270 NW 216 (1936).

1975Further, it must, ordinarily, relate to a past or existing fact, or an alleged past or existing fact, and not to the future or future events or occurrences’. 37 CJS, p 222. *373 " ’An actionable representation must relate to past or existing facts and cannot consist of mere broken promises, unfulfilled predictions, or erroneous conjectures as to future events. ’ 26 CJ, p 1087, as quoted with approval in Mieske v Harmony Electric Co, 278 Mich 61, 66 .” 270 NW 216 (1936).

1960In Harrigan & Reid Co. v. Burton, 224 Mich 564, 569 ( 33 ALR 142 ); it was said: “The generally accepted rule is that a presumption prevails in favor of the reasonableness and validity in all particulars of a municipal ordinance unless the contrary is shown by competent evidence, or appears on the face of the enactment.” Of like import is Austin v. Older, 283 Mich 667, 674 , where it was said: *310 “It is elementary that every intendment is in favor of the constitutionality of an ordinance and plaintiff has the burden of showing that it has no real or substantial relation to public health, mor

1947In Austin v. Older, 283 Mich. 667 , the general rule was stated as follows (p. 674): “It is elementary that every intendment is in favor of the constitutionality of an ordinance and plaintiff has the burden of showing that it has no real or substantial relation to public health, morals, safety or general welfare: Zoning ordinances are constitutional in principle as a valid exercise of the police power.” Of like import is Moreland v. Armstrong, 297 Mich. 32 .

1958Co. v. Van Steinburg, 17 Mich 99, 119 . [**] The rule, quoted from Brininstool into In re Boyer's Estate, 282 Mich 552, 556 , and Kellom v. City of Ecorse, 329 Mich 303, 308 , reads as follows: "It is the generally accepted rule that to entitle a plaintiff to recover damages presently for apprehended future consequences of an injury, there must be such a degree of probability of such consequences as to amount to reasonable certainty that they will result from the original injury." [***] The nature of such treatment, by which the growth of one leg is retarded, is not explained in the record. [*

1951The above case was cited with approval in Re Boyer’s Estate, 282 Mich 552 , in which case the Court said: “The testimony did not tend to show such probability of future injury as. to amount to a reasonable certainty that the consequences suggested will result from the original injury.” We conclude that a judgment for $25,000 would amply compensate plaintiff for all of plaintiff’s damages supported by the proofs.

1937Strohm v. Railroad Co., 96 N. Y. 305 ; Briggs v. Railroad Co., 177 N. Y. 59 ( 69 N. E. 223 , 101 Am.

1909Strohm v. Railroad Co., 96 N. Y. 305 ; Briggs v. Railroad Co., 177 N. Y. 59 ( 69 N. E. 223 , 101 Am.

1937Strohm v. Railroad Co., 96 N. Y. 305 ; Briggs v. Railroad Co., 177 N. Y. 59 ( 69 N. E. 223 , 101 Am.

1909Strohm v. Railroad Co., 96 N. Y. 305 ; Briggs v. Railroad Co., 177 N. Y. 59 ( 69 N. E. 223 , 101 Am.

1937Strohm v. Railroad Co., 96 N. Y. 305 ; Briggs v. Railroad Co., 177 N. Y. 59 ( 69 N. E. 223 , 101 Am.

1909Strohm v. Railroad Co., 96 N. Y. 305 ; Briggs v. Railroad Co., 177 N. Y. 59 ( 69 N. E. 223 , 101 Am.

2024In other words, “[t]he proper materiality question is whether ‘the’ contract issued, at the specific premium rate agreed upon, would have been issued notwithstanding the misrepresented facts.” Oade v Jackson Nat’l Life Ins Co of Mich, 465 Mich 244, 254 ; 632 NW2d 126 (2001). -3- The trial court hinted that Mota-Peguero’s failure to disclose that her 16-year-old daughter lived with her was not a material misrepresentation, so it would not have been a basis for rescission on its own.

2024In other words, “[t]he proper materiality question is whether ‘the’ contract issued, at the specific premium rate agreed upon, would have been issued notwithstanding the misrepresented facts.” Oade v Jackson Nat’l Life Ins Co of Mich, 465 Mich 244, 254 ; 632 NW2d 126 (2001). -3- The trial court hinted that Mota-Peguero’s failure to disclose that her 16-year-old daughter lived with her was not a material misrepresentation, so it would not have been a basis for rescission on its own.

2022At common law, “the generally accepted rule was that one who procured the issuance of an arrest warrant by submitting a complaint could be held liable if the complaint was made maliciously and without probable cause.” Malley v Briggs, 475 US 335, 340-341 ; 106 S Ct 1092 ; 89 L Ed 2d 271 (1986).

2022At common law, “the generally accepted rule was that one who procured the issuance of an arrest warrant by submitting a complaint could be held liable if the complaint was made maliciously and without probable cause.” Malley v Briggs, 475 US 335, 340-341 ; 106 S Ct 1092 ; 89 L Ed 2d 271 (1986).

2022Hanysz relies on the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in Todd v Weltman, Weinberg & Reis Co, LPA, 434 F3d 432, 439, 444 (CA 6, 2006), in which the defendant allegedly initiated an improper garnishment proceeding, for the proposition that immunity does not apply to complaining witnesses who “ ‘set the wheels of government in motion by instigating a legal action.’ ” Quoting Wyatt v Cole, 504 US 158 , 164- 165; 112 S Ct 1827 ; 118 L Ed 2d 504 (1992).

2022Hanysz relies on the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in Todd v Weltman, Weinberg & Reis Co, LPA, 434 F3d 432, 439, 444 (CA 6, 2006), in which the defendant allegedly initiated an improper garnishment proceeding, for the proposition that immunity does not apply to complaining witnesses who “ ‘set the wheels of government in motion by instigating a legal action.’ ” Quoting Wyatt v Cole, 504 US 158 , 164- 165; 112 S Ct 1827 ; 118 L Ed 2d 504 (1992).

2014The faithless agent rule provides that an agent who engages in misconduct is not entitled to the compensation related to the act that was performed improperly.16 However, “[i]t is the generally accepted rule that an officer may forfeit all right to compensation because of fraud, misconduct or gross neglect in the management of the corporation or in the performance of his duties.”17 14 Id. at 428-429 ; Saveski, 261 Mich App at 555 . 15 See Nordlund, 288 Mich App at 228 . 16 See Harris v Specialties Distrib Co, 305 Mich 373, 379 ; 9 NW2d 645 (1943) (noting that the employee had no right to profi

2014The faithless agent rule provides that an agent who engages in misconduct is not entitled to the compensation related to the act that was performed improperly.16 However, “[i]t is the generally accepted rule that an officer may forfeit all right to compensation because of fraud, misconduct or gross neglect in the management of the corporation or in the performance of his duties.”17 14 Id. at 428-429 ; Saveski, 261 Mich App at 555 . 15 See Nordlund, 288 Mich App at 228 . 16 See Harris v Specialties Distrib Co, 305 Mich 373, 379 ; 9 NW2d 645 (1943) (noting that the employee had no right to profi

2014The faithless agent rule provides that an agent who engages in misconduct is not entitled to the compensation related to the act that was performed improperly.16 However, “[i]t is the generally accepted rule that an officer may forfeit all right to compensation because of fraud, misconduct or gross neglect in the management of the corporation or in the performance of his duties.”17 14 Id. at 428-429 ; Saveski, 261 Mich App at 555 . 15 See Nordlund, 288 Mich App at 228 . 16 See Harris v Specialties Distrib Co, 305 Mich 373, 379 ; 9 NW2d 645 (1943) (noting that the employee had no right to profi

2014The faithless agent rule provides that an agent who engages in misconduct is not entitled to the compensation related to the act that was performed improperly.16 However, “[i]t is the generally accepted rule that an officer may forfeit all right to compensation because of fraud, misconduct or gross neglect in the management of the corporation or in the performance of his duties.”17 14 Id. at 428-429 ; Saveski, 261 Mich App at 555 . 15 See Nordlund, 288 Mich App at 228 . 16 See Harris v Specialties Distrib Co, 305 Mich 373, 379 ; 9 NW2d 645 (1943) (noting that the employee had no right to profi

2014The faithless agent rule provides that an agent who engages in misconduct is not entitled to the compensation related to the act that was performed improperly.16 However, “[i]t is the generally accepted rule that an officer may forfeit all right to compensation because of fraud, misconduct or gross neglect in the management of the corporation or in the performance of his duties.”17 14 Id. at 428-429 ; Saveski, 261 Mich App at 555 . 15 See Nordlund, 288 Mich App at 228 . 16 See Harris v Specialties Distrib Co, 305 Mich 373, 379 ; 9 NW2d 645 (1943) (noting that the employee had no right to profi

2014The faithless agent rule provides that an agent who engages in misconduct is not entitled to the compensation related to the act that was performed improperly.16 However, “[i]t is the generally accepted rule that an officer may forfeit all right to compensation because of fraud, misconduct or gross neglect in the management of the corporation or in the performance of his duties.”17 14 Id. at 428-429 ; Saveski, 261 Mich App at 555 . 15 See Nordlund, 288 Mich App at 228 . 16 See Harris v Specialties Distrib Co, 305 Mich 373, 379 ; 9 NW2d 645 (1943) (noting that the employee had no right to profi

2014The faithless agent rule provides that an agent who engages in misconduct is not entitled to the compensation related to the act that was performed improperly.16 However, “[i]t is the generally accepted rule that an officer may forfeit all right to compensation because of fraud, misconduct or gross neglect in the management of the corporation or in the performance of his duties.”17 14 Id. at 428-429 ; Saveski, 261 Mich App at 555 . 15 See Nordlund, 288 Mich App at 228 . 16 See Harris v Specialties Distrib Co, 305 Mich 373, 379 ; 9 NW2d 645 (1943) (noting that the employee had no right to profi

2014The faithless agent rule provides that an agent who engages in misconduct is not entitled to the compensation related to the act that was performed improperly.16 However, “[i]t is the generally accepted rule that an officer may forfeit all right to compensation because of fraud, misconduct or gross neglect in the management of the corporation or in the performance of his duties.”17 14 Id. at 428-429 ; Saveski, 261 Mich App at 555 . 15 See Nordlund, 288 Mich App at 228 . 16 See Harris v Specialties Distrib Co, 305 Mich 373, 379 ; 9 NW2d 645 (1943) (noting that the employee had no right to profi

2014The faithless agent rule provides that an agent who engages in misconduct is not entitled to the compensation related to the act that was performed improperly.16 However, “[i]t is the generally accepted rule that an officer may forfeit all right to compensation because of fraud, misconduct or gross neglect in the management of the corporation or in the performance of his duties.”17 14 Id. at 428-429 ; Saveski, 261 Mich App at 555 . 15 See Nordlund, 288 Mich App at 228 . 16 See Harris v Specialties Distrib Co, 305 Mich 373, 379 ; 9 NW2d 645 (1943) (noting that the employee had no right to profi

2011“It should be noted . .. that the generally accepted rule, the situs of intangible assets is the domicile of the owner unless fixed by some positive law, applies to the descent and distribution of personal property.” Rapoport’s Estate, 317 Mich at 301 .

2001The generally accepted analysis used in preliminary injunction cases considers four factors: harm to the public interest if an injunction issues, whether the harm to the applicant in the absence of a stay outweighs the harm to the opposing party if a stay is granted; the strength of the applicant's demonstration that the applicant is likely to reveal on the merits; and demonstration that the applicant will suffer irreparable injury if a preliminary injunction is not granted. [ MSEA v. Dep't of Mental Health, 421 Mich. 152 , 365 N.W.2d 93 (1984).] The focus of the four-factor analysis is on the

2001The generally accepted analysis used in preliminary injunction cases considers four factors: harm to the public interest if an injunction issues, whether the harm to the applicant in the absence of a stay outweighs the harm to the opposing party if a stay is granted; the strength of the applicant’s demonstration that the applicant is likely to reveal on the merits; and demonstration that the applicant will suffer irreparable injury if a preliminary injunction is not granted. [MSEA v Dep’t of Mental Health, supra.] The focus of the four-factor analysis is on the type of injury rendered by the i

1998Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 179-180 , 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803).

1998Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 179-180 , 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803).

1998As this Court stated in Brown v. Shelby Twp., 360 Mich. 299, 309 , 103 N.W.2d 612 (1960): "The generally accepted rule is that a presumption prevails in favor of the reasonableness and validity in all particulars of a municipal ordinance unless the contrary is shown by competent evidence, or appears on the face of the enactment." [Quoting Harrigan & Reid Co. v. Burton, 224 Mich. 564, 569 , 195 N.W. 60 (1923).] One of the reasons underlying this presumption is that persons holding legislative office, such as members of the city council, are *149 duty-bound to act in conformity with their oaths

1998As this Court stated in Brown v. Shelby Twp., 360 Mich. 299, 309 , 103 N.W.2d 612 (1960): "The generally accepted rule is that a presumption prevails in favor of the reasonableness and validity in all particulars of a municipal ordinance unless the contrary is shown by competent evidence, or appears on the face of the enactment." [Quoting Harrigan & Reid Co. v. Burton, 224 Mich. 564, 569 , 195 N.W. 60 (1923).] One of the reasons underlying this presumption is that persons holding legislative office, such as members of the city council, are *149 duty-bound to act in conformity with their oaths

1989See also, Michigan Humane Society v Natural Resources Comm, 158 Mich App 393, 399-400 ; 404 NW2d 757 (1987); Pharris v Secretary of State, 117 Mich App 202, 204 ; 323 NW2d 652 (1982).

1989See also, Michigan Humane Society v Natural Resources Comm, 158 Mich App 393, 399-400 ; 404 NW2d 757 (1987); Pharris v Secretary of State, 117 Mich App 202, 204 ; 323 NW2d 652 (1982).

1986The generally accepted rule as to charitable institution status is stated in Exemption of charitable organization from taxation or special assessment, 34 ALR 634 , 635: In general, it may be said that any body not organized for profit, which has for its purpose the promotion of the general welfare of the public, extending its benefits without discrimination as to race, color, or creed, is a charitable or benevolent organization within the meaning of the tax exemption statutes. [Quoted in Auditor General v R B *61 Smith Memorial Hospital Ass’n, 293 Mich 36, 38-39 ; 291 NW2d 213 (1940).] See als

1986The generally accepted rule as to charitable institution status is stated in Exemption of charitable organization from taxation or special assessment, 34 ALR 634 , 635: In general, it may be said that any body not organized for profit, which has for its purpose the promotion of the general welfare of the public, extending its benefits without discrimination as to race, color, or creed, is a charitable or benevolent organization within the meaning of the tax exemption statutes. [Quoted in Auditor General v R B *61 Smith Memorial Hospital Ass’n, 293 Mich 36, 38-39 ; 291 NW2d 213 (1940).] See als

1986The generally accepted rule as to charitable institution status is stated in Exemption of charitable organization from taxation or special assessment, 34 ALR 634 , 635: In general, it may be said that any body not organized for profit, which has for its purpose the promotion of the general welfare of the public, extending its benefits without discrimination as to race, color, or creed, is a charitable or benevolent organization within the meaning of the tax exemption statutes. [Quoted in Auditor General v R B *61 Smith Memorial Hospital Ass’n, 293 Mich 36, 38-39 ; 291 NW2d 213 (1940).] See als

1984Bradbury v Ford Motor Co, 123 Mich App 179, 186 ; 333 NW2d 214 (1983); see, also, Camden Fire Ins Co v Peterman, 278 Mich 615, 618-619 ; 270 NW 807 (1937); Losinski v Ford Motor Co, 43 Mich App 114, 121-122 ; 204 NW2d 49 (1972).

1984Bradbury v Ford Motor Co, 123 Mich App 179, 186 ; 333 NW2d 214 (1983); see, also, Camden Fire Ins Co v Peterman, 278 Mich 615, 618-619 ; 270 NW 807 (1937); Losinski v Ford Motor Co, 43 Mich App 114, 121-122 ; 204 NW2d 49 (1972).