generally accepted rule in Missouri

2017However, C.M.B.R. also “reinforced the generally accepted principle in all types of bench-tried cases that circuit courts are better positioned to determine witness credibility and weigh evidence in the context of the whole record than an appellate court.” J.A.R. v. D.G.R., 426 S.W.3d 624, 626 (Mo. banc 2014) (citing C.M.B.R., 332 S.W.3d at 815-16 ).

2014Because the circuit court’s determinations that Father neglected his children and that it is in the best interest of the Children to have his parental rights terminated are supported by substantial evidence, the judgment is affirmed. 3 Standard of Review Appellate review of termination of parental rights is set out in this Court’s recent decision in In re Adoption of C.M.B.R., 332 S.W.3d 793 (Mo. banc 2011), which reinforced the generally accepted principle in all types of bench-tried cases that circuit courts are better positioned to determine witness credibility and weigh evidence in the con

2014This Court reviews whether clear, cogent, and convincing evidence was presented to support a statutory ground for terminating parental rights under Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30 (Mo. banc 1976).

1998Father’s last point states that the trial court erred and abused its discretion in dividing the marital property 70 percent to Mother and 30 percent to him in that the law requires a fail* and equitable division of such property. 5 Father claims that “there were no statutory or non-statutory factors which mandated a departure from the generally accepted principle that the division should be in substantially equal shares.” The standard for appellate review of a court-tried case is found in Rule 73.01(c), as construed in Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30 (Mo. banc 1976).

1995The same rule appears in United Factories, Inc. v. Brigham, 117 S.W.2d 662 (Mo. App.1938), cert. quashed, 344 Mo. 386 , 126 S.W.2d 1173 (1939): "The generally accepted rule is to the effect that the mere fact that a letter (other than a reply letter) purports to have been written and signed by the person in question is insufficient to establish its authenticity and genuineness." 117 S.W.2d at 665.

1995The same rule appears in United Factories, Inc. v. Brigham, 117 S.W.2d 662 (Mo. App.1938), cert. quashed, 344 Mo. 386 , 126 S.W.2d 1173 (1939): "The generally accepted rule is to the effect that the mere fact that a letter (other than a reply letter) purports to have been written and signed by the person in question is insufficient to establish its authenticity and genuineness." 117 S.W.2d at 665.

1957The general rule at common law is stated in 86 C.J.S., Tenancy in Common, § 46, p. 407: “ * * * the generally accepted rule at common law is that a tenant in common who occupies all or more than his proportionate share of the common premises and who has not agreed to pay therefor or ousted or excluded his cotenant or cotenants is not liable, because of such occupancy alone, to his cotenants for rent or for use and occupation.” This rule is cited and approved in Metzger v. Metzger, Mo.App., 153, S.W.2d 118, 122 [8], See also Ragan v. McCoy, 29 Mo. 356 , 367 and Bates v. Hamilton, 144 Mo. 1 , 45

1957“The generally accepted rule at common law is that a tenant in common who occupies all or more than his proportionate share of the common premises and who has not agreed to pay therefor or ousted or excluded his cotenant or cotenants is not liable, because of such occupancy alone, to his cotenants for rent or for use and occupation.” 86 C.J.S., Tenancy in Common, § 46, p. 407; see also 14 Am.Jur. 102, Sec. 35; Freeman on Coten-ancy and Partition, Secs. 258, 274-275; Ragan v. McCoy, 29 Mo. 356, 367 ; Lilly v. Menke, 126 Mo. 190, 218 , 28 S.W. 643, 994 ; Bates v. Hamilton, 144 Mo. 1, 13 , 45 S.W

1957The general rule at common law is stated in 86 C.J.S., Tenancy in Common, § 46, p. 407: “ * * * the generally accepted rule at common law is that a tenant in common who occupies all or more than his proportionate share of the common premises and who has not agreed to pay therefor or ousted or excluded his cotenant or cotenants is not liable, because of such occupancy alone, to his cotenants for rent or for use and occupation.” This rule is cited and approved in Metzger v. Metzger, Mo.App., 153, S.W.2d 118, 122 [8], See also Ragan v. McCoy, 29 Mo. 356 , 367 and Bates v. Hamilton, 144 Mo. 1 , 45

1957The general rule at common law is stated in 86 C.J.S., Tenancy in Common, § 46, p. 407: “ * * * the generally accepted rule at common law is that a tenant in common who occupies all or more than his proportionate share of the common premises and who has not agreed to pay therefor or ousted or excluded his cotenant or cotenants is not liable, because of such occupancy alone, to his cotenants for rent or for use and occupation.” This rule is cited and approved in Metzger v. Metzger, Mo.App., 153, S.W.2d 118, 122 [8], See also Ragan v. McCoy, 29 Mo. 356 , 367 and Bates v. Hamilton, 144 Mo. 1 , 45

1932The generally accepted rule is to the effect that the judicial construction of a statute by a court of last resort becomes as much a part of the statute as the text itself, and a subsequent change in the construction of a statute, by judicial decision of the court of last resort, is the same, in effect, as if the statute had been amended by legislative enactment. [Mountain Grove Bank v. Douglas County, 146 Mo. 42, 52 .] Consequently, the courts have established and adopted the rule that, where a statute or law has received a given construction by a court of last resort, the rights, positions,

1931The generally accepted rule is to the effect that the judicial construction of a statute by a court of last resort becomes as much a part of the statute as the text itself, and a subsequent change in the construction of a statute, by judicial decision of the court of last resort, is the same, in effect, as if the statute had been amended by legislative enactment. [Mountain Grove Bank v. Douglas County, 146 Mo. 42 , 52.] Consequently, the courts have established and adopted the rule that, where a statute or law has received a given construction by a court of last resort, the rights, positions,

2018Similarly, it is a generally accepted rule of construction that "changes in the law subsequent to the execution of a contract are not deemed to become part of [the] agreement unless its language clearly indicates such to have been [the] intention of [the] parties." Kia Motors America, Inc. v. Glassman Oldsmobile Saab Hyundai, Inc., 706 F.3d 733 , 738 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing 11 Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts § 30:23 (4th ed. 1990) and Rutherford Farmers Coop. v. MTD Consumer Grp., Inc., 124 Fed.

2018Similarly, it is a generally accepted rule of construction that "changes in the law subsequent to the execution of a contract are not deemed to become part of [the] agreement unless its language clearly indicates such to have been [the] intention of [the] parties." Kia Motors America, Inc. v. Glassman Oldsmobile Saab Hyundai, Inc., 706 F.3d 733 , 738 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing 11 Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts § 30:23 (4th ed. 1990) and Rutherford Farmers Coop. v. MTD Consumer Grp., Inc., 124 Fed.

2017From these latest controlling declarations, we concluded in I.M.W., 522 S.W.3d at 306-07 , that (1) trial judges, not appellate courts, are best-suited to and properly tasked with deciding whether proof is “clear, .cogent, and convincing” and “instantly tilts” the termination, scales; and (2) an appellate court should not re-evaluate “clear, cogent; and'convincing” findings through its own perspective, but should conduct a straight Murphy v. Carron review as in other non-jury cases.

2004Dillon, 103 S.W.3d at 239 .

1998However, more recently Trinity Universal Insurance Company v. United States, 382 F.2d 317 (5th Cir.1967), Security Insurance Co. of Hartford v. United States, 192 Ct.Cl. 754 , 428 F.2d 838 (1970), Aetna Casualty and Surety Company v. United States, 435 F.2d 1082 (5th Cir.1970), and Morrison, have rejected the decision in Standard Accident and it appears to be the generally accepted rule that, although the obligee may have a right of set-off against the surety under a payment bond, the obligee does not have a right of set-off against the surety under a performance bond.

1998However, more recently Trinity Universal Insurance Company v. United States, 382 F.2d 317 (5th Cir.1967), Security Insurance Co. of Hartford v. United States, 192 Ct.Cl. 754 , 428 F.2d 838 (1970), Aetna Casualty and Surety Company v. United States, 435 F.2d 1082 (5th Cir.1970), and Morrison, have rejected the decision in Standard Accident and it appears to be the generally accepted rule that, although the obligee may have a right of set-off against the surety under a payment bond, the obligee does not have a right of set-off against the surety under a performance bond.

1998However, more recently Trinity Universal Insurance Company v. United States, 382 F.2d 317 (5th Cir.1967), Security Insurance Co. of Hartford v. United States, 192 Ct.Cl. 754 , 428 F.2d 838 (1970), Aetna Casualty and Surety Company v. United States, 435 F.2d 1082 (5th Cir.1970), and Morrison, have rejected the decision in Standard Accident and it appears to be the generally accepted rule that, although the obligee may have a right of set-off against the surety under a payment bond, the obligee does not have a right of set-off against the surety under a performance bond.

1998However, more recently Trinity Universal Insurance Company v. United States, 382 F.2d 317 (5th Cir.1967), Security Insurance Co. of Hartford v. United States, 192 Ct.Cl. 754 , 428 F.2d 838 (1970), Aetna Casualty and Surety Company v. United States, 435 F.2d 1082 (5th Cir.1970), and Morrison, have rejected the decision in Standard Accident and it appears to be the generally accepted rule that, although the obligee may have a right of set-off against the surety under a payment bond, the obligee does not have a right of set-off against the surety under a performance bond.

1996The court concluded that it did not need to “explore the application here of the generally accepted doctrine that in the case of a joint policy covering joint property, not even an innocent co-owner may recover if the other co-owner is guilty of wrongful conduct.” 479 S.W.2d at 161 .