generally accepted rule in Iowa

1995Corp., 558 So.2d 404, 406 (Fla.1990) (“It is a generally accepted rule of contract law that, where a writing expressly refers to and sufficiently describes another document, that other document, or so much of it as is referred to, is to be interpreted as part of the writing.”); Wilson v. Wilson, 217 Ill.App.3d 844 , 160 Ill.Dec. 752 , 577 N.E.2d 1323, 1329 (1991) (“For a contract to incorporate all or part of another document by reference, the reference must show an intention to incorporate the document and make it part of the contract.”); Garrett v. State Farm Mut.

1995Corp., 558 So.2d 404, 406 (Fla.1990) (“It is a generally accepted rule of contract law that, where a writing expressly refers to and sufficiently describes another document, that other document, or so much of it as is referred to, is to be interpreted as part of the writing.”); Wilson v. Wilson, 217 Ill.App.3d 844 , 160 Ill.Dec. 752 , 577 N.E.2d 1323, 1329 (1991) (“For a contract to incorporate all or part of another document by reference, the reference must show an intention to incorporate the document and make it part of the contract.”); Garrett v. State Farm Mut.

1995Corp., 558 So.2d 404, 406 (Fla.1990) (“It is a generally accepted rule of contract law that, where a writing expressly refers to and sufficiently describes another document, that other document, or so much of it as is referred to, is to be interpreted as part of the writing.”); Wilson v. Wilson, 217 Ill.App.3d 844 , 160 Ill.Dec. 752 , 577 N.E.2d 1323, 1329 (1991) (“For a contract to incorporate all or part of another document by reference, the reference must show an intention to incorporate the document and make it part of the contract.”); Garrett v. State Farm Mut.

1995Corp., 558 So.2d 404, 406 (Fla.1990) ("It is a generally accepted rule of contract law that, where a writing expressly refers to and sufficiently describes another document, that other document, or so much of it as is referred to, is to be interpreted as part of the writing."); Wilson v. Wilson, 217 Ill.App.3d 844 , 160 Ill.Dec. 752 , 577 N.E.2d 1323, 1329 (1991) ("For a contract to incorporate all or part of another document by reference, the reference must show an intention to incorporate the document and make it part of the contract."); Garrett v. State Farm Mut.

2026See Porter, 217 N.W.2d at 230 (“The generally accepted rule is that retention of the right to inspect work under construction to see that the provisions of the contract are carried out and to stop 14 work if they are not is insufficient in itself to constitute retention of control of any part of the work within the meaning of the restatement principle.”).

2026“It is the generally accepted rule that mere errors in judgment by a lawyer are not grounds for negligence, at least where the lawyer acts in good faith and exercises a reasonable degree of care, skill and diligence.” Baker v. Beal, 225 N.W.2d 106, 112 (Iowa 1975).

2016Louis Cty. v. Seibert, 634 S.W.2d 590, 592 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (“It is improper to suggest that someone not a party to the case has agreed to indemnify a party for damages assessed against it . . . .”); John Deere Indus.

2016See Shapiro Packing Co. v. Landrum, 136 S.E.2d 446, 449 (Ga. Ct. App. 1964) (“The generally accepted rule is that the fact that a defendant is insured or otherwise indemnified against loss in the event of a recovery against him [cannot] be shown as an independent fact by a plaintiff.” (emphasis added)); St.

2013This duty is the same to an invitee as to a tenant. 244 Iowa 939, 940 , 57 N.W.2d 225, 226 (Iowa 1953) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).

2013This duty is the same to an invitee as to a tenant. 244 Iowa 939, 940 , 57 N.W.2d 225, 226 (Iowa 1953) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).

1984The general rule is stated by one authority: In support of the very generally accepted rule ... that the failure to satisfy a statute requiring a broker’s contract to be in writing precludes recovery in quantum meruit also, it has been stated in a number of cases that to hold other-wise would be [to] nullify the intent of the statute. 41 A.L.R.2d 901, 910 (1955) (citing Beahler v. Clark, 32 Ind.App. 222, 227 , 68 N.E. 613, 614 (1903)) (true intent of the statute was that there should be no recovery of compensation for the services of a broker except upon a written contract); Selvage v. Talbott

1984The general rule is stated by one authority: In support of the very generally accepted rule ... that the failure to satisfy a statute requiring a broker's contract to be in writing precludes recovery in quantum meruit also, it has been stated in a number of cases that to hold other-wise would be [to] nullify the intent of the statute. 41 A.L.R.2d 901, 910 (1955) (citing Beahler v. Clark, 32 Ind.App. 222, 227 , 68 N.E. 613, 614 (1903)) (true intent of the statute was that there should be no recovery of compensation for the services of a broker except upon a written contract); Selvage v. Talbott

1984The general rule is stated by one authority: In support of the very generally accepted rule ... that the failure to satisfy a statute requiring a broker's contract to be in writing precludes recovery in quantum meruit also, it has been stated in a number of cases that to hold other-wise would be [to] nullify the intent of the statute. 41 A.L.R.2d 901, 910 (1955) (citing Beahler v. Clark, 32 Ind.App. 222, 227 , 68 N.E. 613, 614 (1903)) (true intent of the statute was that there should be no recovery of compensation for the services of a broker except upon a written contract); Selvage v. Talbott

1984The general rule is stated by one authority: In support of the very generally accepted rule ... that the failure to satisfy a statute requiring a broker's contract to be in writing precludes recovery in quantum meruit also, it has been stated in a number of cases that to hold other-wise would be [to] nullify the intent of the statute. 41 A.L.R.2d 901, 910 (1955) (citing Beahler v. Clark, 32 Ind.App. 222, 227 , 68 N.E. 613, 614 (1903)) (true intent of the statute was that there should be no recovery of compensation for the services of a broker except upon a written contract); Selvage v. Talbott

1984The general rule is stated by one authority: In support of the very generally accepted rule ... that the failure to satisfy a statute requiring a broker's contract to be in writing precludes recovery in quantum meruit also, it has been stated in a number of cases that to hold other-wise would be [to] nullify the intent of the statute. 41 A.L.R.2d 901, 910 (1955) (citing Beahler v. Clark, 32 Ind.App. 222, 227 , 68 N.E. 613, 614 (1903)) (true intent of the statute was that there should be no recovery of compensation for the services of a broker except upon a written contract); Selvage v. Talbott

1984The general rule is stated by one authority: In support of the very generally accepted rule ... that the failure to satisfy a statute requiring a broker's contract to be in writing precludes recovery in quantum meruit also, it has been stated in a number of cases that to hold other-wise would be [to] nullify the intent of the statute. 41 A.L.R.2d 901, 910 (1955) (citing Beahler v. Clark, 32 Ind.App. 222, 227 , 68 N.E. 613, 614 (1903)) (true intent of the statute was that there should be no recovery of compensation for the services of a broker except upon a written contract); Selvage v. Talbott

1984The general rule is stated by one authority: In support of the very generally accepted rule ... that the failure to satisfy a statute requiring a broker's contract to be in writing precludes recovery in quantum meruit also, it has been stated in a number of cases that to hold other-wise would be [to] nullify the intent of the statute. 41 A.L.R.2d 901, 910 (1955) (citing Beahler v. Clark, 32 Ind.App. 222, 227 , 68 N.E. 613, 614 (1903)) (true intent of the statute was that there should be no recovery of compensation for the services of a broker except upon a written contract); Selvage v. Talbott

1984The general rule is stated by one authority: In support of the very generally accepted rule ... that the failure to satisfy a statute requiring a broker's contract to be in writing precludes recovery in quantum meruit also, it has been stated in a number of cases that to hold other-wise would be [to] nullify the intent of the statute. 41 A.L.R.2d 901, 910 (1955) (citing Beahler v. Clark, 32 Ind.App. 222, 227 , 68 N.E. 613, 614 (1903)) (true intent of the statute was that there should be no recovery of compensation for the services of a broker except upon a written contract); Selvage v. Talbott

1982In State v. York, 211 N.W.2d 314, 318 (Iowa 1973), we said: This court has recognized what appears to be the generally accepted rule that “courts have a considerable latitude in excluding offered evidence that is objectionable, even in the absence of any objection or if there is a proper ground which is not stated.” This is also true of the court’s power to strike evidence it deems erroneously admitted.

1982State v. Shimon, 182 N.W.2d 113, 115 (Iowa 1970).

1974Men’s Assn., 239 Iowa 196, 213-214 , 29 N.W.2d 559, 568 (1947): “It is a generally accepted principle of law that when a debtor owes a fixed, certain, due, sum of money, commonly called a liquidated debt, the offer of a less sum to the creditor, with a statement or notice that it is in full payment of the obligation, and its acceptance and retention by the creditor do not bar him from collecting the balance of the debt, in the absence of any new or additional consideration.

1974Men’s Assn., 239 Iowa 196, 213-214 , 29 N.W.2d 559, 568 (1947): “It is a generally accepted principle of law that when a debtor owes a fixed, certain, due, sum of money, commonly called a liquidated debt, the offer of a less sum to the creditor, with a statement or notice that it is in full payment of the obligation, and its acceptance and retention by the creditor do not bar him from collecting the balance of the debt, in the absence of any new or additional consideration.

1974Fisher v. United States, 441 F.2d 1288 (3 Cir. 1971); DeVille v. Shell Oil Company, 366 F.2d 123, 125 (9 Cir. 1966); Hader v. Coplay Cement Mfg.

1969Thompson v. Jackson, 93 Iowa 376, 382 , 61 N.W. 1004 , 1006; Pier-son v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 , 87 S.Ct. 1213 , 18 L.Ed.2d 288, 294 ; Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335 , 20 L.Ed. 646 ; Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 580-581 (2d Cir.1949); Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396 , 56 A.L.R. 1239, 1246 (2 Cir.); Fraley v. Ramey, supra; Williamson v. Waugh, 160 F.Supp. 72, 76 (D.C.S.D.W.Va.1958); Rogers v. Marion, supra; Edwards v. Wiley, 70 N.M. 400 , 374 P.2d 284, 286 (1962); Tedford v. McWhorter, Tex.Civ.App., 373 S.W.2d 832, 836 (on rehearing 1964); Anno: 173 A.L.R. 802 , 816; Anno: 13 A. L.R. 1344,

1969Thompson v. Jackson, 93 Iowa 376, 382 , 61 N.W. 1004 , 1006; Pier-son v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 , 87 S.Ct. 1213 , 18 L.Ed.2d 288, 294 ; Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335 , 20 L.Ed. 646 ; Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 580-581 (2d Cir.1949); Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396 , 56 A.L.R. 1239, 1246 (2 Cir.); Fraley v. Ramey, supra; Williamson v. Waugh, 160 F.Supp. 72, 76 (D.C.S.D.W.Va.1958); Rogers v. Marion, supra; Edwards v. Wiley, 70 N.M. 400 , 374 P.2d 284, 286 (1962); Tedford v. McWhorter, Tex.Civ.App., 373 S.W.2d 832, 836 (on rehearing 1964); Anno: 173 A.L.R. 802 , 816; Anno: 13 A. L.R. 1344,

1969Thompson v. Jackson, 93 Iowa 376, 382 , 61 N.W. 1004 , 1006; Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 , 87 S.Ct. 1213 , 18 L.Ed.2d 288, 294 ; Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335 , 20 L.Ed. 646 ; Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 580-581 (2d Cir.1949); Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396 , 56 A.L.R. 1239, 1246 (2 Cir.); Fraley v. Ramey, supra; Williamson v. Waugh, 160 F. Supp. 72, 76 (D.C.S.D.W.Va.1958); Rogers v. Marion, supra; Edwards v. Wiley, 70 N.M. 400 , 374 P.2d 284, 286 (1962); Tedford v. McWhorter, Tex.Civ.App., 373 S.W.2d 832, 836 (on rehearing 1964); Anno: 173 A.L.R. 802 , 816; Anno: 13 A. L.R. 1344,

1969Thompson v. Jackson, 93 Iowa 376, 382 , 61 N.W. 1004 , 1006; Pier-son v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 , 87 S.Ct. 1213 , 18 L.Ed.2d 288, 294 ; Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335 , 20 L.Ed. 646 ; Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 580-581 (2d Cir.1949); Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396 , 56 A.L.R. 1239, 1246 (2 Cir.); Fraley v. Ramey, supra; Williamson v. Waugh, 160 F.Supp. 72, 76 (D.C.S.D.W.Va.1958); Rogers v. Marion, supra; Edwards v. Wiley, 70 N.M. 400 , 374 P.2d 284, 286 (1962); Tedford v. McWhorter, Tex.Civ.App., 373 S.W.2d 832, 836 (on rehearing 1964); Anno: 173 A.L.R. 802 , 816; Anno: 13 A. L.R. 1344,

1969Thompson v. Jackson, 93 Iowa 376, 382 , 61 N.W. 1004 , 1006; Pier-son v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 , 87 S.Ct. 1213 , 18 L.Ed.2d 288, 294 ; Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335 , 20 L.Ed. 646 ; Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 580-581 (2d Cir.1949); Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396 , 56 A.L.R. 1239, 1246 (2 Cir.); Fraley v. Ramey, supra; Williamson v. Waugh, 160 F.Supp. 72, 76 (D.C.S.D.W.Va.1958); Rogers v. Marion, supra; Edwards v. Wiley, 70 N.M. 400 , 374 P.2d 284, 286 (1962); Tedford v. McWhorter, Tex.Civ.App., 373 S.W.2d 832, 836 (on rehearing 1964); Anno: 173 A.L.R. 802 , 816; Anno: 13 A. L.R. 1344,

1969Thompson v. Jackson, 93 Iowa 376, 382 , 61 N.W. 1004 , 1006; Pier-son v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 , 87 S.Ct. 1213 , 18 L.Ed.2d 288, 294 ; Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335 , 20 L.Ed. 646 ; Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 580-581 (2d Cir.1949); Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396 , 56 A.L.R. 1239, 1246 (2 Cir.); Fraley v. Ramey, supra; Williamson v. Waugh, 160 F.Supp. 72, 76 (D.C.S.D.W.Va.1958); Rogers v. Marion, supra; Edwards v. Wiley, 70 N.M. 400 , 374 P.2d 284, 286 (1962); Tedford v. McWhorter, Tex.Civ.App., 373 S.W.2d 832, 836 (on rehearing 1964); Anno: 173 A.L.R. 802 , 816; Anno: 13 A. L.R. 1344,

1969Thompson v. Jackson, 93 Iowa 376, 382 , 61 N.W. 1004 , 1006; Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 , 87 S.Ct. 1213 , 18 L.Ed.2d 288, 294 ; Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335 , 20 L.Ed. 646 ; Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 580-581 (2d Cir.1949); Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396 , 56 A.L.R. 1239, 1246 (2 Cir.); Fraley v. Ramey, supra; Williamson v. Waugh, 160 F. Supp. 72, 76 (D.C.S.D.W.Va.1958); Rogers v. Marion, supra; Edwards v. Wiley, 70 N.M. 400 , 374 P.2d 284, 286 (1962); Tedford v. McWhorter, Tex.Civ.App., 373 S.W.2d 832, 836 (on rehearing 1964); Anno: 173 A.L.R. 802 , 816; Anno: 13 A. L.R. 1344,

1969Thompson v. Jackson, 93 Iowa 376, 382 , 61 N.W. 1004 , 1006; Pier-son v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 , 87 S.Ct. 1213 , 18 L.Ed.2d 288, 294 ; Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335 , 20 L.Ed. 646 ; Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 580-581 (2d Cir.1949); Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396 , 56 A.L.R. 1239, 1246 (2 Cir.); Fraley v. Ramey, supra; Williamson v. Waugh, 160 F.Supp. 72, 76 (D.C.S.D.W.Va.1958); Rogers v. Marion, supra; Edwards v. Wiley, 70 N.M. 400 , 374 P.2d 284, 286 (1962); Tedford v. McWhorter, Tex.Civ.App., 373 S.W.2d 832, 836 (on rehearing 1964); Anno: 173 A.L.R. 802 , 816; Anno: 13 A. L.R. 1344,