generally accepted rule in Minnesota

2013“Arbitration regarding automobile reparations therefore departs from the generally accepted principle that ‘arbitrators are the final judges of both law and fact.’ ” Id. (quoting Johnson, 426 N.W.2d at 421 ).

2003Arbitration regarding automobile reparations therefore departs from the generally accepted principle that “arbitrators are the final judges of both law and fact.” Id. (citing State, by Sundquist v. Minnesota Teamsters Pub. and Law Enforcement Employees Union Local No. 320, 316 N.W.2d 542, 544 (Minn.1982)).

1944Decker v. Montague, 195 Minn. 278, 284 , 262 N. W. 684, 687 , Mr. Justice Olson, speaking for the court, said: “So we find that it is a generally accepted rule of statutory construction that a revision of existing statutes is presumed not to have changed their meaning, even if there be phraseological alterations, unless an intention to change clearly appears from the language of the revised statute when considered in connection with the subject matter of the act and its legislative history.” See, also, 6 Dunnell, Dig. & Supp. § 8961; Champ v. Brown, 197 Minn. 49 , 266 N. W. 94 ; and Sexton v.

1944Decker v. Montague, 195 Minn. 278, 284 , 262 N. W. 684, 687 , Mr. Justice Olson, speaking for the court, said: “So we find that it is a generally accepted rule of statutory construction that a revision of existing statutes is presumed not to have changed their meaning, even if there be phraseological alterations, unless an intention to change clearly appears from the language of the revised statute when considered in connection with the subject matter of the act and its legislative history.” See, also, 6 Dunnell, Dig. & Supp. § 8961; Champ v. Brown, 197 Minn. 49 , 266 N. W. 94 ; and Sexton v.

2013“Arbitration regarding automobile reparations therefore departs from the generally accepted principle that ‘arbitrators are the final judges of both law and fact.’ ” Id. (quoting Johnson, 426 N.W.2d at 421 ).

1976Jur. 2d, Insurance, § 340; Remmer v. Glens Falls Ind. Co. 140 Cal. App. 2d 84 , 295 P. 2d 19 , 57 A. L.

1976Jur. 2d, Insurance, § 340; Remmer v. Glens Falls Ind. Co. 140 Cal. App. 2d 84 , 295 P. 2d 19 , 57 A. L.

1966To hold otherwise, the court observed, would be to “mulct” the defendant twice and permit the plaintiff “an undeserved double recovery.” 238 F. Supp. 645 .

1946Violation of the ordinance has for its foundation this generally accepted rule (Baxter v. Coughlin, 70 Minn. 1, 4 , 72 N. W. 797, 798 ): “* * * that where the statute, for the protection and benefit of individuals, prohibits a person from doing an act, or imposes upon him a duty, if he disobeys the prohibition or neglects to perform the duty, he is liable to those for whose protection the statute was enacted for any damages resulting proximately from such disobedience or neglect.” This rule has been applied in numerous cases since, and without deviation.

1946Violation of the ordinance has for its foundation this generally accepted rule (Baxter v. Coughlin, 70 Minn. 1, 4 , 72 N. W. 797, 798 ): “* * * that where the statute, for the protection and benefit of individuals, prohibits a person from doing an act, or imposes upon him a duty, if he disobeys the prohibition or neglects to perform the duty, he is liable to those for whose protection the statute was enacted for any damages resulting proximately from such disobedience or neglect.” This rule has been applied in numerous cases since, and without deviation.

1946Our decision in Rooney v. Koenig, 80 Minn. 483, 486 , 83 N. W. 399, 400 , brings into play the generally accepted rule that, “where land is conveyed by a deed of general warranty, any superior outstanding title subsequently acquired by the grantor will inure to the benefit of the grantee and his assigns.” Appellant’s judgment never became a lien upon the homestead in the circumstances here shown.

1946Our decision in Rooney v. Koenig, 80 Minn. 483, 486 , 83 N. W. 399, 400 , brings into play the generally accepted rule that, “where land is conveyed by a deed of general warranty, any superior outstanding title subsequently acquired by the grantor will inure to the benefit of the grantee and his assigns.” Appellant’s judgment never became a lien upon the homestead in the circumstances here shown.

1944Decker v. Montague, 195 Minn. 278, 284 , 262 N. W. 684, 687 , Mr. Justice Olson, speaking for the court, said: “So we find that it is a generally accepted rule of statutory construction that a revision of existing statutes is presumed not to have changed their meaning, even if there be phraseological alterations, unless an intention to change clearly appears from the language of the revised statute when considered in connection with the subject matter of the act and its legislative history.” See, also, 6 Dunnell, Dig. & Supp. § 8961; Champ v. Brown, 197 Minn. 49 , 266 N. W. 94 ; and Sexton v.

1944Decker v. Montague, 195 Minn. 278, 284 , 262 N. W. 684, 687 , Mr. Justice Olson, speaking for the court, said: “So we find that it is a generally accepted rule of statutory construction that a revision of existing statutes is presumed not to have changed their meaning, even if there be phraseological alterations, unless an intention to change clearly appears from the language of the revised statute when considered in connection with the subject matter of the act and its legislative history.” See, also, 6 Dunnell, Dig. & Supp. § 8961; Champ v. Brown, 197 Minn. 49 , 266 N. W. 94 ; and Sexton v.

1944Decker v. Montague, 195 Minn. 278, 284 , 262 N. W. 684, 687 , Mr. Justice Olson, speaking for the court, said: “So we find that it is a generally accepted rule of statutory construction that a revision of existing statutes is presumed not to have changed their meaning, even if there be phraseological alterations, unless an intention to change clearly appears from the language of the revised statute when considered in connection with the subject matter of the act and its legislative history.” See, also, 6 Dunnell, Dig. & Supp. § 8961; Champ v. Brown, 197 Minn. 49 , 266 N. W. 94 ; and Sexton v.

1944Decker v. Montague, 195 Minn. 278, 284 , 262 N. W. 684, 687 , Mr. Justice Olson, speaking for the court, said: “So we find that it is a generally accepted rule of statutory construction that a revision of existing statutes is presumed not to have changed their meaning, even if there be phraseological alterations, unless an intention to change clearly appears from the language of the revised statute when considered in connection with the subject matter of the act and its legislative history.” See, also, 6 Dunnell, Dig. & Supp. § 8961; Champ v. Brown, 197 Minn. 49 , 266 N. W. 94 ; and Sexton v.

1913Price v. Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co. 136 Ga. 175 , 71 S. E. 4 ; Brown v. Illinois Cent.

1913Price v. Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co. 136 Ga. 175 , 71 S. E. 4 ; Brown v. Illinois Cent.

1891Geib v. Reynolds, 35 Minn. 331 , ( 28 N. W.

1891Geib v. Reynolds, 35 Minn. 331 , ( 28 N. W.

1891Harper v. Butler, 2 Pet. 239 ; Wilkins v. Ellett, 9 Wall. 740 , s. c. 108 U. S. 256 , (2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 641;) Williams v. Storrs, 6 John.

1891Harper v. Butler, 2 Pet. 239 ; Wilkins v. Ellett, 9 Wall. 740 , s. c. 108 U. S. 256 , (2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 641;) Williams v. Storrs, 6 John.

1891Harper v. Butler, 2 Pet. 239 ; Wilkins v. Ellett, 9 Wall. 740 , s. c. 108 U. S. 256 , (2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 641;) Williams v. Storrs, 6 John.

1890On the latter proposition the authorities in this country are not entirely agreed; But, notwithstanding the vigorous protest against it in Glass v. Hulbert, 102 Mass. 24 , the generally accepted doctrine is that, even in cases coming within the statute of frauds, where the written contract, whether executed or executory, fails, through mistake or fraud, to express the actual agreement orally agreed on, it may be reformed as well by including in it the description of a subject-matter omitted as by excluding from it a subject already in it.