28 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 1973–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Corl v. Huron Castings, Inc.green2 sentences2002See Corl v Huron Castings, Inc, 450 Mich 620, 626-628 ; 544 NW2d 278 (1996) (refusing to apply the collateral source rule for tort *52 damages to an employment contract); Ferrett v General Motors Corp, 438 Mich 235, 243 ; 475 NW2d 243 (1991) (refusing to recognize a cause of action in tort for negligent evaluation of an employee). 2002See Corl v Huron Castings, Inc, 450 Mich 620, 626-628 ; 544 NW2d 278 (1996) (refusing to apply the collateral source rule for tort *52 damages to an employment contract); Ferrett v General Motors Corp, 438 Mich 235, 243 ; 475 NW2d 243 (1991) (refusing to recognize a cause of action in tort for negligent evaluation of an employee). | 2 | 2 |
Tebo v. Havlikgreen2 sentences2015The tortfeasor has contributed nothing, except the activity which caused the plaintiff’s injuries. [Tebo v Havlik, 418 Mich 350, 366 ; 343 NW2d 181 (1984); see also Greer v Advantage Health, 305 Mich App 192, 207-208 ; 852 NW2d 198 (2014).] Zurich and Broder assert that the collateral source rule applies to Broder, in that Broder’s claim against Bowles is not diminished because of Zurich’s payment of the insurance policy. 2015The tortfeasor has contributed nothing, except the activity which caused the plaintiff’s injuries. [Tebo v Havlik, 418 Mich 350, 366 ; 343 NW2d 181 (1984); see also Greer v Advantage Health, 305 Mich App 192, 207-208 ; 852 NW2d 198 (2014).] Zurich and Broder assert that the collateral source rule applies to Broder, in that Broder’s claim against Bowles is not diminished because of Zurich’s payment of the insurance policy. | 1 | 6 |
Nasser v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'ngreen2 sentences2019See Nasser v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 435 Mich 33, 58 ; 457 NW2d 637 (1990). 2019See Nasser v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 435 Mich 33, 58 ; 457 NW2d 637 (1990). | 1 | 3 |
Bourdon v. Readgreen2 sentences2015Moore v Secura Ins, 482 Mich 507, 516 ; 759 NW2d 833 (2008).4 “The collateral source rule provides that compensation due [to] an injured person from an independent source other than another tortfeasor does not operate to lessen damages recoverable from the wrong-doer.” Lynch v Sign of The Beefeater, Inc, 90 Mich App 358, 363 ; 282 NW2d 321 (1979), rev’d on other grounds 407 Mich 866 (1979); see also Bourdon v Read, 30 Mich App 681, 684 ; 186 NW2d 737 (1971). 2015Moore v Secura Ins, 482 Mich 507, 516 ; 759 NW2d 833 (2008).4 “The collateral source rule provides that compensation due [to] an injured person from an independent source other than another tortfeasor does not operate to lessen damages recoverable from the wrong-doer.” Lynch v Sign of The Beefeater, Inc, 90 Mich App 358, 363 ; 282 NW2d 321 (1979), rev’d on other grounds 407 Mich 866 (1979); see also Bourdon v Read, 30 Mich App 681, 684 ; 186 NW2d 737 (1971). | 1 | 2 |
Heinz v. Chicago Road Investment Co.green2 sentences2009See Heinz v Chicago Rd Investment Co, 216 Mich App 289, 299-300 ; 549 NW2d 47 (1996). 2002The trial court found inapplicable Heinz, supra, which held that the collateral-source rule codified in MCL 600.6303 did not alter the jury’s assessment of damages, but simply recognized that the plaintiffs were compensated already for part of the damages, because “there was no statutory limit on the jury’s ability to assess the plaintiffs damages.” We disagree. | 1 | 2 |
Citizens Insurance Co. of America v. Tuttlegreen2 sentences1996Citizens Ins Co of America v Tuttle, 411 Mich 536 ; 309 NW2d 174 (1981). 3 The collateral source rule is in this respect outside the ambit of the prohibition against double recovery by the victim, because the victim is deemed to have paid for the benefits received by way of premium payments. 1996Citizens Ins Co of America v Tuttle, 411 Mich 536 ; 309 NW2d 174 (1981). 3 The collateral source rule is in this respect outside the ambit of the prohibition against double recovery by the victim, because the victim is deemed to have paid for the benefits received by way of premium payments. | 1 | 2 |
Perrott v. Shearergreen2 sentences1984Perrott v Shearer, 17 Mich 48, 55 (1868), may be the oldest Michigan case on the collateral-source doctrine. 1984If this view is correct, there exists no compelling reason why the insured should get more than he bargained for." See Note, Unreason in the Law of Damages: The Collateral Source Rule, 77 Harv L Rev 741, 750-751 (1964). [52] Perrott v Shearer, 17 Mich 48, 55 (1868), may be the oldest Michigan case on the collateral-source doctrine. | 1 | 2 |
Greer v. Advantage Healthgreen2 sentences2015The tortfeasor has contributed nothing, except the activity which caused the plaintiff’s injuries. [Tebo v Havlik, 418 Mich 350, 366 ; 343 NW2d 181 (1984); see also Greer v Advantage Health, 305 Mich App 192, 207-208 ; 852 NW2d 198 (2014).] Zurich and Broder assert that the collateral source rule applies to Broder, in that Broder’s claim against Bowles is not diminished because of Zurich’s payment of the insurance policy. 2015The tortfeasor has contributed nothing, except the activity which caused the plaintiff’s injuries. [Tebo v Havlik, 418 Mich 350, 366 ; 343 NW2d 181 (1984); see also Greer v Advantage Health, 305 Mich App 192, 207-208 ; 852 NW2d 198 (2014).] Zurich and Broder assert that the collateral source rule applies to Broder, in that Broder’s claim against Bowles is not diminished because of Zurich’s payment of the insurance policy. | 1 | 1 |
cluster 760824green1 sentence2011The court reasoned that “[a]pplying the collateral source rule in the employment discrimination context prevents the discriminatory employer from avoiding liability and experiencing a windfall, and also promotes the deterrence functions of discrimination statutes.” Id. at 434. | 1 | 1 |
James M. Scott, Jr. v. Robert C. Flowersgreen1 sentence2007John Hosp., 474 Mich. 1089 , 711 N.W.2d 351 (2006); Adair v. Michigan, 474 Mich. 1027 , 709 N.W.2d 567 (2006); Grievance Administrator v. Fieger, 476 Mich. 231 , 719 N.W.2d 123 (2006); Grievance Administrator v. Fieger, 477 Mich. 1228 (2006); People v. Parsons, Docket No. 132975, ___ Mich. ___, 728 N.W.2d 62 (2007); Ruiz v. Clara's Parlor, Docket No. 130847, 477 Mich. 1044 , 728 N.W.2d 855 (2007); and Neal v. Dep't of Corrections, 477 Mich. 1049 , 728 N.W.2d 857 (Docket No. 130862, issued March 23, 2007). [2] Scott v. Flowers, 910 F.2d 201, 213 (C.A.5, 1990). [1] Justice Markman questions why | 1 | 1 |
Rogers v. City of Detroitgreen1 sentence2007Justice Markman believes that the source of State Auto's loss was the trial court's decision not to apply the collateral source rule, even though this Court explicitly held that the trial court "properly ruled concerning the collateral source rule." Rogers at 157, 579 N.W.2d 840 . | 1 | 1 |
| Kirkland v. Blaine County Medical Centergreen | 1 | 1 |
| McMiddleton v. Otis Elevator Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Beaird v. Browngreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Blacha v. Gagnon
green
2 sentences1990As the Court in Blacha, supra, p 178 , indicated, the trial court must be careful to "instruct the jury as to each of the theories of recovery advanced by the opposing parties, clearly advising that if plaintiff’s contention is believed,” the other evidence may not serve "to mitigate damages.” The trial court’s opinion on plaintiff’s motion in limine states, in relevant part: I do believe, after reading both the motion and the response and both briefs, that due to this Court’s understanding of the collateral source rule, and due to defense counsel’s request to show motive as a result of the al 1990As the Court in Blacha, supra, p 178 , indicated, the trial court must be careful to "instruct the jury as to each of the theories of recovery advanced by the opposing parties, clearly advising that if plaintiff's contention is believed," the other evidence may not serve "to mitigate damages." [14] The trial court's opinion on plaintiff's motion in limine states, in relevant part: I do believe, after reading both the motion and the response and both briefs, that due to this Court's understanding of the collateral source rule, and due to defense counsel's request to show motive as a result of t | 5 | 1979–1990 |
Ferrett v. General Motors Corp.
green
2 sentences2002See Corl v Huron Castings, Inc, 450 Mich 620, 626-628 ; 544 NW2d 278 (1996) (refusing to apply the collateral source rule for tort *52 damages to an employment contract); Ferrett v General Motors Corp, 438 Mich 235, 243 ; 475 NW2d 243 (1991) (refusing to recognize a cause of action in tort for negligent evaluation of an employee). 2002See Corl v Huron Castings, Inc, 450 Mich 620, 626-628 ; 544 NW2d 278 (1996) (refusing to apply the collateral source rule for tort *52 damages to an employment contract); Ferrett v General Motors Corp, 438 Mich 235, 243 ; 475 NW2d 243 (1991) (refusing to recognize a cause of action in tort for negligent evaluation of an employee). | 3 | 1996–2002 |
Shinholster v. Annapolis Hospital
neutral
2 sentences2019However, M Civ JI 3.06 pertains only to insurance, not Medicaid coverage, and Medicaid payments do not fit with the definition of “collateral source” under MCL 600.6303, Shinholster v Annapolis Hosp, 255 Mich App 339 ; 660 NW2d 361 (2003), judgment aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 471 Mich 540 ; 685 NW2d 275 (2004). 2019However, M Civ JI 3.06 pertains only to insurance, not Medicaid coverage, and Medicaid payments do not fit with the definition of “collateral source” under MCL 600.6303, Shinholster v Annapolis Hosp, 255 Mich App 339 ; 660 NW2d 361 (2003), judgment aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 471 Mich 540 ; 685 NW2d 275 (2004). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Johnnie F Shinholster v. Annapolis Hosp
green
1 sentence2019However, M Civ JI 3.06 pertains only to insurance, not Medicaid coverage, and Medicaid payments do not fit with the definition of “collateral source” under MCL 600.6303, Shinholster v Annapolis Hosp, 255 Mich App 339 ; 660 NW2d 361 (2003), judgment aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 471 Mich 540 ; 685 NW2d 275 (2004). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Shivers v. Schmiege
green
1 sentence2015Shivers v Schmiege, 285 Mich App 636, 653 ; 776 NW2d 669 (2009). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
O'Neal v. St. John Hospital & Medical Center
green
1 sentence2015Shivers v Schmiege, 285 Mich App 636, 653 ; 776 NW2d 669 (2009). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Moore v. Secura Insurance
green
2 sentences2015Moore v Secura Ins, 482 Mich 507, 516 ; 759 NW2d 833 (2008).4 “The collateral source rule provides that compensation due [to] an injured person from an independent source other than another tortfeasor does not operate to lessen damages recoverable from the wrong-doer.” Lynch v Sign of The Beefeater, Inc, 90 Mich App 358, 363 ; 282 NW2d 321 (1979), rev’d on other grounds 407 Mich 866 (1979); see also Bourdon v Read, 30 Mich App 681, 684 ; 186 NW2d 737 (1971). 2015Moore v Secura Ins, 482 Mich 507, 516 ; 759 NW2d 833 (2008).4 “The collateral source rule provides that compensation due [to] an injured person from an independent source other than another tortfeasor does not operate to lessen damages recoverable from the wrong-doer.” Lynch v Sign of The Beefeater, Inc, 90 Mich App 358, 363 ; 282 NW2d 321 (1979), rev’d on other grounds 407 Mich 866 (1979); see also Bourdon v Read, 30 Mich App 681, 684 ; 186 NW2d 737 (1971). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Lynch v. Sign of the Beefeater, Inc.
neutral
2 sentences2015Moore v Secura Ins, 482 Mich 507, 516 ; 759 NW2d 833 (2008).4 “The collateral source rule provides that compensation due [to] an injured person from an independent source other than another tortfeasor does not operate to lessen damages recoverable from the wrong-doer.” Lynch v Sign of The Beefeater, Inc, 90 Mich App 358, 363 ; 282 NW2d 321 (1979), rev’d on other grounds 407 Mich 866 (1979); see also Bourdon v Read, 30 Mich App 681, 684 ; 186 NW2d 737 (1971). 2015Moore v Secura Ins, 482 Mich 507, 516 ; 759 NW2d 833 (2008).4 “The collateral source rule provides that compensation due [to] an injured person from an independent source other than another tortfeasor does not operate to lessen damages recoverable from the wrong-doer.” Lynch v Sign of The Beefeater, Inc, 90 Mich App 358, 363 ; 282 NW2d 321 (1979), rev’d on other grounds 407 Mich 866 (1979); see also Bourdon v Read, 30 Mich App 681, 684 ; 186 NW2d 737 (1971). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Velez v. Tuma
green
1 sentence2014The Court observed that when “a judgment contains both economic and noneconomic damages, a circuit court’s applying the setoff to the jury’s verdict before application of the collateral source rule would have to determine how to allocate the settlement between economic and noneconomic damages.” Velez, 492 Mich at 25 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Markley v. Oak Health Care Investors of Coldwater, Inc
green
2 sentences2012Because application of the setoff to the jury’s verdict can result in a recovery beyond those statutorily mandated damages limitations, we further hold that a joint tortfeasor’s settlement must be set off from the final judgment after application of the noneconomic damages cap of MCL 600.1483, as well as the collateral source rule. 1 Markley v Oak Health Care Investors of Coldwater, Inc, 255 Mich App 245 ; 660 NW2d 344 (2003). 2 We therefore reverse that portion of the Court of Appeals’ judgment affirming the circuit court’s application of the common-law setoff rule. 2012Because application of the setoff to the jury’s verdict can result in a recovery beyond those statutorily mandated damages limitations, we further hold that a joint tortfeasor’s settlement must be set off from the final judgment after application of the noneconomic damages cap of MCL 600.1483, as well as the collateral source rule. 1 Markley v Oak Health Care Investors of Coldwater, Inc, 255 Mich App 245 ; 660 NW2d 344 (2003). 2 We therefore reverse that portion of the Court of Appeals’ judgment affirming the circuit court’s application of the common-law setoff rule. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Velez v. Tuma
green
2 sentences2012There is no dispute that plaintiff’s total economic damages are eliminated by the collateral source rule because plaintiff has received, and will continue to receive, supplemental security income benefits from the Social Security Administration. 7 The circuit court’s calculation can be demonstrated as follows: Total Jury Verdict $1,524,831.86 Settlement Setoff - $195,000 Post Setoff Verdict $1,329,831.86 $0 due to reduction for Economic Damages collateral sources $394,200 due to statutory cap Noneconomic Damages on noneconomic damages Final Judgment $394,200 8 Velez v Tuma, 283 Mich App 396 ; 2012There is no dispute that plaintiff’s total economic damages are eliminated by the collateral source rule because plaintiff has received, and will continue to receive, supplemental security income benefits from the Social Security Administration. 7 The circuit court’s calculation can be demonstrated as follows: Total Jury Verdict $1,524,831.86 Settlement Setoff - $195,000 Post Setoff Verdict $1,329,831.86 $0 due to reduction for Economic Damages collateral sources $394,200 due to statutory cap Noneconomic Damages on noneconomic damages Final Judgment $394,200 8 Velez v Tuma, 283 Mich App 396 ; | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Adair v. State, Dept. of Educ.
green
1 sentence2007John Hosp., 474 Mich. 1089 , 711 N.W.2d 351 (2006); Adair v. Michigan, 474 Mich. 1027 , 709 N.W.2d 567 (2006); Grievance Administrator v. Fieger, 476 Mich. 231 , 719 N.W.2d 123 (2006); Grievance Administrator v. Fieger, 477 Mich. 1228 (2006); People v. Parsons, Docket No. 132975, ___ Mich. ___, 728 N.W.2d 62 (2007); Ruiz v. Clara's Parlor, Docket No. 130847, 477 Mich. 1044 , 728 N.W.2d 855 (2007); and Neal v. Dep't of Corrections, 477 Mich. 1049 , 728 N.W.2d 857 (Docket No. 130862, issued March 23, 2007). [2] Scott v. Flowers, 910 F.2d 201, 213 (C.A.5, 1990). [1] Justice Markman questions why | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Neal v. Department of Corrections
neutral
1 sentence2007John Hosp., 474 Mich. 1089 , 711 N.W.2d 351 (2006); Adair v. Michigan, 474 Mich. 1027 , 709 N.W.2d 567 (2006); Grievance Administrator v. Fieger, 476 Mich. 231 , 719 N.W.2d 123 (2006); Grievance Administrator v. Fieger, 477 Mich. 1228 (2006); People v. Parsons, Docket No. 132975, ___ Mich. ___, 728 N.W.2d 62 (2007); Ruiz v. Clara's Parlor, Docket No. 130847, 477 Mich. 1044 , 728 N.W.2d 855 (2007); and Neal v. Dep't of Corrections, 477 Mich. 1049 , 728 N.W.2d 857 (Docket No. 130862, issued March 23, 2007). [2] Scott v. Flowers, 910 F.2d 201, 213 (C.A.5, 1990). [1] Justice Markman questions why | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Ruiz v. Clara's Parlor, Inc.
neutral
2 sentences2007John Hosp., 474 Mich. 1089 , 711 N.W.2d 351 (2006); Adair v. Michigan, 474 Mich. 1027 , 709 N.W.2d 567 (2006); Grievance Administrator v. Fieger, 476 Mich. 231 , 719 N.W.2d 123 (2006); Grievance Administrator v. Fieger, 477 Mich. 1228 (2006); People v. Parsons, Docket No. 132975, ___ Mich. ___, 728 N.W.2d 62 (2007); Ruiz v. Clara's Parlor, Docket No. 130847, 477 Mich. 1044 , 728 N.W.2d 855 (2007); and Neal v. Dep't of Corrections, 477 Mich. 1049 , 728 N.W.2d 857 (Docket No. 130862, issued March 23, 2007). [2] Scott v. Flowers, 910 F.2d 201, 213 (C.A.5, 1990). [1] Justice Markman questions why 2007John Hosp., 474 Mich. 1089 , 711 N.W.2d 351 (2006); Adair v. Michigan, 474 Mich. 1027 , 709 N.W.2d 567 (2006); Grievance Administrator v. Fieger, 476 Mich. 231 , 719 N.W.2d 123 (2006); Grievance Administrator v. Fieger, 477 Mich. 1228 (2006); People v. Parsons, Docket No. 132975, ___ Mich. ___, 728 N.W.2d 62 (2007); Ruiz v. Clara's Parlor, Docket No. 130847, 477 Mich. 1044 , 728 N.W.2d 855 (2007); and Neal v. Dep't of Corrections, 477 Mich. 1049 , 728 N.W.2d 857 (Docket No. 130862, issued March 23, 2007). [2] Scott v. Flowers, 910 F.2d 201, 213 (C.A.5, 1990). [1] Justice Markman questions why | 1 | 2007–2007 |
People v. Parsons
green
1 sentence2007John Hosp., 474 Mich. 1089 , 711 N.W.2d 351 (2006); Adair v. Michigan, 474 Mich. 1027 , 709 N.W.2d 567 (2006); Grievance Administrator v. Fieger, 476 Mich. 231 , 719 N.W.2d 123 (2006); Grievance Administrator v. Fieger, 477 Mich. 1228 (2006); People v. Parsons, Docket No. 132975, ___ Mich. ___, 728 N.W.2d 62 (2007); Ruiz v. Clara's Parlor, Docket No. 130847, 477 Mich. 1044 , 728 N.W.2d 855 (2007); and Neal v. Dep't of Corrections, 477 Mich. 1049 , 728 N.W.2d 857 (Docket No. 130862, issued March 23, 2007). [2] Scott v. Flowers, 910 F.2d 201, 213 (C.A.5, 1990). [1] Justice Markman questions why | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Grievance Administrator v. Fieger
green
2 sentences2007John Hosp., 474 Mich. 1089 , 711 N.W.2d 351 (2006); Adair v. Michigan, 474 Mich. 1027 , 709 N.W.2d 567 (2006); Grievance Administrator v. Fieger, 476 Mich. 231 , 719 N.W.2d 123 (2006); Grievance Administrator v. Fieger, 477 Mich. 1228 (2006); People v. Parsons, Docket No. 132975, ___ Mich. ___, 728 N.W.2d 62 (2007); Ruiz v. Clara's Parlor, Docket No. 130847, 477 Mich. 1044 , 728 N.W.2d 855 (2007); and Neal v. Dep't of Corrections, 477 Mich. 1049 , 728 N.W.2d 857 (Docket No. 130862, issued March 23, 2007). [2] Scott v. Flowers, 910 F.2d 201, 213 (C.A.5, 1990). [1] Justice Markman questions why 2007John Hosp., 474 Mich. 1089 , 711 N.W.2d 351 (2006); Adair v. Michigan, 474 Mich. 1027 , 709 N.W.2d 567 (2006); Grievance Administrator v. Fieger, 476 Mich. 231 , 719 N.W.2d 123 (2006); Grievance Administrator v. Fieger, 477 Mich. 1228 (2006); People v. Parsons, Docket No. 132975, ___ Mich. ___, 728 N.W.2d 62 (2007); Ruiz v. Clara's Parlor, Docket No. 130847, 477 Mich. 1044 , 728 N.W.2d 855 (2007); and Neal v. Dep't of Corrections, 477 Mich. 1049 , 728 N.W.2d 857 (Docket No. 130862, issued March 23, 2007). [2] Scott v. Flowers, 910 F.2d 201, 213 (C.A.5, 1990). [1] Justice Markman questions why | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Grievance Administrator v. Fieger
green
1 sentence2007John Hosp., 474 Mich. 1089 , 711 N.W.2d 351 (2006); Adair v. Michigan, 474 Mich. 1027 , 709 N.W.2d 567 (2006); Grievance Administrator v. Fieger, 476 Mich. 231 , 719 N.W.2d 123 (2006); Grievance Administrator v. Fieger, 477 Mich. 1228 (2006); People v. Parsons, Docket No. 132975, ___ Mich. ___, 728 N.W.2d 62 (2007); Ruiz v. Clara's Parlor, Docket No. 130847, 477 Mich. 1044 , 728 N.W.2d 855 (2007); and Neal v. Dep't of Corrections, 477 Mich. 1049 , 728 N.W.2d 857 (Docket No. 130862, issued March 23, 2007). [2] Scott v. Flowers, 910 F.2d 201, 213 (C.A.5, 1990). [1] Justice Markman questions why | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Karaczewski v. FARBMAN STEIN & CO.
neutral
1 sentence2007John Hosp., 474 Mich. 1089 , 711 N.W.2d 351 (2006); Adair v. Michigan, 474 Mich. 1027 , 709 N.W.2d 567 (2006); Grievance Administrator v. Fieger, 476 Mich. 231 , 719 N.W.2d 123 (2006); Grievance Administrator v. Fieger, 477 Mich. 1228 (2006); People v. Parsons, Docket No. 132975, ___ Mich. ___, 728 N.W.2d 62 (2007); Ruiz v. Clara's Parlor, Docket No. 130847, 477 Mich. 1044 , 728 N.W.2d 855 (2007); and Neal v. Dep't of Corrections, 477 Mich. 1049 , 728 N.W.2d 857 (Docket No. 130862, issued March 23, 2007). [2] Scott v. Flowers, 910 F.2d 201, 213 (C.A.5, 1990). [1] Justice Markman questions why | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Medalist Golf Club, LLC v. Bank One of Michigan
green
1 sentence2007John Hosp., 474 Mich. 1089 , 711 N.W.2d 351 (2006); Adair v. Michigan, 474 Mich. 1027 , 709 N.W.2d 567 (2006); Grievance Administrator v. Fieger, 476 Mich. 231 , 719 N.W.2d 123 (2006); Grievance Administrator v. Fieger, 477 Mich. 1228 (2006); People v. Parsons, Docket No. 132975, ___ Mich. ___, 728 N.W.2d 62 (2007); Ruiz v. Clara's Parlor, Docket No. 130847, 477 Mich. 1044 , 728 N.W.2d 855 (2007); and Neal v. Dep't of Corrections, 477 Mich. 1049 , 728 N.W.2d 857 (Docket No. 130862, issued March 23, 2007). [2] Scott v. Flowers, 910 F.2d 201, 213 (C.A.5, 1990). [1] Justice Markman questions why | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Etheridge v. Medical Center Hospitals green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Franklin v. Mazda Motor Corp. green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Motts v. Michigan Cab Co. green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Marshall Field & Co. v. National Labor Relations Board green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Squires v. Kalamazoo County Road Commissioners green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Valentine v. General American Credit, Inc green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Wood v. Vroman green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Warden v. Fenton Lanes, Inc green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| In Re Finlay Estate green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Gallaway v. Chrysler Corp. green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Putney v. Haskins green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| People v. George green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| People v. Phillips green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Tebo v. Havlik green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Citizens Insurance Co. of America v. Tuttle green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Barton v. Benedict green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Podbielski v. Argyle Bowl, Inc green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Canning v. Hannaford green | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.