collateral source rule in Missouri

2012The collateral source rule is a “combination of rationales applied to a number of different circumstances to determine whether evidence of mitigation of damages should be precluded from admission.” Washington by Washington v. Barnes Hosp., 897 S.W.2d 611, 619 (Mo. banc 1995).

2012Importantly, the Supreme Court expressly rejected "the concept that the collateral source rule should be utilized solely to punish the defendant.” Id. at 621 .

2023The collateral source rule “prevents a tortfeasor from reducing his or her liability to a plaintiff by proving that payments were made to the plaintiff by a collateral source.” Deck v. Teasley, 322 S.W.3d 536, 538 (Mo. banc 2010) (citing Smith v. Shaw, 159 S.W.3d 830, 832 (Mo. banc 2005)).

2022The collateral source rule is “an exception to the general rule that damages in tort are compensatory only,” and “prevents a tortfeasor from reducing his liability to an injured person by proving that payments were made to the person from a collateral source.” Smith v. Shaw, 159 S.W.3d 830, 832 (Mo. banc 2005).

2023“The rationale for such application 8 of the collateral source rule is that ‘plaintiffs who contract for insurance or other benefits with funds they could have used for other purposes are entitled to the benefit of their bargain.’” Id. (quoting Porter v. Toys 'R' Us-Delaware, Inc., 152 S.W.3d 310, 320 (Mo. App. W.D. 2004), as modified (Nov. 23, 2004)).

2012The Supreme Court held that, under the collateral source rule, the defendant “may not escape the consequences of his violations of the Act by an application of payments received or to be received from [the plaintiffs supplier].” Id. at 507 .

1995Missouri courts have applied the collateral source rule to prevent defendants from informing juries of: insurance policies contracted for and paid for by plaintiffs, see, e.g., Iseminger v. Holden, 544 S.W.2d 550, 553 (Mo. banc 1976); Kickham v. Carter, 335 S.W.2d at 90 ; Protection Sprinkler Co. v. Lou Charno Studio, Inc., 888 S.W.2d 422, 424 (Mo.App.1994), Blessing v. Boy Scouts of America, 608 S.W.2d 484, 488-89 (Mo.App.1980); contracted for payments, see Collier v. Roth, 434 S.W.2d 502, 507 (Mo.1968) (in accordance with an agreement with its supplier, plaintiff received payments that dimin

1993Plaintiff first claims the trial court erroneously admitted testimony pertaining to defendant’s “Wage Continuation Program.” According to plaintiff, admission of such evidence violates the collateral source rule, which precludes a wrongdoer from having “damages to which he is liable reduced by proving that plaintiff has received or will receive compensation or indemnity for the loss from a collateral source, wholly independent of him.” Iseminger v. Holden, 544 S.W.2d 550, 552 (Mo. banc 1976).

2013Upon review, this court stated that “while there can be no doubt as to the validity of the collateral source rule as stated in Kickham [v. Carter, 335 S.W.2d 83 (Mo. banc 1960) ] and similar cases ... the argument could relate only to damages and by their verdict the jury never reached the issue of damages when it found in favor of the defendants [on liability].” Id.

2013Upon review, this court stated that “while there can be no doubt as to the validity of the collateral source rule as stated in Kickham [v. Carter, 335 S.W.2d 83 (Mo. banc 1960) ] and similar cases ... the argument could relate only to damages and by their verdict the jury never reached the issue of damages when it found in favor of the defendants [on liability].” Id.

2017R.R., 405 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Mo. App. E.D. 2013); see also Ford v. Gordon, 990 S.W.2d 83, 85 (Mo. App. W.D. 1999) (discussing the origin and purpose of the collateral source rule in Missouri, stating: “The theory behind the collateral source rale is that a wrongdoer should not enjoy the benefit of reduced liability by showing that the plaintiff has already been compensated for the loss from a collateral source, independent of the wrongdoer.”).

2012“Generally, the collateral source rule applies only to evidence of collateral compensation regarding the same injury.” 9 *471 Ford v. Gordon, 990 S.W.2d 83, 85 (Mo.App.

2012However, “[w]here the plaintiff has incurred no expense, obligation, or liability in securing the insurance coverage in question, the collateral source rule has no application.” Duckett v. Troester, 996 S.W.2d 641, 648 (Mo.App.

2005That is, even if this court were to assume, without deciding, that the admission of the evidence at issue violated the collateral source rule, “the record would still have to support a finding of prejudice ... before a new trial would have been proper.” Duckett v. Troester, 996 S.W.2d 641, 648 (Mo.App.1999). 1 “A determination of prejudice by the erroneous admission of evidence depends largely upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case.” McGuire v. Seltsam, 138 S.W.3d 718, 722 (Mo. banc 2004).

2004Additionally, she points out on appeal that TRU could have, and was not prevented from, challenging the reasonableness of her medical expenses through other means. “ ‘The collateral source rule is an exception to the general rule that damages in tort should be compensatory only.’” Washington v. Barnes Hosp., 897 S.W.2d 611, 619 (Mo. banc 1995) (quoting Overton v. United States, 619 F.2d 1299, 1306 (8th Cir.1980)).

2004The rationale for such application of the collateral source rule is that “plaintiffs who contract for insurance or other benefits with funds they could have used for other purposes are entitled to the benefit of their bargain.” Id. at 619 (citing Kickham v. Carter, 335 S.W.2d 83, 90 (Mo.1960), and Over-ton, 619 F.2d at 1306 ).

2023“The rationale for such application 8 of the collateral source rule is that ‘plaintiffs who contract for insurance or other benefits with funds they could have used for other purposes are entitled to the benefit of their bargain.’” Id. (quoting Porter v. Toys 'R' Us-Delaware, Inc., 152 S.W.3d 310, 320 (Mo. App. W.D. 2004), as modified (Nov. 23, 2004)).

2023Id. (holding, under the collateral source rule, respondent could not obtain a credit for a payment made by the appellant’s collateral source).

1995Missouri courts have applied the collateral source rule to prevent defendants from informing juries of: insurance policies contracted for and paid for by plaintiffs, see, e.g., Iseminger v. Holden, 544 S.W.2d 550, 553 (Mo. banc 1976); Kickham v. Carter, 335 S.W.2d at 90 ; Protection Sprinkler Co. v. Lou Charno Studio, Inc., 888 S.W.2d 422, 424 (Mo.App.1994), Blessing v. Boy Scouts of America, 608 S.W.2d 484, 488-89 (Mo.App.1980); contracted for payments, see Collier v. Roth, 434 S.W.2d 502, 507 (Mo.1968) (in accordance with an agreement with its supplier, plaintiff received payments that dimin

1982The collateral source rule is recognized in Missouri, so that a tortfeasor is not permitted to mitigate or reduce damages against him by proving a plaintiff has received indemnity or compensation for an injury or loss from some other source, such as insurance, Blessing v. Boy Scouts of America, 608 S.W.2d 484, 488 (Mo.App.1980), or workers’ compensation benefits, Sampson v. Missouri Pacific R.

2013Id.

1999Second, in Cornelius v. Gipe, 625 S.W.2d 880, 882 (Mo.App. 1981), this court held that where the jury finds for the defendant on the issue of liability and, thus, does not reach the issue of damages, there is no prejudice from the plaintiffs mentioning of a collateral source, the rationale being that the collateral source rule relates only to damages. 4 Hence, because the jury here found the appellant to be zero percent at fault, no prejudice resulted by reason of her mentioning of insurance.

1999As such, the collateral source rule was not implicated in this case, and the trial court erred in granting a new trial on this basis. “[T]he collateral source rule is not a single rule but rather, a combination of rationales applied to a number of different circumstances to determine whether evidence of mitigation of damages should be precluded from admission.” Id. at 619 .

1995In Florida Physician’s Insurance Reciprocal v. Stanley, 452 So.2d 514, 515-16 (Fla.1984), the Florida Supreme Court determined that the collateral source rule should not be applied to public school benefits.

2023The collateral source rule “prevents a tortfeasor from reducing his or her liability to a plaintiff by proving that payments were made to the plaintiff by a collateral source.” Deck v. Teasley, 322 S.W.3d 536, 538 (Mo. banc 2010) (citing Smith v. Shaw, 159 S.W.3d 830, 832 (Mo. banc 2005)).

2023The collateral source rule “prevents a tortfeasor from reducing his or her liability to a plaintiff by proving that payments were made to the plaintiff by a collateral source.” Deck v. Teasley, 322 S.W.3d 536, 538 (Mo. banc 2010) (citing Smith v. Shaw, 159 S.W.3d 830, 832 (Mo. banc 2005)).

2022See O’Gorman & Sandroni, P.C. v. Dodson, 478 S.W.3d 539, 545 (Mo. App. E.D. 2015).

2022See Washington by Washington v. Barnes Hosp., 897 S.W.2d 611, 621-22 (Mo. banc 1995); Ratcliff v. Sprint Mo., Inc., 261 S.W.3d 534, 545-46 (Mo. App. W.D. 2008).

2019See Smith v. Star Cab Co., 323 Mo. 441 , 19 S.W.2d 467 , 469 (Mo. 1929).

2019See Smith v. Star Cab Co., 323 Mo. 441 , 19 S.W.2d 467 , 469 (Mo. 1929).

2017R.R., 405 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Mo. App. E.D. 2013); see also Ford v. Gordon, 990 S.W.2d 83, 85 (Mo. App. W.D. 1999) (discussing the origin and purpose of the collateral source rule in Missouri, stating: “The theory behind the collateral source rale is that a wrongdoer should not enjoy the benefit of reduced liability by showing that the plaintiff has already been compensated for the loss from a collateral source, independent of the wrongdoer.”).

2017See Payton, 405 S.W.3d at 6 .

2015Group, Inc. v. Lewis, 362 S.W.3d 462, 468 (Mo. App. E.D. 2012) (quoting 47 Am.

2015Louis, 349 S.W.3d 460, 465 (Mo. App. E.D. 2011) (quoting Beare v. Yarbrough, 941 S.W.2d 552, 555 (Mo. App. E.D. 1997)). 25 “The collateral source rule prevents a tortfeasor from reducing his liability to an injured person by proving that payments were made to the person from a collateral source.” Smith v. Shaw, 159 S.W.3d 830, 832 (Mo. banc 2005).

2015Louis, 349 S.W.3d 460, 465 (Mo. App. E.D. 2011) (quoting Beare v. Yarbrough, 941 S.W.2d 552, 555 (Mo. App. E.D. 1997)). 25 “The collateral source rule prevents a tortfeasor from reducing his liability to an injured person by proving that payments were made to the person from a collateral source.” Smith v. Shaw, 159 S.W.3d 830, 832 (Mo. banc 2005).

2013Crabtree v. Reed, 494 S.W.2d 42, 44-45 (Mo. banc 1973).

2013“On appeal, the Missouri Supreme Court agreed that the defendant should not have been allowed to adduce this evidence, but denied relief on appeal because plaintiff had not objected based on the collateral source doctrine at the time the testimony was adduced.” Buatte v. Schnuck Mkts., Inc., 98 S.W.3d 569, 574 (Mo.App.E.D.2002) (citing Crabtree, 494 S.W.2d at 45 ).

2013“On appeal, the Missouri Supreme Court agreed that the defendant should not have been allowed to adduce this evidence, but denied relief on appeal because plaintiff had not objected based on the collateral source doctrine at the time the testimony was adduced.” Buatte v. Schnuck Mkts., Inc., 98 S.W.3d 569, 574 (Mo.App.E.D.2002) (citing Crabtree, 494 S.W.2d at 45 ).

2012Co., 104 F.3d 223, 225 (8th Cir.1997) (“[T]he application of the collateral source rule depends on proof that the plaintiff has contributed to the fund he claims as a collateral source.”).

2012Echols v. City of Riverside, 332 S.W.3d 207, 212 (Mo.App.

2012Smith v. Shaw, 159 S.W.3d 830, 832 (Mo. banc 2005); Echols, 332 S.W.3d at 212 .