collateral source rule in Indiana

2009This Court found that the survivor annuity payment, "though perhaps not insurance for tax or regulatory purposes, has sufficient hallmarks of insurance to be deemed such for purposes of the new collateral source rule statute," and was therefore "not admissible in [the] estate's wrongful death claim." Id. at 536 (citing Ind.Code § 34-44-1-2(1)(B)).

2009At common law, the collateral source rule "prohibited tort-feasors from introducing evidence of compensation received by plaintiffs from collateral sources, ie., sources other than the defendant, to reduce damage awards." Shirley v. Russell, 663 N.E.2d 532, 534 (Ind.1996).

2015It was also the largest discount the Hospital gave in 2011 on patient accounts. 3 The court also rejected the patients’ reliance on Stanley v. Walker, 906 N.E.2d 852 (Ind. 2009), as that case involved an evidentiary issue in a personal injury case, i.e. whether admission of evidence of medical expenses discounted from the chargemaster rate would violate the collateral source rule.

2015The Stanley 'Court began its discussion of whether to admit collateral source evidence by identifying different approaches jurisdictions have used, and at the outset observed that some states “apply the collateral source rule to negotiated discoünts on the plaintiffs medical care for which the plaintiff paid consideration” 'and that “[t]wo state-courts have held that the medical discounts were a collateral source, but that they were compelled to set off the collateral source amount ... under their respective state statutes.” 906 N.E.2d at 855 (emphases added).

2015This rule held tortfeasors accountable for the full extent of the consequences of .their conduct, “regardless of any aid or *481 compensation acquired by .plaintiffs through first-party insurance, employment agreements, or gratuitous assistance.” .„ ;-,l Id. (quoting Shirley v. Russell, 663 N.E.2d 532, 534 (Ind.1996) (quoting Shirley v. Russell, 69 F.3d 839, 842 (7th Cir.1995))).

2009This rule held tortfeasors accountable for the full extent of the consequences of their conduct, "regardless of any aid or compensation acquired by plaintiffs through first-party insurance, employment agreements, or gratuitous assistance." Shirley v. Russell, 663 N.E.2d 532, 534 (Ind.1996) (quoting Shirley v. Russell, 69 F.3d 839, 842 (7th Cir.1995)).

2009"As a result, there could be no abatement of damages when partial compensation was received for an injury from a collateral source independent of the one responsible for the loss, and thus, tortfea-sors were held fully accountable for the consequences of their conduct." Pendleton v. Aguilar, 827 N.E.2d 614, 620 (Ind.Ct.App.2005).

2007We have emphasized that “[t]he purpose of this new collateral source rule statute is to determine the actual amount of the prevailing party’s pecuniary loss and to preclude that party from recovering more than once from all applicable sources for each item of loss sustained in a personal injury or a wrongful death action.” Pendleton, 827 N.E.2d at 621 (emphasis added).

2007Ctr., 564 Pa. 156 , 765 A.2d 786, 791 (2001) (holding that the collateral source rule does not apply to a medical expense write-off because it is an "illusory charge” that was “not paid by any collateral source”); Bates v. *241 Hogg, 22 Kan.App.2d 702 , 921 P.2d 249, 252-53 (1996) (holding that a Medicaid write-off is not recoverable because it is not a collateral source); but see Papke v. Harbert, 738 N.W.2d 510, 536 (S.D.2007) (holding that the collateral source rule applies to medical malpractice cases and defendants are "precluded from entering into evidence the amounts ‘written off’ by me

2007Ctr., 564 Pa. 156 , 765 A.2d 786, 791 (2001) (holding that the collateral source rule does not apply to a medical expense write-off because it is an "illusory charge” that was “not paid by any collateral source”); Bates v. *241 Hogg, 22 Kan.App.2d 702 , 921 P.2d 249, 252-53 (1996) (holding that a Medicaid write-off is not recoverable because it is not a collateral source); but see Papke v. Harbert, 738 N.W.2d 510, 536 (S.D.2007) (holding that the collateral source rule applies to medical malpractice cases and defendants are "precluded from entering into evidence the amounts ‘written off’ by me

2006For most of the twentieth century, it was the law in Indiana that "[clompensation for the loss received by plaintiff from a collateral source, independent of the wrongdoer, as from an insurance company, cannot be set up by the wrongdoer in mitigation of damages." Aldridge v. Abram & Hawkins Excavating Co., 474 N.E.2d 107, 108 (Ind.Ct.App.1985), trans. denied.

1996See Nahmias Realty, Inc. v. Cohen, 484 N.E.2d 617 (Ind.Ct.App.1985), trans. denied; Aldridge v. Abram & Hawkins Excavating Co., Inc., 474 N.E.2d 107 (Ind.Ct.App.1985), trans. denied.

2009See Arthur v. Catour, 216 Ill.2d 72, 295 , Ill.Dec. 641, 833 N.E.2d 847, 853-54 (2005) (holding that plaintiffs may present evidence of the billed amount of their medical services and defendants may challenge the reasonableness of the billed amount without specifying what evidence the defendant could introduce to challenge the billed amount); Mitchell v. Haldar, 883 A.2d 32, 40 (Del.2005) (holding that the plaintiff can present evidence of the billed amount as representing the reasonable value of the medical services without addressing whether the defendant was barred from introducing evidence

2009See Arthur v. Catour, 216 Ill.2d 72 , 295 Ill.Dec. 641 , 833 N.E.2d 847, 853-54 (2005) (holding that plaintiffs may present evidence of the billed amount of their medical services and defendants may challenge the reasonableness of the billed amount without specifying what evidence the defendant could introduce to challenge the billed amount); Mitchell v. Haldar, 883 A.2d 32, 40 (Del.2005) (holding that the plaintiff can present evidence of the billed amount as representing the reasonable value of the medical services without addressing whether the defendant was barred from introducing evidence

2009See Arthur v. Catour, 216 Ill.2d 72 , 295 Ill.Dec. 641 , 833 N.E.2d 847, 853-54 (2005) (holding that plaintiffs may present evidence of the billed amount of their medical services and defendants may challenge the reasonableness of the billed amount without specifying what evidence the defendant could introduce to challenge the billed amount); Mitchell v. Haldar, 883 A.2d 32, 40 (Del.2005) (holding that the plaintiff can present evidence of the billed amount as representing the reasonable value of the medical services without addressing whether the defendant was barred from introducing evidence

2009See Arthur v. Catour, 216 Ill.2d 72 , 295 Ill.Dec. 641 , 833 N.E.2d 847, 853-54 (2005) (holding that plaintiffs may present evidence of the billed amount of their medical services and defendants may challenge the reasonableness of the billed amount without specifying what evidence the defendant could introduce to challenge the billed amount); Mitchell v. Haldar, 883 A.2d 32, 40 (Del.2005) (holding that the plaintiff can present evidence of the billed amount as representing the reasonable value of the medical services without addressing whether the defendant was barred from introducing evidence

2009Id. at 1199.

2009Id. at 1200-01.

2008See Butler v. Ind. Dept. of Ins., 875 N.E.2d 235 (Ind.Ct.App.2007), trans. granted, (holding that the collateral source rule does not apply to write-offs because the rule applies only to evidence of collateral source "payments,” and write-offs or discounts are not "payments”). 6 .

2007Du Pont de Nemours and Co., 109 F.Supp.2d 459, 467 (S.D.W.Va.2000).

2007Although the fact that CSX is not completely responsible for the funding is not dispositive, “[f]unds supported in part—but not entirely—by contributions from the defendant are generally considered collateral.” O’Grady, 857 F.2d at 390; see also E.E.O.C. v. Enterprise Ass’n, 542 F.2d 579, 591 (2d Cir.1976) (noting that “[w]here payment has been received from a fund obtained only in part from contributions made by the defendant, the majority rule is that no offset is allowed”); cf. Brice, 664 F.Supp. at 222 (“[T]he rationale behind the collateral source rule is that there is no double recovery

2007Rail Corp, 671 F.Supp. 1068, 1069 (N.D.Ill.1987) (discussing the “traditional” collateral source rule); fail to mention section 55 and base their holding on the common law collateral source rule, e.g., Green, 59 F.3d at 1032 , analyze payments under both the traditional collateral source rule and section 55, e.g., Hall, 322 F.Supp. at 97 (finding first that the collateral source rule prohibits setoff, and then that section 55 prohibits setoff), or recognize that the analysis in that particular case is the same under either section 55 or the common law, e.g.

2007See Falconer, 397 F.Supp.2d at 147 (“If the employer made the payment because it was obligated to do so, the collateral source rule may apply”); Melton, 763 S.W.2d at 326 (“Unlike [a] voluntary contribution ... the contributions made to the Railroad Retirement Board which Railroad seeks to recover were required by federal law under the Railroad Retirement Act.”); cf. Folkestad, 813 F.2d at 1380 (under the traditional collateral source rule, if “the tortfeasor voluntarily procures the insurance, the collateral source rule does not apply” (emphasis added)).

2007Application of the Federal Collateral Source Rule to RRA benefits and FELA Contrary to CSX’s position that the funding of the source “is pivotal under the collateral source rule,” appellant’s br. at 22, federal courts have clearly indicated that “[t]he mere fact that the employer-tortfeasor has contributed money (by payment of premiums, contributions, etc.) to the fund from which the benefits derive does not establish that such fund may not be a collateral source.” Haughton v. Blackships, Inc., 462 F.2d 788, 790 (5th Cir.1972) (non-FELA action for personal injuries); Davis, 18 F.3d at 1244 (Jo

2007Ctr., 564 Pa. 156 , 765 A.2d 786, 791 (2001) (holding that the collateral source rule does not apply to a medical expense write-off because it is an "illusory charge” that was “not paid by any collateral source”); Bates v. *241 Hogg, 22 Kan.App.2d 702 , 921 P.2d 249, 252-53 (1996) (holding that a Medicaid write-off is not recoverable because it is not a collateral source); but see Papke v. Harbert, 738 N.W.2d 510, 536 (S.D.2007) (holding that the collateral source rule applies to medical malpractice cases and defendants are "precluded from entering into evidence the amounts ‘written off’ by me

2007Ctr., 564 Pa. 156 , 765 A.2d 786, 791 (2001) (holding that the collateral source rule does not apply to a medical expense write-off because it is an "illusory charge” that was “not paid by any collateral source”); Bates v. *241 Hogg, 22 Kan.App.2d 702 , 921 P.2d 249, 252-53 (1996) (holding that a Medicaid write-off is not recoverable because it is not a collateral source); but see Papke v. Harbert, 738 N.W.2d 510, 536 (S.D.2007) (holding that the collateral source rule applies to medical malpractice cases and defendants are "precluded from entering into evidence the amounts ‘written off’ by me

2007Co., 484 N.W.2d 162, 166 (Iowa 1992) (“The federal law is well settled that, under the FELA, the collateral source rule operates to prevent consideration of RRA disability pension payments in mitigation of damages suffered by an injured employee.” (citing Eichel)); I l l.

2007See Falconer, 397 F.Supp.2d at 147 (“If the employer made the payment because it was obligated to do so, the collateral source rule may apply”); Melton, 763 S.W.2d at 326 (“Unlike [a] voluntary contribution ... the contributions made to the Railroad Retirement Board which Railroad seeks to recover were required by federal law under the Railroad Retirement Act.”); cf. Folkestad, 813 F.2d at 1380 (under the traditional collateral source rule, if “the tortfeasor voluntarily procures the insurance, the collateral source rule does not apply” (emphasis added)).

2007Instead, “[i] f the employer made the payment because it was obligated to do so, the collateral source rule may apply.” Falconer v. Penn Mar., Inc., 397 F.Supp.2d 144, 147 (D.Me.2005).

2007See Falconer, 397 F.Supp.2d at 147 (“If the employer made the payment because it was obligated to do so, the collateral source rule may apply”); Melton, 763 S.W.2d at 326 (“Unlike [a] voluntary contribution ... the contributions made to the Railroad Retirement Board which Railroad seeks to recover were required by federal law under the Railroad Retirement Act.”); cf. Folkestad, 813 F.2d at 1380 (under the traditional collateral source rule, if “the tortfeasor voluntarily procures the insurance, the collateral source rule does not apply” (emphasis added)).